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As the title suggests, the present essay on antimetaphoric resistance investigates what is here 
being called counter-figures. This term has in this context a certain variety of applications. 
Any other-than-image or other-than-figure, anything that cannot be exhausted by figuration 
(and that is, more or less, anything at all) can be considered ‘counter-figurative’ with regard 
to the formation of images and figures, ideas and schemas, “any graven image, or any like-
ness of any thing”. This is why singularity and radical alterity are key issues here, and why an 
ethical dimension is implied by, or intertwined with, the aesthetic.  
 In terms borrowed from Paul Celan’s Meridian speech, poetry may “allow the most 
idiosyncratic quality of the Other, its time, to participate in the dialogue” (trans. Jerry Glenn). 
This connection between singularity, alterity and temporality is one of the reasons why Celan 
so strongly objects to the application of the traditional concept of metaphor into poetry: focus 
on metaphor can be a way to disregard the “most idiosyncratic quality” of the poetic “figure 
[Gestalt]” and to disallow the mentioned “participation”. As Celan says, “carrying over 
[übertragen]” by metaphor may imply an unwillingness to “bear with [mittragen]” and to 
“endure [ertragen]” the poem’s irreducible otherness, namely an unwillingness to give time.  
 The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first consists of five distinct prolegom-
ena which all address the afore-mentioned variety of applications of the term ‘counter-
figures’, and especially the rejection or critique of either metaphor (by Aristotle, for instance) 
or the concept of metaphor (defined by Aristotle, and sometimes deemed “anti-poetic” by 
both theorists and poets). The purpose of these prolegomena is to show that there are various 
ways to defy the traditional means of interpreting literature and language in general, and 
various ways by which literature and “the things themselves” defy those Post-Aristotelian 
means of understanding language and literature. Even if we restrict ourselves to the tradi-
tional rhetorico-poetical terms, we may see how, for instance, metonymy can be a counter-
figure for metaphor, allegory for symbol, and irony for any single trope or for any piece of 
discourse at all. The limits of figurality may indeed be located at these points of intersection 
between different types of tropes or figures. 
 The second part, following on from the open-ended prolegomena, concentrates on 
Paul Celan’s poetry and poetics. According to Celan, true poetry is “essentially anti-
metaphoric”. I argue that inasmuch as we are willing to pay attention to the “will” of the po-
etic images themselves, the tropes and metaphors in a poem, to be “carried ad absurdum”, as 
Celan invites us to do, we may find alternative ways of reading poetry and approaching its 
“secret of the encounter”, precisely when the traditional rhetorical instruments, and especially 
the notion of metaphor, become inapplicable or suspicious — and even where they still seem 
to impose themselves. 
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EPIGRAPH  (Counter-figures —  extracts from the OED) 
counter- [...] prefix: [...] against, in return. [...] I. 1.a. verbs, [...] expressing the doing of a thing or 
performance of an action in the opposite direction or sense, with a contrary effect, or in opposi-
tion, retort, or response to the action expressed by the simple verb; sometimes with the notion of 
rivalling or outdoing, checking or frustrating that action; sometimes merely in reciprocation. [...] 
II. ns. (and adjs.) / 2. With sense ‘(actor or action) against or in opposition’; [...] 3. a. Done, di-
rected, or acting against, in opposition to, as a rejoinder or reply to another thing of the same kind 
already made or in existence; [...] 4. Acting in reversal of a former action; [...] 5. Done or acting in 
reciprocation of or return for another thing of the same kind; reciprocal; [...] 8. a. Forming the op-
posite member or constituent of anything that has naturally two opposite parts, [...] 9. Having the 
contrary tendency, nature, action, or position; running counter (to something else); opposing, op-
posite, contrary; [...] 
 
figure, n. [...] I. Form, shape./ 1. a. The form of anything as determined by the outline; external 
form; shape generally; [...] 7. Conspicuous appearance. [...] 1699 BENTLEY Phal. 361 Any 
Metaphor at all makes but a very bad Figure. [...] 1766 GOLDSM. Vic. W. x, When Moses has 
trimmed them a little, they will cut a very tolerable figure. [...] II. Represented form; image, like-
ness./ 9. a. The image, likeness, or representation of something material or immaterial.[...]  † b. 
An imaginary form, a phantasm. Obs. [...] 1598 SHAKES. Merry W. IV. ii. 231 To scrape the fig-
ures out of your husbands braines. [...] 10. esp. An artificial representation of the human form. [...] 
12. An emblem, type. [...] IV. A written character. [...] V. In various uses, representing the techni-
cal applications of Gr. sxh/ma / 21. Rhet. a. Any of the various ‘forms’ of expression, deviating 
from the normal arrangement or use of words, which are adopted in order to give beauty, variety, 
or force to a composition; e.g. Aposiopesis, Hyperbole, Metaphor, etc. Also, figure of speech. [...] 
b. In a more restricted sense (with mixture of senses 9 and 12): A metaphor or metaphorical mode 
of expression; an image, similitude. [...] 22. a. Grammar. Any of the permitted deviations from 
the normal forms of words (e.g. Aphæresis, Syncope, Elision), or from the ordinary rules of con-
struction (e.g. Ellipsis). † Formerly also figure of speech. 
 
counter-figure / Obs. rare / [COUNTER- 8: it answers to Gr. a0nti/tupoj image, ANTITYPE 
1.] / A figure or type corresponding to something else. / 1561 J. DAUS tr. Bullinger on Apoc. 
(1573) 77b, These thynges ... be not to be taken corporally, but spiritually as counterfigures of 
other things. [...] 
 
antitype [...] 1. That which is shadowed forth or represented by the ‘type’ or symbol. [...] 2. One 
of the opposite or contrary kind. / 1926 G. K. CHESTERTON Incredul. Father Brown v. 146 An 
antitype; a sort of extreme exception that proves the ... rule. [...] 
 
antitypous [...] Obs. rare. / [f. a0nti/tupoj Gr. force-resisting (f. a0nti in opposition + -tupoj 
striking: see ANTITYPE) + -OUS.] / Resisting force; material, substantial, solid. / 1678 
CUDWORTH Intell. Syst. 815 The Tenuity of their [Angels’] Bodies ... as not..being so solid and 
Antitypous as those which we are now Imprisoned in. Ibid. 829 It is an Essential Property thereof 
[Extensum] to be Antitypous or Impenetrable. 
 
antitypy / rare. / [...] 1605 BACON Adv. Learn. (1640) 156 Motions of Antitypie, commonly 
called Motion opposing Penetration of Dimensions. 1846 SIR W. HAMILTON Dissert. in Reid’s 
Wks. 847 Antitypy, a word in Greek applied not only to this absolute and essential resistance of 
matter, quâ matter, but also, etc. 
 
type, n. [ad. F. type (16th c. in Littré) or L. typus, a. Gr. tu/poj impression, figure, type, f. the root 
of tu/ptein to beat, strike.] / 1. a. That by which something is symbolized or figured; anything 
having a symbolical signification; a symbol, emblem; spec. in Theol. a person, object, or event of 
Old Testament history, prefiguring some person or thing revealed in the new dispensation; correl. 
to antitype. in (the) type, in symbolic representation.2 
                                                 
2 Entries in The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online, Oxford University Press, 16 Jan. 
2007, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50051667, 50084581, 50051855, 50009925, 50009927, 










Part  I  
 
PROBLEMS WITH METAPHOR?  
 


















— But everything  is self-deception!  
— Then even your sentence must be. 
(A coffee-break conversation at a conference on metaphor.) 
 
 * * * 
 
»Warum wehrt ihr euch? Würdet ihr den Gleichnissen folgen, dann wäret ihr selbst 
Gleichnisse geworden und damit schon der täglichen Mühe frei.«  
Ein anderer sagte: »Ich wette, daß auch das ein Gleichnis ist.« 
Der erste sagte: »Du hast gewonnen.«  
Der zweite sagte: »Aber leider nur im Gleichnis.«  
Der erste sagte: »Nein, in Wirklichkeit; im Gleichnis hast du verloren.«  
(Franz Kafka.)3  
 
 * * * 
 
Alles fließt: auch dieser Gedanke, und bringt er nicht alles wieder zum Stehen? 
(Paul Celan.)4  
 
                                                 
3 Franz Kafka, “Von den Gleichnissen”, in Gesammelte Werke. Taschenbuchausgabe in acht Bänden, 8 vols., 
ed. Max Brod, vol. Beschreibungen eines Kampfes: Novellen, Skizzen, Aphorismen aus dem Nachlaß 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1998), p. 72. En. trans. [unspecified translator]: “Why such reluctance? If you 
only followed the parables you yourselves would become parables and with that rid of all your daily cares. / 
Another said: I bet that is also a parable. / The first said: you have won. / The second said: But unfortunately 
only in parable. / The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.” In Parables and Paradoxes [bilin-
gual, various translators] (Schocken: New York, 1971); cit. J. Hillis Miller, Tropes, Parables, Performa-
tives: Essays on Twentieth Century Literature (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 145-146. 
4 Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden, 7 vols., ed. Beda Allemann et al. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 
vol. 3, p. 165, henceforth cited as GW, followed by the number of the volume and page number (in this 
case: GW 3:165). Trans. Peter Fenves: “‘Everything flows’: even this thought, and does it not bring every-
thing again to a standstill?” In Werner Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion: Movements of a Figure 
Through Celan’s Poetry”, in Hamacher, Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to 
Celan, trans. Fenves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1996), p. 344. — Besides the mentioned Gesammelte 
Werke, I will be citing a few other editions of Paul Celan’s works, too. Two recent critical editions in sev-
eral volumes also contain draft versions: the so-called Tübinger Celan-Ausgabe (Werke: Tübinger Ausgabe, 
9 vols, ed. Jürgen Wertheimer et al. [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999ff]) is henceforth cited as TCA 
(followed by the name of the volume and either page number or, in the case of the Meridian volume, the 
number of the section in the final version of the speech [Endf.] or manuscript [Ms.] or typoscript [Ts.] 
fragment; the abbreviation D.O.M. refers to the radio essay “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms” in that 
volume), and the so-called Bonner Celan-Ausgabe (Werke: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, ed. Beda Alle-
mann et al. [Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1990ff]), is henceforth cited as BCA (followed by the volume and 
page numbers). I will also cite the excellent one-volume edition with a commentary by Barbara Wiede-
mann: Die Gedichte: Kommentierte Gesamtausgabe, ed. Barbara Wiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2005), henceforth cited as DGKG. English translations are most often either by Michal Ham-
burger (Poems of Paul Celan [New York: Persea Books, 2002]) or by John Felstiner (Selected Poems and 
Prose of Paul Celan [New York: Norton, 2001]); the name of the translator will be given in each case. 
* * * 
 
La poésie est de toutes les eaux claires celle qui s’attarde le moins aux reflets de ses 
ponts. 




P R O L E G O M E N O N  I  
  
Counter-figures, in plural. At least before any further determinations are given, this  is a mul-
tivalent, ambivalent term. Multivalent: it has several values. Ambivalent: it has contrasting or 
contradictory values. The prefix ‘counter-’ itself means “(1) reciprocation, opposition, frustra-
tion, rivalry, (2) opposite position or direction, (3) correspondence, match, (of things having 
naturally two opposite parts), (4) duplicate, substitute.” Inasmuch as we shall be dealing with 
antimetaphoric resistance and figurality, the term ‘figure’ must be taken here primarily in 
the sense of “figure of speech”, namely a “recognized form of abnormal expression giving va-
riety, force, etc., e.g. aposiopesis, hyperbole, metaphor, (~ of speech only) piece of exag-
geration”.6  However, such figures as hyperbole and aposiopesis can be counter-figures to 
metaphor. Aposiopesis, “A rhetorical artifice, in which the speaker comes to a sudden halt, as 
if unable or unwilling to proceed”, 7  may also — as if — cease to be a mere rhetorical artifice, 
it can be used against rhetorical artifice, against eloquence or euphuism, against the ‘as if’ 
that belongs to rhetorical artifice. It can be used as a rhetorical artifice against rhetorical ar-
tifice — a rhetorical artifice against itself, as it were. As if. Every anti-rhetorical gesture can 
be construed in terms of rhetoric, as it seems. As a wilful privation, determined negation, and 
thus an artifice in its own right. (If that is not a “hermeneutic of suspicion”, then what is?) 8  
What can you say — —? How can you reply, if even your unwillingness to reply can be consid-
ered an artificial device? For many a theorist these days, any objection to metaphor or rheto-
                                                 
5 “À la santé du serpent (XXVI)”, in Œuvres complètes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, cop. 
1983, repr. 2001), p. 267. German trans. Paul Celan: “Dichtung: unter allen klaren Gewässern ist sie’s, 
deren Verweilen am kürzesten währt, wenn sie der Spiegelung der Brücken begegnet. Dichtung: künftiges 
Leben im Innern des wieder zum Menschsein befähigten Menschen.” (GW 4:434-435.) 
6 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, ed. H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler, 4th ed. rev. by 
E. McIntosh (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), entries “counter-”, “figure” (henceforth cited as 
COD). 
7 OED, entry “aposiopesis”; the following examples are given, among others: “1618 Hist. P. Warbeck in 
Harl. Misc. (1793) 63 His communication was still seasoned with savoury parenthesises and breakings off, 
or, if you will, aposiopesises. 1727 POPE Art Sinking 95 The Aposiopesis, an excellent figure for the igno-
rant, as ‘what shall I say?’ when one has nothing to say, or ‘I can no more,’ when one really can no more.” 
(OED, 50010452; 19 Jan. 2007.) We may observe that for Lacan, signification always has an element of 
‘aposiopesis’ in it: “Car le signifiant de sa nature anticipe toujours sur le sens en déployant en quelque sorte 
au-devant de lui sa dimension. Comme il se voit au niveau de la phrase quand elle s’interrompt avant le 
terme significatif : Jamais je ne ..., Toujours est-il..., Peut-être encore...” (“L’instance de la lettre dans 
l’insconcient ou la raison depuis Freud”, in Écrits I [Paris: Seuil, cop. 1966, repr. 1999], pp. 490-526, here 
p. 499.) 
8 In his polemical (mis)reading of Derrida’s “La mythologie blanche”, Paul Ricœur assumes that Derrida 
combines the Heideggerian deconstruction with what he calls “weapons of the hermeneutic of suspicion”, 
namely Marxian ideological critique, Nietzschean genealogy and Freudian psychoanalysis (La métaphore 
vive [Paris: Seuil, cop. 1975], p. 363); however, this is indeed a rather gross misconstrual of Derrida’s text. 
Derrida himself responds to Ricœur in the text (originally presented in a 1978 conference on metaphor, 
where Ricœur also participated) “Le retrait de la métaphore” (in Psyché — inventions de l’autre [Paris: 
Galilée, 1987], pp. 63-93). 
14 Counter-figures
ric in general would be nothing but an artificial device against that which is most natural, 
most normal and not at all “abnormal”: the rule of metaphor, a natural talent from which 
there is “no escaping”. 9  Why — and how on earth can one — decline the gift of metaphor? 
 Figures are of course not only figures of speech. Any “Image, likeness” in general as the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary puts it, any “External form, shape”, any “emblem, type, simile”, 
any “permitted deviation from rules of construction, e.g. ellipse”, even any “particular form 
of syllogism according to position of middle term”, and so on and so forth, can be called a 
“figure” (COD). And we shall not restrict, by an arbitrary decision, the scope of the plural 
term ‘counter-figures’ too quickly either, not even to these various options of ‘counter-’ and 
‘figure’, although the first of these prolegomena will consider the first counter-figure, namely 
the Second Commandment. 
 The entry for ‘counterfigure’ in the Oxford English Dictionary gives some of the accepta-
tions for this rare and obsolete term and its correspondences to other terms: it is defined first 
of all simply as “[a] figure or type corresponding to something else”, but is also considered as 
a synonym to “antitype”, which is itself an ambiguous term: “That which is shadowed forth or 
represented by the ‘type’ or symbol”, but also: “One of the opposite or contrary kind.” What 
is “antitypous” resists force and penetration.  
 Even though the OED considers the term rare and obsolete, there is nothing that prevents 
its novel use for various purposes. Judith Butler uses the term ‘counterfigure’ in a manner akin 
to ours, one of ours, one that is not yet recognized by dictionaries but more or less immedi-
ately intuitive: “It seemed to me that Antigone might work as a counterfigure to the trend 
championed by recent feminists to seek the backing and authority of the state to implement 
feminist policy aims.” 10 
 In order to examine counter-figurative gestures that are formally common to both litera-
ture and philosophy, or art and philosophy, we shall first turn to some of the most classical 
pieces of literature in our tradition. In this first prolegomenon, it is a question of the Second 
Commandment — the most sublime text of the Jewish law book, as Kant has said. 11  Heteroge-
neous as they are, no doubt, with respect to their ‘material’ (the Genesis and the Iliad, 
Shakespeare and Dickinson, etc., not to mention the philosophical and theoretical ‘sources’ 
discussed: Aristotle, Heidegger, and Derrida with regard to the ambivalences and paradoxes 
related to the notion of metaphor; Paul de Man, Jonathan Culler, and Murray Krieger who 
speak of the “essentially anti-poetic” features of this notion and of “literature’s resistance to 
metaphor”), these prolegomena still do have a common final aim, namely to approach the 
‘Meridian’: the Meridian “crossing through the tropes [Tropen durchkreuzendes]”, and the will 
of the tropes and metaphors, in the poem, to be “carried ad absurdum”, which is also named 
in the same speech bearing the title “Der Meridian”. Celan spoke of  this ‘crossing-through’ 
also in other words, in another language: “La Poésie déjoue l’image.”12  Déjouer, 
durchkreuzen: both of these verbs are translated, according to dictionaries, as one English 
verb: “to frustrate.” So it is a question of ‘frustrating’ the tropes, the images, the figures, of 
‘countering’ them (if we may take advantage of a certain possibility of metonymic displace-
                                                 
9 James Deese, “Mind and Metaphor: A Commentary”, in New Literary History  (NLH), Vol. VI No. 1, Au-
tumn 1974, pp. 211-217, here p. 217. This is of course only one example of the mainstream view of all 
modern metaphor theories: no escape from the realm of metaphor. 
10 Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (New York: Columbia U.P., 2000), p. 1. 
11  Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), ed. K. Vorländer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1990), = KdU, B 125 (the established standard abbreviations and pagination for Kant’s three Critiques are 
used here: KrV, KpV, KdU, A for the first edition in each case, B for the 2nd. ed.). 
12  Cf. Celan, »Mikrolithen sinds, Steinchen«: Die Prosa aus dem Nachlaß, ed. Barbara Wiedemann & Ber-
trand Badiou (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2005), No. 230.2 (the note cited here dates from 1968); henceforth 
cited as Mikrolithen; see also TCA/Meridian, Endf. 50d.  
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ment between the prefix ‘counter-’ as ‘frustration’ and the verb ‘to counter’): to counteract 
their effect, the effect we suppose that poetic language has when we interpret it in terms of 
trope, metaphor, Sinn-bild, in terms of rhetorical figures and such effects as “redescription of 
reality” — redescription instead of “giving check to reality”. But “déjouer” does not happen 
without “jouer”, and “Durchkreuzen” still lets the crossed-over appear, as in a palimpsest; a 
counter-figure, for instance “giving check to reality” (or “to time”) instead of just “redescrib-
ing reality”, but without any pretensions of  crossing over to some higher reality or to tran-
scend time, is obviously still a figure of sorts, an antitype, an “exception that proves the rule” 
— the “rule of metaphor”, if you will. As we shall see, there is a “counter-metaphorical 
thrust” at work in the literary “metaphors” themselves, and indeed, the tropes and metaphors 
in the poem have themselves their “will” to be “carried ad absurdum”.  Reductio ad absurdum 
— or the anti-metaphoric resistance — belongs to the intentional structure of the poetic figure 




THE FIRST COUNTER-FIGURE...  
... is the Second Commandment  
 
The first counter-figure is the Second Commandment: “Thou shalt not make unto thee any 
graven image, or any likeness of any thing...” The only obviously figurative element in this 
sentence is the image of a “graven image”. But since the Second Commandment speaks of 
“any graven image, or any likeness”, a graven image is only an example: a paradigm for all 
the images, while the conjunction “or” introduces the extension of this paradigm to any 
likeness at all. This prohibition would forbid producing any image portraying that which is, 
or should be, without  image, namely any other-than-image.14  But this prohibition, this 
counter-figure must be motivated by another that silently precedes it: if the commandment is 
                                                 
13 On Durchkreuzen, cf. Martin Heidegger, “Zur Seinsfrage”, in Wegmarken (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 
1991), pp. 385-426, here p. 411 et passim (also in Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 9; Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe vol-
umes are henceforth cited according to the following example: GA 9:385-426). On redescribing metaphor as 
a “redescription of reality”, cf. Paul Ricœur, La métaphore vive (op. cit.), whose English translation is enti-
tled The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). On “giving 
check to time” or “to reality”, cf. Celan, Mikrolithen, Nos. 165.2, 166.1 (“in jedem Gedicht wird der 
Wirklichkeit ein für allemal Schach geboten” etc.; cf. also below). On the “carrying ad absurdum” of tropes 
and metaphors, cf. Celan, TCA/Meridian, Endf. 39a, and below. Most of these and other issues mentioned 
here shall be of course discussed in more detail later in the present treatise. 
14 This is indeed one of the lexical acceptations of “antitype”: “That which a type or symbol represents” 
(COD). An allegory consists of “type” and “antitype”, or “text” and “pretext” (cf. e.g. Gerhard Kurz, 
Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988], pp. 41-45). On the other hand, 
Schelling’s notion of Gegenbild has been translated as antitype (by Miklos Vetö) and “counter-image”,
as well as contrafigura. “Antitype” is also what resists force and penetration, perhaps also the force of 
representation or figuration in general; that is, at least if we allow ourselves to reduce the word to its ab-
stract possibilities of signification, which are by no means the same as the set of established lexical accepta-
tions, as I hope will become clear. — On Schelling’s notion of Gegenbild, Marie-Christine Challiot-Gillet 
writes in her review of Miklos Vetö’s work on Shelling: “[T]he notion of the Gegenbild, an antitype or 
counter-image, finds its place in designating a secondary or derived reality that ‘reflects’ a further primor-
dial reality at a lower level and in a specifically modified way. The relationship between ground and anti-
type is complex: particular things are the anti-types of the whole insofar as the latter is their ground, but 
they can also desire, in their particularity, to tear themselves away and affirm their difference from the Ab-
solute. But this is only possible because particular things multiply, as it were, the ground’s relation to itself, 
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not purely arbitrary, there must be something already  in the other-than-image that resists or 
perhaps even forbids figuration and restrains the free play of imagination, a counter-
figurative resistance motivating the outspoken commandment.  
 In this context, as it seems, the words are words of God. Namely, the origin and moti-
vator of the commandment is the wholly other without image, as the words preceding these 
reveal to us: “And God spake all these words, saying, / I am the LORD thy God, which have 
brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. / Thou shalt have no other 
gods before me.” Idolatry is the worship of other gods, and iconolatry, the worship of images, 
is a form of idolatry. But does the prohibition of image-making perhaps still concern any 
other, any-other-than-image? And that is: any ‘other’ that either can be or cannot be por-
trayed by an image, portrayed by its image or by the image of another.  
 
... any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or 
that is in the water under the earth: ... 
 
The prohibition concerns stars and trees, humans and animals, fish and rock. Any thing, any 
creature, any being imaginable, any god. 
 But the Second Commandment itself contains a clause that seems to divide the prohi-
bition of idolatry into two antagonistic moments and introduces another counter-figure which 
threatens to undermine the first one, the figure against figuration. As if the voice uttering this 
first counter-figure, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness...”, 
suddenly became suspicious of its own judgement and opted for a second, somewhat less aus-
tere alternative, forbidding not the making of images and likenesses in itself, but their wor-
ship:  
 
Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them... 
 
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing... Thou shalt 
not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them... But how could one do that, how could one 
bow oneself down to images and likenesses and serve them, and how could one not do that, if 
one had already obeyed that which was decreed in the first moment of the Second Com-
mandment and not made any image or likeness in the first place? 
 Here are the First and the Second Commandments in their entirety as they are pro-
nounced at the beginning of the twentieth book of Exodus, first in the canonical King James 
version: 
 
(1) And God spake all these words, saying,  
(2) I am the LORD thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of 
                                                                                                                                                        
the ground being itself antitype, being at once archetype and antitype. The ground is therefore paradoxical 
by definition, possessing potentialities at once productive and hostile to the life which the ground itself gen-
erates.” Challiot-Gillet, “[Review of] Le fondement selon Schelling, by Miklos Vetö. Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2002”, European Journal of Philosophy 14:1 (2006), pp. 121-126, here p. 124. 
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the house of bondage. 
(3) Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 
(4) Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that 
is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the 
earth: 
(5) Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God 
am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third 
and fourth generation of them that hate me; 
(6) And shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my com-
mandments. [Ex. 20:1-6. King James Bible.] 
 
And here is a “hebraicizing” modern translation, by Everett Fox, of the Second Command-
ment in its entirety, according to the mainstream Judaic tradition in which the First Com-
mandment of most Christian doctrines is actually included as part of the ‘second word’ of the 
Decalogue (while the first of these ten ‘words’, namely “I the LORD am your God who 
brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage”, is indeed formally a ‘declara-
tion’ rather than a positive or negative ‘commandment’): 
 
(3) “You are not to have 
any other gods 
before my presence. 
(4) You are not to make yourself a carved-image 
or any figure 
that is in the heavens above, that is on the earth beneath, that is in the waters  
        beneath the Earth; 
(5) you are not to bow down to them, 
you are not to serve them, 
for I, YHWH your God, 
am a jealous God, 
calling-to-account the iniquity of the fathers upon the sons, to the third and fourth 
        (generation) 
of those that hate me, 
(6) but showing loyalty to the thousandth 
of those that love me, 
of those that keep my commandments.”15  
 
                                                 
15 Trans. Everett Fox, The Five Books of Moses. The Schocken Bible 1 (New York: Schocken Books, 1995); 
cit. Carl S. Ehrlich, “’Make yourself no graven image’: The Second Commandment and Judaism”, in L. 
Ehrlich et al., eds., Textures and Meaning: Thirty Years of Judaic Studies at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, Department of Judaic and Near Eastern Studies, University of Massachusetts Amherst, cop. 2004 
[http: //www.umass.edu/judaic/anniversaryvolume], pp. 254-271, here pp. 257-258. Here the Second Com-
mandment is considered as according to the mainstream Judaic tradition, in which the First Commandment 
(or the first “word” of the Decalogue) consists of the “introduction” saying “I am the LORD thy God, which 
have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage”, and the Second Commandment 
begins by the words “Thou shalt have no other gods before me”, continuing by the more detailed prohibi-
tion of idolatry (Ex. 20:2-5; cf. Deut. 5:6-9). Cf. Ehrlich: “As far as I am informed, the verse ‘You shall 
have no other gods besides Me’ (Exod 20:3) is not part of the Second Commandment in any of the Christian 
traditions. [...] Nonetheless, a different division of the commandments has become normative in Judaism. 
According to this understanding, the divine declaration ‘I the LORD am your God who brought you out of 
the land of Egypt, the house of bondage’ (Exod 20:2) stands alone as the First Commandment. ‘You shall 
have no other gods besides Me’ (Exod 20:3) serves as the introduction to the Second Commandment, which 
continues with the prohibition of idolatry in vv. 4-6. [...] The prohibition of worshiping foreign gods is read 
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On the whole, the Second Commandment is of course to be read as a prohibition of idolatry: 
thus perhaps not strictly directed against all image-making but rather against making images 
of God or bowing oneself down to any idol as if before a god, as if before ‘one of the gods’ 
as if there were many, against making oneself “any figure /  that is in the heavens above, that 
is on the earth beneath, that is in the waters beneath the Earth” and bowing oneself down to 
such figures, or serving them as if one would serve one’s master. Figuration may be inevita-
ble, or at least extremely hard to avoid (and as old as man himself, made in God’s image), but 
one is not to adore one’s own creation, neither the figures one creates nor one’s own power of 
creating them, as if one would create one’s own master and then serve him. For “your God”, 
the one speaking in the first person singular to the second person singular, is a “jealous God”. 
Jealous of his creation in both senses of this word: creation as creating on the one hand and 
the created on the other. You are not to posit anything or anyone before his presence, as if 
you could, before the presence that always already preceded you and every(thing) present.  
 But still, is it not as if this jealous God already opted for a more merciful decree after 
hovering for a brief moment between the most strict prohibition and its direst consequences 
imaginable, the prohibition of making images and likenesses, all images and likenesses, 
which would, by consequence, even amount to some sort of denial of His own work? (That 
is, the making of not only “any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the 
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth”, but of “any figure / that is in the heav-
ens above, that is on the earth beneath, that is in the waters beneath the Earth”, namely crea-
                                                                                                                                                        
as part and parcel of the prohibition of idolatry.” (Ehrlich, p. 257.) Cf. also Kenneth Reinhard and Julia 
Reinhard Lupton, “The Subject of Religion: Lacan and the Ten Commandments”, in Diacritics (summer 
2003) 33.2: 71-97, here pp. 74-75. Cf. Chouraqui: “Il ne sera pas pour toi d’autres Elohîms contre mes 
faces. /  Tu ne feras pour toi sculpture ni toute image / de ce qui est dans les ciels, en haut, / sur la terre, en 
bas, dans les eaux, sous la terre. / Tu ne te prosterneras pas devant elles, tu ne les serviras pas, / oui, moi-
même, IHVH-Adonaï, ton Elohîms, / l’Él ardent,...” (André Chouraqui, La Bible [Paris: Desclée de Brou-
wer, 2003].) The most striking distinctive feature of Fox’s translation is, as we can see, that the formulation 
“You are not to make yourself [...] any figure / that is in the heavens above [etc.]” lacks something that is 
present in the other translations, namely the “of”-structure in the syntax of “any likeness of any thing that is 
in heaven above”, corresponding to the structure “... toute image / de ce qui est dans les ciels ...” in 
Chouraqui’s translation. In all, Ehrlich offers a brilliant reading of the Second Commandment, including an 
anecdote that could perhaps summarize much of the Judaic tradition concerning this Commandment as a 
prohibition of idolatry: “The story is told about Rav, the founder of the illustrious Talmud academy in Sura 
in Babylonia, that he was once a guest in a synagogue in which there was a beautifully decorated mosaic 
floor. Rav participated actively in the synagogue service and even read out of the Torah. Yet, when the con-
gregation bowed down in worship, Rav remained standing. His erect attitude was attributable to the figural 
representations on the mosaic floor. The fact that such pictures were to be found in a synagogue did not dis-
turb him. After all, they did not keep him from praying there. Were he, however, to bow down in prayer, it 
could appear as if he were bowing down to the figures depicted on the floor, instead of before the invisible 
God. It was in order to avoid even the possible semblance of idolatry that Rav chose to remain standing.” 
(Op. cit., p. 263.) This “erect attitude” is a counter-figurative act of manifestation, an evasive gesture in or-
der to avoid even the possible semblance of idolatry. Such a gesture is histrionic in its own right, of course; 
a figure against figures, a counter-figure; indeed, a silent ‘artistic’ performance of sorts. It is not iconoclasm 
but rather indicates tolerance, distinguishing between the presence of figures, which is no problem for this 
rabbi, and what is to be performed in their presence, and in spite of, not  necessarily the figures, but the pre-
tensions that some might, knowingly or not, ascribe to these figures, that is: in spite of the allegedly iconic 
function of these images, which might be a misunderstanding as to their role as figures. 
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tion as a figure of God’s creation, the created beings as an after-image of the original act of 
creating them, viewed by the man who is made in God’s image, as if in order to see this 
splendid after-image, the world, Creation, through his eyes, these mirrors of flesh.) A mo-
ment of hesitation between this strictest prohibition and the more moderate prohibition that 
concerns bowing oneself down to the images and serving them? Is it not as if God decided, 
after a too rash first decision and a moment of indecision, or doubt, following this first mo-
ment, to opt for a more ‘humane’ and less unconditional commandment, as if He said: Thou 
shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing... (but in case thou 
dost, and since thou hast already made them unto thee and canst not but make them, in spite 
of thyself)...  thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them...? Figuration and 
imagination, as a passive or active production of ‘mental images’ and in a broad sense, all 
‘ideation’ included (we might presume that if an ‘interior’ act of coveting, for example, is 
already a transgression of the Divine Law, whether the deed of adultery or theft is committed 
or not, also the interior image-making is already a sin), are inevitable — this is a condition 
humaine par excellence, and it could also be seen as a mimetic perversion of the ‘original’ 
divine power of creation — but idolizing these creations,  not only the obscure cult of wor-
shipping “carved images” and visible, tangible figures as fetishes or idols, but figures and im-
ages in general, as if they were the things themselves and not their images, and our power (in 
the sense of active or passive capability) to create them, as if we could put ourselves in 
charge of creating the things themselves in their transcendence, put ourselves beyond their 
transcendence, should not be part of that, part of the human condition. While figuration 
seems inevitable, iconolatry and idolatry are not. Or at least should not be. 
 So let us pretend that we could not right away come across this paradox, or this mo-
ment of indecision or even contradiction, and that we could not immediately reduce it into a 
consistent commandment against idolatry, forbidding the making of images of God or gods, 
as if there were several, and/or worshipping idols and/or idolizing anything else than this one 
God of Israel. Let us pretend that we were to take the sentence “Thou shalt not make unto 
thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the 
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth” as literally as we can, by itself, and not 
to consider it only as an elliptical passage in the text, referring to what precedes it and follows 
it in the sequence of phrases of which the text called the Second Commandment consists. Let 
us pretend that this prohibition is at least apt to extend itself beyond sculpture and painting. 
Let us pretend that God himself paused for a moment after speaking these words and realized, 
as if through a brief silent consultation with himself, that there were already indefinitely 
many images and figures in the heavens above, on the earth beneath, in the waters beneath 
the earth and also in the secret recesses beneath man’s own surface, in his mind or heart; and 
these images in the mind of the very privileged creature, whom God made in His own image, 
were also an image of His Creation, in both senses of this word. Man has already made so 
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many images and has a strong tendency to make them — what would be the consequences of 
forbidding him to do so? Is this tendency not in the very nature of man? Is this power of cre-
ating images not something essential to the creature made in His very image, in the image of 
the One who is without image, and yet, has created all these images, all these figures? And 
should man be blind to His work and not be filled with wonder and awe at seeing it?  “When 
Rabbi Gamliel was asked why God only gave laws against idolatry, rather then excising it 
from the world, he answered that people worship the sun, the moon, the stars, the planets, 
signs of the zodiac, mountains, hills, and even other people. Should God therefore destroy 
them all?”16  The presence of these ‘figures’ is the presence of Creation, and perhaps even 
reproducing their presence, representing them in the form of images, is not condemnable in 
itself. But while this reproduction is innocent in itself and while figuration is inevitable, 
idolatry and iconolatry can be and should be avoided. 
 A scene like this one — an interior scene accessible to our imagination — in which 
we may see God manifesting such psychological or moral characteristics that are usually con-
sidered human or humane, is not unique in the Bible. Jacques Derrida writes: “More than 
once God himself seems to repent and show regret or remorse.”17  In Donner la mort, an in-
stance of this semblance of regret or remorse is the citation of God’s words after the Flood in 
the eighth book of Genesis — we cite the King James Bible:  “[A]nd the LORD said in his 
heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for man’s sake; for the imagination of man’s 
heart is evil from his youth; neither will I again smite any more every thing living, as I have 
done. / While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and 
winter, and day and night shall not cease.”18  This is actually the very reversal of a previous 
repentance, in Genesis 6:5-8: “And GOD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the 
earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. / And 
it repented the LORD that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart. / 
And the LORD said, I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth; both 
man, and beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air; for it repenteth me that I have 
made them. / But Noah found grace in the eyes of the LORD.”19 
                                                 
16 Ehrlich, “Make yourself no graven image”, p. 265.  
17 “Plus d’une fois Dieu lui-même semble se repentir, et marquer du regret, ou du remords.” (Donner la mort 
[Paris: Galilée, 1999], p. 187.) 
18 Genesis  8:21-22; King James Bible. In this and the next quote from Genesis, the noun “imagination” must 
be understood in the very specific, archaistic Biblical sense: “†2. [...] a. Scheming or devising; a device, 
contrivance, plan, scheme, plot; a fanciful project. Obs. exc. as a biblical archaism. / [...] 1535 COVERDALE 
Lam. iii. 60 Thou hast herde their despytefull wordes (O Lorde) yee and all their ymaginacions agaynst me. 
[...] 1709 SWIFT Advancem. Relig. Wks. 1755 II. I. 117 These airy imaginations of introducing new laws for 
the amendment of mankind. 1760-72 H. BROOKE Fool of Quality (1809) III. 47 Any imagination..tending to 
change the nature or form of any one of the three estates.” (OED, 50112174.) 
19 Derrida cites Dhormes’s translation: “Iahvé se repentit [...]  « [...] car je me repens de les avoir faits. »” Cit. 
in Donner la mort, p. 198, Derrida’s emphasis. Henceforth the emphases (italics) are as in the original 
quoted text if not otherwise indicated. 
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 God has no image, at least no other image than man — or Adam, originally both man 
and woman, before Eve was created out of his rib — the man whom He created in His image; 
but imagining Yahweh to take any particular human-like shape is already to commit idolatry. 
He has a name, though. Indeed, right after the First and the Second Commandment follows 
the Third, saying, “Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain; for the LORD 
will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.” (Ex. 20:7.) To take the singular 
name in vain, to displace the personal name is comparable to idolatry. But perhaps the words 
“LORD thy God” are already displaced with regard to the hebraicized form, “Yahweh thy 
Elohim”, substituting the singularity of the personal name with the common nouns “god” and 
“lord”? Periphrases (such as Adonai) have indeed been used in the Jewish tradition since the 
Second Temple, and thus these are meant as a precaution against using the proper name in 
vain. 
 Jean-Luc Marion has summarized one traditional analogy as follows: “For Christians 
and Jews, where man is made in the image of God, if God is unknowable, then man is un-
knowable too.”20  As it seems that the prohibition of iconolatry is not restricted to the por-
trayals of Yahweh, could we suggest that taking any name in vain, displacing the proper 
name in general as “the signifier that transcends any meaning it might attract”,21  is already a 
transgression and bearing false witness with regard to the singularity denoted by it, the radi-
cal alterity with regard to all generic designations? Such universalization has indeed been 
suggested in a psychoanalytic context, namely with reference to Jacques Lacan’s discussion 
of the Decalogue, in an article by Kenneth Reinhard and Julia Reinhard Lupton:  
                                                
 
The commandment establishes the difference between any referent and its representa-
 
20 Jean-Luc Marion, in discussion with Jacques Derrida following the conference paper “In the Name”, in 
John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington Indiana: 
Indiana U. P., 1999), p. 47. — According to a tradition of commentators, the ‘resemblance’ between man 
and God does not, of course, reside in a visual likeness, but rather in man’s being “‘cut off’ from both God 
and nature through the alienating function of language”; this is what Kenneth Reinhard and Julia Reinhard 
Lupton write in their article “The Subject of Religion” (2003, op. cit.). They explain the Hebrew word “tse-
lem — likeness, idol, semblance, originally meaning ‘something cut off,’ hence coordinate with carved or 
graven” — so that we may see difference rather than identity as constitutive to the ‘resemblance’ between 
man and God, or between Adam and Yahweh. Their separation is their separation, it does not only separate 
man and God from each other but also brings them together, it is something that keeps them absolutely apart 
from each other but also from “nature”, and this separation from nature (even though the inverted commas 
are here left out, they should obviously silently and invisibly accompany the word “nature” here) is what 
constitutes their resemblance, their togetherness. “Although Feuerbach delighted in reversing Genesis by 
declaring that man has made God in his own image, the wit is only apparent [...]. God completes the crea-
tion of man in his image by placing him over nature, as its master: the ‘likeness’ of man to God depends on 
man’s difference from the natural world. Moreover, what alienates man from nature is the subject’s alien-
ation in language, precisely what makes him God-like. If man and God appear to mirror each other in a pro-
jective fashion à la Feuerbach, this mirroring is expressed in the form of a chiasmus, a schematic relation 
created in and by language, produced through the syntactical inversions of words and not in the realm of 
visual likeness or ontology: ‘And God created man in His image, in the image of God He created him.’ The 
Hebrew tselem [...] at once locates ‘man’ and ‘God’ in a potentially idolatrous continuum and defines man 
as ‘cut off’ from both God and nature through the alienating function of language.” (Kenneth Reinhard and 
Julia Reinhard Lupton, “The Subject of Religion”, p. 79.) 
21 See Reinhard and Reinhard Lupton, “The Subject of Religion”, p. 78. 
22 Counter-figures
tion — hence its possible prohibition of all visualizations — by recourse to the limit 
case of God, the singular referent for which there can be no adequate symbol. In what 
Lacan calls ‘the laws of speech’ incarnated by the Ten Commandments, the name of 
God is the exception that proves the rule, [...]. [“The Subject of Religion”, p. 78.]  
 
Thus the name of God — the unpronounceable name for which even the word “God” is a pe-
riphrasis22  — or the figure without a figure, is indeed an antitype, “a sort of extreme excep-
tion that proves the rule”, in other words: a counter-figure, in a pre-eminent but still also 
paradigmatic sense (see the epigraphs above).  
 On the other hand, the Second Commandment marks “the institution of the rule of 
speech at the expense of the idolatrous pleasures of the imaginary”, as Kenneth Reinhard and 
Julia Reinhard Lupton reformulate Lacan’s analysis.23  Entering the order of speech, namely 
into the symbolic order, means “the sacrifice of the image” and blocking off “the infantile 
play of phantasms” (“The Subject of Religion”, p. 78). This scheme is not Lacan’s invention, 
however. To see the name as a counter-figure of the image is a Hegelian theme par excel-
lence. It is in names that we think, says Hegel, and it is the name that “sublates” or, let us say, 
relieves (aufhebt) the image.24  In “La littérature et le droit à la mort”, Maurice Blanchot 
paraphrases Hegel’s early Jenaer Systementwürfe (1803-1804): “Adam’s first act, which 
made him master of the animals, was to give them names, that is, he annihilated them in their 
existence (as existing creatures).”25  Blanchot draws from this the conclusion that “before any 
word is spoken, there must be a sort of immense hecatomb, a preliminary flood plunging all 
of creation into a total sea [comme préface à toute parole, une sorte d’immense hécatombe, 
un déluge préalable, plongeant dans une mer complète toute la création]”.26  A preface be-
fore speech: speech before speech, a Vorschrift which commands and permits man to be the 
master of the animals. 
                                                 
22  Cf. e.g Reinhard & Reinhard Lupton, “The Subject of Religion”, pp.  75-76, 78. 
23 “The Subject of Religion”, p. 72. Cf. Lacan: “[T]he second commandment, the one that formally excludes 
not only every cult, but also every image, every representation of what is in heaven, on earth, or in the void, 
seems to me to show that what is involved is in a very special relationship to human feeling as a whole. In a 
nutshell, the elimination of the function of the imaginary presents itself to my mind, and, I think, to yours, 
as the principle of the relation to the symbolic, in the meaning we give that term here; that is to say, to 
speech. Its principal condition is here.” (The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psycho-
analysis, 1959–1960, trans. Dennis Porter [New York: Norton, 1986], pp. 98-99; the translation is cited and 
modified by Reinhard & Reinhard Lupton, “The Subject of Religion”, pp. 77-78.) 
24 Cf. e.g. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), ed. Friedhelm Nicolin & Otto Pöggeler 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1991), § 462, p. 375. “To relieve” is meant here as a translation of Derrida’s translation 
of aufheben and die Aufhebung by relever and la relève; the traditional English translation is “to sublate”, 
“sublation”. 
25 The French translation of Hegel’s text is cited in “La littérature et le droit à la mort”, in La part du feu 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 325. Trans. “Literature and the Right to Death”, by Lydia Davis, in The Gaze of 
Orpheus and Other Literary Essays by Maurice Blanchot, ed. P. Adams Sitney (Barrytown, NY: Station 
Hill, 1981), pp. 21-62. Hegel’s original text reads: “Der erste Act, wodurch Adam seine Herrschaft über die 
Thiere constituirt hat, ist, daß er ihnen Nahmen gab, d. h. sie als seyende vernichtete, und sie zu für sich 
ideellen machte.” (“System der Philosophie: III. Geistesphilosophie [Fragm. 20]”, in Jenaer Systementwürfe 
I. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. VI, ed. Klaus Düsing & Heinz Kimmerle [Hamburg: Meiner, 1975], p. 288.) 
26 Blanchot, La part du feu, p. 326. Trans. Davis. 
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 To plunge all Creation into this ocean of annihilation is not only to plunge all created 
beings into it (‘Creation’ as according to the metonymy of the Verb transferred into its nomi-
nable effects), but even to plunge the Act of Creation into an image, into a troubled and even
blasphemous reflection, an inverted antitype of Itself: a Mirror of Creation. Adam’s act of 
annihilation is an inverted parallel of God’s Act of Creation out of Nothing, and where 
these parallels meet, where they cross each other in a chiasmus, in this prefiguration of the 
Flood (un déluge préalable), we find also God’s remorse pre-figured. But the crossing of a 
chiasmus is never merely a crossing-out, a cancellation: the scene figured and pre-figured as 
a scene of remorse, or the scene of forgiveness, is also a performative, constitutive act of a 
covenant.  
 And perhaps this chiasmus between remorse and grace, silently situating itself also 
between what we have just called the first and the second moments of the Second Com-
mandment, the first prohibiting the making of images and the second only their worship, also 
marks the origin of literature, as a creation of verbal ‘images’ and their prohibition, or rather 
the prohibition of their worship. The literary character of the sacred text, the Word of God 
mediated by the mouth of man, allows for antagonistic interpretations and doctrines while 
never ceasing to insist on its letter. The letter insists upon itself. The written text always says 
the same, repeats itself, regardless of what we would like to ask it. This is at least what Soc-
rates has taught us. 
 But the two moments of the Second Commandment also seem almost identical to a 
certain beginning or even origin of philosophy. At the beginning of his Third Meditation, the 
one concerned with God’s existence (De Deo, quod existat), René Descartes describes or 
prescribes the philosopher’s procedure of self-examination, inviting him, himself (future in-
dicative, first person singular: “Claudam nunc oculos, ...”) or, in principle, anyone, to close 
his eyes and block his ears and retire all the senses from their activities. And it is not only 
these external influences that are to be excluded, but in this quest for itself, the res cogitans 
must, in order to recognize itself for what it is, even efface out of the sphere of consciousness 
all the images of corporeal things, or at least, because such an effacement of all these images 
is hardly possible, as Descartes says, regard them as useless and deceptive things of nought 
(ut inanes et falsas nihili).27  The images, all the images, cannot be effaced altogether, their 
total annihilation is impossible, but their empire must be suspended as a whole. 
                                                 
27 “Claudam nunc oculos, aures obturabo, avocabo omnes sensus, imagines etiam rerum corporalium omnes 
vel ex cogitatione mea delebo, vel certe, quia hoc fieri vix potest, illas ut inanes et falsas nihili pendam, 
[...].” The original French translation by Duc de Luynes, reviewed by Descartes himself, reads (here in 
modernized orthography): “Je fermerai maintenant les yeux, je boucherai mes oreilles, je détournerai tous 
mes sens, j’effacerai même de ma pensée toutes les images corporelles, ou du moins, parce qu’à peine cela 
se peut-il faire, je les réputerai comme vaines et comme fausses ; [...]” (Descartes, Méditations métaphy-
siques / Meditationes de prima philosophia, Texte latin accompagné de la traduction du duc de Luynes, / 
Méditations de philosophie première, Présentation et traduction de Michelle Beyssade [Paris: Le Livre de 
Poche, cop. 1990], p. 82.)  
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 So what we are suggesting is that such a dialectic of remorse and grace, such an inte-
rior dialogue, can even be situated in the hiatus between the two moments of the Second 
Commandment. And this is possible by virtue of the very letter of the text, its literariness so 
to say, and by virtue of the “imagination of man’s heart”, this interior scene that allows man 
to enter even the other interior scene and imagine what the “LORD said in his heart”, to feel 
the grief “at his heart”. But between these two hearts, between these two scenes and between 
my imagination and the grief in (or “at”) the other’s heart, just as between the two moments 
of the Second Commandment, between the image and the other-than-image (let us say: be-
tween the pipe and the image of a pipe, with the legend painted below, in Magritte’s Trahison 
des images: “Ceci n’est pas une pipe”), there must be a moment of halt, suspension, hiatus, 
check, caveat, a moment of fear and trembling that forever suspends my identification with 
the object of my imagination,28  an Atemwende to mark the irreducible distance, the radical 
alterity between my heart or my imagination, and the interiority, viz. the invisibility of the 
other’s heart. “Everything is like everything”, as Donald Davidson says in his famous essay 




28 I would like to refer here, not only to Kierkegaard (Kierkegaard’s Writings VI: Fear and Trembling. Repeti-
tion, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1983]), but also to Der-
rida’s Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999), with its reading of Fear and Trembling as well as of Kafka’s 
Brief an den Vater, both containing powerful demonstrations of imagining the other’s interior scene or fig-
uring out a response — this tremendous book by Derrida and its theory of literature (as hereditary to the re-
ligious discourse and as perjury against this inheritance and as desacralization [p. 205]) cannot be discussed 
in detail in the present treatise, but its profound effect must be hereby affirmed. The book also both explic-
itly and implicitly speaks of Celan’s poetry and of the “phenomenality” and “meteor-like” quality of the po-
etic “things” that Celan actually saw as counter-figures to metaphoricity. (We shall of course return to this.) 
29 “What Metaphors Mean”, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5 No. 1, Special Issue on Metaphor (Autumn 1978), pp. 
39, 41 (cf. below). 
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This prolegomenon begins — rhetorically, no doubt — with an excerpt from a certain Art of 
Poesy, namely Boileau’s, and proceeds to discuss another Poetics, and a Rhetoric too, namely 
Aristotle’s, with regard to the fact that these two contain the first known theory of metaphor. 
Aristotle is not only known to have defined metaphor and to have formulated its first theory, 
he is  also known  for his tendency to reduce the metaphors of his opponents ad absurdum; he 
is not only the first known theorist of metaphor but also the first ‘critic’ of metaphorical dis-
course. Aristotle was, as far as we know, the first to define, but also the first to decline, 
metaphor — the gift of metaphor, as a token for natural talent. This ambivalence can be most 
economically portrayed by referring to a certain contradiction between having clarity and be-
ing obscure. In the Poetics, the talent for using metaphor well is considered as a token of an-
other, more general talent common to both the poet and the philosopher, namely as showing 
“an eye for resemblances”; the metaphorical talent showing the general aptitude for observ-
ing similarity is praised as “the greatest thing by far”. 31  The Rhetoric states that “it is  meta-
phor above all that gives perspicuity [to the diction]”; or more verbatim,  metaphor has per-
spicuity or clarity, besides having a certain charm and “a foreign air”. 32  But in the Topics, this 
having clarity is contested (while Topics is indeed the treatise on the “counterpart” of rheto-
ric, dialectical argumentation), when Aristotle states that “metaphorical expressions are al-
ways obscure”.33  Everything that is said metaphorically is unclear (pan gar asaphes to kata 
metaphoran legomenon), says Aristotle, but the always obscure metaphor has clarity more 
than any other stylistic element (to saphes ... echei malista hê metaphora). But is this contra-
diction between having and being just relative to the context? Is it just so that Aristotle may 
grant clarity to metaphor in the context of rhetoric and, more specifically, when speaking of 
rhetorical style, which is the topic of the third book of the Rhetoric, while in the other con-
text, the context of dialectical argumentation, clarity is precisely what metaphorical expres-
sion lacks? Is the rhetorical clarity just not clear enough for the purposes of the dialectic? Not 
                                                 
31  “[B]ut by far the greatest thing is the use of metaphor [or, more verbatim, ‘by far the greatest is to be meta-
phorical’, polu\ de\ me/giston to\ metaforiko\n ei]nai]. That alone cannot be learnt; it is the token of genius 
[eu0fui%aj te shmei=o/n e0sti]. For the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblances [to\ ga\r eu] 
metafe/rein to\to\ o3moion qewrei=n e0stin].”(Po. 22, 1459a5-9. Ed. Kassel; En. trans. W.H. Fyfe; reproduced 
at The Perseus Digital Library Project, http://perseus.csad.ox.ac.uk/, accessed May 2001; henceforth abbre-
viated as PDLP.) See also the fourth chapter of the Poetics (1448b4 ff), where, in a parallel manner, “imita-
tion” is characterized as properly human and congenital [su/mfuton] to human beings. 
32  “It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learnt from 
anyone else; but we must make use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate. [kai\ to\ safe\j kai\ to\ 
h(du\ kai\ to\ ceniko\n e)/xei ma/lista h( metafora/, kai\ labei=n ou)k e)/stin au)th\n par' a)/llou. dei= de\ kai\ ta\ 
e)pi/qeta kai\ ta\j metafora\j a(rmottou/saj le/gein.] This will be secured by observing due proportion; 
otherwise there will be a lack of propriety [tou=to d' e)/stai e)k tou= a)na/logon: ei) de\ mh/, a)prepe\j 
fanei=tai], because it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are most evident [dia\ to\ par' a)/llhla 
ta\ e)nanti/a ma/lista fai/nesqai]. We must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old 
one; for the same garment is not suitable for both. [a)lla\ dei= skopei=n, w(j ne/w| foiniki/j, ou(/tw ge/ronti 
ti/: ou) ga\r h( au)th\ pre/pei e)sqh/j]” (Rh. III, 2, 1405a8-14, trans. Freese [1967; PDLP].) Cf. the translation 
by W. Rhys Roberts: “Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else 
can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be 
fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriate-
ness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side 
by side. It is like having to ask ourselves what dress will suit an old man; certainly not the crimson cloak 
that suits a young man.” (Rhetorica, 1924.) 
33 Top. VI, 2, 139b34-35, trans. E. S. Forster (1966). 
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to mention the higher purposes of philosophy, as well as the apodeictic ideal of logic in the 
Analytics? Perhaps the heuristic function that metaphor has in rhetoric and even in poetry 
must be abandoned in the realms of logic and philosophy? While rhetoric is the “counterpart” 
(antistrophos) of dialectic, metaphor seems to have a very different role in these two realms. 
The only justification for the presence of metaphor, or rather, of proportional analogy, in phi-
losophical, dialectical or epistemic discourse, would seem to be the systematic elaboration of 
the restricted, four-term proportional analogy into an argument, or into a discussion that is in 
accordance with universal analogy; but when we have systematicity, we no longer have meta-
phor, and vice versa. Metaphor and systematicity are mutually exclusive, as it seems. 34  But 
our question will be, then, whether the concept of metaphor, ever since Aristotle’s “focus” 
upon single words (onoma, in Aristotle’s definition) in the “frame” of a single sentence (a lo-
gos “speaking of one thing”), excluding systematicity and the play of syntax, excluding “the 
excess of syntax over semantics”, is not a condescending gesture: whether locating metaphor 
in the region of poetry does not deprive poetry, or literature, of its own ‘discursive’ power to 
precisely resist metaphor.35  To focus on isolated metaphors may mean a failure to question 






THE GIFT OF METAPHOR AND ITS DECLINE  
 
DEATH OF TRAGEDY, BIRTH OF METAPHOR (“QU’IL DÉCLINÂT SON NOM”) 
 
 
J’aimerais mieux encore qu’il déclinât son nom 
Et dît : “Je suis Oreste, ou bien Agamemnon”, 
Que d’aller, par un tas de confuses merveilles, 
Sans rien dire à l’esprit, étourdir les oreilles : 
Le sujet n’est jamais assez tôt expliqué. 
 
(Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, L’art poétique) 
 
I’de rather much the nauseous Dunce should say  
Downright, my name is Hector in the Play;  
Than with a Mass of Miracles, ill joyn’d,  
Confound my Ears, and not instruct my Mind.  
The Subject’s never soon enough exprest. 
 
(Trans. William Soames, revised by John Dryden)37  
 
                                                 
34 Cf. Derrida, “La mythologie blanche : la métaphore dans le texte philosophique”, in Marges — de la phi-
losophie (Paris: Minuit, cop. 1972). 
35 The present  prolegomenon cannot furnish a systematical exposition of Aristotle’s theory and the relations 
between what we call restricted analogy (four-term proportion) and general or universal analogy (the anal-
ogy of being, the analogy of attribution; pace Pierre Aubenque, it can be, and has been demonstrated that 
Aristotle does entertain a “doctrine of ontological analogy” — if it can be called a doctrine); I am leaving 
this topic for another occasion. 
36 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582. 
37 Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux, L’art poétique, III, 33-37 (Œuvres classiques disposés d’après l’ordre 
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“The Subject’s never soon enough exprest.” Even if all cannot be explained all at once, a dis-
sertation must yield to the maxim expressed by Boileau, and Soames and Dryden as his trans-
lators. They do not say: never too soon, but: never soon enough. The subject should be ex-
pressed as soon as possible, but it can never be expressed soon enough. Soon enough to 
instruct the mind, as Soames and Dryden’s translation put it, and not to confound the ear. 
Even if innumerable figures should be needed — and Boileau indeed recommends the usage 
of innumerable figures for the sake of delight (“De figures sans nombre égayez votre ou-
vrage”) — they should never lead too far from their principal subject.38  So let us try to ex-
plain ours, as soon as possible: the present dissertation will not have been about metaphor.  
 Such denial would not be very significant without the appearance to the contrary. And 
Boileau’s instruction is only significant, also as our epigraph, since the explication of a sub-
ject may require time and effort and often does. Or more than that: since to say that the sub-
ject is never soon enough expressed suggests, taken absolutely, that an explication never 
quite succeeds in a given time, that there will always remain a deferral of explication. Had 
Orestes never had any trouble in expressing his subject,39  that is, to put it short, and with ref-
erence to Euripides’ Orestes, his being subject to the divine verdict of Apollo urging him to 
commit matricide and also justifying the deed, Boileau’s instruction would not be very sig-
nificant. Were there no instances of such hesitation and confusion on stage, it would hardly 
be worth-while giving such advice to the author and to the actor.40  Commentators have 
                                                                                                                                                        
chronologique, avec Introduction [etc.] par Ch-M. des Granges, 2ème éd. [Paris: Librairie Hatier, 1918], p. 
234). English translation by Dryden and Soames (p. 31) as an electronic text in the University of Virginia 
Library Electronic Text Center, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/ modeng/public/BoiArtO.html, last accessed 
in January 2007.  
38 Aristotle says that metaphor causes “the soul to search” or, as it is put in Freese’s translation, unlike an ex-
plicit simile, metaphor forces “the mind [... to] examine” its underlying or, as it is said in the modern theo-
ries, “principal” subject: “For the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a 
word, wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer; it does not say that this is that, so that  the mind does 
not even examine this [ou)kou=n ou)de\ zhtei= tou=to h( yuxh]” (Rh. III, 10, 1410b17ff). After discussing sim-
ile, metaphorical diction, le/cij in general and the enthymeme in the same passage, he also says that the 
popular metaphor should be “neither strange [a0llotri/an], for then it is difficult to take in at a glance, nor 
superficial, for then it does not impress the hearer” (ll. 31-33). So the strange term transferred in metaphor 
(metafora/ de e0stin o0no/matoj a0llotri/ou e0pifora/) (Po. 1457b6-7) should not be far-fetched: it should 
impress the hearer and be liable to be taken in at a glance. The distinction between “principal subject” and 
“subsidiary subject” stems from the modern “interaction theory” of metaphor (cf. the works of Max Black 
[1962] and Ricœur [1975], and below). 
39 In French, sujet corresponds also to such expressions as motif, occasion, raison (cf. Le petit Robert 1: Dic-
tionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française, ed. Paul Robert et al. [Paris: Robert, 1984]; 
henceforth cited as Petit Robert), as for instance in the following three expressions in La nouvelle Héloïse: 
“Tu te presses beaucoup d’être fière de ta laideur ; sois plus humble, crois-moi, tu n’as encore que trop sujet 
de l’être.” “[...] il faudrait me mépriser beaucoup pour ne pas me croire heureuse avec tant de sujet de 
l’être.” “[...] si je sacrifie mon bras à la conservation d’une chose plus précieuse, qui est mon corps, je 
sacrifie mon corps à la conservation d’une chose plus précieuse, qui est mon bien-être. Si tous les dons que 
le ciel nous a faits sont naturellement des biens pour nous, ils ne sont que trop sujets à changer de nature 
[...]” (Éd. Michel Launay [Paris: Flammarion, cop. 1967], pp. 245, 274, 279.) 
40 “Je me ris d’un acteur qui, lent à s’exprimer, / De ce qu’il veut, d’abord, ne sait pas m’informer : / Et qui, 
débrouillant mal une pénible intrigue, / D’un divertissement me fait une fatigue.” (Boileau, “L’Art Poé-
tique”, ll. 29-32.) Trans. Dryden and Soames: “That, from the very op’ning of the Scenes, / The first may 
show us what the Author means / I’m tir’d to see an Actor on the Stage / That knows not whether he’s to 
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viewed Agamemnon’s opening line and its direct sequel in the beginning of Racine’s Iphigé-
nie as perfectly corresponding to Boileau’s preference: 
 
Oui, c’est Agamemnon, c’est ton Roi qui t’éveille. 
Viens, reconnais la voix qui frappe ton oreille.41  
 
These very lines are mocked by Diderot, or the voice of “the First”, in Paradoxe sur le 
comédien, where he bids his interlocutor, “the Second”, to imagine King Henry IV of France 
to use such “absurd” words in facing his own imminent death by murder, speaking, in agony, 
to his friend Sully in the middle of the night42  —  a situation where one would expect loss of 
eloquence rather than such a perfect alexandrine, as it seems.  
 To be sure, Boileau’s Orestes (“qu’il déclinât son nom”) does not decline his name in 
the sense of refusing his name or his responsibility or in some other odd, ambiguous sense. 
The French idiom in Boileau’s lines is, to an extent, untranslatable. To an extent, since So-
ames and Dryden’s “say downright” certainly fits into the mediation provided by such expla-
nations and quasi synonyms as “[t]o say or recite formally or in definite order” (OED), “dire, 
énoncer”; or as the expression “décliner son nom” is translated, “to state, give, one’s 
name”.43  And we may always assure ourselves that the “ou bien” is introduced by Boileau, 
not only as an expletive, but to say that the character should be right away introduced either 
as Orestes or as Agamemnon (or indifferently even as “Hector in the Play”, as the translators 
would have it) and not in such a confusing manner that the spectator could not be certain of 
his identity. The verb décliner is used here, if not in the sense of explaining one’s descen-
dancy in lineage or saying: “I am Orestes son of Agamemnon”, then indeed somewhat in the 
sense of “to say downright”. In English, the corresponding figurative sense (figurative since it 
is thought to derive from usage as a grammatical term) would be “[t]o say or recite formally 
or in definite order”. According to the OED,44  such recital, this “obsolete” and “transferred 
sense”, is instantiated by Queen Margaret’s line, addressed to Queen Elizabeth, in Shake-
speare’s King Richard the Third: “Decline all this, and see what now thou art.”45  What now 
thou art: a breath, a bubble  —   
                                                                                                                                                        
Laugh, or Rage ; / Who, an Intrigue unravelling in vain, / Instead of pleasing, keeps my mind in pain”. 
41 Racine, Théâtre, Tome II (Paris: Hachette, 1948), p. 119. Let us add that in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trem-
bling (Frygt og Bæven) Agamemnon, the king and tragic hero who sacrificed his daughter for the sake of 
the community, figures as a sort of antitype of Abraham (in the sense of an ‘opposite type’), who has no 
analogues. 
42 Denis Diderot, Le paradoxe sur le comédien (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2001), p. 84. 
43 Cf. Petit Robert, entry “décliner”: “I. V. trans. [...] 3º Fig. Décliner ses nom, prénoms, titres et qualités. V. 
Dire, énoncer.” Cf. also Harrap’s Standard French and English Dictionary, ed. J.E. Manson (London: Har-
rap, 1934). 
44 OED: “decline, v. [II.20.]b. transf. To say or recite formally or in definite order. Obs. / 1594 SHAKES. 
Rich. III, IV. iv. 97 Decline all this, and see what now thou art.”  (OED, 00058818.) 
45 Quarto, IV.IV. 2868 / Folio, IV.IV. 2861. For Shakespeare’s works, I have used the New Variorum Edition 
(ed. H.H. Furness et al., Philadelphia: Lippincott, etc., 1871 ff) and the electronic versions of the early 
Quarto and Folio editions in the Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library (http://
etext.virginia.edu/shakespeare/); when other sources have been used, they are specified in the footnotes. 
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A dreame of what thou wast, a garish Flagge 
To be the ayme of euery dangerous Shot; 
A signe of Dignity, a Breath, a Bubble; 
A Queene in ieast, onely to fill the Scene.46   
 
Such figures of Shakespeare’s furnish text-book examples of literary metaphor. But not al-
ways, even in Shakespeare, is this gift  —  the gift of metaphor  —  accepted without further 
ado, or eloquence praised: “Why should calamity be full of words?”47   
 For Boileau, Euripides would have been one to commit the fault of confounding the 
ear with a mass of miracles.48  On the subject of Euripides’ Orestes we could perhaps agree 
with young Nietzsche in accusing the poor playwright of being “the murderer of tragedy”.49 
Or is it rather the suicide of tragedy that takes place in Euripides? Perhaps we might venture 
to also say that in Euripides the birth of metaphor, or at least euphuism, takes place. It is pre-
cisely “after praising Euripides at the expense of Aeschylus”, as C. M. Turbayne remarks, 
that Aristotle praises metaphor without reserve, as it seems: “The greatest thing by far is to be 
a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others. It is the mark of 
genius [euphuias].” (Poetics, 1459a.)50 Aristotle has just pointed out, before these words of 
appraisal, that instead of the plain and ordinary verb in Philoctetes’ line in Aeschylus, “The 
ulcer eats the flesh of my foot”, Euripides uses “feasts upon” (cf. Po. 1458b).51  The naming 
of pain, with a verb that makes us wonder whether it is after all metaphorical or not, turns 
into a feast of eloquence. (Whether it is metaphorical or not: could it be that being eaten by 
the wound is the most accurate, the most immediate description of the torment that we can 
imagine? And not only imaginable to us, but experienced in flesh and blood by Philoctetes 
himself?) 
                                                 
46 Quarto, IV.IV. 2859-2862 (cf. Folio, IV.IV. 2868). 
47 This minimal sign of the thematization of eloquence would be found precisely in the scene just quoted from 
Richard III, as the Duchess of York asks Queen Elizabeth this question right after Margaret’s exit (Folio, 
IV.IV. 2898). 
48 On these suggestions concerning Racine’s Iphigénie and Euripides as possibly corresponding to Boileau’s 
preference and blame, cf. the footnotes in two Larousse editions of Boileau’s Art poétique : Œuvres 
poétiques de Boileau (Paris: Larousse, 1926); Le Lutrin / L’art poétique (Paris: Larousse, 1934). 
49 In The Birth of Tragedy (Die Geburt der Tragödie, 1872) Nietzsche speaks of Euripides’ late play 
Bacchanals — here toward the end of chapter 10: “What was your wish, sacrilegous Euripides, when you 
tried to force that dying myth [of Dionysus and the Maenads] into your service once more? It died beneath 
your violent hands: [etc.].” And in the beginning of chapter 11, just a few lines later: “Greek tragedy met 
her death in a different way from all the older sister arts: she died tragically by her own hand, [...].” (The 
Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, ed. Michael Tanner, trans. Shaun Whiteside [London: Penguin 
Books, 1993], p. 54.) So Nietzsche actually accuses Euripides of the suicide of tragedy. 
50 Cit. Colin Murray Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1962), p. 21. We shall return 
to both Aristotle and Turbayne soon. 
51 “Ai)sxu/loj me\n ga\r e)n tw=? Filokth/th? e)poi/hse »fage/dainan h(/ mou sa/rkaj e)sqi/ei podo/j,« o( de\ a)nti\ 
tou= e)sqi/ei to\ qoina=tai mete/qhken.” (Po. 1458b22ff. Ed. Kassel; quotation marks added.) Translation by 
Fyfe: “Aeschylus in the Philoctetes wrote, ‘The ulcer eats the flesh of this my foot,’ and Euripides instead 
of ‘eats’ put ‘feasts upon.’” (Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 23, translated by W.H. Fyfe [Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1932]. PDLP.) 
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 Euripides’ Orestes seems to recover surprisingly fast from his horrible deed and his 
madness — and from being haunted by the Furies, which Euripides seems to have trans-
formed into mere hallucinated representatives of a psychosomatic disorder, a mere pathologi-
cal displacement. A clinical metaphor, that is. Or a myth to be destroyed by metaphor. He 
recovers in order to play the part of an eloquent villain in all the sophisms and anti-sophisms 
of the play. Such is this ingenious double move, perfect for an antitype of a tragic hero, an 
anti-hero — I cite Arthur S. Way’s poetically sensitive translation:   
 
Orestes. Yet I can cast my burden of affliction — 
Menelaus. Nay, speak not thou of death! — not wise were this. 
Orestes. On Phoebus, who bade spill my mother’s blood. 52  
 
Instead of a tragic hero or heroine like Oedipus or Antigone, assuming responsibility for his 
or her deed, choosing death or blindness rather than living in disgrace, what we have here is a 
tragi-comical anti-hero, who puts the blame on others, on a god in this case. 
 This son of Agamemnon tells Menelaus, in a translation by Edward Philip Coleridge: 
“My body is gone, though my name has not deserted me.”53  Or, as Arthur S. Way translates 
(p. 157): “My life is gone: my name alone is left.” The word sôma [sw~ma], rendered as 
“body” but also as “life” by these translators, refers here in the first place to the ghastly psy-
chosomatic disorder in which Menelaus encounters his nephew, the “wild matted locks”, the 
“fearful glare of his stony eyes”, a “visage marred past all imagining”.54  Thus by metonymy 
Orestes may affirm that his “body is gone” as the order of his countenance is heavily dis-
turbed by his mental trouble. But in its juxtaposition with name [o1noma], the body may also 
be understood as the residence of particularity, individuality, ‘subjectivity’ in a broad sense, 
or indeed “life”.55  In becoming subject to his name, to his name as the token of his descent as 
                                                 
52 There are quite different readings of these lines (413-6) of Euripides’ Orestes. Here is E.P. Coleridge’s 
rendering: “ORESTES But I have a way to recover from these troubles. [a0ll’ e1stin h9mi=n a0nafora\ th=j 
sumfora=j.] MENELAUS Do not speak of death; that is not wise. [mh\ qa/naton ei1ph|j:tou=to me\n ga\r ou0 
sofo/n.] ORESTES It is Phoebus, who commanded me to kill my mother. [Foi=boj, keleu/saj mhtro\j 
e0kpra=cai fo/non.]” I quote above Arthur S. Way’s more poetic translation which seems also to make more 
sense, without being too liberal on the (equivocal) sense of a0nafora/ and sumfora/. And, thirdly, an edition 
by N. Wecklein reads a0qa/naton instead of qa/naton and explains Menelaus’ line (415) as follows: “ein 
Gott kann nicht dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden”. Way’s translation seems to catch the comic effect of 
Orestes’ wordplay with a0nafora/ and sumfora, as Apollo is the deity in a very specific sense “responsi-
ble” for his matricide and at once his ‘means of recovery’ if not of expiation, and thus he unknowingly an-
ticipates the deus ex machina which will fulfil Loxia’s prophecy in the end (l. 1666). (Euripides’ Orestes, ll. 
413-6, trans. Arthur S. Way [London: Heinemann, 1965]. Greek text from PDLP, based on the following 
book: Euripides, Euripidis Fabulae, ed. Gilbert Murray, vol. 3 [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913]. E. P. Col-
eridge’s translation from Euripides, The Complete Greek Drama, edited by Whitney J. Oates and Eugene 
O’Neill, Jr., in two volumes: 2. Orestes [New York: Random House, 1938]. Wecklein’s note from Eurip-
ides, Orestes, mit erklärenden Anmerkungen von N. Wecklein [Leipzig: Teubner, 1906].) — Sophisms and 
anti-sophisms: the play could be read in the light of a dialectic of the Sophistic Enlightenment and its op-
posing forces, i.e. also in the light of Nietzsche’s Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872).  
53 “to\ sw=ma frou=don: to\ d’ o1nom’ ou\ le/loipe/ moi.” Orestes’s words to Menelaus, trans. E.P. Coleridge, l. 
390; ed. Oates & O’Neill, Jr., 1938 (PDLP).  
54 Expressions borrowed from Way’s translation and adapted into our syntax. 
55 That is, not only in the anachronistic sense of modern ‘subjectivity’ but also as u9pokei/menon in an Aristote-
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Agamemnon’s son, and thus to his duty of avenging his father’s death, Orestes must renounce 
his individual life — let us say, improperly and anachronistically, his ‘subjectivity’. Eurip-
ides’ Orestes is one of the literary sons who would let us hear his father’s voice reverberating 
in his own: 
 
O brother of my father, deem that he 
Hears this, who lies ’neath earth, that over thee 
His spirit hovers : what I say he saith.56  
 
Deem that he hears the voice, beneath the earth and hovering over his brother and son, the 
voice of his son being the voice of his own. The decline of the body leaves the name, the 
spirit, the voice still hovering.57  Albeit this son of Agamemnon cannot be quite sure whether 
he is actually speaking in the name of the father or of the son, or of a third party, Apollo, 
upon whom he would cast his “burden of affliction”: 
 
I trow, my father, had I face to face 
Questioned him if I must my mother slay, 
Had earnestly besought me by this beard  
Never to thrust sword through my mother’s heart, 
Since he should not win so to light again, 
And I, woe’s me! should drain this cup of ills!58  
 
For young Nietzsche the decline — or the assassination, or suicide — of tragedy would have 
happened in unison with an effacement of an originary metaphoricity and a shift to another 
kind of metaphoricity,59  this latter subservient to the reasonings of the Sophistic Enlighten-
ment and Socratic philosophy. But to see this decline as a decline of metaphor is very para-
doxical, since the concept of metaphor only arrived after Socrates, with Aristotle’s Poetics 
and the Rhetoric, as far as we know. And it would seem that, in Aristotle’s work, parallel to 
the role of mimesis in Plato’s Republic, it is precisely the concept of metaphor which serves 
as an instrument in subjecting poetical and rhetorical diction to properly philosophical dis-
course.  
 Could it be that such a sense of anachronism that perhaps forced Euripides to murder 
or rather suicide tragedy in the ruthless dawn of Socratic philosophy (yes, I am using the verb 
                                                                                                                                                        
lian sense: the particularity of a concrete “essence” or “substance” (ou0si/a), its numerical distinctiveness, re-
sides in its material distinctiveness from other representatives of its species. 
56 Trans. Way, ll. 673-676.  
57 The proper name is not necessarily the residence of individuality or of subjectivity. Here it seems rather to 
be understood as the locus of a filial bond.  
58 Trans. Way, ll. 288-293. 
59 To extract only one  relevant sentence from Sarah Kofman’s work on Nietzsche and metaphor: “Aussi est-
ce au niveau du concept que l’activité métaphorique, la plus dissimulée, devient par là même la plus 
dangereuse : grâce au concept, l’homme range l’univers entier dans des rubriques logiques bien ordonnées, 
sans savoir qu’il continue alors l’activité métaphorique la plus archaique.” (Nietzsche et la métaphore, [2nd 
ed.] Paris: Galilée, 1983, p. 55.) The effacement of “the originary metaphor” seems to have been, for 
Nietzsche, a historical process that took place in the shift from Pre-Socratic philosophy to Socrates and from 
Dionysian tragedy to Euripides. 
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‘to suicide’ here, transitively and as a parallel to the verb ‘murder’), such a sense of losing 
substance (body, life, subject matter) while still retaining the name, has also befallen meta-
phor — the phenomenon named by Aristotle as far as we know? And perhaps already at the 
time of Aristotle, whose attitude toward metaphor is, to say the least, ambivalent? He praises 
the gift of metaphor in the Poetics only to vehemently depreciate it elsewhere, he praises 
metaphor for having clarity in the Rhetoric only to denounce metaphor as “always unclear” in 
the Topics, to name only a couple of instances of this strange ambivalence.60  But isn’t al-
ready the gesture of defining metaphor, of revealing the rules of its composition, an indication 
for all ‘modern’ poetry that is to strive free from the ‘poetical’ (poetological) subjection to 
such classifying gestures, that metaphor cannot simply be used anymore in the way Aristotle 
describes? Aristotle may be the first to have given metaphor its coup de grâce — or perhaps 
metaphor was already dead before its birth by definition? 
 
 
THE PARADOXICAL TOKEN OF EUPHUIA  (ARISTOTLE) 
 
Aristotle defined but also declined metaphor. He praised the gift for metaphor61  as a token of 
natural talent, common to both the philosopher and the poet, but elsewhere he vehemently 
denounced metaphor in the philosophical, dialectical and epistemic discourse in general. On 
the other hand, we might say that metaphor named itself, and also declined its name in a pe-
culiar sense in Aristotle’s text, and then, elsewhere, Aristotle declined metaphor, denounced 
its use in the name of clarity. Let us try to shed some light on this strange self-defining, self-
declining figure. Metaphor, whose name seems to be derived from the ‘source domain’ of 
‘physics’. 
 The term metaphysics derives, on the other hand, as if by accident, from Aristotle’s 
texts compiled under that heading, and we find the term metaphor used in that work now and 
then. For instance in the ninth chapter of the first book, we find a passage that could be de-
scribed both as anti-metaphysical and as anti-metaphorical: 
 
To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use 
empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model 
of the Ideas? [to\ de\ le/gein paradei/gmata au0ta\ ei]nai kai\ mete/xein au0tw=n ta]lla 
                                                 
60 Rh. 1405a9; Top. 139b33-140a23. 
61 The gift of metaphor, the talent for metaphor, has been considered a natural, primordial talent by many oth-
ers, too: Vico, Rousseau, Herder, Shelley, Nietzsche... We leave this tradition altogether undiscussed in the 
present treatise. Let us quote Pierre Fontanier, however: “Les tropes peuvent sans doute convenir à la 
prose : il peuvent lui convenir, puisque, comme nous l’avons déjà observé, ils ne nous sont pas moins donné 
par la nature que le langage ; puisque nous n’avons pas besoin d’étude pour les apprendre, et qu’ils se glis-
sent à notre insu jusque dans la conversation la plus familière [...]. Les facultés qui ont le plus de part à la 
production des Tropes ou à leur reproduction, sont un don de la nature [...].” (Les figures du discours [Paris: 
Flammarion, cop. 1977, repr. 1999], pp. 180, 182; Fontanier’s treatises were originally published in 1821-
1830.) The possibility of such ‘unconscious’ tropes, and whether these are really “Tropes-figures” as Fonta-
nier terms the ‘figurative tropes’, in contradistinction to such “non-vraies figures” as catachresis, would 
merit a detailed discussion of its own. 
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kenologei=n e0sti\ kai\ metafora\j le/gein poihtika/j. ti/ ga/r e0sti to\ e0rgazo/menon 
pro\j ta\j i0de/aj a0poble/pon;]62  
 
When Aristotle reproaches his teacher Plato, it is the writer of the Rhetoric and of  the Poetics 
who reproaches Plato for using “empty phrases and poetic metaphors”, the Plato who com-
pares rhetoric with cosmetics and would subordinate the true rhetoric to philosophy and ex-
clude the poets from becoming citizens of his ideal Republic. It is Aristotle who praises po-
etry for being more philosophical than history, reproaching Plato, who condemns poetry as 
mere imitation of imitation, as a second-hand imitation of the things that precisely “fashion 
themselves on the model of the Ideas”. To see the pro-poetic and pro-metaphoric Aristotle 
criticizing the anti-poetic and anti-rhetorical Plato for being poetical and metaphorical indeed 
puzzles the casual reader. 
 Here Aristotle condemns, if not the poetic metaphor on the whole, at least a specific 
metaphor, as used in a properly philosophical discourse. Perhaps the problem with this empty 
metaphor is, then, that it fails to reveal a true correspondence between the sensible things and 
their intelligible ‘model’, and thus to fill the form of analogy with a properly metaphorical 
content; however, such a ‘full’ metaphor would for Aristotle no longer be metaphor, but 
analogy. By an anachronism, we might say that Aristotle condemns Plato’s discourse for its 
‘empty’ formalism, and this is not the only time when a philosopher has associated formal 
‘symbolism’ with artistic or poetical ‘symbolism’.63  If we translate the suggestion of modern 
                                                 
62 Met. I, 9, 991a20-23; trans. Tredennick. Cf. Met. XIII, 6, 1079b25-27. Cf. Joe Sachs’s translation of 
991a20ff (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1999): “And to say that [the forms] are patterns and the other things par-
ticipate in them is to speak without content and in poetic metaphors. For what is the thing that is at work, 
looking off toward the forms?” As Tredennick points out, the “thing that is at work (to\ e0rgazo/menon)” 
fashioning the other things after the models or patterns is, for Plato (or Plato’s Socrates), “the Demiurgus” 
(Tim. 28c-29a). The specific point of reference for Aristotle’s scorn can be identified as the passage in Par-
menides where Socrates says: “I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, 
and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to 
them, that and nothing else. [ta\ me\n ei)/dh tau=ta w(/sper paradei/gmata e(sta/nai e)n th=? fu/sei, ta\ de\ 
a)/lla tou/toij e)oike/nai kai\ ei)=nai o(moiw/mata, kai\ h( me/qecij au(/th toi=j a)/lloij gi/gnesqai tw=n ei)dw=n 
ou)k a)/llh tij h)\ ei)kasqh=nai au)toi=j.]” (132d. Trans. H. N. Fowler. Text and translation based on the fol-
lowing books: Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet, Oxford University Press, 1903; Plato in Twelve Volumes, 
Vol. 9 translated by Harold N. Fowler, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925; PDLP). 
63 The term “empty metaphor” comes from D. M. Armstrong: “If the words ‘participation’ and ‘imitation’ are 
taken literally, then it is clear that they do not capture the nature of the relation. But if the words are taken 
analogically, then it is impossible to specify the point of resemblance to literal participation and imitation. 
In Aristotle’s phrase, they are ‘empty metaphors’. [...] So it seems that the theory of Forms explains a’s be-
ing F by reference to a’s having a relation of which we are unable to give any concrete account to an object 
of which we are unable to give any concrete account. We are explaining the known by the unknown.” 
(Nominalism and Realism [1978], p.104.) The last sentence refers to one traditional feature of metaphor as 
“the means by which the less familiar is assimilated to the more familiar”.  “What we primarily demand is 
that the similarity should be a true similarity and that it should have lain hitherto unperceived [...]: some-
thing hitherto unknown is suddenly made known.” (J. M. Murry, “Metaphor” [1972], pp. 28, 30.) But what 
does Armstrong actually mean when he cleverly turns this “pattern” around and says that Plato tries to ex-
plain the “known by the unknown”? In what way do we already “know” that which is being “explained by 
the unknown” in the theory of Forms? The theory is an attempt to explain precisely this relation of knowl-
edge (which can only concern something fixed, permanent, the same in one way or the other), even if this 
attempt fails. And the attempt does not fail only because the metaphor fails: the “poetic metaphor” is, for 
Aristotle, only a symptom of a more general failure of Platonism to account for the role of ideas with re-
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metaphor theory, “that the metaphor creates the similarity [rather than] formulates some simi-
larity antecedently existing” (Max Black),64  back to the Aristotelian ‘system’ which affirms 
an “eye for resemblance”, we might say that an ‘empty’ metaphor, or the ‘always obscure’ 
metaphor, fails to establish an underlying analogy. 
 As far as we know, metaphor enters the scene of theory65  in Aristotle’s Poetics; it is 
the first known text where the word metaphora is used in the sense of a specific figure of 
speech, and defined as such a figure. Aristotle was probably not the first to have used the 
word metaphora for this specific linguistic phenomenon. The name may have already been 
established as a term of rhetoric at the time he lectured on rhetoric and poetics. Nevertheless, 
the first known definition and theory of metaphor appear in the lectures whose surviving 
fragment is known to us by the name of Poetics, and in the third and final section of the more 
complete treatise called the Rhetoric. Let us cite in extenso what is usually given as Aris-
totle’s definition of metaphor in the twenty-first chapter of the Poetics: 
 
Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and 
applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one spe-
cies to another or else by analogy. [metafora\ de/ e0stin o0no/matoj a0llotri/ou 
e0pifora/ h)\ a)po\ tou= ge/nouj e)pi\ ei)=doj h)\ a)po\ tou= ei)/douj e)pi\ to\ ge/noj h)\ a)po\ tou= 
ei)/douj e)pi\ ei)=doj h)\ kata\ to\ a)na/logon.] An example of a term transferred from ge-
nus to species is “Here stands my ship.” Riding at anchor is a species of standing. 
[le/gw de\ a)po\ ge/nouj me\n e)pi\ ei)=doj oi(=on “nhu=j de/ moi h(/d' e(/sthken:” to\ ga\r 
o(rmei=n e)stin e(sta/nai ti.] An example of transference from species to genus is “In-
deed ten thousand noble things Odysseus did,” for ten thousand, which is a species of 
many, is here used instead of the word “many.” [a)p' ei)/douj de\ e)pi\ ge/noj “h)= dh\ muri/'  
)Odusseu\j e)sqla\ e)/orgen:” to\ ga\r muri/on polu/ e)stin, w(=? nu=n a)nti\ tou= pollou= 
ke/xrhtai.] An example of transference from one species to another is “Drawing off 
his life with the bronze” and “Severing with the tireless bronze,” where “drawing off” 
is used for “severing” and “severing” for “drawing off,” both being species of “re-
moving.” [a)p' ei)/douj de\ e)pi\ ei)=doj oi(=on “xalkw=? a)po\ yuxh\n a)ru/saj” kai\ “temw\n 
tanah/kei+ xalkw=?:” e)ntau=qa ga\r to\ me\n a)ru/sai tamei=n, to\ de\ tamei=n a)ru/sai 
ei)/rhken: a)/mfw ga\r a)felei=n ti/ e)stin.] Metaphor by analogy means this: when B is 
to A as D is to C, then instead of B the poet will say D and B instead of D. [to\ de\ 
a)na/logon le/gw, o(/tan o(moi/wj e)/xh? to\ deu/teron pro\j to\ prw=ton kai\ to\ 
te/tarton pro\j to\ tri/ton: e)rei= ga\r a)nti\ tou= deute/rou to\ te/tarton h)\ a)nti\ tou= 
teta/rtou to\ deu/teron.] And sometimes they add that to which the term supplanted 
by the metaphor is relative. For instance, a cup is to Dionysus what a shield is to Ares; 
so he will call the cup “Dionysus’s shield” and the shield “Ares’ cup.” [kai\ e)ni/ote 
prostiqe/asin a)nq' ou(= le/gei pro\j o(/ e)sti. le/gw de\ oi(=on o(moi/wj e)/xei fia/lh pro\j 
                                                                                                                                                        
spect to “other things”.  Julia Annas sums up an important problem in Plato’s theory from Aristotle’s view-
point: “Plato often tends to think of Forms in such a way that a Form can be taken to be both a characteristic 
and a perfect example of that characteristic. The Form of Beauty in the Symposium, for example, seems to 
be both what makes all beautiful things beautiful and also itself a supremely beautiful object.” (Annas’s in-
troduction to her translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books M  and N , translated with introduction and 
notes by Julia Annas [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976], p. 14.) 
64 “Metaphor”, in Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press 1962), pp. 25-47, here p. 37. 
65 Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Le retrait de la métaphore”: “la métaphore peut-être se retire, se retire de la scène 
mondiale, et s’en retire au moment de sa plus envahissante extension” (in Psyché — inventions de l’autre 
[1987; or second, augmented edition in two volumes, vol. I, Paris: Galilée, 1998], pp. 63-93, here p. 65). 
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Dio/nuson kai\ a)spi\j pro\j  )/Arh: e)rei= toi/nun th\n fia/lhn a)spi/da Dionu/sou kai\ 
th\n a)spi/da fia/lhn )/Arewj.] Or old age is to life as evening is to day; so he will call 
the evening “day’s old-age” or use Empedocles’ phrase; and old age he will call “the 
evening of life” or “life’s setting sun.” [h)\ o(\ gh=raj pro\j bi/on, kai\ e(spe/ra pro\j 
h(me/ran: e)rei= toi/nun th\n e(spe/ran gh=raj h(me/raj h)\ w(/sper )Empedoklh=j, kai\ to\ 
gh=raj e(spe/ran bi/ou h)\ dusma\j bi/ou.] Sometimes there is no word for some of the 
terms of the analogy but the metaphor can be used all the same. For instance, to scat-
ter seed is to sow, but there is no word for the action of the sun in scattering its fire. 
Yet this has to the sunshine the same relation as sowing has to the seed, and so you 
have the phrase “sowing the god-created fire.” [e)ni/oij d' ou)k e)/stin o)/noma kei/menon 
tw=n a)na/logon, a)ll' ou)de\n h(=tton o(moi/wj lexqh/setai: oi(=on to\ to\n karpo\n me\n 
a)fie/nai spei/rein, to\ de\ th\n flo/ga a)po\ tou= h(li/ou a)nw/numon: a)ll' o(moi/wj e)/xei 
tou=to pro\j to\n h(/lion kai\ to\ spei/rein pro\j to\n karpo/n, dio\ ei)/rhtai “spei/rwn 
qeokti/stan flo/ga.”] Besides this another way of employing metaphor is to call a 
thing by the strange name and then to deny it some attribute of that name. For in-
stance, suppose you call the shield not “Ares’ cup” but a “wineless cup.” [e)/sti de\ tw=? 
tro/pw? tou/tw? th=j metafora=j xrh=sqai kai\ a)/llwj, prosagoreu/santa to\ 
a)llo/trion a)pofh=sai tw=n oi)kei/wn ti, oi(=on ei) th\n a)spi/da ei)/poi fia/lhn mh\  
)/Arewj a)ll' a)/oinon.]66  
 
This definition can be divided into three sections. The first part is what I would call the ge-
neric formula: “Metaphor is the application of a strange term”, or in other words: “Metaphor 
(meta-phora) consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else”, as Colin 
Murray Turbayne translates the formula.67  The second part can be designated as consisting of 
formal specifications: “the transference (epi-phora) [as] being either from genus to species, 
or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on the grounds of analogy.”68  The 
third part of the definition consists of examples of metaphor, and it seems indeed that the 
definition is not complete without these instantiations and what can be inferred from them. 
And the instantiations can be multiplied ad infinitum upon this “propositional function, in 
which infinite concrete instances can be inserted”, as Umberto Eco remarks in his rich, valu-
able and detailed discussion of Aristotle’s definition,  which, as he continues, “represented a 
stroke of genius”.69  However, within this definition, or elsewhere as far as I can see, Aristotle 
does not explicitly provide all the necessary grounds for differentiating metaphor from other 
kinds of logical operations between species and genera or by analogy. This lack has been 
brought into relief by C. M. Turbayne.  
                                                 
66 Po. 21, 1457b6-33. Trans. W. H. Fyfe; ed. Kassel. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 23, translated by W.H. Fyfe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), PDLP. 
67  The Myth of Metaphor, p. 11. Or as S. H. Butcher [1911] translates: “the application of an alien name by 
transference…”, or as Richard Janko [1987]: “A ‘metaphor’ is the application [to something] of a name be-
longing to something else”. (The addition in square brackets is by Janko.) 
68 Turbayne’s translation and emphasis. Turbayne does not quite explain why he adds the transliterated words 
meta-phora and epi-phora and hyphenates them. 
69 Umberto Eco, “The Scandal of Metaphor: Metaphorology and Semiotics”, trans. Christopher Paci in col-
laboration with the author, in Poetics Today Vol. 4, No. 2, Metaphor (1983), pp. 217-257, here p. 226. With 
regard to the discussion to follow, it must be mentioned that also Eco, in passing, points to the fact that 
“when someone creates metaphors, he is literally speaking, lying — as everybody knows” (p. 219). 
36 Counter-figures
 As has been observed by Jay T. Keehley, it is a question of “perhaps the definitive 
property of metaphors: their ‘as-iffness’ or ‘pretense-that.’”70  And this definitive property is 
not given by Aristotle in his definition. Rather, it must be inferred from his examples; it 
seems to be a clarification given by metaphor. 
 First of all, to say that metaphor consists of giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else, is to provide only the genus of metaphor, and not only the general definition 
for different kinds of metaphor, but the genus under which metaphor belongs, as a species of 
“sort-crossing”.71  The generic formula defines only what Turbayne, in his very interesting 
account of the first two parts of this definition, calls “sort-crossing”, which is far broader than 
what we have come, following Aristotle, to call metaphor. It is indeed also broader than what 
Aristotle himself means by this term. This lack of differentiation in the generic formula can 
be illustrated by Turbayne’s remarkable example: “When I say that the timber-wolf is a wolf 
I am actually giving to timber-wolves a name that belongs to other wolves, and I mean that 
the timber-wolf is a sort included in the larger sort wolf” (The Myth of Metaphor, p. 14). 
‘Sorts’ do not even have to be ‘crossed’ when something is called by the name belonging to 
something else: even when the singular being ‘becomes’ a particular wolf, even when the 
species timber wolf is predicated of this canine creature, and when the genus belonging to this 
species or the genus into which this species belongs, namely the sort wolf, is predicated of the 
species predicated of the individual, the individual wolf has been named by a name that be-
longs (also) to something else. It does of course belong originally and essentially to this par-
ticular canine animal, but this does not change the fact that the predication of essence (ousia, 
“thinghood”, traditionally translated as “substance”) is still predication, that ousia is one of 
the categories, and that its meaning is double: ousia is divided into the so-called first sub-
stance and second substance (first and second thinghood, to use Joe Sachs’s translation), 
broadly corresponding to the later terms existentia and essentia,72  and the second is predi-
cated of the first, the species or form of wolf or timber wolf is predicated of the individual 
being; it is not only the so-called ‘accidents’ that are predicated, and these are sometimes as-
sociated with genera; there is no such thing as ‘an animal’ without being some sort of animal, 
such as wolf or man; but this sort of generic predicate differs of course from such incidents as 
‘being a musician’ or ‘white-fanged’. These ways in which being is spoken of are not usually 
considered tropic uses of language, but they are indeed ‘figures’ and ‘tropes’ of being, in a 
broader sense, figures (schemata) taken on by the being pure and simple (to on haplôs le-
                                                 
70 Jay T. Keehley, “Metaphor Theories and Theoretical Metaphors”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research Vol. 39, No. 4 (June 1979), pp. 582-588, here p. 587. 
71  As Turbayne puts it, “the use of a sign in a sense different from the usual, which use I shall call ‘sort-
crossing’[…,] is the first defining feature of metaphor and, according to Aristotle, its genus” (The Myth of 
Metaphor, p. 11). 
72 Cf. Martin Heidegger, “Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins” (1941), in Nietzsche II (Pfullingen: 
Neske, 1961), p. 406, passim (also GA 6.2.). 
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gomenon), so to say.73  So metaphor is a sort of giving a thing a name that belongs to some-
thing else (too). 
 Of course, the pertinent species and genera  properly and essentially belong to the par-
ticular individual of which they are predicated (Socrates is a human being and human beings 
are animals in possession of logos), and all the predicables (definition, property, genus, and 
accident) may be ‘properly’ predicated of the hypokeimenon or “first thinghood”; in this 
sense they are not allotrios, namely belonging exclusively to something else.74  But the values 
of inclusion and exclusion could precisely substitute the opposition between contiguity and 
resemblance, in order to distinguish metonymy and metaphor from each other. When I speak 
of ‘sails’ instead of ‘ships’, when I say ‘court’ instead of the “persons and proceedings” in-
cluded in “the place” also or “primarily” called “court” (“[court] primarily meaning the place 
but including the persons and proceedings”; OED), I am speaking in terms which either in-
clude one another or are included in a common  relation of relations, either material or logi-
cal, or within a common ‘semantic field’. This is the case with metonymy (and synecdoche), 
but this is not the case with metaphor, namely metaphor by analogy. So this seems to be a 
matter of translation: “belonging to another” is not a sufficient rendering of allotrios, but 
“strange” and “alien” are also too vague. But to say that it is a question of a name (or term) 
that belongs exclusively to something else does not apply to all of Aristotle’s types and ex-
amples of metaphor, as we shall see. 
 The second part of the definition, providing the formal specifications in addition to 
the generic formula, is still far too broad to provide the needed differentiae. The formal defi-
                                                 
73 “But since being, spoken of simply, is meant in more than one way, of which one is incidental, another is as 
the true (and nonbeing as the false), and besides these there are the modes of predication (such as what, of 
what sort, how much, where, and when something is, and anything else ‘is’ means in this way), and still be-
sides all these being-potentially and being-at-work [...].” [a)ll' e)pei\ to\ o)\n to\ a(plw=j lego/menon le/getai 
pollaxw=j, w(=n e(\n me\n h)=n to\ kata\ sumbebhko/j, e(/teron de\ to\ [35] w(j a)lhqe/j, kai\ to\ mh\ o)\n w(j to\ 
yeu=doj, para\ tau=ta d' e)sti\ ta\ sxh/mata th=j kathgori/aj oi(=on to\ me\n ti/, to\ de\ poio/n, to\ de\ poso/n, 
to\ de\ pou/, to\ de\ pote/, kai\ ei)/ ti a)/llo shmai/nei to\n tro/pon tou=ton), e)/ti para\ tau=ta pa/nta to\ 
duna/mei kai\ e)nergei/a|:] (Met. VI, 2, 1026a33ff. Trans. Joe Sachs, in Aristotle’s Metaphysics [2002], p. 111. 
The Greek text: Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed. W.D. Ross [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924]; PDLP.) Cf. Der-
rida, “Le supplément de copule”, in Marges — de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, cop. 1972, repr. 1997), pp. 
219-220. 
74 Cf. LSJ: “a)llo/trioj  [...] / A. of or belonging to another, bi/otoj, nhu=j, a)/xea , Od.1.160, 9.535, 
Il.20.298; gunh/ another man's wife, A.Ag.448 (lyr.); a)llotri/wn xari/sasqai to [p. 71] be bountiful of 
what is another's, Od.17.452; gnaqmoi=si geloi/wn a)llotri/oisin with faces unlike their own, of a forced, 
unnatural laugh, ib.20.347; a). o)/mmasin ei(=rpon by the help of another's eyes, S.OC 146(lyr.); ou)k a). a)/thn 
not inflicted by other hands, Id.Ant.1259; but a). fo/noj murder of a stranger (cf. 11.1), Pl.Euthphr.4b: 
prov., a). a)ma=n qe/roj reap where one has not sown, Ar.Eq.392, cf. Hes.Th.599; a)llotriwta/toij toi=j 
sw/masin xrh=sqai deal with one's body as if it belonged to another, Th.1.70; ta\ a)llo/tria, contr. 
ta)llo/tria, what belongs to others, not one's own, ta). a)posterei=n, deipnei=n, X.Ages.4.1, Theopomp. 
Com.34. / II. opp. oi)kei=oj, foreign, strange, [...]” [etc.] So allotrios is defined, delimited, distinguished by 
its opposition to oikeios, being not one’s own, not one of one’s own possessions, not of one’s own nature, 
but something belonging to another, or unnatural, foreign, strange; moral values seem to penetrate the 
whole series of these acceptations: you are not supposed to touch what belongs to another, another man’s 
wife for example, not to take upon yourself a face unlike your own and  laugh a forced, unnatural laugh, and 
so on. 
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nition, consisting of the generic formula and the further specifications concerning the logical 
operations in terms of species and genera and proportion, gives the outlines to what may be 
more properly called ‘sort-crossing’. But if we define metaphor as sort-crossing, it would re-
main “logically indistinguishable from trope, the use of a word or phrase in a sense other than 
that which is proper to it”, as Turbayne says. The term ‘proper’ means here primarily ‘usual’, 
as in Turbayne’s first definition of sort-crossing as “the use of a sign in a sense different from 
the usual” (The Myth of Metaphor, p. 11). The sort-crossing (basically consisting of various 
logical relations between species and genera) that Aristotle calls by the name ‘metaphor’ 
covers a certain variety of tropes, also those that would later be designated by the names me-
tonymy and synecdoche and also catachresis. Only on further examination do we discover 
that Aristotle, just as the tradition following him, seems to prefer the analogical meta-phora 
to the other types of this epi-phora or this sort-crossing. But this specific difference belong-
ing to the ‘genus’ of ‘meta-phora’, namely the analogical or proportional metaphor, which 
has usually been considered as metaphor proper, also covers the phenomenon of catachresis 
(which means, in Turbayne’s definition, “giving the thing which lacks a proper name a name 
that belongs to something else”), the catachresis of metaphor.  
 Nevertheless, just as Turbayne suggests, “Aristotle apparently regarded the features 
that distinguish metaphor from trope [in general] as psychological, but he did not specify 
them” (The Myth of Metaphor, pp. 11-12). The formal definition is not yet sufficient to dif-
ferentiate metaphor with regard to the trope in its more or less broad acceptations. By more 
or less broad, I mean what I called the ‘tropes’ of being, the schemata of categorial predica-
tion that actually classify as propositions (S-copula-P) on the one hand, and on the other, the 
more or less unusual or unorthodox ways of using words, such as the explicitly figurative 
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and catachresis. At first it seems that the tropes that the 
later tradition has defined as metonymy, synecdoche and catachresis are, for Aristotle, subdi-
visions of metaphor. But there is an important distinction to be made between metaphor and 
these other tropes. Metonymies, synecdoches and catachreses are often very close to what we 
call literal language, or the standard application of words. To be more precise, this proximity 
or rather assimilation to literal or proper usage happens by catachresis, which can be a cata-
chresis of metaphor as well as a catachresis of synecdoche or of metonymy. Metaphor proper, 
without catachresis, has an extra feature, the implicit psychological feature which Turbayne 
just a couple of pages later reveals: “The use of metaphor involves the pretense that some-
thing is the case when it is not. That pretense is involved is only sometimes disclosed by the 
author” (p. 13). This extra feature that distinguishes metaphor from the figures of predication 
(or any naming by another’s name in general, when it is not figurative or tropic in any obvi-
ous sense: family names are a case in point) and from what Pierre Fontanier calls “not true 
figures [non vraies figures]”, namely catachreses (cf. Les figures du discours, pp. 213ff), is 
not immediately clear or explicit in Aristotle’s definition, but must be inferred from the third 
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part of the so-called definition, namely the examples he uses within the definitory passage of 
the Poetics’ chapter 21, while “sort-crossing” in general does not always have to involve this 
feature of conscious pretense, “the as if or make-believe” (The Myth of Metaphor, p. 17).75 
 We leave the guidance of Turbayne’s very helpful analysis of the Aristotelian defini-
tion after a final quotation, namely his own definition of metaphor, derived not only from his 
analysis of Aristotle but also from Gilbert Ryle’s “alternative definition of category-mistake”, 
combining two somewhat antithetic conceptual moments: “sort-crossing or the fusion of dif-
ferent sorts, and the pretense or as if feature” (The Myth of Metaphor, p. 18). Perhaps these 
two moments could be called the epiphoric and the diaphoric moment of metaphor: the 
epi-phoric assimilation and the dia-phoric consciousness of the actually irreducible differ-
ence between the assimilated. The differentiating dia-phora is the necessary counter-figure to 
the assimilating epi-phora within the structure of the figure called meta-phora itself. 
                                                 
75 Turbayne continues: “When Descartes says that the world is a machine or when I say with Seneca that man 
is a wolf, and neither of us intends our assertions to be taken literally but only metaphorically, both of us are 
aware, first, that we are sort-crossing, that is, re-presenting the facts of one sort in the idioms appropriate to 
another, or, in other words, of the duality of sense. I say ‘are aware,’ but of course, we must be, otherwise 
there can be no metaphor. We are aware, secondly, that we are treating the world and man as if they belong 
to new sorts.” (The Myth of Metaphor, p. 17.) Let it be noted in passing, that when such scholars as Freud 
and Jakobson seem to extend to the realm of the subconscious the meaning of what more or less corre-
sponds to the traditional concepts of metaphor and metonymy, they do hesitate to completely associate their 
discoveries with these concepts. The concepts of Traumdeutung (GW II/III) such as Verdichtung and Ver-
schiebung are actually not directly associated with metaphor and metonymy by Freud himself, but by Lacan 
(cf. “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud”, in Écrits I, Nouvelle édition 
[Paris: Seuil, 1999], pp. 490-526; “Appendice II: La métaphore du sujet”, in Écrits II, Nouvelle édition 
[Paris: Seuil, 1999], pp. 359-363). Verdichtung or “condensation” is in Jakobson’s view rather synecdochic 
than metaphorical, and in his terminology, Verschiebung or “displacement” is metonymic. These both thus 
belong to the side of contiguity, while “identification and symbolism” belong to the axis of similarity (“Two 
Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances”, 1956, in Jakoson and M. Halle, Fundamen-
tals of Language, 4th ed. 1980, pp. 67-96, here p. 95). However, Freud indeed speaks of the “symbolism” of 
dreams and Jakobson sees in actual metaphor and metonymy the distinct manifestations of the fundamental 
and mostly non-thematic (‘unconscious’) processes of language belonging to the axes of selection and com-
bination, paradigm and syntagm, similarity and contiguity. These “find their most condensed expression in 
metaphor and metonymy respectively”, and therefore Jakobson names the two semantic lines taken by a de-
velopment of discourse the “METAPHORIC way” and the “METONYMIC way”, which should be the “most ap-
propriate term[s]”, while he nevertheless makes the clear distinction between these ways of development 
and their actual expressions in (conscious) tropes of metaphor and metonymy (p. 90). Actually Jakobson 
seems to approve of how H. Jackson has termed the expressions, such as “Spyglass for microscope, or fire 
for gaslight”, used by a patient who suffers from the contiguity disorder, “QUASI-METAPHORIC EXPRESSIONS 
[...] since, in contradistinction to rhetoric or poetic metaphors, they present no deliberate transfer of mean-
ing” (p. 86). Lacan’s use of the terms ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonymy’, as an adaptation of Freud’s Verdichtung
and Verschiebung, will be ignored in the present study. As Lacan himself observes, his use of the term 
‘metaphor’ deviates from the traditional Aristotelian schema of the proportional analogy: “On peut 
s’étonner que j’éprouve le besoin de pousser les choses aussi loin concernant la métaphore.” (Écrits II, 
p. 362.) The fact that we shall, apart from this brief note, disregard Lacan’s discussion, is not meant to 
suggest that it is uninteresting, but just that it lies beyond the scope of the present treatise. His unorthodox
redefinition of metaphor is actually very interesting indeed, since it suggests the metonymic motivation 
of the metaphor: “L’étincelle créatrice de la métaphore ne jaillit pas de la mise en présence de deux
images, c’est-à-dire de deux signifiants également actualisés. Elle jaillit entre deux signifiants dont l’un
s’est substitué à l’autre en prenant sa place dans la chaîne signifiante, le signifiant occulté restant présent 
de sa connexion (métonymique) au reste de la chaîne.” (Écrits I, p. 504.) 
40 Counter-figures
 The definition of metaphor, Aristotle’s or anyone’s,76  seems at first glance itself 
metaphorical. The alleged definition of metaphor applies itself to itself. This circularity, the 
involvement of the definiendum in the definiens, and Aristotle’s own words about the mutual 
exclusion of metaphor and definition taken into account,77  is scandalous. But this scandal 
does not lend metaphor, or rather the concept of metaphor, more credibility, in the sense that 
metaphor is so omnipresent that it even defines itself. To the contrary, this makes it rather 
more suspicious. It should lead us to question why should we not, then, generalize the concept 
so that it becomes a basic, inescapable feature of all language, and this is indeed what many 
have already done, perhaps without asking some further questions concerning, for instance, 
the status of Aristotle’s discourse on metaphor as a discourse. The apparent metaphoricity of 
Aristotle’s alleged definition of metaphor should lead us to question whether Aristotle him-
self never saw the things in this light; further, in case he did  perceive this dilemma, how 
could he get away with it; if he did perceive it, why did it not bother him any more than it 
seems to have done, namely, not at all. Nothing prevents us from considering Aristotle’s 
definition of metaphor, or the short formula which has so often been considered as his defini-
tion of metaphor (which it cannot be, however, as we have already seen), in terms of this 
definition itself, except the fact that it is situated in a discourse which behaves like an argu-
ment or systematic exposition, and except the fact that the basic rules of definition, laid out 
by Aristotle, prohibit the inclusion of the definiendum in the definiens, and exclude the use of 
metaphor in defining anything.  
 However, when we deal with metaphors, we are dealing with isolated sentences and 
single words detached from their context. If we apply this principle to Aristotle’s definition 
itself and sever the generic formula or its terms (metaphora, epiphora, allotrios) from their 
context, nothing prevents us from considering them as metaphorically used words, as a meta-
phorical sentence. Or is there another “psychological feature” that prevents this self-
application? Let us see. 
                                                 
76 A remarkable example, from Nelson Goodman: “Briefly, a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a 
past and an object that yields while protesting.” (Languages of Art, an Approach to a Theory of Symbols 
[2nd ed., 5th pr.] [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1985 [1st ed. 1968], p. 69.) Cf. Paul Ricœur: “Céder en prot-
estant, voilà, sous forme de métaphore, notre paradoxe : la protestation est ce qui reste du mariage ancien — 
l’assignation littérale — que la contradiction défait ; céder est ce qui arrive finalement par la grâce du rap-
prochement nouveau.” (La métaphore vive [Paris: Seuil, 1975], p. 249. Cf. also pp. 296-297, and Ricœur’s 
comment on Goodman’s description: “On parle encore de la métaphore en termes de métaphore : mais cette 
fois l’écran, le filtre, la grille, la lentille cèdent la place à l’union charnelle!”. The choice of these meta-
phorical names for metaphor is interesting with respect to the allusion to hymen: the screen — which could 
also be a filter — and the filter, the grating, the lense, all these photographic images give way to intercourse, 
a penetration. But non-penetration, non-perpetration are features of the Mallarméan hymen, which is no 
longer metaphorical: cf. Derrida, “La double séance”, in La dissémination [Paris: Seuil, cop. 1972, repr. 
1997].) 
77 “If we are to avoid arguing in metaphors, clearly we must also avoid defining in metaphors and defining 
metaphorical terms [dh=lon o3ti ou0d' o9ri/zesqai ou1te metaforai=j ou1te o#sa le/getai metaforai=j]; oth-
erwise we are bound to argue in metaphors [diale/gesqai ga\r e1stai metaforai=j].” (An. Post. 97b37, 
trans. Tredennick. Cf. Top. VIII, 3.) 
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 The generic formula, which itself appears to be metaphorical or at least provokes 
metaphorical allusions (epiphora, in its juxtaposition with allotrios, could be ‘dowry’, and so 
on),78  must be supplemented, not only with the formal classifications (which are still too 
general), but with examples, instantiations of metaphor. And from these we must infer a cer-
tain ‘psychological’ distinctive feature, namely the feature of pretense, “the as if or make-
believe” (Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor, p. 17). 
                                                
 Aristotle’s definition is perhaps not yet a sufficient definition of metaphor, insofar as 
we consider it only as to its formal characterizations: none of these applications of a name 
belonging to another, the transference from species to genus, from genus to species, from 
species to species nor the transference by analogy, has to be metaphorical in the sense that 
Aristotle seems to ascribe to this term. Firstly, there is a certain contradistinction between the 
first three types of ‘metaphor’ on the one hand, and the most prominent type, namely the 
metaphor by analogy, on the other. The transferences that the later tradition has rather called 
metonymy or synecdoche are not always such that a ‘name’ belonging to another (allotrios) 
is applied, and this is even clear from the examples used by Aristotle: ‘to ride at anchor’ be-
longs to ‘standing’ in a large sense, as a species belongs to its genus (while we can also say 
that a genus belongs to its species, as Aristotle elsewhere points out; the sense of ‘standing’ 
belongs to the meaning of ‘lying at anchor’), ‘ten thousand’ or a ‘myriad’ belongs to ‘many’, 
and ‘drawing off’ instead of ‘severing’ and ‘severing’ instead of ‘drawing off’ both belong to 
‘removing’. It seems that an extra feature has to be ‘induced’ from these examples in order to 
understand why an “alien name” or “strange term” is thought to be involved in such transfer-
ences. Namely, all of these examples seem to involve a moment of fiction, “make-believe” as 
Turbayne puts it or, to use Nietzsche’s characterization of metaphor, a “lie in an extra-moral 
sense”, all except perhaps the first which says “here stands my ship”,79  in which the transla-
tion does not seem to account for the “application of a strange term”, since this application 
seems to imply no ‘live metaphor’ at all; but to use estanai instead of hormein is to use a 
 
78 Cf. Liddell – Scott – Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ): “e)pife/rw  [...] — bring, put or lay upon [...] 2. 
place upon, esp. of placing offerings on the grave [...] lay on, apply, ? fa/rmakon Pl[ato] Ep.354b ?[...] 3. bring 
as a charge against [...] 4. bring, i.e. confer, impose upon, in good or bad sense [...] 5. add to, increase [...] 6. 
give a name to, o)/noma e). tini/ Pl[ato], Plt. 307b, R. 596a, al., Arist. Rh. 1408a7, al.; assign an attribute to a 
substantive [...] Pl. Sph. 251a. [...] 10. In [Stoic] Logic, assert as a conclusion or inference [...] II. Med., 
bring with or upon oneself, bring as a dowry [ou)de\n e)piferome/nhn, Lysias 19.14] 2. consume (eat) in addi-
tion [...] 3. wear or carry on one’s person [...] III. pass. [...] 4. of phrases, to be applied [etc.]”; “e)pifora/ , h(, 
(e)pife/rw) bringing to or upon : hence, 1. donative, extra pay [...] 2. application, o)noma/twn Pl[ato] Lg. 
944b, cf. Cra. 430d. 3. second course [at dinner] [...] 5. application, th\n th=j ai)sqh/sewj e). poiei=sqai to 
concentrate attention, Plu[tarch] 2.1144b. [...] II. (from Pass.) offering made at the grave, Plu. Num. 22.  2. 
impact, [...] sudden attack [...] attack of an orator, [...] 3. vehemence in oratory, [...] 5. Medic. epiphora, per-
sistent flow of tears, as a disease [...] III. Rhet., second clause in a sentence [...] 2. repetition [...] 3. succes-
sion of clauses ending in the same word [...] IV. in Stoic Logic, the conclusion of a syllogism [...] 2. ques-
tion at issue [etc.]” (LSJ/PDLP.) It must be noted that Aristotle’s use of the term epiphora is based on an 
already established usage that is equivalent to the “application (of a name)” or “attribution”. 
79  “Here stands my ship [nhu=j de/ moi h(/d' e(/sthken:]” is from the Odyssey, I, 185 and XXIV, 308 (cf. Janko 
[1987] ad 1457b10). 
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general term instead of the specific verb reserved for ‘riding at anchor’, a proper name of 
sorts, and in this sense it is a deviation from the ordinary usage.80  Nevertheless, murion, “ten 
thousand” or “numberless” as the amount of Odysseus’ noble deeds is a sort of hyperbolical 
approximation for a great number, a ‘myriad’;81  “drawing off” or “severing” are indeed lit-
eral ways of “removing” something, but here the ‘thing’ removed is the life or the soul of a 
man, and only this connection seems to make these ‘removals’ metaphorical, since we may 
always ask whether anybody has ever seen or experienced how a soul is removed, drawn off 
or severed with a “bronze” from the body?  
 Chalkos, which is a common metonymy in Greek poetry “for anything made of metal” 
(LSJ), stands for a sword in the first of these two examples, and it has been suggested that a 
“cupping-bowl” is the referent of the second; it could also refer to “drawing water”.82  It is 
easy to see that many of Aristotle’s exemplary ‘metaphors’ in the context of the ‘definition’ 
are complex figures, involving not only one kind of trope but rather woven of several, like 
these two that illustrate the transference from species to species and employ this metonymy 
of ‘bronze’. Not to mention the riddles that provide good metaphors and can be composed of 
several, i.e. of several metaphorical words, such as the other cupping-bowl example that Aris-
totle repeatedly refers to: “I saw a man who welded bronze on another man by fire.”83  But it 
also seems that for Aristotle, each metaphorically used vocable is an individual metaphor.  
 In the case of the analogical metaphors, the examples are, if possible, even more 
clearly fictitious or mythical. But who says that for the Greeks, or for the pre-Aristotelian 
Greek poets, “the god-created flame” was a metaphor for the sun or its light? The concept of 
metaphor inaugurated by Aristotle is a way to relate the ‘primitive’ myth to epistemic con-
cerns, such as the episteme of the phusis. 
 The generic formula with its term allotrios must not be severed from the rest of the 
definition, or vice versa, because every transference from species to genus, from genus to 
                                                 
80 On these verbs, cf. the OED entry “stand, v.” (OED,50236064) (“[32.]b. Of a ship: To ride at anchor”) and 
the LSJ entries o9rme/w (“to be moored, lie at anchor, of a ship”) and i3sthmi (“[IV.]B. Pass. and intr. tenses 
of Act., to be set or placed, stand, Hom. etc.”). 
81 LSJ gives “numberless” or “countless” as a primary meaning for muri/oj and the exact number “ten thou-
sand” appears first as assigned to this term in Hesiod. The example (“h] dh\ muri/  0Odusseu\j e)sqla\ 
e)/orgen”) is taken from the Iliad, II, 272 (cf. Janko ad 1457b11). 
82 Fyfe adds a note to this: “Probably ‘the bronze’ is in the first case a knife and in the second a cupping-bowl. 
This would make the metaphor intelligible.” Butcher translates as follows: “From species to species, as: 
‘With blade of bronze drew away the life,’ and ‘Cleft the water with the vessel of unyielding bronze.’ Here 
arusai, ‘to draw away’ is used for tamein, ‘to cleave,’ and tamein, again for arusai – each being a species of 
taking away.” For two other metaphors with a cupping-bowl (or cupping-glass, as this instrument is more 
often called) as their referent, this time more specifically a riddle, cf. Rh. III, 3, 1405b1f. and Po. 22, 
1458a29-30, where it is a question of the following example: “I saw a man who welded bronze on another 
man by fire (a1ndr’ ei]don puri\ xalko\n e0p’ a0ne/ri kollh/santa)” (trans. Golden). But Janko writes (ad 
1457b13-14): “Both quotations are from Empedocles (see on 47b18), whom Aristotle regarded as a genius 
of metaphor. The first (frag. 138D) refers apparently to killing a man, the second  (frag. 143D) to drawing 
water.” 
83 “a1ndr’ ei]don puri\ xalko\n e0p’ a0ne/ri kollh/santa” (Po. 1458a29f.; cf. Rh. II, 2, 1405a35-b6; cf. Po. 22, 
1458a21-30.) 
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species, from species to species or by analogy does not have to be metaphorical, and because 
in order to be metaphorical, such a transference or attribution (epiphora) must be deviant, and 
the examples are indispensable in order that we can ‘induce’ the feature that belongs to this 
deviation, namely the rhetorically stylistic or poetical function of this deviance becomes ap-
parent. Aristotle must restrict the scope of metaphor to a certain unorthodox usage of lan-
guage, even though the ability to use metaphor well is an extraordinary gift of nature, or a 
token of a common gift that belongs to man by nature. Not only a talent common to both the 
poet and the philosopher but, at least in principle, common to all mankind or man’s essence 
(of which an individual human being can always be deprived de facto, of course, by privation 
of what belongs to him de jure, as his birthright). 
 In metaphor, the epiphor must be accompanied by a diaphoric moment,84  and Aris-
totle’s definition states this quite clearly by the word allotrios. So, to speak of metaphor as a 
deviant predication in the manner of the modern theorists is only a commentary on Aristotle’s 
theory and an explication of its implications and not its complete revision. To put it briefly 
and perhaps provocatively: All that can be said on metaphor can be found in Aristotle al-
ready.85  That is, inasmuch as his statements also contradict each other in a remarkable way: 
                                                 
84 To be sure, this is not the only way to understand the contradistinction of epiphor and diaphor. Epiphora 
has been translated by modern authors as either transport (Guy Bouchard, Procès de la métaphore [1984], 
pp. 270-271n3; 284n14) or transference (I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric [1950], p. 135). 
Diaphora is most usually rendered as “difference”. However, Philip Wheelwright conceives of the pair 
epiphor (“which is usually translated ‘transference’”) — diaphor as follows: “For whereas ‘epiphor’ con-
notes a semantic movement (phora) from something on to (epi-) something else, the word ‘diaphor’ con-
notes a semantic movement through (dia-) a grouping of several particulars. [...] [A]nd I would suggest that 
a metaphor is perhaps epiphoric to the extent that an antecedent resemblance is effective, diaphoric to the 
extent that the significant resemblance is that which has been induced by, and is emergent from, the meta-
phor itself.” (“Semantics and Ontology” [1972], p. 67.) Douglas Berggren summarizes Wheelwright’s con-
ception as follows: “Diaphoric metaphor does not merely compare antecedently given similarities between 
principal and subsidiary subjects, but introduces new meaning by construing the one in terms of the other.” 
(“The Use and Abuse of Metaphor” [1962], s. 242.) The difference is between operating on an antecedent 
difference and making a difference (diaphora), i.e. producing a new ‘specific’ meaning, by introducing an 
‘epiphoric’ transfer, a quasi-identity across an antecedent difference. But metaphor also retains the antece-
dent tension while it negates some of the ordinary attributes of the “subsidiary subject” (“wineless cup” — 
which is actually quite a complex example). — A different view on epiphora could be ‘inferred’ from the 
fact that while metaphora has sometimes been translated into Latin as translatio, epiphora has been ren-
dered as illatio, these being participial forms of the verbs transferre and inferre. In Wilhelm von Moer-
beke’s translation (1278), Aristotle’s formula reads as follows: “Metaphora autem est nominis alieni illa-
tio.” (Thomas Schestag indicated this translation to me in his pre-examination report.) The ‘carrying over’ 
in metaphor would be established by ‘carrying in’, ‘bringing in’ or simply ‘applying’, ‘introducing’ an 
‘alien name’ for that which either already has or has not a name of its own. The verb “sowing” in the figure 
of “sowing the god-created fire” is Aristotle’s example of the latter situation, as we have seen, and it is 
clearly not a question of ‘substitution’ here. Whether it is simply a question of resemblance or rather of a 
more complex structure of analogy remains questionable (cf. Derrida, “La mythologie blanche”, pp. 290-
291). 
85 Cf. Paul Ricœur, La métaphore vive (Paris: Seuil, cop. 1975); Guy Bouchard, Le procés de la métaphore 
(Quebec: Hurtubise, 1984); and e.g. the following statement by Umberto Eco, with whose view I would 
partly agree, at least on this matter: “Not the least of the contradictions encountered in a ‘metaphorology’ is 
that, of the thousands and thousands of pages written about metaphor, few add anything of substance to the 
first two or three fundamental concepts stated by Aristotle. In effect, very little has been said about a phe-
nomenon concerning which, it seems, there is everything to say.” (“The Scandal of Metaphor” [1983], pp. 
217-218.)   
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metaphor both gives clarity and is always unclear. If this is true, if both of these claims are 
true at the same time, we must ask the question of metaphor’s givenness, or at least two ques-
tions: (1) What are the presuppositions for the concept of metaphor, the horizon upon which 
it can be given, stated or defined? (2) What is the horizon of the individual metaphor and why 
would Aristotle not consider some of the apparent metaphors in his own text, for instance, 
metaphorical? This second question should be examined with regard to the two forms of 
analogy, restricted and universal, the latter understood also as a quest for the systematization 
of human discourse (as an ‘onto-theological’ discourse, a systematization that proceeds also 
through a broadly speaking ‘doxographical’ analysis), but this project cannot be undertaken 
in the present context. 
 In any case, it seems that insofar as we consider Aristotle’s definition of metaphor in 
the terms that are provided by the definition itself, namely, if we consider its words and sen-
tences as detached from their context, without relating them to the overall discourse of which 
they are part (and the limits of this context are not easy to determine), the definition destroys 
itself as a definition. If we fold the definition back upon itself and consider the generic for-
mula and its single terms in isolation from the context, we see how metaphor refuses its name 
— declines its name, by definition. 
 The name metaphora derives from the verb metapherein [metafe/rein] — let us at 
least pretend that the verb and its infinitive form is the root of all the derived forms, for in-
stance the noun and the adjective. The adjective form metaphoretos appears in the second 
chapter of the fourth book of the Physics. There Aristotle discusses place, topos, and in that 
context the verb metapherein denotes concrete, let us say ‘physical’, transportation: 
 
Place seems to be something like a vessel [kai\ ga/r dokei= toiou=to/ ti ei]nai o9 to/poj 
oi[on to\ a0ggei=on], the vessel being a transportable place [e1sti ga\r to\ a0ggei=on 
to/poj metaforhto/j]. But the vessel is no part of the thing [to\ d’a0ggei=on ou0de\n 
tou= pra/gmato/j e0stin]. [Phys. IV, 2, 209b28-30.]86   
A vessel is a transportable place, topos metaphoretos. Quite literally too, as we may add. Ar-
istotle does not simply accept this seeming or supposed and logically dubious ‘likeness’ be-
tween place and vessel, of course. A jar is a sort of place, and indeed a portable, transportable 
place. It is topos insofar as it surrounds and limits that which is contained within it. But the 
nature of the topos requires that this figure, not yet sufficient in itself, be inverted. 
 The transportable place, namely the vessel, plays a remarkable role in the difficult 
discussion concerning place in the first to fifth chapter of the fourth book of the Physics. In 
the second chapter, the vessel is indeed a metaphorizable place (topos metaphoretos) since it 
appears to represent all place, place in general or the concept of place, as if it were not only 
                                                 
86 The translation by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye modified (Physics, in The Complete Works Of Aristotle, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes [Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1984]); the Greek text from Aristote, Physique (I-!V), T. I, 
texte établi et traduit par Henri Carteron (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1926). Cf. Joe Sachs’ translation: “And place 
seems to be something of the kind that a jar is (for the jar is a portable place), but the jar in no way belongs 
to the thing.” (Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study [2001], p. 98.) 
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an exemplary place but the metaphor of all place. But this metaphor is treated in a peculiar 
fashion which merits our specific attention. A second metaphor is to do away with the first in 
this economy. The vessel represents place as separate from its content, the thing contained, 
and namely, transportable. But place itself is immobile, unmovable or rather irremovable:  
 
As the vessel is transportable place, so place is a non-portable vessel [e1sti d’ w3sper 
to\ a0ggei=on to/poj metaforhto/j, ou3tw kai\ o9 to/poj a0ggei=on a0metaki/nhton]. 
[Phys. IV, 4, 212a14f.]87   
 
This chiasmatic formula, consisting of a double metaphor as it seems, resembles the last of 
Aristotle’s exemplary uses of metaphor in the twenty-first chapter of the Poetics, where Ares’ 
shield is called a “wineless cup” as according to the principle by which a strange term is first 
applied and then its usual attribute is denied, an operation which only follows the deviant at-
tribution as according to the analogy that constituted the expressions “Ares’ cup” and “Dio-
nysus’ shield” in the first place.88  But now the figure seems to be used as if to reveal that the 
analogy between the vessel and place in general is false or, rather, that the representation of 
all place by the exemplary ‘metaphorizable place’, the vessel, turns out to be insufficient. The 
vessel still metaphorizes place, but in order to do so, the first metaphor has to be undone by 
the second one: now place in general is not represented by a vessel as a transportable place, 
but by a non-portable (irremovable) vessel, or rather both in their chiasmatic crossing-
through. If the vessel, a transportable place, represents place in general, it fits the scheme of 
transference from species to genus. Place understood as a non-portable vessel may be taken 
as another kind of transference, from genus to species plus an explicit negation of an imperti-
nent attribute (portability, removability), but it may also be understood as an extension of the 
scope of the term “vessel” [a0ggei=on] by the very method of such transference and negation. 
This chiasmic configuration, and the whole dialectical discussion of place in Physics IV, 1-
4,89  lead to what would seem to be Aristotle’s concluding definition of place: “So that is 
what place is: the first unchangeable limit of that which surrounds.”90  In the systematic, dia-
                                                 
87 En. trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (1984); Greek text ed. Carteron (1926). Cf. Joe Sachs (2001): “But 
just as the jar is a portable place, so also place is an immovable jar.” Cf. Edward Hussey (Aristotle’s Phys-
ics, Books III and IV, trans. with notes by Edward Hussey [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983]): “Just as the 
vessel is a place which can be carried around, so place is a vessel which cannot be moved around.” 
88 It actually seems that in the metaphor of the “cup without wine”, not only wine but each and every attribute 
of the cup, except the strange and enigmatic detour through the emblem or metonymy of Dionysus, is being 
abstracted — the “wineless cup” standing for Ares’ shield is indeed a remarkable example of metaphor, 
quite different from the minimalism of, say, “Man is wolf”. 
89 “Dialectical” is to be understood here in the Aristotelian sense of dialectic as the method “by which (in the-
ory at least) the philosophical inquirer started from the accumulated material of common-sense intuitions, 
previous opinions of philosophers, and observed facts relevant to the subject, and ascended by a process of 
rational criticism and generalization to the correct account of the subject, which would usually be enshrined 
in a definition of the central term”; this is how Edward Hussey describes the “practice of Aristotelian dialec-
tic [which] is codified in the Topics, [while] Physics III and IV provide one of the earliest surviving exam-
ples of its application” (Aristotle’s Physics, Books III and IV, p. ix). 
90 “  3Wste to\ tou= perie/xontoj pe/raj a0ki/nhton prw=ton, tou=t’ e1stin o9 to/poj.” (Phys. IV, 4, 212a20-
21.) Trans. Hussey. The Greek text is from Carteron’s edition (1926); this is his translation: “Par suite la 
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lectical discussion which leads to this definition, the metaphors neutralize each other — or 
support each other, if you will, which is not a completely different matter, just a different 
‘metaphor’ — and reduce each other as metaphors. In this discursive systematization, they 
cease to be mere metaphors, if they ever were that, which is doubtful: a vessel is a transport-
able place, and the metaphor of place as a non-portable vessel needs this counterpart, this 
counter-figure in order to be reduced as metaphor, while of course the figure of the vessel as 
topos metaphoretos would remain incomplete, insufficient without its own chiasmatic coun-
terpart or counter-figure. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 In any case, this discussion of place is the ‘source domain’ from which Aristotle de-
rives the name for metaphor. Proper naming and defining, however, reject metaphor. If meta-
phor can only be named and defined by metaphor, if metaphor can only derive its name by 
metaphor, we must conclude that metaphor declines its name: the phenomenon named meta-
phor cannot be properly named or defined since proper naming and defining reject metaphor. 
The subject of the refusal is, in the first place, metaphor itself.91 
 It would therefore not be altogether impertinent to suggest that the concept of meta-
phor, bending back upon itself and indefinitely calling for renewed attention and greater pre-
cision, in order to differentiate it from what it is not, or contrarily, in order to extend its scope 
far beyond its traditional limits, is an undecidable concept of sorts. The concept of metaphor 
calls for an indeterminate discursive frame that is actually denied to the metaphor itself, and 
yet, it also remains itself so indeterminate that it seems to allow us to transfer it all over and 
expand its scope ad infimitum, since when considered narrowly enough, this concept seems to 
invite this very procedure of self-application, the unlimited metaphorization of metaphor. 
 If metaphor can only be named by metaphor, by transporting the name or definition 
from an alien ‘source domain’, does metaphor not refuse the possibility of giving the proper 
name to itself? This paradox has not escaped Pierre Fontanier’s attention, as he introduced 
the concept of catachresis or forced metaphor. A forced metaphor (métaphore forcée) is not 
properly a metaphor, it is a pseudo-figure (non vraie figure), and the word ‘figure’ itself is a 
catachresis and not a true figure, since the original sense of this word is to an extent incom-
patible with its catachrestic use. Incompatible to an extent, since there must be some analogi-
cal relation that has made it possible to use such a metaphor in the first place, to use such a 
pseudo-figurative metaphor in the absence of another word for the idea.92   
 
limite immobile immédiate de l’enveloppe, tel est le lieu.” 
91 According to Aristotle himself, metaphors cannot be used in defining; metaphor and definition are mutually 
exclusive. Metaphor should not enter the definition of metaphor, for two reasons at least: (1) the definien-
dum must not be used in the definiens, and (2) as Aristotle himself says, metaphorical speech is “always un-
clear” and therefore: “If we are to avoid arguing in metaphors, clearly we must also avoid defining in meta-
phors and defining metaphorical terms; otherwise we are bound to argue in metaphors.” (An. Post. 97b37, 
trans. Tredennick. Cf. Top. VIII, 3.) 
92 Pierre Fontanier, Les figures du discours, pp. 213-219 and p. 63: “Le mot figure n’a dû d’abord se dire, à ce 
qu’il paraît, que des corps, ou même que de l’homme et des animaux considérés physiquement et quant aux 
limites de leur étendue. Et, dans cette première acception, que signifie-t-il? Les contours, les traits, la forme 
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 Aristotle himself affirms that one may name by metaphor something hitherto un-
named.93  But his example of such metaphorical naming (namely “sowing the god-created 
fire”) could be considered poetic and expressly mythological, while in this context he says 
nothing of the parallel possibility of using metaphor in a theoretical discourse, such as his 
own theoretical discourse concerning metaphor. He seems to evade the question. And at once, 
the question does not evade his text: the formula reveals or re-marks its own method.  
 But why do we usually not make the mentioned self-application of Aristotle’s for-
mula? Perhaps there is another ‘psychological feature’ involved. We expect from the theo-
retical discourse a certain sincerity, no pretense and no dissimulation. This intentional fea-
ture, in two senses of the term ‘intentionality’, namely the generally phenomenological sense 
(directedness to something) and the sense related to the purposes and designs of a conscious 
subject, an author’s intentions, is irreducible insofar as we are to distinguish between theory 
and fiction. But this does not mean that we are automatically to expect pretense and insincere 
intentions from a literary text, or absence of all dissimulation, irony and figurativity from 
epistemic or theoretical discourse. 
 If reading Aristotle’s definition in its own terms, bending it back upon itself, seems 
sycophantic in the sense given to this term by Aristotle himself and relating to the reductio ad 
absurdum of an opponent’s metaphor,94  why should we accept that poetic texts are read in 
                                                                                                                                                        
extérieure d’un homme, d’un animal, ou d’un objet palpable quelconque. / Le discours, qui ne s’adresse 
qu’à l’intelligence de l’âme, n’est pas, même considéré quant aux mots qui le transmettent à l’âme par les 
sens, un corps proprement dit. Il n’a donc pas de figure, à proprement parler. Mais il a pourtant, dans ses 
différentes manières de signifier et d’exprimer, quelque chose d’analogue aux différences de forme et de 
traits qui se trouvent dans les vrais corps. C’est sans doute d’après cette analogie qu’on a dit par métaphore, 
Les figures du discours. Mais cette métaphore ne saurait être regardée comme une vraie figure, parce que 
nous n’avons pas dans la langue d’autre mot pour la même idée.” 
93 Cf. the definition already cited above: “Sometimes there is no word for some of the terms of the analogy but 
the metaphor can be used all the same. For instance, to scatter seed is to sow, but there is no word for the 
action of the sun in scattering its fire. Yet this has to the sunshine the same relation as sowing has to the 
seed, and so you have the phrase ‘sowing the god-created fire.’” (Po. 1457b25-30, trans. Fyfe.) This is fol-
lowed by the description of the type of metaphor that the “unmovable vessel” represents: “Besides this an-
other way of employing metaphor is to call a thing by the strange name and then to deny it some attribute of 
that name. For instance, suppose you call the shield not “Ares’ cup” but a “wineless cup” (b30-33). 
94 Aristotle has been criticized for reading his precursors or opponents too literally, and that is to say, for ap-
plying the “sycophantic” method of reducing metaphor to absurdity recommended in the Topics (cf. Top. 
139b34ff), a method that seems suspiciously sophistic. But in these occasions where he seems to interpret 
“vauge [sic] statements literally for polemic purposes” or to insist “on taking metaphor in philosophy liter-
ally”, he also shows that the theories of his opponents are “fundamentally wrong, not just mistaken in de-
tails”, as Julia Annas has argued in her commentary on the two last books of the Metaphysics (op. cit., pp. 
214-217). Aristotle’s criticism against Plato’s “poetic metaphors” is indeed a case in point. The aim of An-
nas’s work is to show that Aristotle’s treatise, in these concluding books of the Metaphysics, mainly con-
cerned with the philosophy of mathematics of the Platonists and the Pythagoreans, is not merely “a petti-
fogging discussion of mystical nonsense” (p. 1). However, we may indeed find passages of which we may 
say with Annas: “This [1092a29-b3] looks like a joking reduction to absurdity of metaphors about genera-
tion and parenthood in connection with numbers” (p. 217). Most often, in the passages commented on by 
Annas, the vagueness or metaphoricity of Aristotle’s opponents’ arguments is not their only fault and he is 
able to show that the non-metaphorical alternatives or theories “are fundamentally wrong, not just mistaken 
in details” (p. 217). Thus Aristotle’s method is not mere “sycophancy” in the sense given in the Topics 
(139b36). 
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terms of isolated words and sentences providing material for a theory of metaphor? If the phi-
losophical text is “allowed to deconstruct its own metaphors” (de Man), and is indeed ex-
pected to do so, why should we not allow poems, epic or tragic, or whatever their genre, a 
parallel force of deconstruction or reductio ad absurdum? Parallel, but not identical. 
 Perhaps the theories of metaphor should follow the example of, say, Max Black, and 
restrict themselves to such simple examples as “Man is a wolf”, “Smith is a pig”, “My sweet-
heart is my Schopenhauer”?95  It must be said in favour of Max Black that he wisely refuses 
to superimpose his theory of metaphor on to the more “complex” cases, as he calls them, in 
poetry and the discourse of mysticism, such as W. H. Auden’s verses “Oh dear white chil-
dren, casual as birds, / Playing amid the ruined languages”, and Thomas Browne’s apophatic 
sentence “light [is] but the shadow of God”;96  both of these are meta-rhetorical rather than 
simply rhetorical figures. But more often those turns of phrase that do not easily fit into the 
theories concerning “standard beliefs” and “systems of associated commonplaces” are still 
violently reduced into being just more complex instances of metaphor, “difficult meta-
phors”.97  It makes very little difference whether we focus on Achilles rushing like a lion or 
on Achilles portrayed as a rushing lion, the basic structure, mediated by a “common genus”98  
or tertium comparationis, is in both cases quite simple; furthermore, it still makes little dif-
ference whether we reformulate this simple structure in terms of “current platitudes” (Black), 
and so on. Here is Aristotle’s version of the most simple instances of the ever-returning “raids 
of the bestiary”:99   
 
The simile also is a metaphor; for there is very little difference. [e)/stin de\ kai\ h( ei)kw\n 
metafora/: diafe/rei ga\r mikro/n:] When the poet says of Achilles, “he rushed on 
like a lion,” it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,” it is a metaphor [o(/tan me\n 
ga\r ei)/ph| [to\n )Axille/a] » w(j de\ le/wn e)po/rousen «, ei)kw/n e)stin, o(/tan de\ » le/wn 
e)po/rouse «, metafora/:]; for because both are courageous, he transfers the sense and 
calls Achilles a lion. [dia\ ga\r to\ a)/mfw a)ndrei/ouj ei)=nai, proshgo/reusen 
metene/gkaj le/onta to\n )Axille/a.] The simile is also useful in prose, but should be 
less frequently used, for there is something poetical about it. [xrh/simon de\ h( ei)kw\n 
kai\ e)n lo/gw|, o)liga/kij de/: poihtiko\n ga/r.] (Rh. III, 4, 1406b, trans. Freese; ed. 
                                                 
95 Cf. Wayne C. Booth, “Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5, No. 1 
(Autumn 1978), pp. 49-72, here p. 56. 
96 Cf. Max Black, “Metaphor”, in Models and Metaphors, pp. 26-27, passim. Browne’s sentence actually 
reads as follows: “The Sunne it self is but the dark simulachrum, and light but the shadow of God.” (Sir 
Thomas Browne, “The Garden of Cyrus”, in Urne Buriall and The Garden of Cyrus, ed. John Carter [Cam-
bridge U.P., 1958], p. 105.) 
97 Cf. Black, “Metaphor”. For instance Leibniz, admiring the beauty and courage of Angelus Silesius’ poetry, 
deems his “metaphors” difficult. Heidegger cites Leibniz’s letter in Der Satz vom Grund (p. 68), but does 
not directly comment on Leibniz’s use of the term “metaphor”; however, Heidegger’s most famous argu-
ment against the notion of metaphor as a “handy crutch” of interpretation happens only some twenty pages 
later in the book. — On Leibniz’s comments on Angelus Silesius, cf. also Derrida, Sauf le nom (Paris: 
Galilée, 1993), pp. 16-17. 
98 Cf. Aristotle, Rh. III, 10, 1410b10-15, and below. 
99 This expression “raid of the bestiary” is borrowed from Jonathan Culler’s “Commentary”, in NLH Vol. VI, 
No 1 (Autumn 1974), p. 222. Culler’s expression corresponds roughly to the “system of commonplaces” 




The multivalent term logos is here rendered as “prose” — but what is “prose”, anyway, what 
was “prose” for the Greeks, beyond the anachronism of this translation? A partial answer can 
be found just a few lines before the definition of metaphor in the Poetics, in a definition of 
logos whose translation is enough to show how painfully untranslatable by one word this 
Greek word logos remains:  
 
A phrase [logos] is a composite sound with a meaning, some parts of which mean 
something by themselves. It is not true to say that every “phrase” is made up of nouns 
and verbs, e.g. the definition of man; but although it is possible to have a “phrase” 
without verbs, yet some part of it will always have a meaning of its own, for example, 
Cleon in “Cleon walks.” A “phrase” may be a unit in two ways; either it signifies one 
thing or it is a combination of several “phrases.” The unity of the Iliad, for instance, is 
due to such combination, but the definition of man is “one phrase” because it signifies 
one thing. [lo/goj de\ fwnh\ sunqeth\ shmantikh\ h[j e)/nia me/rh kaq' au(ta\ shmai/nei 
ti (ou) ga\r a(/paj lo/goj e)k r(hma/twn kai\ o)noma/twn su/gkeitai, oi[on o( tou= 
a)nqrw/pou o(rismo/j, a)ll' e)nde/xetai a)/neu r(hma/twn ei)=nai lo/gon, me/roj me/ntoi 
a)ei/ ti shmai=non e(/cei) oi(=on e)n tw=? badi/zei Kle/wn o( Kle/wn. ei]j de/ e)sti lo/goj 
dixw=j, h)\ ga\r o( e(\n shmai/nwn, h)\ o( e)k pleio/nwn sunde/smw?, oi(=on h ( 0Ilia\j me\n 
sunde/smw? ei[j, o( de\ tou= a)nqrw/pou tw=? e(\n shmai/nein.] [Po. 1457a23-30; trans. 
Fyfe; ed. Kassel.] 
 
In the Metaphysics it is said that “not to mean one thing is to mean nothing”, and “For it is 
not possible to think without thinking one thing, so if thinking is possible, one could set down 
one name for this thing.”100  The unity of the Iliad would consist of sentences that mean one 
thing; but of course, metaphor is not the only way to say one thing and mean another. Even 
though Aristotle clearly acknowledges the possibility of using metaphor and related stylistic 
devices ironically (there are numerous examples of this in the Rhetoric and the Poetics), the 
restriction of metaphor to single words in single sentences means also the exclusion of such 
discursive powers that might undermine the power of some single metaphor; on the other 
hand, while the “inspiration” and “enthusiasm” of spontaneous emotions characterize poetry, 
ironical use of such high-flown style seems to be more appropriate in “prose”.101  So it never 
                                                 
100  Met. IV, 4, 1006b7ff, trans. Sachs (2002). “... to\ ga\r mh\ e(\n shmai/nein ou)qe\n shmai/nein e)sti/n, mh\ 
shmaino/ntwn de\ tw=n o)noma/twn a)nh/?rhtai to\ diale/gesqai pro\j a)llh/louj, kata\ de\ th\n a)lh/qeian 
kai\ pro\j au(to/n: ou)de\ ga\r e)nde/xetai noei=n mh\ noou=nta e(/n: ei) d' e)nde/xetai, teqei/h a)\n o)/noma tou/tw? 
tw=? pra/gmati e(/n” (1006b7-11, ed. Christ). 
101 Cf. e.g. Rh. III, 7, where Aristotle for instance speaks of the “emotional”, “inspired” or “enthusiastic” style 
of poetry and, on the other hand, of the ironic use of such high-flown language in for instance Plato’s dia-
logues: “Compound words, a number of epithets, and ‘foreign’ words especially, are appropriate to an emo-
tional speaker; for when a man is enraged it is excusable for him to call an evil ‘high-as-heaven’ or ‘stupen-
dous.’ He may do the same when he has gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm, either by praise, 
blame, anger, or friendliness, as Isocrates does at the end of his Panegyricus: ‘Oh, the fame and the name!’ 
and ‘In that they endured.’ For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and it is clear that the hearers 
accept what they say in a sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appropriate to poetry; for there is some-
thing inspired in poetry [e)/nqeon ga\r h( poi/hsij]. It should therefore be used either in this way or when 
speaking ironically [met' ei)rwnei/aj], after the manner of Gorgias, or of Plato in the Phaedrus.” (1408b; 
trans. Freese; ed. Ross.)  
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seems to occur to Aristotle that the metaphor (or simile), in terms of which we see Achilles in 
the image of a lion, might be subjected to irony within the poetic work itself, within the logos 
called the Iliad. 
 What if there was a textual, discursive force or rather antitypy (resistance to force) 
that would ruin or frustrate the tertium comparationis? What if we, for once, allowed the text, 
even such a classical text as the Iliad, to “deconstruct its own metaphors” (as Paul de Man 
suggests), to resist the force of its own metaphors or its metaphors of force? 
 
 
TO RESIST THE FORCE OF METAPHORS AND THE METAPHORS OF FORCE:  
SIMONE WEIL’S PACIFISTIC READING OF THE ILIAD  
 
Has perhaps the naïve, spontaneous metaphor been forever lost since the Homeric world? Or, 
more precisely, the Iliadic world, in which it may have been still plausible to see Achilles in 
the figure of the leaping lion or the lion in the figure of Achilles, as it seems. The world 
whose monument, Achilles’ shield, is wrought by the gods themselves — as if they already 
mourned the loss of the world of this blood-thirsty innocence. The world after Achilles’ is the 
world of Odysseus, the brave new world that is no longer that brave pure and simple, the 
world of Polytropos, the ‘no one’ of many names, the hero and anti-hero of the Odyssey, an 
antitype to the divine but naïve Achilles, an antitype whose thousand noble deeds are 
counter-poised by his thousand perhaps less noble schemes, ‘tropes’. Polytropos, a man of 
many devices. 
 Simone Weil has written on the Iliad as a “poem of force” (in the essay “L’Iliade ou 
le poème de la force”), and according to her its true epic genius can only be rediscovered 
when the Europeans learn to not admire the force, to not hate the enemies, to not despise the 
unfortunate, to not appeal to a divine destiny that would justify the use of force, and such a 
renaissance of the Homeric genius is not at all likely to take place very soon.102  The genius of 
this poem does not reside in its metaphors and similes of force, but rather in its final resis-
tance to being transported into an enthusiasm by these tropes: “Quant aux guerriers, les 
comparaisons qui les font apparaître, vainqueurs ou vaincus, comme des bêtes ou des choses 
ne peuvent faire éprouver ni admiration ni mépris, mais seulement le regret que les hommes 
puissent être ainsi transformés.” On the other hand, the art of warfare, argues Simone Weil, 
is nothing but the art of provoking such transformations. She also writes: “Il n’est possible 
d’aimer et d’être juste que si l’on connaît l’empire de la force et si l’on sait ne pas le re-
specter.”103   
                                                 
102  Cf. “L’Iliade ou le poème de la force”, in La source grecque (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), p. 42. 
103 Weil, “L’Iliade ou le poème de la force”, pp. 33, 38, 41. Cf. also p. 32: “Telle est la nature de la force. Le 
pouvoir qu’elle possède de transformer les hommes en choses est double et s’exerce de deux côtés ; elle 
pétrifie différemment, mais également, les âmes de ceux qui la subissent et de ceux qui la manient. [...] Les 
batailles ne se décident pas entre hommes qui calculent, combinent, prennent une résolution et l’exécutent, 
mais entre hommes dépouillés de ces facultés, transformés, tombés au rang soit de la matière inerte qui n’est 
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 You may only resist the power of similes and metaphors if you recognize it, and 
moreover, if you recognize the gap that is opened precisely where the ground for comparison, 
the ‘common genus’ or tertium comparationis is to be found; but perhaps this recognition of 
power means also the danger of being exposed to it, being suspended between the more im-
mediate dispositions of admiration or contempt, and the more reflective attitudes of regret, or 
knowing how not to respect. For Aristotle, the heuristic function of the poetic metaphor re-
sides in its ability to “teach by means of a common genus”, to “send the soul searching” for 
the meaningful yet abstract generic relation, but never too far;104  an indefinite suspension 
over the abyss, undecided as to whether we, as readers or spectators, should identify or 
rather differentiate, would not seem fit for poetry. 
 Such double exposure, showing the empire of the images of force in order to show 
their deceptiveness, but without explicitly and thematically moralizing upon them, is danger-
ous of course: the reader may always fall prey to identification and admiration instead of rec-
ognizing the abyss. Aristotle’s implicit and explicit distinctions between the two “eyes for 
resemblance”, the poet’s and the philosopher’s, according to which (to name one of these dis-
tinctions) enthusiasm and inspiration are proper to poetry, while the prosaist should not fall 
for the seductions of elevated style, can be seen as a paradoxical gesture of moralism: the ap-
parent amoralism of not stating immediately and explicitly one’s purpose may be proper for a 
Gorgias or Plato, or the rhetor and the dialectician in general, perhaps partly because such 
irony can nevertheless be more or less immediately recognized by their audience, trained to 
follow such an intellectual game; but another kind of immediacy is expected from poetry.  
 The lion-likeness quite often appears in the Iliad, but in the final twenty-fourth book 
(not to mention related images, of men seen as wolves, hounds, etc.), in Apollo’s reproach to 
the other gods for their unjust favouring of Achilles, the lion-like nature is explicitly juxta-
posed with what would be fitting to a man; this is Chapman’s impressive and intelligent 
translation, which in its psychologically sensitive liberality pays attention to the fact that 
Achilles, in his lion-like nature, seems essentially deprived of the “ruth that now should draw 
so deep / In all the world”, incapable, by his very privation of some essential characters of 
human nature, to bear the ambivalent weight of shame that should befall man, who should be 
neither “mere wild” nor “slave to his pride”: 
                                                                                                                                                        
que passivité, soit des forces aveugles qui ne sont qu’élan. C’est là le dernier secret de la guerre, et l’Iliade 
l’exprime par ses comparaisons, où les guerriers apparaissent comme les semblables soit de l’incendie, de 
l’inondation, du vent, des bêtes féroces, de n’importe quelle cause aveugle de désastre, soit des animaux 
peureux, des arbres, de l’eau, du sable, de tout ce qui est mû par la violence des forces extérieures.” When 
Weil speaks of “force”, she actually constantly speaks of the force of metaphors and comparisons, compari-
sons and metaphors of force. 
104 Cf. Rh. III, 10, 1410b; cf. infra, passim. 
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[........................................................] Achilles, that withstands 
All help to others, you can help — one that hath neither heart 
Nor soul within him that will move or yield to any part 
That fits a man, but lion-like, uplandish, and mere wild, 
Slave to his pride, and all his nerves being naturally compil’d 
Of eminent strength, stalks out and preys upon a silly sheep: 
And so fares this man — that fit ruth that now should draw so deep 
In all the world being lost in him, and shame (a quality 
Of so much weight that both it helps and hurts excessively 
Men in their manners) is not known, nor hath the power to be, 
In this man’s being. [...]105  
 
Deprived of mercy (eleos) and shame (aidos), these two interrelated temporalities, Achilles 
seems also deprived of “the moment of hesitation which only provides us with our regard to-
wards our fellow men [ce temps d’arrêt d’où seul procèdent nos égards envers nos sem-
blables]” (Weil, p. 22).  
 The poetic motivation for Achilles’ lion-likeness does not, finally, reside in the char-
acteristic of courage or some other virtue, not even in some vice, such as ruthlessness, that is 
common to the great warrior and the lion. Rather, it is motivated by the privation of other 
characteristics that this comparison reveals, when read in its context. In the discursive ‘frame’ 
the metaphorical ‘focus’ thus turns back against itself.106  Being like a lion turns out to be not 
                                                 
105 Chapman’s Homer: The Iliad and the Odyssey, trans. George Chapman (Ware: Wordsworth, 2000 [Chap-
man’s Iliad first appeared in 1611]), p. 394 (Book XXIV, ll. 40ff). Cf. the trans. by A.T. Murray: “Nay, it is 
the ruthless Achilles, O ye gods, that ye are fain to succour, him whose mind is nowise right, neither the 
purpose in his breast one that may be bent; but his heart is set on cruelty, even as a lion that at the bidding of 
his great might and lordly spirit goeth forth against the flocks of men to win him a feast; even so hath 
Achilles lost all pity, neither is shame in his heart, the which harmeth men greatly and profiteth them 
withal.” [a)ll' o)low=| )Axilh=i qeoi\ bou/lesq' e)parh/gein, / w(=| ou)/t' a)\r fre/nej ei)si\n e)nai/simoi ou)/te no/hma / 
gnampto\n e)ni\ sth/qessi, le/wn d' w(\j a)/gria oi)=den, / o(/j t' e)pei\ a)\r mega/lh| te bi/h| kai\ a)gh/nori qumw=| / 
ei)/caj ei)=j' e)pi\ mh=la brotw=n i(/na dai=ta la/bh|sin: / w(\j )Axileu\j e)/leon me\n a)pw/lesen, ou)de/ oi( ai)dw\j / 
gi/gnetai, h(/ t' a)/ndraj me/ga si/netai h)d' o)ni/nhsi.] (The Iliad with an English Translation by A.T. Murray, 
Ph.D. in two volumes [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924]; Greek text: Homeri Opera in five 
volumes [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920], PDLP. Also Samuel Butler’s translation is reproduced in 
the PDLP: “So, then, you would all be on the side of mad Achilles, who knows neither right nor ruth? He is 
like some savage lion that in the pride of his great strength and spirit springs upon men's flocks and gorges 
on them. Even so has Achilles flung aside all pity, and all that decency which at once so greatly banes yet 
greatly boons him that will heed it.” [Mineola: Dover, 1999 (orig. 1898).]) With regard to the famous con-
trast between Chapman’s and Alexander Pope’s Homer (The Iliad, 1715-1720), cf. Pope’s rendering of 
these lines: “Is then the dire Achilles all your care? / That iron heart, inflexibly severe; / A lion, not a man, 
who slaughters wide, / In strength of rage, and impotence of pride; / Who hastes to murder with a savage 
joy, / Invades around, and breathes but to destroy! / Shame is not of his soul; nor understood, / The greatest 
evil and the greatest good.” (The Iliad of Homer, Translated by Alexander Pope, with notes by the Rev. 
Theodore Alois Buckley, M.A., F.S.A. and Flaxman's Designs [1899], reproduced electronically as a Project 
Gutenberg E-Text, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6130/6130-pdf.pdf. Last accessed in January 2007.) 
106 However, “frame”, the term originally introduced into metaphor theories by Max Black, has been described 
as “that minimal unit which establishes the incongruity” (Eva F. Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and 
Linguistic Structure [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987], p. 24 / cit. Phyllis Perrin Wilcox, Metaphor 
in American Sign Language [Gallaudet U.P., 2001], “Chapter One” of which is reproduced electronically in 
the following URL: http://gupress.gallaudet.edu/excerpts/MASLone.html). Whether we understand the 
frame of metaphor as the sentence in which the metaphor’s focus-word occurs or as the “system of com-
monplaces”, it is still a question of a “minimal unit” and this explains why the concept of metaphor often 
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(just) a sign of extreme strength but (also) of an essential weakness. Achilles is a tragic char-
acter, because in “this man’s being” (not his essence as a human being, though, but in Chap-
man’s translation, Homer’s words107  are taken absolutely to mean that Achilles is devoid of 
shame, which in his very being “hath [not] the power to be”), he remains a “slave to his 
pride” and to his, if this anachronism be allowed, narcissistic work of mourning. 108 
 
 
fails to deal with text and discourse, or “system” or “syntax” (cf. Derrida, “La mythologie blanche”). 
107 “... ou)de/ ? oi( ai)dw\j gi/gnetai ...” 
108 Here I would like to refer to Derrida’s numerous texts on the work of mourning as narcissism — and as a 
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Antitypy — resistance to force, for example the resistance offered by a text to its own meta-
phors of force, or to the force of its own metaphors — is one of the types, but not the only 
type of ‘counter-figures’. This plurality resists being subsumed under generic unity, but also 
being referred back to any focal source of meaning that should govern the polysemy. This plu-
rality is neither a genus nor an analogical unity governed by a punctual source, radiating itself 
all over the series of meanings in a regulated polysemy. Rather, the irreducibly plural term of 
counter-figures points — without pointing — to the plurality which refuses such reduction or 
regulated polysemy.  
 The first counter-figure is the Second Commandment. But if you never made an image in 
the first place, how could you abstain from worshipping it? So this Second Commandment is al-
ready divided into two antagonistic moments. 
 As well, the antitypous resistance is divided: the text, the tissue may contain metaphors, 
for instance, if we only “allow the text to deconstruct its own metaphors” (Paul de Man) they 
may ‘frustrate’ themselves (‘to frustrate’ is one of the translations for the verb used by Celan, 
durchkreuzen); on the other hand, the text, the tissue, may resist an exterior attempt at fig-
uration, it may resist metaphor as an instrument of criticism, as a “poetic overall key” (Hei-
degger), or resist “criticism [as] a metaphor for the act of reading” (de Man, again). “La 
poésie déjoue l’image.” (Paul Celan.) 109 
 Counter-figurative antitypy is also the resistance offered by the ‘materiality’ of lan-
guage, not only the sonorities and tonalities or “timbre” (Celan) or the “grain of the voice” 
(Barthes) that are untranslatable, but also what Martin Heidegger has called Nennkraft, “nam-
ing power”. Irony can be a counter-figure, metonymy can be a counter-figure to metaphor. 
 And we call counter-figures those sentences by which the metaphoricity of a given ex-
pression, apparently metaphorical, is being denied, in spite of appearances to the contrary. 
This denial takes the form of a quasi-Magrittean legend: “Ceci n’est pas un pipe.” The 
counter-figurative sentence — “ce[ci] n’est pas une métaphore” — seems of course diametri-
cally opposed to the sentence painted into Magritte’s ambiguously titled work, La trahison des 
images: we do not say that “this is not a pipe” because it is a picture, an image of a pipe, but 
rather something like “this is not an image” — but an image need not be a metaphor (or sym-
bol) and a metaphor need not be an image. 110   
 The image may always commit treason on itself, the mask may always reveal itself as a 
mask: there is a counter-figurative power residing within the figure, and a “counter-
metaphorical thrust” (Murray Krieger) within the literary metaphor itself. Moreover, other fig-
                                                 
109 Cf. Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, Second Edition, 
Revised (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, cop. 1983, repr. 1997), p.107; Allegories of Reading 
(New Haven: Yale U.P., cop. 1979), p. 72; Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe Bd. 52: Hölderlins Hymne 
»Andenken« [1941/42] (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1982), p. 40 (=GA 52:40); Paul Celan, Mikrolithen, p. 
127, No. 230.2. 
110 The phrase “ce n’est pas une métaphore” occurs, as such and in a paradoxical context, in at least Derrida’s 
Schibboleth — pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilée, 1986); we shall return to this. — A couple of more exam-
ples, first from Walter Benjamin: “Es gibt kein Geschehen oder Ding weder in der belebten noch in der un-
belebtem Natur, das nicht in gewisse Weise an der Sprache teilhätte, denn es ist jedem wesentlich, seinen 
geistigen Inhalt mitzuteilen. Eine Metapher aber ist das Wort »Sprache« in solchem Gebrauche durchaus 
nicht.” (“Über Sprache überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen” [1916], in Sprache und Geschichte. 
Philosophische Essays [Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000], p. 30.) — Another one, from Martin Buber: “Gefühle 
wohnen im Menschen; aber der Mensch wohnt in seiner Liebe. Das ist keine Metapher, sondern die 
Wirklichkeit; [...]” (Ich und Du [Stuttgart: Reclam, 2001] [1st ed. 1923, revised 1957].) 
Prolegomena 55
ures can be counter-figures to metaphor. Irony and hyperbole can undermine metaphor (as in 
Lautréamont), apparent metaphors can show themselves to be metonymies and metonymy 
may deconstruct metaphor (see Genette’s, de Man’s and Culler’s readings of Proust). Cata-
chresis, which can be either catachresis by metaphor or by metonymy or synecdoche, as Pierre 
Fontanier shows, is for him a pseudo-figure, “non vraie figure”; for us, it can be also counter-
figure. But isn’t the best metaphor always already a catachresis, an ‘abuse’ of metaphor, and 
thus already something other than metaphor, even opposed to metaphor: rather, the most ac-
curate expression for that which previously had no name? 
 If we are willing to affirm, with Heidegger, that his talk of the “home of being [Haus des 
Seins]” is no metaphor, 111  we are dealing with a counter-figure in two senses of this plural 
term; one of these senses is the already mentioned paradoxical quasi-Magrittean denial of the 
metaphoricity of a given apparently metaphorical sentence; but there are also other ways to 
speak of counter-figurativity with respect to this denial and to that which it concerns. There 
are figures “worse than metaphor”, says Aristotle. 112  Even worse, as we might add. From a 
viewpoint very different from that of Aristotle’s, Rudolf Carnap seems to affirm that there are 
indeed turns of phrase worse than metaphor. He scorns Heidegger’s “metaphysical” talk of 
“the Being” and “the Nothing” (das Sein, das Nichts), and especially his sentence “the Nothing 
itself nothings” (das Nichts selbst nichtet) with the coined verb nichten, pointing out that such 
talk is not, strictly speaking, even metaphorical, since metaphors deal with terms that mean 
something, with words that have some meaning to begin with, but “to nothing” has none. 113  
                                                 
111 Cf. “Brief über den »Humanismus«”, in Wegmarken (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1996), pp. 313-364, 
here p. 358 (a separate printing, similar pagination with Gesamtausgabe 9). 
112 “Words are sometimes used neither equivocally, nor metaphorically, nor in their proper sense; for example, 
the law is said to be the ‘measure’ or ‘image’ of things naturally just. [e1nia d’ ou1te kaq’ o9mwnumi/an ou1te 
kata\ metafora\n ou1te kuri/wj ei1rhtai, oi[on o9 no/moj me/tron h2 ei0kw\n tw=n fu/sei dikai/wn.] Such 
phrases are worse than metaphors; for a metaphor in a way adds to our knowledge of what is indicated on 
account of the similarity, for those who use metaphors always do so on account of some similarity. [e1sti de\ 
ta\ toiau=ta xei/rw th=j metafora=j: h9 me\n ga\r metafora\ poiei= pwj gnw/rimon to\ shmaino/menon dia\ 
th\n o9moio/thta: pa/ntej ga\r oi9 metafe/rontej kata/ tina o9moio/thta metafe/rousin:] But the kind of 
phrase of which we are speaking does not add to our knowledge; for no similarity exists in virtue of which 
the law is a ‘measure’ or an ‘image,’ nor is the law usually described by these words in their proper sense. 
[to\ de\ toiou=ton ou0 poiei= gnw/rimon: ou1te ga\r h9 o9moio/thj u9pa/rxei, kaq’ h4 me/tron h2 ei0kw\n o9 no/moj 
e0sti/n, ou1te kuri/wj ei1wqe le/gesqai.] So, if anyone says that the law is a ‘measure’ or an ‘image’ in the 
proper sense of these words, he is lying; for an image is something whose coming into being is due to imita-
tion, and this does not apply to the law. If, however, he is not using the word in its proper sense, obviously 
he has spoken obscurely, and with worse effect than any kind of metaphorical language. [w3ste ei0 me\n 
kuri/wj me/tron h2 ei0ko/na to\n no/mon fhsi\n ei]nai, yeu/detai: ei0kw\n ga/r e0stin ou[ h9 ge/nesij dia\ 
mimh/sewj, tou=to d’ ou0x u9pa/rxei tw=| no/mw|: ei0 de\ mh\ kuri/wj, dh=lon o3ti a0safw=j ei1rhke kai\ xei=ron 
o9poiounou=n tw=n kata\ metafora/n legome/nwn.]” (Top. VI, 2, 140a6-18, trans. Forster.) — For Thomas 
Hobbes too, there are more dangerous figures than metaphor, namely the “inconstant names”: “For one man 
calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; [...] such names can 
never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less 
dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.” (Leviathan, ed. by C. B. 
Macpherson [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976], pp. 109-110; i.e. Pt. I: Of Man, Ch. iv: Of Speech; Incon-
stant names. Partly cited by Ted Cohen in his “Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy” [1978], p. 4.) 
113 Rudolf Carnap: “The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language”, trans. Arthur 
Papp, repr. in Michael Murry, ed., Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. Critical Essays (New Haven: Yale 
U.P., 1978), pp. 23-34, cf. esp. pp. 24-26, 28. Originally “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische 
Analyse der Sprache”, Erkenntnis 2 (1931). Here we have an excerpt, dealing with a sentence detached 
from Heidegger’s “Was ist Metaphysik?” (1929), “Das Nichts selbst nichtet”, and the neologism therein, 
the verb nichten: “We pointed out before that the meaningless words of metaphysics usually owe their ori-
gin to the fact that a meaningful word is deprived of its meaning through its metaphorical use in metaphys-
ics. But here we confront one of those rare cases where a new word is introduced which never had a mean-
ing to begin with.” (Pp. 24-25.) 
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But while metaphors always deal with words having meaning, with words that refer to deter-
mined beings, the talk of being (das Sein) and nothingness (das Nichts) themselves cannot be 
metaphorical either, although the question of being has always been fixed by what has been 
called, by Jacques Derrida, “ontic metaphors”. 114  The history of being (Geschichte des Seins) 
consists of these determinations of being in terms of some determined being or some way of 
being, from the Platonic ideas to ‘being’ determined as presence (ousia as parousia) and be-
ing-at-work (energeia) to the modern notion of subjectivity and indeed, to ‘being’ deter-
mined, by the logical positivism represented by Carnap, as “observable data”, being “accessi-
ble to empirical science”, and so on. Carnap’s and Heidegger’s “overcomings of metaphysics” 
are diametrically opposed to each other. 115 
 Perhaps Derrida bears in mind even Carnap’s sense of “overcoming metaphysics” and of 
the original meaningfulness of the terms rendered less meaningful by metaphysical metaphors, 
when he points out, in “Violence et métaphysique” (1964), that ‘being’ and ‘nothing’ are the 
only ‘things’ that escape metaphor; on the other hand, being and nothingness can only arrive 
in language and thought, they can only dwell in logos, they are contemporaneous with logos; 
language and being are equiprimordial (gleichursprünglich).116  But while being that, while be-
ing equiprimordial with language and meaning, and while being only articulatable by the ap-
parent “ontic metaphors”, being and nothingness escape metaphor since they escape meaning 
or determination: being, and nothingness as its counterpart, withdraw from every determina-
tion, while they make positive determinations and their negations possible. Having no meaning 
to begin with, being and nothingness, and the turns of speech addressing them, are absolutely 
counter-figurative; these instances of naming being or nothingness are, as Derrida says, ex-
tremely rare. Or are they?  
 What does it mean to have meaning in the first place? If “being speaks always and eve-
rywhere throughout language”, 117  what is it to have meaning? To repeat Heidegger’s and Der-
rida’s question: Are we sure, for instance, that we already know what a ‘home’ or ‘house’ is? 
And are we sure we can know this before comprehending ‘being’ in one way or another, al-
though this term appears to remain, and rightly so, the most unfamiliar and uncanny? That we 
know already, definitely and once and for all, what a ‘home’ is? Is there a ‘transcendental sig-
nified’ which regulates the polysemy (and the ‘semantic field’) of, for instance, ‘home’, such 
a ‘focal meaning’ which, for Aristotle, regulates the whole equivocal unity of being and the 
‘analogy of attribution’ — namely, presence as the highest being and as characterizing the 
‘beingness’ or ‘thinghood’ belonging to all beings or things in the primary sense (prôtê ousia, 
‘first thinghood’)? Or is the equivocality irreducible? How could the talk of language as a 
‘home of being’ — concerning both the possibility of metaphor (language) and that which es-
capes all metaphor (being, das Sein, l’être), even though it has always been articulated in 
terms of beings, in terms of what is (Seiendes, l’étant), i.e. in terms of ‘ontic metaphors’ — 
                                                 
114 Cf. “Le retrait de la métaphore” (1978), in Psyché — inventions de l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1987 [nouvelle 
édition augmentée, tome 1, 1998]), pp. 63-93. 
115 “Überwindung der Metaphysik” is not only a part of Carnap’s title, but also one of Heidegger’s (in Weg-
marken [GA 9]), while these two texts seem to have no other connection but the partial identity of the title. 
116 “S’il n’y a d’histoire que par le langage et si le langage (sauf quand il nomme l’être lui-même ou le rien : 
presque jamais) est élémentairement métaphorique, Borges a raison : « Peut-être l’histoire universelle n’est-
elle que l’histoire de quelques métaphores ». [...] L’être lui-même peut seulement être pensé et dit. Il est 
contemporain du Logos qui lui-même ne peut être que comme Logos de l’être, disant l’être.” (L’écriture et 
la différence [Paris: Seuil, cop. 1967], pp. 137, 212.) Derrida would elaborate on this later, in “Le retrait de 
la métaphore”. 
117 Heidegger / cit. Derrida, in “Différance”, trans. Alan Bass, in Margins of Philosophy (New York: Harvester, 
1982), p. 27. Heidegger’s sentence, “das Sein spricht überall und stets durch alle Sprache hindurch”, is from 
“Der Spruch des Anaximander”, in Holzwege (5. Aufl.) (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1972), p. 338 / GA 
5:366. 
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be metaphorical if it suddenly turns out that the term which we thought familiar, ‘home’ or 
‘house’, is actually even more unfamiliar than the strange term ‘being’, since we must already 
somehow ‘know’ being in order to know what, and even that, a home or house is? The being of 
the house resides in the house of being. 118 
 This list of counter-figures is not complete, but this incompleteness is not just accidental 
and due to lack of systematization. The list is not complete without an extra figure, an extra 
counter-figure which re-marks the whole plurality and frustrates the quest for a “last in-
stance” of meaning (as Derrida puts it), for a transcendental signified that should govern the 
equivocality. Re-marks, that is: a sign refers to another sign and also to this movement of re-
ferring, its own movement of referring. 119  This endless movement of reference without a last 
instance of meaning, without a thematic unity, a semantic halt that governs the various tropes 
and is represented by tropes, metaphors and metonymies, is nevertheless no longer the 
movement of metaphor but the movement of (no)-more-metaphor: “plus de métaphore”. This 
pun, hardly translatable without the clumsy parentheses, is not only the title of one of the 
subchapters in Derrida’s “La mythologie blanche”, 120  but also the consequence of a long dem-
onstration, in “La double séance”, to show that we are not simply dealing with metaphors and 
metonymies anymore when we are dealing with Mallarmé’s poetic practice of “syntaxier” and 
the tropes referring to each other; the “excess of syntax over semantics” frustrates the quest 
for unifying themes and semes, the quest for a source of meaning that should govern the dis-
placements and condensations. When we are dealing with re-marking, with the excess of syn-
tax over semantics, with the always already divided origin of meaning, we are dealing with 
dissemination. But dissemination is not only a name for this abysmal referentiality (if it is a 
name, which is contestable, since it belongs to the moving chain that it re-marks), but also for 
the limit of all hermeneutical enterprises; in his memorial speech for Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
published as the book Béliers (2003),121  Derrida brings up this old theme or counter-theme in a 
new light, not in order to contest the necessity of hermeneutical exegesis but to “counter-
sign” that irreducible necessity in his own way... 
 We shall not discuss all these questions directly in the present treatise, but I would con-
sider it necessary to make these indications in order to clarify the horizon of ‘counter-figures’ 
from which we shall proceed. The horizon for reading is gained through interpretation 
(namely, the hermeneutical spiral just mentioned), but at a certain point this horizon recedes 
and you are free to read again, as if for the first time, “alone with the lamp”... 122  Free but 
responsible: “Die Welt ist fort, ich muß dich tragen.”123 
                                                
 
 
118 These questions cannot be elaborated in detail in the present treatise. They must be mentioned, however. 
The most important point of reference is Jacques Derrida’s “Le retrait de la métaphore” and the texts dis-
cussed therein. 
119 Cf. Derrida, “La double séance”, in La dissémination (Paris: Seuil, cop. 1972, repr. Points Essais, 1993); cf. 
Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard U.P., 1986). 
120 Marges (cop. 1972), pp. 261ff; cf. “La double séance” (in La dissémination, repr. 1993), pp. 307-315 (on p. 
315: “plus de métaphore, plus de métonymie”); cf. passim. 
121 Béliers. Le dialogue ininterrompu : entre deux infinis, le poème (Paris: Galilée, 2003). 
122 Cf. Celan, “Stimmen [II]”, in Sprachgitter (GW 1:147). 





METAPHORICIANS & METAPHYSICIANS 
 
 
Als Stilfigur im Sinne der rhetorischen Definition ist die Metapher tatsächlich tot.124  
 
La métaphore est morte, vive la métaphore !125   
 
[...] and she is expected to be as fine a resurrection as ever the doctor handled.126  
 
“We shall soon no doubt have more metaphoricians than metaphysicians” — this is what 
Wayne C. Booth predicted in 1978, in the important “Special Issue on Metaphor” of Critical 
Inquiry (Vol. 5, No. 1). And he continued: “I have in fact extrapolated with my pocket calcu-
lator to the year 2039; at that point there will be more students of metaphor than people.”127 
                                                 
124  Beda Allemann, “Metapher und das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache” (1968), pp. 38-39. A first pub-
lished version, in the English translation by Günther Rebing, reads as follows: “Metaphor as a figure of 
style as defined by traditional rhetoric is indeed dead.” But it also continues: “But we need not insist on the 
traditional definition of metaphor.” (“Metaphor and Antimetaphor” [1967], p. 116.) We shall return later to 
this remarkable article, or these two articles (the English and the German version, whose first and most 
striking difference resides in the title), and to this abruptly interrupted extract. 
125  Jean Greisch, “Les mots et les roses: La métaphore chez Martin Heidegger” (1973), p. 455.  
126  S. J. Pratt / cit. OED, entry “resurrection, n.”: “ [4]b. A disinterred corpse. (Cf. 6.) rare. / 1775 S. J. PRATT 
[i.e. Samuel Johnson Pratt] Liberal Opin. cxxxiii. (1783) IV. 203 The doctor is attending a lady of your par-
ish, who is troubled with a complication,..and she is expected to be as fine a resurrection as ever the doctor 
handled.” (OED, 50204577. Last accessed Jan. 2007.) 
127 Wayne C. Booth, “Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation”, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
Special Issue on Metaphor (Autumn 1978), pp. 49-72, here p. 49. (The same articles concerning metaphor, 
pp. 3-176, were published again in Sheldon Sacks, ed., On Metaphor [Chicago: Chicago U. P., 1979].) 
Booth’s sentence, the first we quoted, continues after a dash (p. 49): “or should that be metamorticians, the 
embalmers of dead metaphor?” — I would like to briefly take up Booth’s sample metaphor which he dis-
cusses at length and from various viewpoints (p. 52): “A lawyer friend of mine was hired to defend a large 
Southern utility against a suit by a small one, and he thought at first that he was doing fine. All of the law 
seemed to be on his side, and he felt that he had presented his case well. Then the lawyer for the small util-
ity said, speaking to the jury, almost as if incidentally to his legal case, ‘So now we see what it is. They got 
us where they want us. They holding us up with one hand, their good sharp fishin’ knife in the other, and 
they sayin’, ‘you just set still, little catfish, we’re jes going to gut ya.’’ At that moment, my friend reports, 
he knew he had lost the case. ‘I was in the hands of a genius of metaphor.’” This piece of discourse could 
lend itself to an indefinite analysis, but just a remark or two, in addition to Booth’s, will do. The lawyer’s 
genius (regardless of whether he really thought and empathetically felt what he said or whether he was just 
a good professional, or a born rhetorician) or the force of the image employed by him does not, perhaps, re-
side so much in resemblance or in proportional analogy (p. 54: “large utility is to fisherman as small utility 
is to catfish; knife is to catfish’s vital center as large utility’s measures are to small utility’s vital center; and 
so on”); these are, after all, rather abstract and formal in regard of the potent emotive and intellectual im-
pact of the discourse. The fisherman-and-catfish image should be taken very literally, first, and then the 
identity and difference in the relation between the image and the situation into which it is applied may be 
envisaged in a more striking light than the formal analysis or paraphase could offer. It is the principle, or the 
rule of reflection (Kant on hypotyposis; cf. below), or rather the ‘emotional mood’ — and the error involved 
— that we are perhaps invited to apply: the large utility deals with the small one as if it was dealing with a 
catfish. An indifference that is not even cruelty, because it apparently lacks emotion, even hostile emotion, 
or perverts emotion (the fisherman’s words to the catfish). Such conduct is deprived of the sense of reverence 
that should be involved when human beings and communities deal with each other, an ethical aspect which 
even economical interests should not overrule; so the “category mistake” resides rather on the side of the 
“large utility” than on the side of the “small one” or its lawyer. And this is not to suggest that it is allright to 
treat catfish or other nonhumans indifferently and without the same kind of respect. In any case, such an ex-
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 Ted Cohen, another contributor to the same special issue, wrote: “These are good 
times for the friends of metaphor. Now that the respectability of metaphor seems to be ac-
knowledged all round, the only serious questions thought open concern how metaphor is to 
be described”.128  As we are, at the moment of my writing the present dissertation, still less 
than half-way between the moment of Booth’s extrapolating and its result, it seems that the 
growth is no longer quite as exponential as it used to be in the 1970s, even though new trea-
tises on metaphor are, to be sure, written all the time, penetrating deeper and deeper into the 
only serious questions thought still open, those concerning the description of metaphor. 
 Cohen’s own answer to these serious questions is “the joke”. Not a joke, but the “cul-
tivation of intimacy” that is involved when we tell jokes to each other and understand them, 
an unspoken common code which cannot really be paraphrased. In this respect metaphors are 
like jokes: good metaphors, like good jokes, cannot be paraphrased, and the prerequisite for 
grasping them is a common code. This is indeed very suggestive, and perhaps this description 
of metaphor in terms of the cultivation of intimacy — a shared horizon of a certain complai-
sance — and jokes is also one of the features which make metaphor, for many poets and theo-
rists of literature, so unacceptable. Unpoetic, even anti-poetic, since poems are not usually 
jokes. This is not to claim that poetry is an exclusively serious matter, but that poems may be 
something radically different from both jokes and metaphors. 
 It is no joke and no metaphor if I say that today Metaphorics threatens to become the 
New Metaphysics. Seriously. Almost a religion, or if not an onto-theology, then at least a 
celebration of “this uncanny onto-linguistic power we call metaphor”.129  The “old 
subject”130  called Metaphor, whose death some had already announced, can always be resur-
rected, and indeed has been, as it seems. ‘Resurrection’ is not the only religious ‘metaphor’ 
involved here. Metaphor is not only “alive”, it is also “primal”, “absolute”, and even equal to 
an “infinite semiosis”. Let us read the concluding paragraph from a fairly recent study on 
                                                                                                                                                        
tra view or aspect (extra with respect to Booth’s several ways of looking at the image) may strip at least 
some of the simply metaphorical coating off the surface of the discourse by showing, in this specific case, 
that we are dealing with a suggestion concerning a literal attitude of indifference, literal but falsely applied. 
— Yet, the exact intention of the small utility’s lawyer, his motivation as such, remains of course inaccessi-
ble to us. Whether the emotive plea was just cold rhetorical calculation or really a double-edged empathetic 
piece of fiction (not only a fish-eye perspective on the defendant’s conduct but a penetration into the defen-
dant’s spirit and perspective as a fisherman holding a knife), we never know. And this is precisely why, 
even in such apparently obvious cases, the metaphoricity of a given expression, or at least the exact focus of 
its metaphoricity (for instance whether it is the speaker’s metaphor or someone else’s “category mistake”), 
may remain questionable. It can always be a question of something that might very literally apply, for ex-
ample, to a fisherman (here the indifference or feigning of indifference — feigning also in regard of the 
spoken address directed to the poor catfish!), but is then mistakenly (or mischievously) applied to another 
“category”, that of human relations, for instance. — This may seem waggish or over-the-top, but the moti-
vation for such quibbling should eventually become clearer. And it is also a counter-quibble. 
128 “Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy”, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5 No. 1 (Autumn 1978), p. 3 
129  William Franke, “Metaphor and the Making of Sense: The Contemporary Metaphor Renaissance”, in Phi-
losophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000), pp. 137-153, here p. 143. 
130  Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Le retrait de la métaphore”. 
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“The Contemporary Metaphor Renaissance” (2000), which “reassert[s] the veritable voca-
tion” of rhetoric in a manner that is more than bold: 
                                                
 
What the new, hermeneutic theories of metaphor, taken together, show is how meta-
phor, as absolute and “alive,” affords a glimpse into the creative making of sense that 
makes perceptions and experiences into a world. Metaphor assumes a transcendental-
hermeneutic function and reveals the world in the moment of its emergence as a lin-
guistic creation or construction. Even from within the disciplines of language and lit-
erature themselves, the primal metaphor, variously named die absolute Metapher, la 
métaphore vive, la metafora inaudita, or infinite semiosis, has reopened the most ba-
sic ontological questions about language and its relation to the world on its own new 
terms. Reality has shown itself in this new perspective to be graspable, if at all, only 
in and through metaphor. What are the ontological implications of this mediation of 
all our language, and therefore of our very knowledge and experience of the world, by 
metaphor? In other words, what does unlimited metaphoricity, such as it has recently 
been rediscovered, imply about the way things are and are known? These recently re-
opened questions open the horizon of rhetoric in such a way that, far from accepting 
being relegated to the status of a technical, adjunct discipline, it is enabled to reassert 
its veritable vocation as first philosophy. [William Franke, “Metaphor and the Making 
of Sense”, p. 151.]  
 
In the seventies, the only questions left open, they said, concerned description and evaluation. 
Towards the millennium, as it seems, the veritable vocation of rhetoric as first philosophy — 
which is quite a radical displacement with regard to the original, Aristotelian meaning of 
these terms, and a displacement which presupposes a radical “generalized restriction”131  of 
the Aristotelian understanding of rhetoric, too — arose precisely from questions concerning 
not only the epistemological but also the ontological implications of metaphor. However, the 
author of the article just cited seems to ignore that for instance Paul Ricœur remains, in spite 
of certainly being a proponent of the “live metaphor”, quite far from confusing the heuristics 
of metaphor with the so-called ontological analogy, or rhetorico-poetical language and 
“speculative” language in general. One of Ricœur’s main concerns in La métaphore vive 
(1975) is, anyway, to secure the autonomy of “speculative discourse” against the unlimited 
extensions of the concept of metaphor; actually Ricœur altogether misperceived, in his po-
lemic against Derrida, the direction where the attack against this distinction was to be ex-
pected from — but this is another story. 
 The modern “metaphor renaissance”, especially in the vein of the “cognitive theory of 
metaphor” which should, however, not be confused with the hermeneutic approach à la 
Ricœur or the broadly speaking structuralist view à la Genette, for instance, seems sometimes 
amazingly ahistorical. This critique has been expressed by some of the proponents of this 
movement, too, such as Olof Jäkel who has pointed out that the major theorists of the cogni-
tive approach, Lakoff and Johnson (or Lakoff with his other collaborators), have overlooked 
the contributions of such authors as Vico, Locke, Herder, Kant and Hans Blumenberg, not to 
 
131 Cf. Gérard Genette, “La rhétorique restreinte”, in Figures III (Paris: Seuil, cop. 1972 [repr. 1992]), pp. 21-
40, here p. 22. 
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mention the eighteen other more or less impressive names Jäkel lists at the beginning of his 
article.132  However, it is perhaps not altogether insignificant that for instance Locke and Kant 
do not exactly use the term ‘metaphor’ but speak of “obvious sensible Ideas [...] transferred 
to more abstruse significations” (Locke) — which, in spite of the appearances to the contrary, 
need not always be metaphorically transferred, to be exact — and of ‘symbols’, symbolical 
hypotyposes (Kant).133  By the term ‘metaphor’ the post-Aristotelian tradition, including 
Locke, has most often meant very precisely “a rhetorical device unsuitable for philosophical 
discourse”, or an “artistic trope”,134 thus implying a rather reductive notion of ‘art’ as some 
sort of ‘rhetoric’. 
 If “we cannot refer to time without speaking metaphorically”, as one of the “forgotten 
contributors”, Harald Weinrich claims (cited in Jäkel’s article on p. 19), then it seems that 
such treatises as Edmund Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbe-
wusstseins (1928) and Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1927), or Aristotle’s discourse on time in 
the Physics, or Kant’s discussion of time as an a priori form of intuition and as auto-
affection,135  and all the treatises that have tried to challenge the Platonic image of time as an 
image of eternity, must still be metaphorical through and through. Such a claim would be 
against the grain of more or less the whole Occidental philosophical tradition until, say, 
George Lakoff. Husserl complains, of course, that he cannot think of a better word to de-
                                                 
132 Cf. Olof Jäkel, “Kant, Blumenberg, Weinrich: Some Forgotten Contributors to the Cognitive Theory of 
Metaphor”, in Raymond Gibbs Jr. and Gerard J. Steen, eds., Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics: Selected 
Papers from the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference, Amsterdam, 1997 (Amsterdam: J. 
Benjamins, 1999), pp. 9-27, here pp. 9-10. 
133 Cf. Jäkel, “Kant, Blumenberg, Weinrich”, pp. 11-12: “[...] the British philosopher John Locke is condemned 
by [Mark] Johnson for his rejection of metaphor as a rhetorical device unsuitable for philosophical dis-
course [...]. What is overlooked is the fact that in the passage criticized, Locke is only concerned with the 
artistic trope. In the first chapter of his philosophy of language, though, as part of his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding from 1689, Locke explains the central ‘Cognitive Linguistic’ tenet quite precisely: / 
[‘]It may also lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Knowledge, if we remark, how 
great a dependance our Words have on common sensible Ideas; and how those, which are made use of to 
stand for Actions and Notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sen-
sible Ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and are made to stand for Ideas that come not 
under the cognizance of our senses[’] […]. Put sarcastically, Locke’s only failure would be not to have ad-
dressed these ‘Words taken from the Operations of sensible Things, and applied to certain Modes of Think-
ing’ […] explicitly as conceptual metaphors.” A few lines later, Jäkel continues, this time on Kant: “Now 
there are concepts without any directly corresponding sensual intuition. Such concepts need to be ‘sensual-
ized’ indirectly, and according to Kant this is the cognitive function of metaphor.” (Jäkel, p. 12.) Is it really? 
“Kant does not have [i.e. does not use here] a special term metaphor, but speaks of symbols instead [cf. 
KdU, § 59, B254-B260].” (Ibid.) Perhaps Kant does not use the term ‘metaphor’ because it would be inap-
propriate, the rhetorical determinations of this special term taken into account. We cannot say, to be exact, 
that Kant’s text “ascertains the ubiquity of metaphor in everyday language” (p. 13), without paying attention 
to the possibility that Kant ignored the term ‘metaphor’ on purpose. Hypotyposis (which can be either 
schematic or symbolic) need not be metaphor. Hypotyposis, or analogy, or symbol (words in Kant’s vo-
cabulary): none of these need be metaphor. 
134 Cf. Jäkel, “Kant, Blumenberg, Weinrich”, already cited in the note above. 
135 Cf. KrV B 67-68: “[...] die Zeit [...] [als] die Form der Anschauung [...] nichts anders sein kann, als die Art, 
wie das Gemüt durch eigene Tätigkeit [...] durch sich selbst affiziert wird [...]”; cf. also Rudolf Eisler, Kant-
Lexikon. Nachschlagewerk zu Immanuel Kant (1930), entries “Zeit”, “Affektion”, “Analogie”, Symbol” 
(electronic version in Textlog.de, http://ww.textlog.de/kant-lexikon.html, accessed Nov. 11th, 2006). 
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scribe the absolute time-constitute subjectivity than “stream [Fluß]”, not to mention for in-
stance the neologism Zeithof, borrowed by Paul Celan into his poetry and poetics from this 
treatise by Husserl, as we shall see, and all the other “parallels” and “analogies” between time 
and space that we are forced to use. “Für all das fehlen uns die Namen.”136  But this com-
plaint, and the whole systematic discourse, whatever its shortcomings might be, are meant to 
reduce the metaphoricity of such a metaphor — or, to be exact, catachresis. What is more, we 
are not to see the time-constituting ‘flow’ of subjectivity, in Husserl’s sense, in the image of 
streaming water, but rather in spite of this specific image — while, of course, watching a 
stream flowing along its course is certainly a temporal experience, an experience in time and 
space. 
 In Sein und Zeit, the famously antimetaphorical thinker Heidegger asks a ‘rhetorical’ 
question (marked by the famously antimetaphorical poet Paul Celan in his personal copy of 
the book): “Is it an accident that proximally and for the most part significations are ‘worldly,’ 
sketched out beforehand by the significance of the world, that indeed they are often predomi-
nantly ‘spatial’, or is this ‘fact’ existential-ontologically necessary and why is it? [Ist es Zu-
fall, daß die Bedeutungen zunächst und zumeist »weltliche« sind, durch die Bedeutsamkeit 
der Welt vorgezeichnete, ja sogar oft vorwiegend »räumliche«, oder ist diese »Tatsache« ex-
istential-ontologisch notwendig und warum?]”137  This is not to suggest that we speak for ex-
ample of time in spatial ‘metaphors’, as the “philosophy of language” would have it (accord-
ing to Heidegger, “philosophical research”, namely phenomenology, should renounce this 
philosophy of language, in favour of the “things themselves” [“um den »Sachen selbst« nach-
zufragen”]), but to emphasize that all our understanding is already “worldly”, “spatial” — 
and indeed also temporal — and remains so, insofar as we do not just abstract the phenomena 
of ‘time’ and ‘space’ from this ‘concrete’ “being-in-the world”. For Heidegger, the concept 
of metaphor relies not only upon the metaphysical dichotomy of ‘the sensible’ and ‘the intel-
ligible’, but also upon abstraction from the ‘things themselves’; the alleged ‘sensible’ hearing 
and seeing are actually ‘abstract’ hearing and seeing, as Heidegger often, and also in his anti-
metaphorical argument in Der Satz vom Grund, argues. 
 And much later, if we keep to the theme of time and space or being and time, or time 
and being and their interrelations, in the 1962 lecture “Zeit und Sein” Heidegger argues, first, 
                                                 
136 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [Hua X],  ed. Rudolf Boehm  (Haag: 
Nijhoff, 1966) , esp. pp. 74-75 [429], cf. e.g. pp. 5 [370], 25 [386], 26 [388], 35-36 [395-396]. 
137 GA 2:221; i.e. Sein und Zeit, ed. 1949/1993, p. 166; henceforth, if the earlier pagination is given in the mar-
gin of the Gesamtausgabe volume, or I have used an earlier edition with identical text but different pagina-
tion, I may sometimes refer to the pagination of early editions in square brackets, as follows: GA 2:221 
[166]. Partly cit. and trans. James K. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversa-
tion 1951-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U.P., 2006), p. 15; the last subordinate clause (“or is this 
‘fact’...”) is my translation. Also cited in Celan, La bibliothèque philosophique / Die philosophische Biblio-
thek. Catalogue raisonné des annotations établi par Alexandra Richter, Patrik Alac, Bertrand Badiou; 
préface de Jean-Pierre Lefebvre (Paris: Éditions Rue d’Ulm, 2004), henceforth cited as La bi. phi., p. 379 
(No. 609). 
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that “authentic time” proves to be three-dimensional, while time is not thinkable without the 
“dimensions” of the past, the present and the future, and then that actually it seems “as if 
[gleichsam]” the interplay of these three dimensions constituted the fourth dimension of time 
— “not only ‘as it were’, but as a fact. / The authentic time is four-dimensional [nicht nur 
gleichsam, sondern aus der Sache. / Die eigentliche Zeit ist vierdimensional]”.138  As a matter 
of fact, “aus der Sache”, time is four-dimensional, claims Heidegger. That is to say: literally, 
taken that we are still to trust the opposition of ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ here. It is not only so 
that authentic time consists of the past, the present and the future, and the interplay of these 
three as a fourth constituent, and that insofar as this is proven to be the case, we may apply 
the term ‘dimension’ to all these four modalities of time, “as if” they were dimensions, while 
the term ‘dimension’ properly applies only to space, or that properly speaking time is the 
fourth dimension besides the three dimensions of space. To the contrary, Heidegger argues 
that the term ‘dimension’ and precisely the characterization as ‘four-dimensional’ applies as 
properly as possible to time, and that the proper meaning of time is that it is four-
dimensional. Only because time is the “pre-spatial locality [vorräumliche Ortschaft]” can 
there be a “where [Wo]” (ibid.). So to call time three-dimensional or properly (“aus der Sa-
che”) four-dimensional is not a metaphor, insofar as we do not call every departure from the 
current usage a metaphor, but rather a quasi-metonymical reduction (in the sense of tracing 
back) of dimensionality to its grounding in temporality. In his personal copy of the 1949 in-
troduction to “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Heidegger has written a note which inverts the order of 
these dimensions: “Zeit ist vierdimensional: Die erste , alles versammelnde Dimension ist die 
Nähe .”139 
 We shall not consider Heidegger’s antimetaphoric objections here in detail, or rather 
his denouncement of the concept of metaphor as a “metaphysical concept” and as an “overall 
key of all poetics”, nor discuss any further the important notion of proximity (“Nähe”). In-
stead, let me quote another thinker, Vladimir Jankélévitch, in order, as it were, to present a 
couple of very good examples of the ‘always metaphorical’ discourse concerning time:  
 
Time that erodes mountain chains and makes the pebbles of the beach smooth, time 
that levels all harshness and consoles all pain, soothing and healing time, is this not 
the vocation of decay?140  
 
Is this kind of discourse on time obviously metaphorical? With respect to the most trivial 
common parlance, a “vocation of decay” or an “erosion of rancor” may be metaphorical, 
taken that only a human subject may have a vocation and that, inversely, erosion is always a 
physical process that touches only upon inanimate matter, rather a geological than psycho-
                                                 
138 Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), p. 16. 
139 Wegmarken, GA 9:377, note a. 
140 Forgiveness, trans. Andrew Kelly (Chicago: Chicago U.P., 2005), p. 24. I have not had access to the origi-
nal French title, Le pardon (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1967). 
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logical phenomenon. And even if Jankélévitch’s text is full of metaphors and he characterizes 
“decay” itself here as “only a metaphor for fastening down ideas” (Forgiveness, p. 24), this 
text is still a philosophical discourse that tries to move beyond all the confusions and false 
assimilations toward authentic forgiveness, the ‘proper’ meaning of forgiveness beyond all 
“simili-forgivenesses”, mere metaphors and illusions, toward the conditions of possibility and 
impossibility of true forgiveness.141  As we already suggested, the Aristotelian “eye for re-
semblances” is common to both the poet and the philosopher, but Aristotle seems also to 
think that it is the philosopher who must have another eye too, able to discern distinctions 
beyond generic identities and resemblances, analogy beyond metaphor.  
 But is it really metaphorical to say that time erodes mountain chains and makes the 
pebbles of the beach smooth? If there is anything ‘literal’ to say about time, is it not precisely 
these things, and also that time levels harshness and consoles, soothes and heals? We may 
always quibble and say that at least ‘time’ is here a metonymy (or synecdoche) for what takes 
place in time, the weather and the sea, psychological processes; but these are not only ‘in’ 
time as if in a container or a stream. They are time, wind and waves and consolation and 
healing are temporal phenomena. To look for the idea of time, the paradigm of time beyond 
these phenomena and not in these phenomena, as these phenomena, is like ... well, if I may 
have recourse to an old joke, like asking a fruit-dealer for a fruit, but not an apple or an or-
ange or a banana, just plain fruit. A fruit for all seasons, yet for none. And still we need an 
idea, a schema of ‘fruit’ that is reducible neither to any particular or specific fruit nor to the 
sum of all the fruits hitherto known. The extravagant Platonic phantasy with regard to this 
form was to consider this ‘idea’ as something separate (chorismos), having an independent 
existence as a “paradigm” after which all other things — all ‘other’ fruits for instance — 
were “modelled”, and in which all these “participate”; it would not only be fruit in general, 
that which provides the specific and particular fruits their form, but the most perfect, the most 
beautiful individual fruit, the eternal fruit after which the other fruits are more or less imper-
fectly modelled and seasoned, subjected to growth and decay; these notions of “modelling” 
and “participation” are precisely the “empty words and poetic metaphors” of which Aristotle 
accuses Plato in the Metaphysics. 
 Speaking of the pebbles made smooth by the sea, namely by time, it must be men-
tioned also that Paul Celan denies that he is using a metaphor in coining the word Meermühle 
(“sea-mill”) in a poem of his: it is this quite concrete, quite worldly process of grinding to 
which he refers in coining that word, as an analogue to other mills or mills in general — in-
                                                 
141 Cf. also Jacques Derrida, Pardonner : l’impardonnable et l’imprescriptible (Paris: L’Herne, 2005); “Le 
Siècle et le Pardon (entretien avec Michel Wieviorka)”, in Foi et Savoir, suivi de Le Siècle et le Pardon 
(Paris: Seuil, 2001), pp. 101-133, e.g. p. 103: “En principe, il n’y a pas de limite au pardon, pas de mesure, 
pas de modération, pas de « jusq’ou ? ». Pourvu, bien entendu, qu’on s’accorde sur quelque sens « propre » 
de ce mot.” 
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cluding Todesmühle, which is no metaphor, either. But we shall return to these non-
metaphorical figures later. 
 “Absolute metaphor” is an oxymoron, “conceptual metaphor” is another. When we 
extend the meaning of the old term ‘metaphor’, transfer it to the root of all ‘cognition’, when 
we establish a continuity between concept and metaphor,142  when the distinctions are not 
only blurred between different kinds of tropes and figures and all of them become reduced to 
metaphor, but also distinctions between analogy and metaphor, model and metaphor, hypoty-
posis and metaphor become obfuscated, we risk also losing the historico-philosophical under-
standing of the “sense and necessity”143 of these distinctions within a given theory or “sys-
tem”,144  namely in the overall “syntax” of a given text (or corpus of texts) or discourse, from 
Aristotle through Kant, Hegel and Locke even to Max Black and Mary B. Hesse, who still so 
‘conservatively’ cling to the distinctions between models, metaphors and analogies, and even 
dare to say that there are cases in which an “analogy has degenerated into metaphor”.145 
 Mary Hesse illustrates the distinction between metaphor and analogy very well by the 
distinction between “angry sky” on the one hand, and “angry dog” or “angry God” on the 
other, in which “angry sky” is an example of metaphor and the two others are examples of 
analogies. Analogy in the sense instantiated by these two latter examples does not involve the 
same kind of identification as “angry sky” presumably does. The subjective, human feeling of 
anger is analogically transferred to the dog or to God (which might make us wonder if Hesse 
actually thought of the anagram she so strikingly uses here), across an unbridgeable distance, 
which we are not expected to cross; a dog’s anger and God’s anger are not only absolutely 
heterogeneous and dissimilar with regard to each other, but also with regard to ours; these 
conscious subjects are to be presumed as radically different from ours, unknown as such but 
either empirically observable or purely thinkable. But in the case of an angry sky, it is pre-
sumed that we poetically, that is metaphorically, transfer our subjective affections to inani-
mate nature, or to objects in general, including the other subject, but in its objective phe-
nomenality rather than qua alter ego. A dog or God are called angry across an unbridgeable 
distance, but metaphor means a make-believe bridge between the subject and the object. 
 This is a good distinction to remember. Analogies and models are, in principle, not 
only inescapable for the scientific mind as well as for the mind and language in general, as it 
                                                 
142 This is what Derrida sees Nietzsche to have done; cf. “La mythologie blanche” (in Marges,  cop. 1972), p. 
313; cf. also p. 271n21; cf. also “Violence et métaphysique” (in L’écriture et la différence [cop. 1967, repr. 
1997], pp. 117-228, here pp. 203-204); cf. also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Translator’s Preface” to Der-
rida’s Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, cop. 1976, 2nd pr. 1977). 
143 Derrida, “Le retrait de la métaphore”, pp. 78-79. 
144 I am using the term “system” between inverted commas, knowing that according to Heidegger it is an 
anachronism to speak of a “system” with respect to Aristotle’s philosophy, for instance. But here the notion 
(having a Greek etymology) is not restricted to the modern metaphysics of subjectivity and its pervasive no-
tion of “positing” (cf. “Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins”, in Nietzsche II). 
145 Cf. Mary B. Hesse, “Scientific Models”, in Warren Shibles, ed., Essays on Metaphor (Whitewater: The 
Language Press, 1972), pp. 169-180, here p. 178; cf. also Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1963). 
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seems, but also innocent insofar as we keep in mind the radical distance implied; it is of 
course one of the fundamental principles of theological discourse (and not only that of the so-
called negative theology), that the irreducible distance between God and the worldly ana-
logues must be strictly maintained. But are we sure that this distinction between ‘scientific 
analogy’ and ‘poetic metaphor’, and “angry sky” as an example of the latter, or of anthropo-
morphism in general, does not imply a reductive understanding of poetry, and also of the or-
dinary, vernacular use of similar expressions? It must be said, if only in passing here, that 
Heidegger actually vehemently, repeatedly and at some length objects even to the notion ac-
cording to which the human subject transfers her own lived experience (Erlebnisse) and the 
subjective capability of experiencing to the inanimate objects of nature, in speaking for in-
stance of — well, let us say — “angry sky”, “brooding mountains”, or “joyous undulation of 
waves”.146 
 The last example mentioned is Douglas Berggren’s example of a ‘Hölderlinian’ poetic 
metaphor, or as Berggren calls it, “textural” metaphor. Berggren’s article, “The Use and 
Abuse of Metaphor” (1962), is an important early contribution to what would later become 
known as the cognitive theory of metaphor, but has also a certain sensitivity to phenomenol-
ogy. Berggren happens to be one of the very few Anglo-Saxon theorists of metaphor, in the 
broadly speaking Analytic tradition, to have mentioned Heidegger at all, let alone as early as 
1962, in a very affirmative tone, and in support of the metaphor theory of “the appropriate 
mode of stereoscopic vision”. Berggren comes actually rather close to Heidegger in discuss-
ing the “joyous undulation of waves” and in refuting the notion according to which “such tex-
tures [as the mentioned ‘Hölderlinian’ example and John Clare’s description of a primrose 
“with its crimp and curdled leaf / And its little brimming eye”] [...] have been empathetically 
or unconsciously projected into perceived objects”, by pointing out that such an argument is 
not only “irrelevant from a phenomenological point of view; it is also based on the faulty 
supposition that objects are initially apprehended in a completely sterilized or immaculate 
manner”. He continues a little later: “If we are to apprehend swirling colors in a painting, or 
the joy of waves, we must in some sense see with our emotions, even though the textures we 
thereby apprehend are not themselves either actual feelings, or mere sense data of a sterilized 
sort.”147  This necessity could be described in Heideggerian terms of Befindlichkeit, no doubt; 
and indeed, in order to arrive at mere sense data of a sterilized sort, we would have to abstract 
from the actual concrete experience or phenomena, namely from “the matters themselves”. 
                                                 
146 Cf. Heidegger, Aristoteles, Metaphysik ? 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft [1931] (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Klostermann, 1990 [1st ed. 1981]), §9a, i.e. GA 33:70-77.  
147 Douglas Berggren, “The Use and Abuse of Metaphor, I” (1962), pp. 254, 256. The examples, “brooding 
mountains” and “joyous undulation of waves”, along with “echoing light” and “the height of nobility”, as 
well as the distinction between “Pictorial, Structural, and Textural” metaphors (“it is the textural mode of 
metaphor which is essential to poetry, and the structural mode which is essential to both science and phi-
losophy”) are on pp. 241, 255. Heidegger is mentioned on pp. 257-258. 
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 It is indeed Heidegger himself who radically contests the theory of subjective projec-
tion or transference that is also refuted by Berggren, although the latter does that in favour of 
a better understanding of metaphor, while Heidegger denounces the concept of metaphor al-
together as a metaphysical concept. I cite Brogan’s and Warnek’s excellent English transla-
tion of Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle’s concept of dunamis (“force”): 
 
We are asking: Is anything actually explained by referring the positing [Ansetzung] of 
forces in things and objects themselves back to a transferral [Übertragung] of subjec-
tive experiences into the objects? Or is this popular explanation a sham; namely, is it 
something which for its part is in need of explanation in all respects and, when ex-
plained, untenable? The said explanation is indeed a sham. We shall try now, with at-
tention to what comes later, simply to become familiar with this by adducing a few 
guiding thoughts. From this it shall become apparent how the said explanation fails to 
recognize its own presuppositions. 
 1. The stated explanation presupposes as self-evident that what transpires in the 
inwardness of subjectivity [was wir im Inneren der Subjektivität vorfinden] is more 
easily and more surely comprehended than what we encounter externally as object. 
 2. It is assumed that the subject, the proper I, is that very thing which is first of 
all experienced and which thereby presents itself at any time as the nearest. From this 
is derived what undergoes the transferral onto the objects. 
 3. The said explanation neglects to demonstrate why such a transferral from 
subjective determinations onto the objects is carried out at all. 
 4. In particular it fails to ask whether the objects themselves do not, after all, 
demand such a transfer of subjective experiences onto them [ob denn am Ende die 
Objekte eine solche Übertragung subjektiver Bestimmungen auf sie fordern]. 
 5. If there exists such a demand, and if it is not pure arbitrariness that we, for 
example, name one landscape cheerful and another melancholy, then it must be asked 
how the objects themselves are given prior to the metaphorical, transferred compre-
hension and the sympathy of such a mood [wie denn die Objekte selbst vor der über-
tragenden Erfassung und Einfühlung solcher Stimmung gegeben sind]. What is their 
character as objects such that they demand such a transfer? 
 6. It is not taken into consideration that, if the objects themselves in accordance 
with their intrinsic content and their way of being require such a transfer in order to be 
addressed, for example, as forces and powers [wenn die Objekte selbst ihrem Sachge-
halt und ihrer Seinsart nach eine solche Übertragung verlangen, etwa als Kräfte und 
Mächte angesprochen zu werden], then indeed a transfer is not needed in the first 
place; for in this case we would already find in them what we would attribute to them 
[denn dann finden wir in ihnen selbst, was wir ihnen zusprechen]. 
 7. Recklessly explaining certain objective thing-contents — for example, real 
forces and efficacious or effective connections and capacities — as subjective trans-
ferrals results in even those forces, capacities, and capabilities peculiar to subjects as 
such being misconstrued in their proper essence [in ihrem Eigenwesen verkannt wer-
den]. 
 8. Because of this and on the basis of all the said shortcomings, the way to a 
decisive question remains closed off, and this question runs thus: In the end, is what 
we are here calling force, capacity, etc., something which in its essence is neither sub-
jective nor objective? But if neither the one nor the other, where then do these phe-
nomena belong? Do they at all allow themselves to be determined from out of an ori-
gin [aus einem Ursprung bestimmen]? But then what kind of explanation is such a 
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determination of origin [Ursprungsbestimmung]?148  
 
This is only one remarkable example of Heidegger’s insistent objections to metaphor, one of 
the lesser known examples of his well-known resistance to the “overall key of all poetics”, 
the irreducibly metaphysical concept of metaphor. We shall not presently discuss these Hei-
deggerian objections in detail — it would require another treatise, on figures and counterfig-
ures, restricted and universal analogy.149  However, out of these eight “guiding thoughts”, it 
can be noticed already that Heidegger’s ‘strategy’ is diametrically opposed to the strategy of 
metaphor: instead of making that which is hitherto unknown to us, or at least relatively unfa-
miliar and ‘abstract’, by introducing it through the image of something more familiar and 
supposedly more concrete, he rather insists that that which we suppose to be more familiar to 
us already, may actually be far less familiar than we assume, and rather uncanny, unheimlich, 
and that the assumed familiarity itself, the being-at-home so to say, is questionable through 
and through. 
 This procedure has been called “inverted metaphoricity” or, with reference to Der-
rida’s reading of Heidegger, quasi-metaphoricity.150  It is indeed a chiasmatic reversal of the 
ordinary rule of metaphor. This chiasmus is one that I would call counter-figure. It crosses 
over the trope and thereby forms a palimpsest, giving a wink, releasing a glimpse through the 
“speech-grille” (Sprachgitter), a “distanced comprehension [entferntes Verstehen]”. But this 
liberated view is also liberated from seeing (as a vision of images and figures), a veiled or 
                                                 
148 Trans. Brogan and Warnek (1995), pp. 63-64; I have corrected the word “transferal” several times into 
“transferral” (GA 33:73-74). 
149 Heidegger’s lectures on the notion of force [dunamis] and being-at-work [energeia] deal also with the much 
debated notion of ontological analogy, analogia entis in Aristotle; it is indeed the difference between re-
stricted and universal analogy in Aristotle that should be clarified, but this cannot be done here; I do intend 
to deal with these questions elsewhere, though. 
150 See the excellent review article by Axel Schmitt, “Poetik der Beschneidung oder Wie dekonstruktiv kann 
man Celan lesen? Ein Blick auf neue Celan-Literatur”, in literaturkritik.de, Nr. 6, Schwerpunkt: Paul Celan 
(Juni 2003): “Das wesentlich Neue dieser dekonstruktiven Celan-Leküre [sic] besteht in der Herausarbei-
tung einer Poetik, deren Kernpunkt ein sich wechselseitig potenzierender, nicht zu schlichtender Streit 
zwischen Materialität und Sinn ist, wobei der Verstehensprozess immer wieder durch die Unzulänglichkeit 
der Materialität unterbrochen und an seine eigene Grenze geführt wird. Im Mittelpunkt dieses Wechsel-
spiels von Verstehen und Befremden steht das, was Derrida mit dem Begriff der Quasi-Metaphorik 
beschrieben hat. Gemeint ist damit eine invertierte Metaphorik, der es nicht mehr darum zu tun ist, Un-
bekanntes durch die Übertragung eines bekannten Begriffs vertrauter zu machen, sondern umgekehrt Ver-
trautes durch die Umkehrbewegung unheimlicher werden zu lassen. Celans Dichtungskonzeption lässt sich 
weder auf eine hermeneutisch geleitete Auslegung des Sinns festschreiben noch kann sie auf der reinen 
Sinn-dissémination verortet werden. Vielmehr hält sich die dichterische Rede für ihn im »Zwischen« von 
Aussagemöglichkeit und deren Erschütterung, indem sie am begrifflichen Sprechen festhält und dieses 
gleichzeitig von Innen aufzubrechen sucht.” (http://www.literaturkritik.de/public/rezension.php?rez_id = 
6120; accessed Dec. 7th, 2006.) For the notion of quasimetaphoricity, cf. Derrida, “Le retrait de la méta-
phore”.  Schmitt’s view of deconstructive reading and its relation to Celan’s poetics is very accurate, I 
think. But it must be noted that Schmitt seems to take the notion of dissémination too narrowly here, appar-
ently only with reference to Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé in “La double séance” (in La dissémination, cop. 
1972). Actually Derrida applies this notion also to Celan, without comparing him with Mallarmé in any 
way, in Béliers (2003), and there dissemination is precisely juxtaposed with hermeneutics; not simply op-
posed to it, but understood as a limit to which the hermeneutic process must be taken, in an “infinite conver-
sation” between these two interlocutors, hermeneutics and deconstruction. 
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blindfolded wink, towards something yet unheard of. This viewless view, “halb Bild und 
halb Schleier”, phenomenality of the non-phenomenal, is language. We shall return to these 
paradoxes later, of course.151 
 For Paul Celan, poetry is not a heuristic redescription of reality, a miniature reflection 
of the cosmos, but a Gegenkosmos, “counter-cosmos”, an inverted world-view. In this in-
vertedness, in this wish to walk on one’s hands, this poet’s worldly (i.e. sublunary and 
“‘counter’-supralunary”) counter-world formally resembles the inverted world of philosophy, 
as has been noted.152  But it also strives to be an objection to metaphysics, to all the meta-
physics (perhaps even to Heidegger’s counter-metaphysics, after all; namely to his insistence 
on foundations and fountainheads, sources and origins, paths instead of aporias), and among 
all these, the metaphysics of language and art. 
 But should we not ask, paying heed to the proximity of Berggren’s and Heidegger’s 
arguments against the projectionist theory, for instance, whether Heidegger’s resistance to the 
allegedly metaphysical concept of metaphor could still be revised to support a new and better 
kind of metaphor theory, as Jean Greisch and Paul Ricœur have suggested (“La métaphore 
est morte, vive la métaphore !”)?153  Against this question, however, another one must be 
asked: Why keep to the old name, the old philosopheme metaphor, dragging along with it the 
whole tradition that fosters the insufficient and arbitrary decisions upon poetry and language 
that for instance Heidegger tries to deconstruct? 
 
 
METAPHOR’S RESISTANCE TO PARAPHRASE AND LITERATURE’S RESISTANCE TO 
METAPHOR (CULLER, DAVIDSON, COHEN) 
 
The present dissertation does not wish to contribute to the mainstream of metaphor theories, 
but rather to explore certain counter-currents running against the all-absorbing enthusiasm 
over metaphor. (Although it might be fair to give the figure all four legs to swim with, I do 
not suggest plunging into such counter-currents, but to explore them. To let them flow, if you 
will, and not try to confine them at once, for instance, by pretending to adjust the extant con-
                                                 
151 Cf. Celan, GW 1:167; GW 3:170; see also the texts by Hugo Huppert and Werner Hamacher in Hamacher et 
al., eds., Paul Celan (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986); Hamacher’s essay, “Die Sekunde der Inversion”, 
has also been reprinted (in a slightly revised form, to my knowledge) in his book Entferntes Verstehen. 
Studien zu Philosophie und Literatur von Kant bis Celan (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998; I have only had 
access to the English translation, by Peter Fenves [in Premises, 1996]; cf. below) and translated, as far as I 
know, no less than three times into English.  
152 It is Paul Ricœur who sees the “live” metaphor as a heuristic redescription of reality, in La métaphore vive 
(Paris: Seuil, cop. 1975). Werner Hamacher has pointed out the affinity between Hegel’s talk of philosophy 
as a world turned upside down and Celan’s poetics, with the reference in the Meridian to Büchner’s Lenz 
who wished, on his twentieth of January, to walk upon his hands (“Die Sekunde der Inversion”, 1988; cf. 
below). In Celan’s draft material for the Meridian speech, we find a note, with a touch of hesitation, self-
suspicion of “anthropocentrism”, speaking of Gegenkosmos: “Gedicht nicht augenfällige oder geheime 
Spiegelung des Kosmos, sondern Gegenkosmos. Das Sublunare als »Gegen«-Supralunare (also doch an-
thropozentrisch??)” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 286; cf. below). 
153 Cf. Greisch, “Les mots et les roses” (1973); Ricœur, La métaphore vive (“Huitième étude”). 
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 cept of metaphor to better suit some difficult cases, or by attempting to introduce a new con-
cept of metaphor, which would be always possible, as it seems, by virtue of the natural lin-
guistic capacities of such words as ‘metaphor’, its naturally metaphoric capacities.) The aim 
of the present study is rather to explore the motivation, or the “sense and necessity”154 of 
some dissenting voices that have not been so enthusiastic about applying the concept of 
metaphor, more or less without reserve as it seems, to such areas of interest as literary and 
philosophical language. 
 There have been, at the same time as the mainstream of metaphor theories seems to 
have expanded far beyond all traditional margins of rhetoric and poetics, certain counter-
currents to the mainstream and even to its backwaters. In a famous and influential article of 
the same famous “Special Issue on Metaphor” of Critical Inquiry with Booth’s extrapolation 
and Cohen’s salutation to the friends of metaphor, Donald Davidson155 argues against “the 
central mistake” of most metaphor theorists, namely “the idea that a metaphor has, in addition 
to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning”, i.e. a metaphorical meaning, while 
he still insists that clearing away this mistake “makes metaphor a more, not a less, interesting 
phenomenon” (“What Metaphors Mean”, p. 32). Davidson’s argument in the article could be 
summarized by his own sentence: “Metaphor makes us see one thing as another by making 
some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight” (p. 47). His view is inspiring, clear 
and insightful. But we could well ask whether it is always metaphor which prompts the in-
sight, if the figure taken as metaphor does not by itself necessarily carry any more or less 
hidden message besides the so-called literal meaning, or translate a propositional content, that 
is, whether the figure taken to be metaphorical is properly metaphorical in the first place. As 
Davidson says, “we are seldom in doubt that what we have is a metaphor” (p. 35), when what 
we have seems obviously metaphorical. But there are doubtful cases, even such cases in 
which the obviously metaphorical expression turns out to be something else instead. In cases 
where ‘metaphor’ is a question of interpretation, are we allowed to attach the label ‘metaphor’ 
to the figure itself? As “intimation is not meaning” (p. 41), could it sometimes be that we are 
invited to consider the apparent metaphor otherwise than metaphorically, and even otherwise 
than in terms of meaning?  
 When Donald Davidson denies the existence of specifically metaphorical meaning (or 
metaphor’s “having a special meaning, a specific cognitive content”; p. 46), he still denies it 
to metaphor and in favour of a better understanding of this verbal phenomenon. His para-
doxical thesis “that metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, 
and nothing more” is meant to make “metaphor a more, not a less, interesting phenomenon” 
(p. 32). But there are other kinds of dissenting voices, and also such a voice as Jonathan 
                                                 
154 Jacques Derrida, “Le retrait de la métaphore”, in Psyché [1987/1998], pp. 78-79; cf. En. trans. by F. 
Gasdner [1998], p. 115 (there, “ le sens et la nécessité” is rendered as “the meaning and necessity”). 
155 “What Metaphors Mean”, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5 No. 1, Special Issue on Metaphor (Autumn 1978), pp. 
31-48. 
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Culler’s who, a couple of years earlier, ventured as far as to suggest that literary critics should 
“scrap” the notion of metaphor altogether, since “it is a positive hindrance to our understand-
ing of reading because it conceals the complexities of interpretation”.156 I would agree with 
Culler when he points out, in a later text, “The Turns of Metaphor” (1981), that “there is a 
certain perversity in an account of metaphor which works well for highly uninteresting and 
even artificial figures of replacement and which breaks down, or at least becomes relatively 
useless, in the case of the creative, suggestive literary metaphors which interest us most.”157 
Too often, that seems to be the case: many theories of metaphor seem to be quite unable to 
account for the complexities of literary language; and some theorists, such as Max Black, also 
affirm this problem. This is a concession which has not often been noted, however. 
 But perhaps readers and interpreters must keep alive their critical awareness of meta-
phor if it is precisely the resistance to metaphor that literature draws its power from? This 
may be inferred from what Culler claims in the same brief “Commentary” already cited, 
which concluded another special issue “On Metaphor” (New Literary History, Autumn 1974):  
 
Literature’s power has been thought to lie in metaphor, but in fact it is precisely litera-
ture’s resistance to metaphor, resistance to replacement operations, which is the 
source of this power. [“Commentary”, p. 229.]  
 
But where there is resistance, there must be something to be resisted. Therefore it is question-
able whether the concept of metaphor could just be “scrapped” by literary criticism.158 
Culler’s own talk of this resistance seems to contradict this suggestion. Know thy enemy: this 
would be the battle-cry for poetry, inasmuch as it is “essentially anti-metaphoric”, and for 
poetics that must struggle with its own tradition and the tendencies of criticism as a “meta-
phor for the act of reading” (Paul de Man).159  More seriously speaking, there is no counter-
figure without figure: without the image of the tobacco pipe above it, the Magrittean inscrip-
tion, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe”, would not make much sense, would it? 
 In the later text, “The Turns of Metaphor”, a chapter in The Pursuit of Signs (1981), we 
are no longer invited to simply “scrap” the concept of metaphor, but the literary metaphors 
are treated in a critical or deconstructive manner, following for instance the readings of 
Proust by Stephen Ullmann (for whose Festschrift the chapter was originally destined), 
Gérard Genette and Paul de Man, and what has been discovered in these readings or through 
them: namely that many of Proust’s central ‘metaphors’, especially in Du côté de chez 
Swann, are actually “generated” and “supported” by metonymy (p. 193). In Culler’s terms, 
                                                 
156 “Commentary”, in New Literary History, Vol. VI, No 1, On Metaphor (Autumn 1974), pp. 219-229, here p. 
228. 
157 The Pursuit of Signs (London : Routledge, 1981), p. 205. 
158 “Scrapping the term ‘metaphor’ would not harm such theories [of literature] and would, on the contrary, 
force them to look more closely at the interpretive processes which produce a tension between unity and 
disparity and at the various textual indeterminacies which provoke such reading.” (“Commentary”, p. 228.) 
159 ”Criticism is a metaphor for the act of reading, and this act is itself inexhaustible.” (Blindness and Insight: 
Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism [1983], p. 107.) 
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this means in the final analysis that the metaphors which we might take to be “based on the 
perception of an essential similarity” are actually products crafted by the work of metonymy 
which is, by definition as it seems, “based on a merely accidental or contingent connexion”. 
Culler borrows from Ullmann the concise characterizations of metaphors and metonymies as 
“figures based on essences” and “figure[s] based on accident[s]” and then proceeds to decon-
struct this opposition that has led so many critics to prefer metaphor to the allegedly much 
less interesting figure of metonymy, not to mention the many other figures and tropes of the 
classical tropologies.160   
 Metaphor has become not only the privileged figure, which it was already in Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, but often also the metaphor for all other figures of speech and 
even for the figures of thought. This synecdochic displacement which makes metaphor the 
figure of all figures, or “a genus of which all the other tropes are species”, is not necessarily 
due to mere “blindness” or “laziness”,161  but may be motivated by certain preferences and 
also desires. Metaphor is the figure most readily defensible and justifiable on cognitive 
grounds, as Culler points out; it entertains a certain relation to the form of proposition, even if 
it is often very difficult to restate in propositional form; and these figures par excellence are 
those that “are read as artistic inventions grounded in perceptions of relations in the world”, 
grounded “in the perception of resemblances in experience, in intimations of essential quali-
ties”. To its modern proponents at least, metaphor is not just a “non-referential play of forms” 
(The Pursuit of Signs, p. 191): in metaphor poetry is to find its defence.  
 The proponents of metaphor, including Proust himself, judging by his statements that 
are contradicted by the metonymical motivation of his own metaphors, believe that poetry is 
an essentially metaphorical way of presenting “human experience to us in a new way, giving 
us not scientific truth but a higher imaginative truth, the perception of fundamental connex-
ions and relationships” (p. 192). In his reading of Proust with regard to Ullmann’s and 
Genette’s readings, Culler follows de Man in not being satisfied with recognizing the alleg-
edly harmonious interrelation or interpenetration between metaphor and metonymy, in which 
“the role of metonymy in metaphor”162 seems to be still a relationship in which the former is 
subjected to the service of the latter: the “interpenetration” (The Pursuit..., p. 192) turns out to 
                                                 
160 The Pursuit of Signs, p. 190. — Not to mention “simile or synecdoche, […] metalepsis or meiosis, or […] 
anadiplosis, alloiosis, or anatapodosis”, as Culler lists (on p. 188). 
161 Cf. Umberto Eco, “The Scandal of Metaphor” (1983), p. 217. Cf. Culler: “[T]oday metaphor is no longer 
one figure among others but the figure of figures, a figure for figurality; and I mean this not figuratively but 
quite literally: the reason we can devote journals and conferences to metaphor is that metaphor is not just 
the literal or proper name for a trope based on resemblance but also and especially a figure for figurality in 
general.” (The Pursuit of Signs, p. 189.) 
162 Genette, “Métonymie chez Proust”, in Figures III (Paris: Seuil, cop. 1972), p. 42 (“le rôle de la métonymie 
dans la métaphore”); cit. Culler, The Pursuit of Signs, p. 193. Cf. de Man, Allegories of Reading (New Ha-
ven: Yale U.P., cop. 1979), pp. 60-61n5 (“beyond Genette’s model of a reconciled system of metaphor and 
metonymy”, beyond “Genette’s model of happy totalization” we are to find, in Proust’s sentence “the sun 
having turned its eye elsewhere [le soleil ayant tourné ailleurs son regard]” a certain “figure of the unread-
ability of figures and therefore no longer, strictly speaking, a figure”). 
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be a hierarchy in which the penetrated metaphor dominates by enclosing the other figure, 
namely metonymy, within its own structure. Otherwise one would be in danger of unsettling 
the hierarchy of essence over accidents: “For the capture and appreciation of essences, if it is 
to mean anything or carry any value, must be distinguished from the purely fortuitous or ac-
cidental relationships brought about by juxtaposition.” (The Pursuit..., p. 193.) Culler cites a 
passage of Le Temps retrouvé in which the narrator celebrates “metaphor as the instrument of 
artistic truth”, an instrument by which the writer brings together two sensations which may 
lie far apart in time, and thus, by identifying their common quality and liberating them from 
the contingencies of time, “reunites” them in their essence by uniting words in a wedlock 
(“par le lien indescriptible d’une alliance de mots”).163  But in a chain of readings that takes 
him from Ullmann through Genette to de Man, Culler argues that the very “distinction be-
tween contingent and necessary connexions” actually turns out to be threatened in Proust’s 
text (cf. The Pursuit of Signs, pp. 194-196). We shall return to Proust for a brief moment a 
little later, but rather through de Man’s reading of him. 
 But now, how is the alleged higher truth of metaphor related to meaning, message, 
and cognitive content? In the famous article already quoted, “What Metaphors Mean?” 
(1978), Donald Davidson argues that “metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal 
interpretation, mean, and nothing more”, and that “We must give up the idea that a metaphor 
carries a message, that it has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning).” 
Davidson’s insights, the denial of meaning, message and content to metaphor, come close to 
challenging the very notion of metaphor, “carrying over” as the Greek name suggests. But 
Davidson still insists that clearing away the mistake about metaphorical meaning “makes 
metaphor a more, not a less, interesting phenomenon” (“What Metaphors Mean”, pp. 32, 45). 
As Culler argues, such a shift of emphasis from the poetics of structure to the pragmatics of 
the effect “would involve treating the notion of metaphor as a description of certain interpre-
tive operations performed by readers when confronted by a textual incongruity, such as the 
assertion of a patently false identity”.164  Davidson’s argument in his article could be summa-
                                                 
163  “[L]a vérité ne commencera qu’au moment où l’écrivain prendra deux objets différents, posera leur rapport, 
analogue dans le monde de l’art à celui qu’est le rapport unique, de la loi causale, dans le monde de la sci-
ence et les enfermera dans les anneaux nécessaires d’un beau style, ou même, ainsi que la vie, quand en 
rapprochant une qualité commune à deux sensations, il dégagera leur essence en les réunissant l’une et 
l’autre pour les soustraire aux contingences du temps, dans une métaphore, et les enchaînera par le lien in-
descriptible d’une alliance de mots. La nature elle-même, à ce point de vue sur la voie de l’art, n’était elle 
pas commencement d’art, elle qui souvent ne m’avait permis de connaître la beauté d’une chose que long-
temps après dans une autre, […]” (Proust, À la Recherche du temps perdu, VII : Le Temps retrouvé [coll. 
Folio classique n°2203; Paris: Gallimard, 1999], p. 196; partly cited by Culler, The Pursuit of Signs, 194. In 
his citation, Culler omits, possibly by accident, the clause “dans une métaphore” and does not cite the last 
sentence quoted here, either.) 
164 The Pursuit of Signs, p. 208. Toward the end of the chapter, Culler nevertheless contests this view: “Instead 
of explaining the original production of the metaphor by the author […] we would be describing the produc-
tion of a metaphorical reading by the reader. […] [A] rhetoric focussed on persuasion rather than tropes will 
be engaged from the outset in an uncertain calculus, trying to account for effects of force which are never 
wholly predictable.” (p. 209.) 
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rized by his own sentence that we already quoted: “Metaphor makes us see one thing as an-
other by making some literal statement that inspires or prompts the insight.” But in spite of 
the fact that the statement itself is literal and does not contain any metaphorical meaning (“in-
timation is not meaning”), “we are seldom in doubt that what we have is a metaphor”.165 
Should we sometimes be, perhaps? In the absence of such a horizon that would provide us 
with a more or less immediate grasp of the metaphor as a metaphor (Ted Cohen points out 
that in this respect, as a “cultivation of intimacy”, metaphors resemble jokes),166  namely 
when we come across “difficult metaphors”, it is us, the readers who can be held responsible 
for the metaphoricity of the apparent metaphor. As Culler says, “the figurative is the name we 
give to effects of language that exceed, deform, or deviate from the code; codifications of 
previous excesses, deformations, and deviations only create opportunities for new turns” (The 
Pursuit of Signs, p. 209). This may happen even when we actually are unable to ‘figure out’ 
what a certain poetic turn-of-phrase means, and this difficulty may become a pretext for an 
interpretative metaphor, while it could also have some other effect, such as, first of all, an 
honest acknowledgement of this difficulty as a difficulty, a discovery of the obstacle as an 
obstacle. We shall consider this possibility in more detail in discussing Paul Celan’s poetry 
and poetics. 
 Donald Davidson denies that “associated with a metaphor is a cognitive content that 
its author wishes to convey and that the interpreter must grasp if he is to get the message”, 
and juxtaposes metaphor with jokes and dreams: “to suppose that [metaphor] can be effective 
only by conveying a message is like thinking a joke or a dream makes some statement which 
a clever interpreter can restate in plain prose” (“What Metaphors Mean”, p. 46). This is obvi-
ously not the case with jokes and dreams. But it is also obvious that jokes and dreams differ 
from each other.  
 Another contributor to the Critical Inquiry’s “Special Issue on Metaphor”, Ted 
Cohen, very successfully associates jokes and metaphors as ways to achieve intimacy be-
tween the speaker and the hearer. Let us take a long quote, since when we see in what re-
spects metaphors resemble jokes, we may also see in what respects jokes and metaphors may 
resemble poems, and in what respects poems are radically different from jokes and meta-
phors. This approximation and differentiation have to do with the Celanian question of com-
plicity with the poem: the author abandons, gives up his complicity (Mitwisserschaft), and 
thereby gives the reader the chance for an instantaneous complicity with the poem. This in-
stantaneous, punctual “cultivation of intimacy” (if I may use and abuse Cohen’s expression), 
might be precisely the limit, the borderline to which metaphors are taken, as Celan points 
out.167  But well before quoting Celan’s words, let us quote Cohen: 
                                                 
165 “What Metaphors Mean”, pp. 47, 41, 35. 
166 Cf. Cohen, “Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy”, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5 No. 1, Special Issue on 
Metaphor (Autumn 1978), pp. 3-12. 
167 Mikrolithen, No. 226, p. 126 (see below). 
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There is a unique way in which the maker and the appreciator of a metaphor are 
drawn closer to one another. Three aspects are involved: (1) the speaker issues a kind 
of concealed invitation; (2) the hearer expends a special effort to accept the invitation; 
and (3) this transaction constitutes the acknowledgement of a community. All three 
are involved in any communication, but in ordinary literal discourse their involvement 
is so pervasive and routine that they go unremarked. The use of metaphor throws 
them into relief, and there is a point in that. […] Realizing the metaphorical character 
of an expression is often easy enough; it requires only the assumption that the speaker 
is not simply speaking absurdly or uttering a patent falsehood. […] In both tasks — 
realizing that the expression is intended metaphorically, and seeing what to make of it 
— the hearer typically employs a number of assumptions about the speaker: what the 
speaker believes, what the speaker believes about what the hearer believes (which in-
cludes beliefs about what the speaker thinks the hearer can be expected to believe 
about the speaker). […] [Cohen’s example, discussed at some length, is calling some-
one, the chairman in one’s departmental meeting, figuratively a “Bolshevik”; the 
process of metaphorical interpretation ensuing from this has as its consequence that 
the speaker and the addressee “become an intimate pair”.] The sense of close commu-
nity results not only from the shared awareness that a special invitation has been given 
and accepted, but also from the awareness that not everyone could make that offer or 
take it up. In general, and with some obvious qualifications, it must be true that all lit-
eral use of language is accessible to all whose language it is. But a figurative use can 
be inaccessible to all but those who share information about one another’s knowledge, 
beliefs, intentions, and attitudes. I think the community can be as small as you like, 
even a solitary pair: perhaps only the chairman knows enough of what you think and 
feel (along with knowing that you know that he knows this) to take the point of your 
remark. And the group might even be smaller: surely the self-dialogue of the soul is 
often figurative. / In these respects metaphors are surprisingly like jokes. With a joke, 
too, there is first the realization that it is a joke and then the understanding — what’s 
called getting the joke. [“Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy”, pp. 8-10.]  
 
This model associating metaphors with jokes, whose horizon might extend itself to the most 
universal of communities (especially since jokes need not always be verbal) and contract it-
self to the strictest hermeticism of self-dialogue, this paradigm might well account for even 
the most hermetic, the most idiosyncratic, the most difficult metaphor as a metaphor. The 
best jokes and the best metaphors are radically unparaphrasable, untranslatable into another 
idiom. Perhaps the hermeticism of a modern poem would resemble the radical esotericism of 
a private joke? A joke into which one might have been initiated sooner or later, but which 
defies all elucidation and paraphrase or prefacing even after such initiation? 
 But how many times do you laugh at a joke? Even the best of all the jokes you know? 
Or even if it is extremely funny, even if it always makes you smile at least, would you com-
pare it with a poem? To drop the metaphor, to drop the metaphorical connexion between 
jokes and metaphors, and to drop the connexion between metaphor and poetry: How many 
times can you read a poem? Is the intimacy of reading poetry similar to the intimacy of meta-
phor illustrated by Cohen’s jokes (which we did not bother to cite) and by his description of 
their pragmatic features? How many responses are there to metaphor? Or to a joke? Even 
though much of what a metaphor or a joke may cause us to notice is not propositional in 
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character and thus there may be no end to our description of the response it inspires,168  they 
still seem to require an intimacy that provides for the correct horizon of their elucidation, the 
correct membership in a linguistic community that can cultivate intimacy amongst itself. 
Even when this horizon of intimacy (with metaphor) may be endlessly cultivated, it is still a 
closed familiar horizon. 
 It seems, as we zigzag from Cohen back to Davidson’s theory, that the cultivation of 
intimacy leads the skilled and educated reader to being cultivated and in a position to instruct 
others, to initiate, even if the moment of being initiated shows the efforts of elucidation to be 
of a secondary degree with regard to the original act of reading and understanding: 
 
Not, of course, that interpretation and elucidation of a metaphor are not in order. 
Many of us need help if we are to see what the author of a metaphor wanted us to see 
and what a more sensitive or educated reader grasps. The legitimate function of so-
called paraphrase is to make the lazy or ignorant reader have a vision like that of the 
skilled critic. The critic is, so to speak, in benign competition with the metaphor 
maker. The critic tries to make his own art easier or more transparent in some respects 
than the original, but at the same time he tries to reproduce in others some of the ef-
fects the original had on him. In doing this the critic also, and perhaps by the best 
method at his command, calls attention to the beauty or aptness, the hidden power, of 
the metaphor itself. [Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, p. 47.]  
 
A rather complacent view of reading and pedagogy. A benign competition between the critic 
and the metaphor maker. 
 
 
RESISTANCE, NOT IMMUNITY (KARSTEN HARRIES’S COUNTER-ATTACK) 
 
In the “Special Issue on Metaphor” of Critical Inquiry, which also contains a contribution by 
de Man (the famous text on “The Epistemology of Metaphor”), Karsten Harries admits, 
partly with reference to Culler’s “Commentary”, that the modern aesthetic and poetic autotel-
ism “implies the demand that [poetry] struggle against metaphor”. However, he also insists 
on the metaphorical nature of poetical language: “Resistance here cannot mean immunity.”169 
In the struggle between modern poetry and metaphor, “metaphors become weapons directed 
against reality, instruments to break the referentiality of language”, and “the poet’s broken 
metaphors” are thus used against metaphor, since whereas “the predominant use of poetic 
metaphor has been to exalt the real object, [...] we have to admit that the aesthetic approach to 
                                                 
168 Cf. Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean”, p. 46. What about dreams then? Davidson conceives of metaphor 
as “the dreamwork of language and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter 
as on the originator” (p. 31). Dream and metaphor seem to be, in traditional notions of metaphor, incom-
patible, since metaphor usually implies conscious use; the originator of a metaphor is not supposed to be 
puzzled about its meaning or interpretation, whereas in the case of dreams, the interpreter might well be the 
same person as the originator, engaged in a conscious endeavour of interpreting unconscious spontaneity. 
We leave this question open, however. 
169 Karsten Harries, “Metaphor and Transcendence”, in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 5, No. 1, Special Issue on Meta-
phor (Autumn 1978), pp. 73-90, here p. 75. 
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art demands derealization”. Harries cites Ortega y Gasset: “The weapon of poetry turns 
against natural things and wounds or murders them”, whereas more traditionally the function 
of poetic metaphor has been “to embellish and to throw into relief beloved reality”.170  But as 
Harries points out: “Perhaps we should not speak of the modern poet. Poetry continues to be 
many things, and poets continue to use metaphors in many ways” (“Metaphor and Transcen-
dence”, p. 83). Harries associates any poet’s refusal to use metaphor with an aspiration for 
“presentness”, and that would imply sheer hubris: 
 
God knows neither transcendence nor metaphor — nor would man, if he were truly 
godlike. The refusal of metaphor is inseparably connected with the project of pride, 
the dream of an unmediated vision, a vision that is not marred by lack [implied by 
metaphor], that does not refer to something beyond itself that would fulfil it. This ori-
gin ties the aesthetic approach, in spite of its willingness to surrender all claim to 
truth, to the Cartesian hope that the search for knowledge can come to rest in the 
plenitude of clear and distinct perception. It is a vain hope. [“Metaphor and Transcen-
dence”, p. 83.]  
 
We include here Harries’s counter-attack against the modern anti-metaphoricians, such as, 
according to him, Paul Valéry (while his notion of Valéry’s poetics is quite narrow and one-
sided, I’m afraid), in order to show how contrasting and contradictory the presuppositions 
concerning metaphoricity and anti-metaphoricity can be. While he affirms that poets continue 
to use metaphors in many ways, he fails to observe that the resistance to metaphor is not as 
homogeneous as he takes it to be, either. For Paul Celan, as we shall see, the anti-metaphoric 
essence of poetry (Mandelstam’s poetry, for instance) resides in its resistance to all supralu-
nary and supratemporal pretensions, and in its affirmation of worldliness, temporality, hu-
manity and finitude. Even when Celan strongly approves of Valéry’s designation of poetry as 
“langage à l’état naissant”, it is certainly not “an unmediated vision” he is dreaming of. And 
if Kafka’s despair of writing, as a despair over metaphor (“Metaphor is one thing among 
many that make me despair of writing”), is motivated by the lack of originality that character-
izes literary language, he affirms the poverty of writing with respect to the self-sufficiency 
and autonomy of practically every other occupation.171  Should the writer just humbly recon-
                                                 
170 “Metaphor and Transcendence”, pp. 80-81. The citation from Ortega is from The Dehumanization of Art 
and Other Writings on Art and Culture (Garden City, N.J., 1956); cf. Harries, “Metaphor and Transcen-
dence”, p. 80n16. 
171 Kafka’s diary: “6. Dezember [1921]. Aus einem Brief: »Ich wärme mich daran in diesem traurigen Winter.« 
Die Metaphern sind eines in dem vielen, was mich am Schreiben verzweifeln läßt. Die Unselbständigkeit 
des Schreibens, die Abhängigkeit von dem Dienstmädchen, das einheizt, von der Katze, die sich am Ofen 
wärmt, selbst vom armen alten Menschen, der sich wärmt. Alles dies sind selbständige, eigengesetzliche 
Verrichtungen, nur das Schreiben ist hilflos, wohnt nicht in sich selbst, ist Spaß und Verzweiflung.” (Ge-
sammelte Werke. Taschenausgabe in acht Bänden, ed. Max Brod, vol. Tagebücher 1910-1923 [1998], p. 
403.) Derrida writes, citing these words by Kafka: “Tout ce qu’on pourrait appeler la modernité littéraire 
tient [...] à marquer la spécificité littéraire contre l’assujettissement au poétique, c’est-à-dire au métaphori-
que, à ce que Rousseau analyse lui-même comme le langage spontané. S’il y a une originalité littéraire, ce 
qui n’est sans doute pas simplement sûr, elle doit s’émanciper sinon de la métaphore, que la tradition a aussi 
jugée réductible, du moins de la spontanéité sauvage de la figure telle qu’elle apparaît dans le langage non-
littéraire.” (De la grammatologie [Paris: Minuit, cop. 1967], p. 383.) — Cf. Harries, “Metaphor and Tran-
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cile himself and his occupation with the traditional subjection to poetics and rhetoric, or with 
the condescending view of poetry as a more or less exalted form of ordinary language? And 
what is ordinary language, anyway? Resistance to metaphor has of course also been under-
stood as belonging to a realist enterprise, in favour of the so-called ordinary language that 
should do without euphuism. So it is certainly not always a question of some modern auto-
apotheosis and autotelism. For Paul de Man, metaphor is essentially anti-poetic precisely 
when it is conceived in terms of “recuperation” or restoring immediacy: “To the extent that 
metaphor can be thought of as a language of desire and as a means to recover what is absent, 
it is essentially anti-poetic.”172 
 
 
DE MAN: “ALLOWING THE TEXT TO DECONSTRUCT ITS OWN METAPHORS” 173 
 
Paul de Man’s work is of course very rich with respect to our thematics of counter-figures. 
We shall, however, take only one exemplary passage out of his Allegories of Reading (1979). 
In the chapter on Rilke, de Man cites and comments on one of the interpreters of Sonette an 
Orpheus, Hermann Mörchen, who finds in metaphor “an act of identification” and a means 
by which the poet can “abandon himself without fear to his language”, the language true and 
faithful and “the unmediated expression of an unhappy consciousness”. De Man expresses his 
doubts about Rilke’s willingness to submit to such a conception of language.174 
 De Man himself certainly has not “scrapped” the concept of metaphor. He uses the 
term actually very often also in his own reading of Rilke, for instance in discussing the poem 
“Am Rande der Nacht”. At first this use appears to be neutral, just the standard way of apply-
ing this concept to linguistic or literary specimens. However, at a certain point in his reading, 
he arrives at certain reservations about this concept. Here is the poem, written 1900, from 
Das Buch der Bilder: 
 
AM RANDE DER NACHT 
 
MEINE Stube und diese Weite,  
wach über nachtendem Land, – 
ist Eines. Ich bin eine Saite,  
über rauschende breite  
Resonanzen gespannt.  
                                                                                                                                                        
scendence”, pp. 75, 77. 
172 Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, cop. 1979), p. 47; cf. p. 46. — On the question of metaphor in Valéry and Valéry’s 
readings of Descartes, we should consult Derrida’s essay “Qual quelle: les sources de Valéry”, in Marges — 
de la philosophie (Paris: Minuit, cop. 1972). 
173 Allegories of Reading, p. 72.  
174 Hermann Mörchen is cited and criticized by Paul de Man in Allegories of Reading, pp. 25-26. 
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Die Dinge sind Geigenleiber,  
von murrendem Dunkel voll;  
drin träumt das Weinen der Weiber,  
drin rührt sich im Schlafe der Groll  
ganzer Geschlechter.....  
Ich soll  
silbern erzittern: dann wird  
Alles unter mir leben,  
und was in den Dingen irrt,  
wird nach dem Lichte streben,  
das von meinem tanzenden Tone,  
um welchen der Himmel wellt,  
durch schmale, schmachtende Spalten  
in die alten  
Abgründe ohne  
Ende fällt...175  
 
In de Man’s detailed reading, from which we here only extract a few lines, “the subject, 
claiming to be the string of a violin, meets and adapts itself perfectly to objects which, in a 
metaphor that is truly Rilkean in its seductive audacity, are said to be the ‘body’ of this same 
violin”. The overall transformation is clear enough: the speaking subject is a string suspended 
across the space of resonance, and the things are “bodies of violins” (yes, in the plural: “Gei-
genleiber”). And thus: “The poem is an example of the most classical of metaphors, con-
ceived of as a transfer from an inside to an outside space (or vice versa) by means of an ana-
logical representation.” However, as de Man argues, we must not stop at this observation: 
“But if one allows oneself to be guided by the rigorous representational logic of the meta-
phors, […], then one should follow their guidance to the end.” The end without an end, as we 
might add: “ohne / Ende”. De Man observes in the poem “a displacement that distorts the ha-
bitual relationship between theme and figure.” The theme would be recognizable as the sub-
ject’s thematic claim as a representative of “all [that] will live under me” (“wird / Alles unter 
mir leben”), the poet who gives, by his own initiative, the voice to all that “errs in things” 
(“in den Dingen irrt”), but the figure by which this theme is stated distorts their relationship: 
 
The pattern we have just schematized does not appear quite in this shape in the text. 
The inwardness that should belong, per definition, to the subject is located instead 
within things. Instead of being opaque and full, things are hollow and contain, as in a 
box, the dark mass of sentiments and of history. The interiority of the speaking sub-
ject is not actively engaged; whatever pathos is mentioned refers to the suffering of 
others: the woes of women, the ire of historical generations. By a curious reversal, 
this subjectivity is invested  from the start, before the figural transfer has taken place, 
                                                 
175 Rainer Maria Rilke, Das Buch der Bilder, repr. in Die Gedichte (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1998), pp. 346-347. 
En. trans. Philipp Kellmeyer: “ON THE EDGE OF THE NIGHT // My room and this vastness, / awake over 
parroting land, – / are one. I am a string, / strung over rustling wide / resonances. // The things are violin 
bodies, / full of grumbling dark; / inside the wifes’ weeping is dreaming, / inside the rancour of whole dy-
nasties / is stirring in the sleep… / I shall / shake silverly: then / everything underneath me will live, / and 
what errs in the things, / will strive after the light, / which falls from my dancing tone, / around which 
heaven waves, / through narrow, yearning cracks, / into the old / chasms without / end…” (Electronic text: 
http:// www.philipp.uni-hd.de/rilke_files/nacht.html. Accessed December 7th, 2006.) 
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in objects and in things. This subjective experience is said to be dark to the extent that 
it is unable, by itself, to find expression; it exists in a condition of error and of blind-
ness (“was in den Dingen irrt…”) until the subject, the “I” of the poem, confers upon 
it the clarity of entities that are available to the senses by giving it the attribute of 
voice. The usual structure has been reversed: the outside of things has been internal-
ized and it is the subject that enables them access to a certain form of exteriority. The 
“I” of the poem contributes nothing of its own experience, sensations, sufferings, or 
consciousness. The initial model of the scene is not, as one might think at first, that of 
an autonomous subject confronting nature or objects, as is the case, for example, in 
Baudelaire’s poem “l’Homme et la mer”. [Allegories of Reading, p. 36.]  
 
At this point, we cut short de Man’s reading and ask, whether Baudelaire’s “L’homme et la 
mer” consists of such a metaphorical structure as is suggested by de Man. “The initial model 
of the scene” in  Baudelaire’s “L’Homme et la mer” may indeed be “that of an autonomous 
subject confronting nature or objects”, but perhaps not simply from the perspective of such a 
subject. Let us have a glimpse into Baudelaire’s poem: 
 
L’HOMME ET LA MER 
 
Homme libre, toujours tu chériras la mer ! 
La mer est ton miroir, tu contemples ton âme 
Dans le déroulement infini de sa lame 
Et ton esprit n’est pas un gouffre moins amer. 
 
Tu te plais a plonger au sein de ton image; 
Tu l’embrasses des yeux et des bras, et ton coeur 
Se distrait quelquefois de sa propre rumeur 
Au bruit de cette plainte indomptable et sauvage. 
 
Vous êtes tous les deux ténébreux et discrets; 
Homme, nul n’a sondé le fond de tes abîmes; 
O mer, nul ne connaît tes richesses intimes, 
Tant vous êtes jaloux de garder vos secrets! 
 
Et cependant voilà des siècles innombrables 
Que vous vous combattez sans pitié ni remords, 
Tellement vous aimez le carnage et la mort, 
O lutteurs éternels, O frères implacables !176  
 
So here, in Baudelaire’s poem, a subjective ‘autonomy’ would be what inspires the compari-
son between man and sea, “Both [...] gloomy and reticent” (“tous les deux ténébreux et dis-
                                                 
176 Les Fleurs du  Mal, ed. Jacques Dupont (Paris: Flammarion, cop. 1991), p. 69. En trans. William Aggeler: 
“Man and the Sea // Free man, you will always cherish the sea! / The sea is your mirror; you contemplate 
your soul / In the infinite unrolling of its billows; / Your mind is an abyss that is no less bitter. // You like to 
plunge into the bosom of your image; / You embrace it with eyes and arms, and your heart / Is distracted at 
times from its own clamoring / By the sound of this plaint, wild and untamable. // Both of you are gloomy 
and reticent: / Man, no one has sounded the depths of your being; / O Sea, no person knows your most hid-
den riches, / So zealously do you keep your secrets! // Yet for countless ages you have fought each other / 
Without pity, without remorse, / So fiercely do you love carnage and death, / O eternal fighters, implacable 
brothers!” (William Aggeler, The Flowers of Evil [Fresno, CA: Academy Library Guild, 1954]. Reproduced 
electronically at Fleursdumal.org, http://fleursdumal.org/poem/113. Accessed Nov. 2006.) 
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crets”), and both also so jealous of their secrets (“jaloux de garder vos secrets”), while the 
central characteristic attributed to man, within this comparison or simile, is: “Man, no one has 
sounded the depths of your being” (“Homme, nul n’a sondé le fond de tes abîmes”)… A 
strange “freedom of the will” (Baudelaire indeed apostrophizes the “free man”), inasmuch as 
the depths of the abyss, the depths of both the sea and the man (“Et ton esprit n’est pas un 
gouffre moins amer”), have not been sounded at will by anyone: the ‘subject’, too, here ad-
dressed in the second person, remains inaccessible even to himself. The ‘speaking subject’ of 
this poem is not the one who compares himself to the sea but the one who speaks to the man 
who sees his own image in the sea and embraces it with his eyes and arms. The poem is 
variably addressed to man and, by another kind of apostrophe, to the sea, while the last stanza 
could well be addressed to man alone, the man who slays his brother while he has never 
“sounded [sondé]” the depths of his adversary, either, never shared his secrets with the other 
man.  
 The last stanza could be where the simile ceases to be mere simile, since it would 
seem absurd to attribute the eternal battle to man and sea as if the carnage (with its literal al-
lusion to carne, ‘meat’) took place between them and not, for instance, upon the ‘battlefield’ 
of the sea; to cite Corneille’s lines which Baudelaire might have had in mind: “Et la terre, et 
le fleuve, et leur flotte, et le port, / Sont des champs de carnage où triomphe la mort” (Le 
Cid, IV, 3). If we accept that the last stanza could change the variation between an address to 
man and an apostrophe to the sea into an address solely to mankind — namely “implacable 
brothers”, the ones whose souls love more their mirror image, the sea, and the metaphors of 
its unfathomable depth, than the real brother, the human brother who also loves the sea — 
they would not lose anything in figurativity but gain an extra figure, that of irony. Which is 
indeed a counter-figure to the spontaneous metaphor. 
 
 
METONYMY AS COUNTER-FIGURE FOR METAPHOR (DE MAN, HENRY, GENETTE) 
 
Metonymy can also be a counter-figure to metaphor. But the structure of metonymy, as op-
posed to metaphor and either distinguished from synecdoche or comprising it, sometimes as-
sociated with allegory and other times with symbol, remains a matter of dispute. Let us pick 
an extract from de Man’s reading of Proust in Allegories of Reading: 
 
The synecdoche that substitutes part for whole and whole for part is in fact a meta-
phor,* powerful enough to transform a temporal continguity [sic? cf. below] into an 
infinite duration: “Born of the sunny days, resurrected only upon their return, contain-
ing some of their essence, [the buzzing of the flies] not only reawakens their image in 
our memory but certifies their return, their actual, persistent, unmediated presence.” 
[Du côté de chez Swann.] Compared to this compelling coherence, the contingency of 
a metonymy based only on the casual encounter of two entities that could very well 
exist in each other’s absence would be entirely devoid of poetic power. “The tune of 
human music [as opposed to the ‘natural’ flies] heard perchance during summer-
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time…” may be able to stimulate memory in a mechanical way, but fails to lead to the 
totalizing stability of metaphorical processes. If metonymy is distinguished from 
metaphor in terms of necessity and contingency (an interpretation of the term that is 
not illegitimate), then metonymy is per definition unable to create genuine links, 
whereas no one can doubt, thanks to the butterflies, the resonance of the crates, and 
especially the “chamber music” of the flies, of the presence of light and of warmth in 
the room. On the level of sensation, metaphor can reconcile night and day in a chiaro-
scuro that is entirely convincing. 
___________ 
* Classical rhetoric generally classifies synecdoche as metonymy, which leads to dif-
ficulties characteristic of all attempts at establishing a taxonomy of tropes; tropes are 
transformational systems rather than grids. The relationship between part and whole 
can be understood metaphorically, as is the case, for example, in the organic meta-
phors dear to Goethe. Synecdoche is one of the borderline figures that create an am-
bivalent zone between metaphor and metonymy and that, by its spatial nature, creates 
the illusion of a synthesis by totalization. [Allegories of Reading, pp. 63, 63n8.]  
 
De Man attaches the values of totalization and stability and necessity to metaphor and synec-
doche, while the latter is for him ambiguously situated between metaphor and metonymy, but 
closer to metaphor, while for metonymy is reserved the value of chance, contingency, arbi-
trariness and being “syntagmatically joined by repeated usage and no longer by the con-
straints of meaning” (p. 66).  
 This may support the suspicion that the borderlines between tropes or between figures 
(tropic figures or figurative tropes), not only between synecdoche and metaphor and between 
synecdoche and metonymy but also between metaphor and metonymy, and between all these 
figurative tropes and their non-figuration by catachresis (“non-vraie figure”), remain, gener-
ally speaking, forever disputable; each of these may overlap or intersect the other; there are 
metonymic metaphors, metaphoric metonymies, not to mention the non-figurative tropes that 
Fontanier designates as catachreses, which can be either metonymic or synecdochic or meta-
phoric, and so on and so forth. And each may also function as a counter-figure of the other.  
 It is indeed to beyond Genette’s view of “happy totalization” or “reconciled system” 
of “metonymy within metaphor” that both de Man and, following him, Culler want to direct 
our attention: to the subversive, deconstructive or, as I would say, counter-figurative power of 
metonymy with regard to metaphor. This can be construed in several ways: one is indeed to 
be found in Proust’s famously erroneous use of the word métaphore to designate that which 
should obviously be designated métonymie. A famous example of this is “faire cattleya”, the 
alleged ‘metaphor’ for making love, which is motivated by the incidental fact that Odette 
wore these orchids fastened into her bodice, and Swann used their sudden disorder as a pre-
text for a first timid physical contact with her, straightening them for her after their carriage 
had tilted and they had been thrusted off their seats for a moment.177  “Faire cattleya” has of 
                                                 
177 In Un amour de Swann: “[...] les jours suivants il usa du même prétexte. Si elle avait des catleyas à son cor-
sage il disait: « C'est malheureux, ce soir, les catleyas n’ont pas besoin d’être arrangés, ils n’ont pas été dé-
placés comme l’autre soir; il me semble pourtant que celui ci n’est pas très droit. Je peux voir s’ils ne sen-
tent pas plus que les autres ? » ... Ou bien, si elle n’en avait pas: « Oh ! pas de catleyas ce soir, pas moyen 
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course no relation of resemblance or analogy with making love (“la possession physique”) 
(if not the famously suggestive visible ‘morphology’ of the orchids,  not only the  blossom
but  also  the  tuberoids which have their name from the testicle-like shape), rather it is so that 
this “simple vocable”, as the narrator observes, became part of the private jargon of the lov-
ers, and this happened indeed through the metonymic, contingent liaison with the original 
incident. Cattleya and lovemaking coincided, incidentally occupied the same space and time, 
and coincidence might well be considered as yet another major designation for metonymy 
(besides contiguity and/or contingency, “continguity” as the typo [?] in de Man’s text sug-
gests, and liaison, connexion, etc.), at least inasmuch as ‘to coincide’ means, among other 
things, “1. intr. To [...] occupy the same area or portion of space”, “2. To occur or happen at 
the same time; to occupy the same space of time” (OED). 178 
 But despite the certain arbitrariness and contingency that often characterizes the con-
nection by contiguity (or coincidence), the metonymic associations are still relations of ‘de-
pendency’ and ‘inclusion’, since their relation is established within, or in regard of, some 
specific temporal, spatial, material or conceptual continuum between, for instance, matter and 
form, form and content, part and whole, cause and effect, and so on.179  The main difference 
between metaphor and metonymy may reside in their different relations to reality; the alleg-
edly ‘prosaic’ nature of metonymy may well be due to the fact that it is less prone to “gratui-
tous fantasy”, as Albert Henry puts it. In his acclaimed study on metonymy and metaphor 
(1971), Henry accentuates the difference and even opposition of principle between these two 
types of figure in the following manner:  
 
Dans une certaine mesure, la métaphore fait toujours violence au réel. Par le fait 
même, elle est plus exposée que la métonymie à la fantaisie gratuite et même à 
l’élucubration. / La métonymie procède de l’observation objective : elle découvre et 
traduit un lien qui est dans nos représentations des choses. Elle trouve un garde-fou et 
une justification dans l’évidence du monde extérieur ou dans des rapports conceptuels 
                                                                                                                                                        
de me livrer à mes petits arrangements. » De sorte que, pendant quelque temps, ne fut pas changé l’ordre 
qu’il avait suivi le premier soir, en débutant par des attouchements de doigts et de lèvres sur la gorge 
d’Odette, et que ce fut par eux encore que commençaient chaque fois ses caresses ; et bien plus tard, quand 
l’arrangement (ou le simulacre rituel d’arrangement) des catleyas fut depuis longtemps tombé en désuétude, 
la métaphore « faire catleya », devenue un simple vocable qu’ils employaient sans y penser quand ils vou-
laient signifier l’acte de la possession physique.” À la recherche du temps perdu 2. Du côté de chez Swann. 
Deuxième partie (Paris: Gallimard, 1946). 
178 Entry “coincide, v.”, OED, 50043544; 11 Jan., 2007. 
179 Cf. e.g. Genette, Figures III, pp. 25ff; I disagree with Genette when he distinguishes metonymy and synec-
doche, suggesting that dependency and inclusion characterize synecdoche but not metonymy; as for in-
stance Umberto Eco has noted, the traditional distinctions between metonymy and synecdoche are arbitrary 
and unsatisfying (cf. above). This arbitrariness could be illustrated by comparing two corresponding types 
of the metonymical and synecdochic catachresis distinguished by Fontanier (“catachrèse de métonymie”, 
“catachrèse de synecdoque”): “Ces métonymies du contenant : La Cour, pour Les courtisans ; Le Barreau, 
pour Les gens du barreau, pour Les avocats ; le Tribunal, pour les juges qui siègent au tribunal [etc.]”; “Ces 
synecdoques d’abstraction : le Gouvernement, pour Les gouvernans ; le Ministère, pour Les ministres ; la 
Commission, pour Les commissaires [etc.]” (Les figures du discours, pp. 214-215). 
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acceptés.180   
 
These features do not prevent Henry from emphasizing the greater demand of inspiration and 
novelty in metaphor than in the figure of contiguity, which seems to be, in principle at least, 
more faithful to reality: 
 
La métaphore demande plus d’inspiration et elle ouvre des chemins nouveaux. C’est 
peut-être la raison pour laquelle les poètes, depuis Baudelaire surtout, n’ont cessé 
d’exalter la métaphore, ou, comme disent improprement plusieurs d’entre eux, 
l’image[...]./ Encore serait-il bon de ne pas applaudir trop tôt cette passion aveugle — 
aveugle au mensonge qu’est la métaphore. L’ironie lucidement extravagante de 
Lautréamont aurait dû servir de garde-fou : « Et, cependant, quoique je réserve une 
bonne part au sympathique emploi de la métaphore (cette figure de rhétorique rend 
beaucoup plus de services aux aspirations humaines vers l’infini que ne s’efforcent de 
se le figurer ordinairement ceux qui sont imbus de préjugés ou d’idées fausses, ce qui 
est la même chose), il n’en est pas moins vrai que la bouche risible de ces paysans 
reste encore assez large pour avaler trois cachalots. » [Les Chants de Maldoror; 
“Chant IV”.] [Henry, Métonymie et métaphore, p. 64.]181  
 
We might almost replace the word garde-fou by the word contre-figure, in both of its occurren- 
ces here: 1. “La métonymie [...] trouve un garde-fou et une justification dans l’évidence du 
monde extérieur ou dans des rapports conceptuels acceptés.” 2. “L’ironie lucidement ex-
travagante de Lautréamont aurait dû servir de garde-fou [...].” Both metonymy and irony 
can be counter-figures to the “blind passion” and “lie” that metaphor is. 
 The distinction between metonymy and synecdoche is intricate. Gérard Genette refers 
this distinction back to a certain history ranging from Dumarsais through Fontanier to such 
modern authors as Mauss, Freud, and of course, Jakobson. For Dumarsais, metonymy and 
synecdoche (which is a type of metonymy) are both based on a liaison (while ‘dependence’ 
applies only to synecdoche) that is neither the relation of resemblance pertaining to metaphor, 
nor the relation of contrast that pertains to irony, and by these distinctions all tropes are 
“subordinated” under the three associative principles of similitude, contiguity and opposition. 
Fontanier dropped irony from among these principles of tropology, since he considers irony 
not to be a trope, for it consists of several words (and is therefore a “figure of expression” and 
not “of words”, a “pseudo-trope”). But the notion of liaison is less rigorous than the concept 
of contiguity, since the latter term is also better suited to the type of metonymy which is not 
based on the relation of dependence or, in other words, inclusion. So Dumarsais’ association 
of metonymy and synecdoche fits into the characterization of metonymy as a trope of “conti-
guity and / or inclusion [les deux relations de contiguïté (et / ou d’inclusion)]”. Given that the 
relation of inclusion falls under the notion of contiguity, namely that it is indeed included 
among the several acceptations of this term, we may well reduce synecdoche into being a 
                                                 
180 Albert Henry, Métonymie et métaphore (Paris: Klinksieck, 1971), p. 64. The association of metonymy with 
prose and metaphor with lyric poetry is Roman Jakobson’s (cf. “Two Aspects of Language”, pp. 91-92, 95-
96). 
181 Cf. also Michel Deguy, “Citations de Maldoror”, in Figurations (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), pp. 231-268. 
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type of metonymy. This reduction has often been done, for instance by Roman Jakobson.182 
We do not wish to separate logical connexions from material links, or physical continuity 
from inclusion in a relational system (for instance a term’s belonging to a certain semantic 
field), and therefore we shall be content with the oppositional pair metonymy-metaphor, the 
trope or figure of contiguity (and inclusion) as distinguished from metaphor as a trope or fig-
ure of resemblance (and exclusion).183   
 However, in order not to commit the violence of simplifying things, it must be noted 
that metonymy is not always conceived in terms of inclusion but, on the contrary, in terms of 
exclusion. It is Murray Krieger who links metaphor with symbol and metonymy with alle-
gory, referring symbol and allegory to de Man’s use of these terms, and he also connects me-
tonymy with “mock-metaphor” and understands allegory as a counter-metaphorical figure.184  
                                                 
182 Cf. Jakobson, “Two Types of Aphasia...”. Contiguity is a peculiar sort of relation: we might consult the 
definitions given by the OED to confirm this peculiarity. These definitions all apply also to metonymy or 
quasi-metonymy; this quasi- is a mark of distinction upon which I would like to insist, in order to empha-
size that we are here dealing with a sort of trope, but a non-figurative trope in Fontanier’s sense, a trope that 
is not altogether figurative. (However, catachresis, this pseudo-figurative trope, has often the form of me-
tonymy and synecdoche — we reduce the latter to the former — more often than that of metaphor, as it 
seems; cf. Les figures du discours, p. 214: “En traitant de la métonymie et de la synecdoque, nous avons sig-
nalé nombre d’exemples de ces deux Tropes, comme des catachrèses, plutôt que comme de vraies fig-
ures.”). Contiguity, in general or in its different acceptations, is a relation which allows both for an uninter-
rupted contact, whether physical or non-physical, and a relation without actual contact, touching without 
touching. Cf. OED, entry “contiguity”: “1. The condition of touching or being in contact. [...] b. fig. Of non-
physical contact. [...] c. Psychol. Proximity of impressions or ideas in place or time, as a principle of asso-
ciation. [...] 2. concr. A thing in contact; a contiguous thing, point, surface, etc. Obs. [...] 3. quasi-concr. A 
continuous mass, whereof all the parts are in uninterrupted contact. [...] 4. loosely. Close proximity, without 
actual contact.” (OED, 5004856. 29 Nov., 2006.) 
183 Cf. Gérard Genette, “La rhétorique restreinte”, in Figures III (Paris: Seuil, cop. 1972), p. 26. Genette quotes 
Freud’s Totem und Tabu: “[D]ie beiden Prinzipien der Assoziation — Ähnlichkeit und Kontiguität — in der 
höheren Einheit der Berührung zusammentreffen. Kontiguitätsassoziation ist Berührung im direkten, Äh-
nlichkeitsassoziation solche im übertragenen Sinne.” (GW 9:105.) Paying heed to the fact that the verb 
übertragen happens to be a most verbatim translation of the Greek metafe/rein, and to the fact that Über-
tragung is often used as an equivalent of the term Metapher, we may see that this conforms not only to the 
general signification of “sens figuré du mot” (Genette uses the French translation by Jankélévitch [p. 26n1]), 
but also to the signification that Aristotle already assigned to the concept of metafora/. Metaphor is not just 
any application of a name belonging to something else whatsoever, any transference from species to genus 
or from genus to species or from species to species or by analogy whatsoever: a certain additional feature of 
fiction, “pretense”, “make-believe” (Turbayne) is required in order that this trope becomes metaphorical (or 
figurative, as Fontanier would say). — Gérard Genette has his doubts about the legitimacy of including the 
trope of spatial inclusion in the category of contiguity, and uses the classical example to distinguish the 
mere physical contact from the properly metonymical feature of contiguity, namely the material relation of 
one part to other parts from the relation pars pro toto: “La voile n’est pas contiguë au navire, mais elle est 
contiguë au mât et à la vergue et, par extension, à tout le reste du navire, à tout ce qui, du navire, n’est pas 
elle.” This splitting of hairs concerning the presence or absence of physical contact, to the point of arguing 
over the absence of contact of the sail with the ship’s hull, may seem pettifogging, but it has also an inter-
esting aspect. The metonymic relation of the part to the rest characterizes something that we might consider, 
following Genette’s precision of detail but not the vocabulary of his analysis, a quasi-synecdoche: any time 
when a part is detached from an unnamed set that seems to constitute a whole that is in direct contact with 
itself, we would be dealing with such a quasi-synecdoche. But this also shows that the distinction between 
metonymy and synecdoche may lead to confusion. As Genette shows, every synecdoche can be converted to 
metonymy and vice versa. (Cf. Figures III , p. 27.) 
184 Cf. A Reopening of Closure: Organicism Against Itself  (New York: Columbia U.P., 1989), pp. 9, 25, and 
below. Cf. also de Man’s reading of Rousseau in Allegories of Reading (p. 210): “With the reintroduction of 
needs, the relapse into the seductions of metaphor is inevitable and the cycle repeats itself. Needs reenter the 
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Let us read another passage or two from de Man’s reading of Proust, or should we say his 
allegory of reading Proust, in order to grasp these connections: “The superiority of the ‘sym-
bolic’ metaphor over the ‘literal,’ prosaic, metonymy is reasserted in terms of chance and ne-
cessity.” (Allegories of Reading, p. 70.) In this scheme “necessity” is on the side of metaphor, 
and “chance” on the side of metonymy, of course. De Man continues (on p. 70): “Within the 
confines of the fiction [the passage de Man concentrates upon is the famous reading scene in 
Du Côté de chez Swann, Pléiade edition of 1954, vol. 1:82-88, which was already cited in the 
passage above], the relation between the figures is indeed governed by the complementarity 
of the literal and the figural meaning of the metaphor. Yet the passage seems oddly unable to 
remain sheltered within this intra-textual closure.” We skip here to the end of the long para-
graph and proceed by quoting the following (on p. 71): 
 
This reversal by which the intra-textual complementarity chooses to submit itself to 
the test of truth is caused by “the projection of all the forces of life.” / Proust’s novel 
leaves no doubt that this test must fail; numberless versions of this failure appear 
throughout the pages of the Recherche. In this section, it is stated without ambiguity: 
“We try to find again, in things that have thus become dear to us, the reflection that 
our consciousness [âme] has projected upon them; we are disappointed in discovering 
that, in their natural state, they lack the seduction that, in our imagination, they owed 
to the proximity of certain ideas ...” (p. 87, ll. 2-7). Banal when taken by itself, the ob-
servation acquires considerable negative power in context, when one notices that it 
occurs at the center of a passage whose thematic and rhetorical strategy it reduces to 
naught. For if the “proximity” between the thing and the idea of the thing fails to pass 
the test of truth, then it fails to acquire the complementary and totalizing power of 
metaphor and remains reduced to “the chance of a mere association of ideas.”  
 
In the widely de Manian perspective, metaphor means, among other things, an aspiration to 
transcend time, to bring two moments together into a supratemporal unity of sorts, a solid 
“symbolic” unity indeed. The remarks of Murray Krieger (who basically shares de Man’s no-
tions of symbolic metaphor and allegoric metonymy) on theological typology (in other terms, 
prefiguration) are thus, as we shall see in a moment, connected with metaphor, while it is the 
introduction of both semiotic and temporal distance that introduce the mock-metaphor, the 
allegory, the metonymy that undermine the typological, prefigurative theologeme associated 
with metaphor.  
 But as Paul Celan argues, poetry — “the poem today” — does not seek to transcend 
time, it seeks to traverse it. The distance is not bridged, it requires a “leap” (Sprung). We 
shall return to this too. Metonymy, or contiguity, implies not only inclusion (as corporeal or 
spatial connexion, in a logical relation such as causality, or otherwise), but also, on the other 
hand and seen from another angle, exclusion: the metonymical mock-metaphor or the allego-
rization of the symbol-metaphor reveals the unbridgeable distance involved between the ana-
logues or elements of juxtaposition.185 The notion of contiguity allows indeed for both conti-
                                                                                                                                                        
literary discourse as the aberrant proper meaning of metaphors against which the allegory constitutes itself.”  
185 On allegory and symbol and their relation to irony and temporality, cf. de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporal-
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nuity and breach of continuity. The metonymic alliance is not the “symbolic” unity but rather 
the “allegoric” breach of unity, inasmuch as we trust this distinction that connects metaphor 
with symbol and allegory with metonymy, as in the ring (sumbolon) whose halves are sepa-
rated and remain distinct. 
 The typographical error in de Man’s text (if it is that), spelling “continguity”, happens 
to unite these contrasting, if not contradictory tendencies of metonymy and synecdoche: con-
tiguity, continuity, and contingency, all in one “continguity”.  
 We shall adhere to the inclusive notion of metonymy: inclusive on the one hand, in-
asmuch as it comprises both synecdoche and metonymy, or should we say, metonymic 
synecdoche and synecdochic metonymy, and on the other, inclusive since it comprises both 
material and corporeal, conceptual and linguistic links, such connexions between terms that 
can be conceived as included within a more or less solid framework or either material or 
immaterial relations; (apparent) metaphors can also often be shown to be motivated by such 
horizons of contiguity and inclusion. 
 In his article “The Scandal of Metaphor”, Umberto Eco writes:  
 
As far as synecdoche is concerned, it is spoken of as a ‘substitution of two terms for 
each other according to a relation of greater or lesser extension’ (part for the whole, 
whole for the part, species for genus, singular for plural, or vice versa), while meton-
ymy is spoken of as a ‘substitution of two terms for each other according to a relation 
of contiguity’ (where contiguity is a rather fuzzy concept insofar as it covers the rela-
tions cause/effect, container/content, instrument for operation, place of origin for 
original object, emblem for object emblematized, and so on). And when it is specified 
that the synecdoche carries out a substitution within the conceptual content of a term, 
while metonymy acts outside of that content [I, for one, cannot quite understand why 
we should detach, for instance, causality from conceptual content, and it seems that 
not only ego but also Eco finds this problematic, as we see here:], it is hard to see why 
the part for the whole is a synecdoche and the material for the object a metonymy — 
as though it were  ‘conceptually’ essential for an object to have constituent parts and 
not to be made of some material.186  
 
A few pages later Eco points to the metonymic type of relation that supports Aristotle’s ex-
amples of the analogical metaphor (the “wineless cup” that stands for Ares’ shield, when we 
realize that the shield stands for Ares just as the cup stands for Dionysus, and so on): “Cup 
and Dionysus are commonly associated by contiguity, through the relation subject/instrument, 
                                                                                                                                                        
ity”, in Blindness and Insight (2nd ed., 1983, op. cit.); on poetry’s wish not to transcend but to traverse time, 
cf. Celan, GW 3:186; on the necessity of “leap [Sprung]”,  cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 68, passim; and below. 
Murray Krieger’s “Figure in the Renaissance Poem”, in A Reopening of Closure, pp. 1-29, will be discussed 
below. — Gerhard Kurz points out that a symbol is often an index and as such contiguous (or more or less 
continuous: “necessary contiguity [eine notwendige Kontiguität]” is Kurz’s term) with what it indicates 
(take smoke as an index of fire, for example), and also an “immanent element” of a narrative (“Das Symbol 
ist ein immanentes Element einer Geschichte”), while allegory is characterized by an element of discon-
tinuity (Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988], pp. 76-77).  
186 “The Scandal of Metaphor”, pp. 219-221 (p. 220 contains a large “tree of Porphyry [diagram]”). Cf. p. 246: 
“As a matter of fact, the traditional rhetoric has never satisfactorily explained why a substitution ge-
nus/species (?) and a substitution pars/totum (?) are both synecdoches, while all the other kinds of substitu-
tions (object/purpose, container/content, cause/effect, material/object, and so on) are called metonymies.” 
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through a cultural habit (without which cup could stand for many other objects). [...] And the 
same goes for the relation shield/Ares.” Yet, the association of metonymy, as a figure of con-
tiguity, with mere contingency (an accidental relation) can be seen through comparing this 
relationship with the synecdochic relation between species and genus, such as the man/animal 
relation (in which ‘man’ is a species of the genus ‘animal’, i.e. Seelenwesen, a living being): 
“The case  of man/animal presents us with an analytic relation, while that of cup/Dionysus 
presents us with a synthetic relation. [...] [W]hile it is not possible to think of a man who is 
not an animal, it is always possible to think of Dionysus without thinking of cup.” (“The 
Scandal of Metaphor”, p. 227.) I doubt whether this is that simple, however. Dionysus is not 
just another fellow who fancies a pint now and then, he is the Wine God. And a writer or 
poet, as a writer or poet, is not thinkable without the pen or other stationery (be it his ‘per-
sonal voice’, ‘personal computer’, his ‘lyre’ or whatever); Orpheus would not, for us at least, 
be Orpheus without his lyre or without an essential contiguity with his lyre; even when he 
would be deprived of his instrument, he would still be Orpheus the poet, the-one-with-(or 
without)-the-lyre; Orpheus without the lyre would be a determined negation, to use the well-
know term of Hegelian logic. Dionysus is unthinkable without his ‘shield’, which is almost a 
meta-rhetorical trope since it brings this emblematic character into relief. But it is of course 
true that these associations have nothing to do with a ‘substantial’ truth purified of all con-
ventions, arbitrary performative gestures and accidental attributes. And moreover, all too of-
ten perhaps, the fellow next-door who fancies a pint now and then is defined in our eyes by 
his metonymic emblem, in the non-fictional world as well. 
 I take three exemplary metaphors from Eco’s article: “She’s a birch”, “She was a 
rose”, and Malherbe’s “Et rose elle a vécu ce que vivent les roses,/ L’espace d’un matin”. 
There are of course several ways to describe these figures. To call her a rose could be, first of 
all, a catachresis of my vision of her. Or a (synecdochic) metonymy: wholesome complexion 
instead of the whole complexity. And this metonymy could be analysed into a quasi-literal 
statement in at least two ways: 1. Her complexion is rose-hued in some very specific manner, 
albeit this specification is not explicated in this “poem in miniature” (as Ricœur defines 
metaphor), as it is detached from its possible context. 2. Her complexion resembles the petals 
of a rose: delicate, semi-transparent, silky, and so on, with reference to both tactile and visual 
and olfactory sensations; and depending on the context, it might be pertinent to observe that 
roses also have prickles, and so on. But both of these options show how the metaphor must be 
metonymically motivated.187  A girl can be a birch by virtue of her birch-like flexibility, as 
                                                 
187 Even Max Black’s “man is wolf” is metonymically motivated, since these species stand for a certain com-
mon genus or several, not the genus “animal” however, but such “genera” as the supposed ruthlessness to-
wards fellow creatures, and so on. — Why species and genera? One of Aristotle’s most striking examples of 
metaphor is old age seen as withered stalk, since these both share the genus of having lost one’s bloom. The 
metaphor instructs our minds through the detour of common genus, says Aristotle. (Rh. III, 10, 1410b10-
15.) These are not of course ontological species and genera (in the sense of ‘man is an animal’), but rather 
depend on an abstract logic of invention; and it is also worth noticing that ‘both having lost their bloom’ 
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seems obvious (Eco’s subtle analysis will not be commented on here, although we take ad-
vantage of some of his insights). But the formality of this explication and of the proportional 
metaphor in general, in its most abstract formality, could be illustrated by calling a Polyne-
sian girl a birch and a Karelian girl a palm tree. Which is of course possible, depending on the 
context.  
 But in a poem, a birch can be something else than a metaphor or symbol; it can even 
be a landmark on a heart’s path: 
 
[...] ein Weg 
nach Rußland steigt dir ins Herz, 
die karelische Birke  
hat 
gewartet, 
der Name Ossip kommt auf dich zu, [...]188  
 
In order to understand this ‘image’ of the birch tree, or rather the birch tree itself on the way-
side of the heart-path, as it were, in order to understand this “Karelian birch”, in the context 
of the poem and these few lines, we should perhaps know that its Latin name is betula alba, 
and thus it corresponds to the last word of this poem: “Alba.”  
 And moreover, this final word and line alludes to a proper name, or actually several: 
on the site of the ancient town of Alba Fucens there is the small town of Celano, the home-
town of Thomas of Celano (Tommaso da Celano, ca. 1200-1255), the probable author of 
“Dies Irae”. Celano’s name played a certain role of its own when the young poet Paul 
Antschel formed the anagram of his name. So it is not only the name Ossip that (one) comes 
across upon this path. The way to Russia, in this poem, is a path upwards to a heart, or a path 
that “rises” to a heart. There would be much to say about interiorization (“Er-innerung”) and 
“learning by heart”,189  and about the quasi-metonymic contiguity between the heart — the 
                                                                                                                                                        
[a1mfw ga\r a0phnqhko/ta] seems to be just another metaphor that explains the original metaphor. — More-
over, I would argue that even describing one’s pain to a doctor by saying metaphorically that “my chest is 
burning” or that “I feel pins and needles in my arms” is motivated by metonymies, derived from the experi-
ence of being pricked by a needle or burning one’s skin (these examples are from Eco, “The Scandal of 
Metaphor”, p. 256). 
188 Celan, “Es ist alles anders”, in Die Niemandsrose (GW 1:284). Trans. John Felstiner: “[...] a path / to Russia 
rises into your heart, / the Karelian birch / is still / waiting, / the name Ossip comes toward you, [...]” (“It’s 
all different from what you think”, in Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan [New York: Norton, 2001], 
p. 205.) Cf. Michael Hamburger’s translation: “[...] a way / to Russia ascends to your heart, / the Karelian 
birch tree / has waited, / the name Osip walks up to you, [...]” (“Everything’s different from how you con-
ceive it”, in Poems of Paul Celan. Revised & Expanded  [New York: Persea, 2002], p. 195.) Cf. Leonard 
Moore Olschner, “Es ist alles anders”, in Jürgen Lehmann, ed., Kommentar zu Paul Celans »Die Niemands-
rose« (Heidelberg: Winter, 1997), pp. 340-352, here p. 343; cf. also, on p. 351, the commentary on the final 
line of the poem, “Alba”: “‘Alba’ sammelt in sich jedoch weitere Bezüge, die sich wohl nicht auf etwas 
Eindeutiges festlegen lassen.” Only a couple of these several interrelations have been mentioned above. Cf. 
also Barbara Wiedemann’s commentary on the poem, in Celan, Die Gedichte: Kommentierte 
Gesamtausgabe, ed. Wiedemann (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2005), pp. 711-713 (henceforth cited as 
DGKG). — We shall return to some parts of this poem later. 
189 Cf. Heidegger, “Wozu Dichter?”, in Holzwege (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1950) = GA 5 [282-285]; cf. 
Celan, La bi. phi., p. 364, No. 393; cf. Derrida, “Che cos’è la poesia”, bilingual (French and English) in 
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very literal, or at least non-metaphorical name for the invisible interiority of, at least, human 
beings or living beings in general — the proper name and the path (“ein Weg”), and all that 
travels the path toward the heart, turning inwards. Indeed, it is a question of “contiguity and / 
or inclusion”, which apply also to the hands and lungs that this poem speaks of. These names 
and organs and places and things all belong to a quasi-metonymic constellation or configura-
tion of sorts, and it would be misleading to call them metaphors or symbols; even the term 
metonymy may mislead, insofar as metonymy is understood as a rhetorical figure. We shall 
return to at least some of the lines of this poem later. 
 Of the simple beauty of Malherbe’s couplet, “Et, Rose, elle a vécu ce que vivent les 
roses, / L’espace d’un matin”, let us only note that it should be read in its context and saved 
from being attacked by an army of clichés, Metapherngestöber. The context of this piece of 
Renaissance poetry, the detached lines whose encyclopaedic horizon is always hard to de-
limit, just as Eco invites us to observe with regard to metaphor, contains also the legendary 
(and, as such, dubious) anecdote, claiming that “Rose, elle” was initially a typographic error 
replacing the proper name, or rather the nickname given by the poet, Rosette. And “Rose, 
elle” (or “rose elle”, or just Rose) may thus be read as a metonymy for at least three possible 
origins: (1) the play of contingency, or chance, materialized in the typo, or (2) the play of the 
poet, first nicknaming Marguerite du Périer by the name Rosette and then condensing this 
into just Rose, or (3) the play of the poet with established poetical conventions, for instance a 
certain pun in a Neo-Latinic poem by Pontano.190 None of these is simply metaphorical, in-
asmuch as the intervention of contingency in the form of materiality and chance, as well as 
the proper name and its metonymies, as well as meta-poetical quotations of established con-
ventions are all liable to undermine the simple, spontaneous or quasi-theological metaphor; 




METAPHOR RENAISSANCE VS. RENAISSANCE METAPHOR:  
THE “COUNTER-METAPHORICAL THRUST” (MURRAY KRIEGER) 
 
As an example of the thematization of the resistance to metaphor or a “counter-metaphorical 
thrust”, in other words “this countermovement that strips and exposes metaphor”,191  a 
movement that is interior to poetic figuration and metaphor itself, we must consider Murray 
Krieger’s essays in A Reopening of Closure: Organicism Against Itself (1989), a book that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Points... Interviews 1974-1994, ed. Elizabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 289-299, 
esp. p. 294. 
190 Cf. Eco, op. cit., pp. 250-251, passim; cf. e.g. Arpad Steiner, “Et, Rose, elle a vecu ce que vivent les 
roses...”, in Modern Language Notes, Vol. 42, No. 8. (Dec. 1927), pp. 528-529 [JSTOR]. 
“Metapherngestöber” is from Paul Celans’s poem “Ein Dröhnen”, to which we shall return in detail. 
191 Murray Krieger, A Reopening of Closure: : Organicism Against Itself (New York: Columbia U.P., 1989), p. 
18. 
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ends with an apology for metaphor (“Stricken by Metaphor”), even though it also problema-
tizes our persistently naïve ways of responding to that figure of resemblance and warns 
against the “indulgence in metaphor”: “To allow oneself to be stricken by metaphor without 
recognition, recovery, and retreat is [...] to rest in a state of danger.” He thematizes not only 
how the metaphor of organicism turns against itself,192  as the title of his book suggests, but 
also, taking Renaissance poetry as the source of his examples, the way that literary metaphor 
turns against itself in a certain way. 
 The counter-metaphorical movement is, after all, not a matter of some particular dec-
ade or era, but may even be inherent to the poetic figure itself. Murray Krieger, who actually 
considers himself as an apologist for metaphor, uncovers this moment of resistance in Ren-
aissance poetry; it could certainly be shown that this “thrust” is older (both historically and 
logically) than Renaissance and belongs to the very nature, to the very birthright of the trope 
or figure called metaphor. First of all, the counter-metaphorical thrust realizes itself in a text, 
in an ironical context of a given poem, for instance in a Renaissance poem that uses the 
Christian tropes par excellence in an unorthodox manner, in bad faith, so to say.  
 Krieger, interested in the theological ground for the organicist metaphor (and not the 
biological, as he says), uncovers a certain radical interpretation of the symbol-oriented notion 
of metaphor in religious discourse: 
 
This semiotic preference of symbol to allegory carries with it a definition of metaphor 
as the one figure that captures all originally external things within itself and, having 
transformed them, identifies them with (and within) itself. Of course, this is to speak 
of metaphor in the most radical sense (in contrast to simile or analogy or, more cur-
rently, metonymy). It requires, in its quest for verbal presence, a total identity of the 
two elements collapsed into the figure instead of settling for mere similarity, which 
permits difference as well as similarity to remain as characteristics of the two ele-
ments, still grasped as two, with some remainder — large or small — incommensu-
rate and so unabsorbed. [A Reopening of Closure, p. 6.]193 
 
This “most radical” conception of metaphor implies a “total collapse of semiotic distance in 
the miraculous transformation that permits an identity of presences”; this identity is indeed 
like the “presence of God in the historical creature of Christ, like that of His body and His 
blood in bread and wine” (pp. 6ff). But this radical Christian sacramental metaphor, “meta-
phor in its original theological form” (p. 7), should be distinguished from its literary, profane 
counterpart. Inasmuch as the “model” is borrowed from the realm of faith and applied to the 
                                                 
192 “We must remember [...] that organicism begins and ends as metaphor. It lives and thrives because it takes 
itself as metaphor seriously — which is to say literally — and it is deprived of its power by those who look 
into its metaphor and unground it, often because of their own political motives that turn into their own 
metaphors.” (A Reopening of Closure, p. 5.) The expressions “counter-metaphorical thrust” and “this 
countermovement that strips and exposes metaphor”, corresponding to “mock-metaphor”, appear on pp. 15, 
18, 75, and the final chapter, “Stricken by Metaphor”, is on pp. 57-84; the sentences, just quoted, on the 
“indulgence in metaphor” are on pp. 57, 59. 
193 Cf. p. 29n6: “I hope it is evident that I use ‘duality’ in opposition to ‘unity’ to signify the divided con-
sciousness we associate with metonym in contrast to metaphor, [...].” 
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secular literary use, the “distance is in part  — even if grudgingly — restored to conscious-
ness once the same principle of metaphor is taken out of the literally Christian sign-system 
and is applied to an analogous profane structure that the poet uses as if it was the religious 
one” (p. 8).194  The failure to distinguish this sacralizing and literalizing of metaphor from the 
“de-sacralizing” of this model, namely from “the imposition of the metaphorical structure 
upon unworthy materials — perhaps materials arousing skepticism rather than inspiring 
faith”, may underlie, according to Krieger, the modern or post-modern anti-organicist critique 
(p. 8): “I believe that, to some extent, the partly inaccurate grounds for the dismissal of the 
organic tradition in recent years can be traced to the failure to distinguish between the theo-
logical semiotic and the secular borrowing of certain elements from the theological semiotic.” 
The assumption behind the “charge of the sacralization of poetry” is that “such borrowing 
must be uncritical and blind”. In the figure of Renaissance poetry, which is the announced 
subject of Krieger’s chapter, this is not always the case. The metaphor is borrowed from the 
theological tradition, but this borrowing is “a borrowing with a difference (or with an aware-
ness of difference), a borrowing that often is conscious of — and even exploits — the conse-
quences of a semiotic built out of the loss of theological substance” (p. 8).195   
 In defining metaphor “within its theological origins”, Krieger of course relates this 
originality to Renaissance poetry; the historical origins of the concept of metaphor are pre-
Christian and not theological, of course. On the other hand, if the “semiotic distance” is, if 
only “in part”, “restored to consciousness” through secularization, it must have already be-
longed to the consciousness of distance, presupposed and not precluded by metaphor. Inas-
much as “some semiotic distance has been inserted when the metaphor is borrowed for pro-
fane uses” (p. 9), this insertion can only be a re-insertion, a restitution of the property that has 
been appropriated from the rhetorico-poetical metaphor by the non-profane discourse. A re-
appropriation of the inappropriateness that was metaphor’s property in the first place.  
 But wasn’t the desire for Real Presence and the quasi-religious yearning for an imagi-
native truth higher than the scientific truth inscribed on the structure of metaphor as its origi-
                                                 
194 Cf. on p. 7: “As Christ is literalized in the world and the eternal Christian pattern is actualized in the fini-
tude and temporal sequence of human history, so the metaphor comes literalized in the poem — and, for the 
critic, the metaphor of the poem as organism itself becomes literalized in organic theory, which uncritically 
accepts the mystification. [...] The typological habit urges the reader to see every textual event doubly (at 
least), both as an unrepeatable chunk of world history caught in the stream of time and as an element in a 
fixed pattern that, though transcendent, is immanently — and thus always — present in history. [...] As with 
the several figures of the Old Testament fulfilled in the one Christ story of the New, the historical figure, 
existentially trapped in the unredeemable birth-to-death sequence of the single life, is metaphorically ‘fig-
ured’ as part of an ever-redeeming design whose fulfillment is both later and — in the typological scheme 
— already now. The figure is only an historical cipher and yet it is also in the fulfillment that converts mere 
figure into typological figura.” (By “typological figura” Krieger means the theological notion of “type”, ty-
pus [see the entries “type, n1” and “figura” in the OED], i.e. “the several figures of the Old Testament ful-
filled in the one Christ story of the New” [p. 7]).  
195 Cf. p. 57: “[E]ven the poets celebrating the possibilities of secular love felt the need to open metaphor up to 
the skepticism of difference, though only while their typological imagination dwelled on the power of po-
etic language to produce identity.” 
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nal possibility? Well before the Christian discourse adopted this form of proportional analogy 
— the gift of metaphor originally defined and also declined by Aristotle — might not this 
figure of all figures already have treasured within itself a dream of literality more than literal, 
a hyper-propriety of sorts? 
 Whatever the answer might be to these questions, inasmuch as metaphor depends 
upon a “conviction of identity [and] the elimination of all semiotic distance between two enti-
ties, so that they exchange properties and are confounded as one thing”, and this transubstan-
tial model is then carried over to the “analogous profane structure[s]” (pp. 8-9), we must ask 
with Krieger:  
 
How, then, can we still see it as metaphor? [...] How, then, in the profane adaptation, 
can the perceived awareness of the borrowings of metaphoric form and its imposition 
on non-sacred materials in order to bestow a magic upon them — how can this 
awareness help but sponsor a scepticism that would preclude the metaphoric effect 
and move us from metaphor to metonym or, as Paul de Man puts it, from symbol to 
allegory? [A Reopening of Closure, p. 9] 
 
Krieger’s own response to this question is this (still on p. 9): 
 
I want to argue for a criticism that, confronted by such profane poems [a Petrarchan 
sonnet, for example], responds at once to the sense of metaphoric identity and to the 
awareness of semiotic distance that should preclude metaphor. Yet in these cases the 
two responses, instead of creating a mutual blockage, reinforce one another. In accord 
with such a criticism, we would feel the power of metaphor even while, with the 
poem’s encouragement, we would feel the inappropriateness of the application. 
 
Whereas the sacralized metaphor, motivated by the “quest for verbal presence”, would imply 
a transubstantiation of sorts, word become flesh and flesh become word (“a total identity”), 
the desacralized literary metaphor implies a “counter-metaphorical thrust”, a resistance to 
identification. Of course, there are at least as many different views of religious figures of 
speech as there are those of the Eucharist. Faith in metaphor need not imply reading literally; 
to the contrary, Saint Augustine warns us of taking the metaphors of Christian literature car-
nally (carnaliter); we must not confuse the spiritual, i.e. figurative meaning with its literal, 
carnal, mundane counterpart.196  Yet, even a sort of transubstantialist or consubstantialist no-
tion of the connexion between word and flesh, a metonymical connexion of sorts between the 
poetic word and not only materiality but even corporeality, can be counter-figurative. We 
                                                 
196 Cf. De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 23, 141, 
147, 171 (1.24; 3.20; 3.33; 3.87; 3.114), et passim. The secular metaphor “permits difference as well as 
similarity to remain as characteristics of the two elements [brought together or compared], still grasped as 
two, with some remainder” (Krieger, loc. cit.). Even to the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation 
belong “bread and wine remaining”, but only as “appearances” and “accidents” of the true substance, cf. 
OED, entry “transubstantiation”: “2. The conversion in the Eucharist of the whole substance of the bread 
into the body and of the wine into the blood of Christ, only the appearances (and other ‘accidents’) of 
bread and wine remaining: according to the doctrine of the Roman Church.” (OED, 50256577. Accessed 
Nov. 2006. Emphases added.)  
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shall return to this strange quasi-metonymic counter-figure later. But before that, let us con-
tinue reading Krieger’s remarkable book consisting of his three Wellek Library Lectures of 
1988. 
 Krieger reads, in the first lecture we have been quoting (“Figure in Renaissance Poem 
as Bound and Unbounded”), sonnets by Edmund Spenser, Sir Phillip Sidney and William 
Shakespeare. While the Mariolatric Spenser (cf. Krieger, pp. 13ff), “sometimes too soberly 
and singlemindedly Platonic to mock his metaphor”, “yields to his metaphor without resis-
tance, unconcerned about the friction between chastity and desire”, and “fails to recognize the 
mock-metaphor already present in the secular adaptation of Christian metaphor”, Sidney’s 
“counter-metaphorical thrust is much keener”: his Stella, seen in a “mock-metaphorical per-
spective, [...] is no more than a projected sign that represents his desire to see her as a star, a 
desire that is realized as for him in his mystified rapture she becomes this star”, while yet, 
“the invocation of the very name ‘Stella’ produces a magic nominalism, as into the name the 
sacred person is incarnated”, and thus Sidney writes in a “half-idolatrous, half-comic” fashion 
of his muse (cf. e.g. this first line: “When Nature made her chief work, Stella’s eyes”; or this: 
“Queen Virtue’s court, which some call Stella’s face”), and we readers, “we feel, and are 
meant to feel, the extent to which the metaphor is a mistake, even a silly mistake”.197 The 
ambivalent metaphor, hyperbole exceeding itself on the verge of irony, is a counter-figure to 
the excessively single-minded metaphor. 
 When it comes to Shakespeare’s Sonnets, Krieger argues that they often follow “the 
same model of total metaphorical union that we have observed in Spenser and Sidney, and 
with most serious effects”; he also recognizes a sort of “typological model” in them, “with 
the beloved functioning as the fulfilment of earlier figures”. Sonnet 31 ends with the follow-
ing couplet: “Their images I lov’d I view in thee, / And thou — all they — hast all the all of 
me.” Yet, the parallel scheme of prefiguration in Sonnet 106, in which “the sequence of indi-
viduals in the written history of our culture (‘the chronicle of wasted time’) similarly culmi-
nates and dissolves in the present beloved”, as Krieger describes, ends with the following 
couplet:  
 
For we, which now behold these present days, 
Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues to praise.198   
 
Krieger comments on this: “Again the poet is locked in the paradox of language as both 
magical and deficient.” A couple of paragraphs later, and after having cited Sonnets 113-114, 
                                                 
197 A Reopening of Closure, pp. 13, 15, 16, 17; Krieger cites Spenser’s sonnets 8, 22, and 72, and Sidney’s son-
nets 28 and 74. We cite Astrophil and Stella, poems 7 & 9 (electronic texts in http://www.luminarium.org/
renlit/stella7 htm, .../stella9 htm. Source of the electronic ed.: J. William Hebel and Hoyt H. Hudson, eds., 
Poetry of the English Renaissance 1509-1660 (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1941). 
198 Cf. Paul Celan’s translation of this couplet, with a remarkable paronomasia (“Gegenwart [...] gegeben 
ward” [GW  3:347]): “Selbst uns hier heut, den Zeugen deiner Gegenwart: / ein Aug, das staunt, kein Mund, 
der preist, gegeben ward.”  
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evoking the speaker’s eye that shapes to the beloved’s “feature” even the “rud’st sight” and 
“deformèd’st creature”, and on the other hand, “flattery in [his] seeing”: “Both the metaphor 
and the collapse of the metaphor are sustained in these poems”, and “the newly transformed 
realities that the metaphor would create are undone in the creating” (pp. 18-21).  
 The last of Shakespeare’s Sonnets briefly considered by Krieger, before moving fi-
nally to Ben Johnson, in the chapter we have been following, is Sonnet 105. Peter Szondi’s 
great essay on Celan’s translation of this poem cannot be ignored; Krieger does not mention 
this text in his lecture, but I must make a few remarks. Szondi shows how in this sonnet a 
shift from description to performance takes place: “Celan’s language does not speak about 
something, but ‘speaks’ itself.”199  This means also a radical shift of focus with regard to fig-
uration, too: in the translation, Celan neither describes things through rhetorical figures nor 
simply renounces them, but directs the attention to the act of figuration, “forging together 
[zusammenschmieden]”, instead of composing verse upon some already extra-textually exist-
ing compound of virtues. The difference is most aptly displayed by the difference between 
the closing couplets, first by Shakespeare: 
 
‘Fair, kind, and true’ have often liv’d alone,  
Which three till now never kept seat in one. 
 
And then by Celan: 
 
»Schön, gut und treu« so oft getrennt, geschieden. 
In Einem will ich drei zusammenschmieden.  
 
In the original, the “now” refers to the “fair friend” whose constancy Shakespeare praises, by 
the verse that is confined to the friend’s constancy, his “wondrous excellence” in being “fair, 
kind, and true” (“my verse, to constancy confin’d”), but Celan’s verse is, instead of such a 
prescribed bonding to what is being described, “sheltered in constancy”: “In der Beständig-
keit, da bleibt mein Vers geborgen.”200  Perhaps some might say that Celan’s translation fails 
to be fair, kind and true to the original; but it is indeed true in a Celanian way: “Abtrünnig 
erst bin ich treu.” (GW 3:56.) 
 From Krieger’s book we shall only cite a few of his concluding remarks for the first 
lecture: 
 
As viewed from within the sacralizing figure, there are two elements that must be 
seen to fuse into the incarnating presence that obliterates the difference and distance 
between them. But, in stimulating our continuing awareness of that difference be-
tween the two, two other elements arise, each seeking to command the action at the 
                                                 
199 “The Poetry of Constancy: Paul Celan’s Translation of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 105”, trans. Harvey Mendel-
sohn, in Peter Szondi, Celan Studies, trans. Susan Bernofsky and H. Mendelsohn (Stanford: Stanford U.P., 
2003), pp. 1-26, here p. 13. Original German version “Poetry of Constancy — Poetik der Beständigkeit: 
Celans Übertragung von Shakespeares Sonett 105” (1971), in Schriften 2, ed. Jean Bollack et al. (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978), pp. 321-344. 
200 Cf. Szondi, Celan Studies, p. 26. 
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expense of the other [...]. Indeed, as in allegory, there is a residue of inappropriateness 
as we apply the action to either, sensing it to belong exclusively to the other. In this 
second, de-sacralizing mode the interplay between tenor and vehicle in the metaphor 
(or mock-metaphor) makes the two both interchangeable and mutually exclusive. [A 
Reopening of Closure, pp. 24-25.] 
 
This other pair of elements, actually a virtual second pair (“I concede”, Krieger writes, “that 
these are not really four elements but only two that I am asking you to consider in two very 
different ways”), represents the counter-metaphorical thrust within the structure of the meta-
phor or mock-metaphor, the allegorico-metonymic resistance to the totalizing tendency of the 
metaphor understood as a “sacralizing figure”. 
 
As our focus alternates from one to the other and back again, the disjunction between 
them is not bridged: with the poem’s surreptitious encouragement, we do not stop 
comparing the two elements, so that we cannot overcome our sense of their incom-
mensurability. [...] So what we have, as we pursue both modes, which continually 
double back upon one another, is — in effect — four elements, one pair functioning 
within the urge toward metaphorical fusion and the other pair, as if in mockery of the 
first, functioning within the urge toward a mutual exclusion that seems metonymic. 
Yet we do well to sustain both pairs, seeing each as the shadow seeking a reality that 
would efface the other. [A Reopening of Closure, p. 25.]201   
 
The mockery of the metaphorical urge, the comparative perspective which refuses to obliter-
ate the literal discrepancy, functions within the dialectical structure of the figure of resem-
blance. It is the metonymic or allegorical moment, as Krieger conceives them, within meta-
phor, even within the ‘symbolic’ metaphor. Indeed, resemblance does not preclude 
difference, to the contrary, resemblance presupposes difference. What is, strictly speaking, 
identical (A=A), is not similar, the identical are not just similar but the same. In the profane 
Renaissance love poem there is an inherent “concession” that “turns the metaphor against it-
self” (p. 25). The Renaissance poet introduces “a mocking shadow to the metaphor he ap-
pears to maintain” (p. 27). In fact, any metaphor, “because of its limits as metaphor, an-
nounces its mock-metaphoric counterthrust” (p. 28). Yet, as Krieger still considers himself a 
spokesman for the force of metaphor, or at least “for the verbal presence of metaphor in po-
ems”, he maintains that even if language can be seen in terms of discrepancy and metaphor as 
mistake, “Still, there they stand — both language and metaphor — not altogether deserving 
our disbelief” (p. 27).202   In the third, concluding Wellek Library Lecture, Krieger confes-
ses his desire: 
 
But I desire the verbal absolute of metaphor in the face of metonymy only while ac-
knowledging the need in poems for each to carry the sense of its becoming its other, 
                                                 
201 Cf. pp. 52-53: “the notion of metaphor in general [...] must [...] be subject to its own metonymic undoing.” 
202 Cf. pp. 61-62: “[T]he thematics of this opposition between sameness and difference, metaphor and meton-
ymy, achieves a climactic self-consciousness in de Man’s work, especially his earlier work, which is all on 
the side of metonymy and embattled against metaphor. My entire career, on the other hand, may be seen as 
an attempt to make a credible case for the verbal presence of metaphor in poems, whatever the thematic 
gaps, the absences, it covers, and by covering manages to reveal.” 
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continually carrying out the paradox of a polarity in which the poles become identical 
without yielding up the opposition of their mutual exclusivity. [A Reopening of Clo-
sure, p. 62.] 
 
Before concluding the present prolegomenon, let us take an excursion to a couple of sonnets 
not discussed by Krieger, in order to find another kind of typological prefiguration of sorts 
(“ein Dich-Vorgestalten”, as Celan translates “all you prefiguring” in Sonnet 106), and also 
another kind of metonymy. First, the famous Sonnet 18, in which figurativity or comparabil-
ity is explicitly thematized, and also temporality as a condition of possibility for a poem’s 
“eternal summer”, eternity as a type of temporality: 
 
Shall I compare thee to a Summers day? 
Thou art more louely and more temperate: 
Rough windes do shake the darling buds of Maie, 
And Sommers lease hath all too short a date:  
Sometime too hot the eye of heauen shines, 
And often is his gold complexion dimm’d, 
And euery faire from faire some-time declines, 
By chance, or natures changing course vntrim’d:  
But thy eternall Sommer shall not fade, 
Nor loose possession of that faire thou ow’st, 
Nor shall death brag thou wandr’st in his shade, 
When in eternall lines to time thou grow’st,  
    So long as men can breath or eyes can see, 
    So long liues this, and this giues life to thee.203 
 
The comparison is at once forsaken and relieved (sublated, aufgehoben: destroyed, preserved 
and lifted onto a higher level). This process of relieving the questionable comparison-to-a-
summer’s-day onto the metaphor-of-eternal-summer is touched by gentle irony: since Hegel 
at least, such a gift of life, a survival in the name (“in eternal lines”), would be considered a 
gift of death (Mallarmé: “Je dis : une fleur !”— Blanchot: “Je dis : cette femme”, etc.).204  But 
the eternity of these lines grows to time: ever it grows, through time, “to time” — while it 
also grows back into time. This eternity needs breath and sight. It depends on the life of hu-
                                                 
203 1609 First Folio. A facsimile of the page can be consulted in the Internet Shakespeare Editions, 
http://ise.uvic.ca/Library/facsimile/book/UC_Q1_Son/12/. — Paul Celan’s undated, fragmentary draft trans-
lation has been published, in Kathrin Volkmann,  Shakespeares Sonette auf deutsch (diss.) (Heidelberg 
1996), p. 152. It does not contain the three last lines, and I cite here only lines 9-11 which have achieved 
most complete form: 
 
Doch du, dein Sommer – er ist unbegrenzt 
Du hältst das Schöne, es bleibt dein Besitz 
Der Tod wirft keinen Schatten über dich. 
 
 Cf. the information in the electronic publication of the University of Bamberg, by Christa Jahnson, ed., 
Datenbank: Shakespeares Sonette in Deutschland:  “Sonett 18 / (ohne die Verse 12-14) wird aus dem kor-
rigierten Typoskript mitgeteilt von Kathrin Volkmann [...]. Ferner wird das 1.Qu. aus Sonett 6 zitiert (a.a.O. 
S.154). Beide Übersetzungsversuche befinden sich im Nachlaß Dt. Literaturarchiv Marbach D.90.1.335.)” 
(http://web.uni-bamberg.de/split/britkult/links/sonettbiblio/sonette/gebib10 htm.) 
204 Cf. Maurice Blanchot, “La littérature et le droit à la mort”, in La part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), pp. 
303-344, here pp. 325, 329. 
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manity, on men’s ability to breath and see also in the days to come — and what else would 
you expect from such a dramatic poet as Shakespeare? This gift of life does not so much 
transcend time as it traverses time, it is eternity not so much outside or above time, but in the 
possibility of repetition, again and again. This eternity is “so long as”, this ever is an ever-
and-ever, and it depends on men’s ability to see and speak, read and recite. Who is given life 
in these lines? An  uncanny Galatea perhaps? She hovers in the air (“So long as men can 
breath”), upon the lines (“or eyes can see”). Breath and eyes give life to “this”, namely the 
lines of the poem, “and this gives life to thee”. This can be seen to reverberate in a remark-
able manner in Celan’s poetics, and therefore we can only guess why he never completed the 
translation of this poem. 
 Let us also read Sonnet 65, speaking of honeyed breath but also of black ink, and 
Celan’s translation of it (dated October 31. 1963) — we reproduce here the division into 
quatrains used by Celan: 
 
Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea, 
But sad mortality o’ersways their power, 
How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea, 
Whose action is no stronger than a flower? 
 
Oh how shall summer’s honey breath hold out, 
Against the wrackful siege of battering days, 
When rocks impregnable are not so stout, 
Nor gates of steel so strong but time decays? 
 
Oh fearful meditation! where, alack, 
Shall Time’s best jewel from Time’s chest lie hid? 
Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back? 
Or who his spoil of beauty can forbid? 
 
O, none, unless this miracle have might  — 




Nicht Erz, nicht Stein, nicht Erde, nicht die See: 
sie trotzen nicht der Sterblichkeit Gewalten. 
Und sie, die Schönheit, soll dagegenstehen? 
Sie, eine Blume, soll hier Kraft entfalten? 
 
Des Sommers Honig-Atem, hält er stand? 
Die Tage kommen tobend angeritten. 
Zeit-und-Verfall! Du trotzt nicht, Felsenwand. 
Und Tore, ehern, ihr steht nicht inmitten. 
 
Der Zeit Juwel – nein, du bewahrsts nicht auf: 
mit eigner Truhe kommt die Zeit geschritten. 
Und welcher Hand hält ihre Füße auf? 
Sie raubt die Schönheit – wer wills ihr verbieten? 
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Nein, keiner! Nie! Es sei denn, dies trifft zu:
Aus meiner Tinte Schwarz, draus leuchtest du.205 
 
Let us concentrate on the closing couplet and a few shifts or transformations between the 
‘versions’, here arranged into a clumsy list of pairs: (a) “my love” — “du”; (b) “in black ink” 
— “Aus meiner Tinte Schwarz” ; (c) “my love” — “meiner Tinte”; (d) “O, none, unless ...” — 
“Nein, keiner! Nie! Es sei denn ...”; (e) “unless this miracle” — “Es sei denn, dies trifft zu”. 
And a commentary on these pairs: (A) Shakespeare’s text does not address “thee” directly, 
but speaks of “my love”. (B) The impersonal “black ink” is transformed into “meiner Tinte 
Schwarz”, and the preposition “in” is transformed into “aus”, “out of”. (C)  The possessive 
pronoun “my” shifts from “my love” to “my ink”, “meiner Tinte”. (D) “O none, unless ...” 
has turned into the more emphatic, more desperate-sounding expression with three negatives, 
approximately translatable as “No, none! Never! Be it then that ...”. (E) And the continuation 
of this “O none, unless ...”, shifts from “unless this miracle” into something like “should it 
happen, then, that ...”, ending with the colon that yields a certain emphasis to the last line 
(“Es sei denn, dies trifft zu: / ...”).  
 The blackness of the ink (“meiner Tinte Schwarz”), impersonal in the source text, has 
become the only possession of the “I” in the translation of this couplet, the only remainder of 
the fleeting possessions named in the original, the only one besides “my love”, while it is 
“du” that the translation addresses, instead of “my love”. And of course, the black ink is “an 
objectifying metonym for the poet”.206  But what kind of an object, what kind of materiality is 
that? And what kind of metonymy? These belong to the guiding questions for our reading of 
Celan’s poetry and poetics. 
 The improbability of the “miracle” and the affirmation of the “may still” upon the 
condition of this miracle, while “may still” has no individual counterpart in the translation, 
have been aggravated by the emphatic, three-times repeated negation, and the miracle itself 
has rather been transformed into chance: “Es sei denn, dies trifft zu:” — Should it so happen, 
that, in spite of the odds.... The last word of the translation is “du”, and unlike the original 
text in which the second person address does not occur, the previous strophes of the transla-
tion also contain several apostrophes. What might shine forth from the text, from this written 
address, is the realization of this address. It is not so much the sensible and material abun-
dance, the temporal beauty, the jewel bestowed by time and bound to be restored to its chest, 
all that was lost to time and that would be miraculously resurrected, but the address itself, the 
strange interpersonal and inter-temporal relationship that comes to shine, when the reading 
                                                 
205  GW 5:334-5. We quote Shakespeare’s text, divided into quatrains, as in the cited volume of Celan’s works. 
206 Cees Koster, “‘Aus meiner Tinte Schwarz...’: The Case of the Proliferating Pronouns”, [chapter 8] in From 
World to World. An Armamentarium for the Study of Poetic Discourse in Translation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2000); reproduced electronically as a “proefschrift” (http://home.planet nl/~koste327/proefschrift/chapter_
8 html). Koster’s chapter contains an excellent linguistic reading of Celan’s translation of Sonnet 65 and a 
couple of others, furnished with statistical tables comparing the occurrences of different personal pronouns 
       in Shakespeare’s and Celan’s versions.
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eye (pars pro toto) meets the blackness of the ink (while the ink can be seen as an effect 
standing for a cause, or perhaps rather in terms of contiguity: contiguous with the hand, with 
writing as a handicraft, with the handwork [Handwerk] of the poet; we shall return to 
this).207  The black ink is a mirror of sorts for the eye that shines, but a dark mirror that yields 
no image, directly, but rather the chance that rises out of the darkness (“Es sei denn, dies trifft 
zu”). This chance of “du” is the chance of the wink of an eye, Augenblick (“instant”) in which 
the image of the flower and the honeyed breath are reawakened in another time, even for the 
briefest and most intimate moment.208  If it should happen that the sight of the ink meets the 
eye of the reader (zutreffen means both a coincidence and hitting a target), this ignition of the 
gaze might also happen. In another time, the other’s time.  
 Inasmuch as metaphor may be conceived of as containing both the quest for presence 
and identification as well as the contrary moment, the ‘metonymic’ or ‘allegoric’ awareness 
of distance, we may say that a certain reductio ad absurdum belongs to the structure of meta-
phor itself, a counter-reduction to the “metaphoric reductions” (Krieger) that “leave out dif-
ference” (Shakespeare).209  And Krieger’s insights concerning the counter-metaphorical thrust 
                                                 
207 Cf. below. The reflexive thematization of writing poetry is of course by no means rare in the sonnet genre, 
on the contrary, with all the pens and paper and ink and song as its metonyms. This self-thematization is 
rather a constant in the whole Western canon of poetry, in one way or another, from all the Greek apostro-
phes to Gods and Muses to postmodern digital poetry. 
208 Atemwende, perhaps — but the relation between speech and images, visibility and invisibility remains to be 
carefully examined, with respect to Celan’s drafts for a phenomenology of poetry (cf. below). — In a recent 
study on the “chronography” in Celan’s poetry and poetics, Sandro Zanetti has brilliantly considered the 
role of “metonymical alteration” and its difference from metaphor: “»Ich schreibe Gedichte – ich schreibe 
mit der Hand«, vermerkt Celan in einer weiteren Notiz zum Meridian [TCA/Meridian, Ms. 604]. Er weist 
damit auf eine konkrete körperliche Verbindung des Schreibers zum Geschriebenen hin, die als meto-
nymisch in dem Sinne aufgefaßt werden kann, daß Schreiber und Geschriebenes über die Hand und – dies 
wäre zu ergänzen – über Schreibgerät und Papier eine nachbarschaftliche Relation eingehen, die entschei-
dend durch Berührung, aber auch durch (technisch mitbestimmte) Prozesse der Ablösung und Stellvertre-
tung charakterisiert sind.” (Sandro Zanetti, »zeitoffen«. Zur Chronographie Paul Celans [München: Fink, 
2006], p. 124.) A few lines later Zanetti continues: “Tatsächlich lassen sich Celans Überlegungen zu all 
dem, was er »Gestalt« nennt, jeweils unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines metaphorischen oder aber eines meto-
nymischen Bezugs zu einer jeweils anderen »Gestalt« lesen, gegebenenfalls bis in die Mikrophysik psy-
chologischer Dispositionen hinein. »Kunst« folgt demnach eher dem Schema metaphorischer Identifikation, 
»Dichtung« eher dem Gebot metonymischer Alteration. Die Art der Relation zweier Gestalten (deren 
»Sinn«) ist im Bereich der Sprache von solchen Ausrichtungen abhängig. So gesehen läßt sich Celans 
Ablehnung der Metapher (auch) darauf zurückführen, daß metaphorische Operationen diejenigen meto-
nymischen Relationen leicht vergessen lassen, die – z.B. auf dem Papier, in der Nachbarschaft von Worten, 
oder, darüber hinaus, im Verhältnis eines körperlich anwesenden Menschen zu einem ihm vorliegenden 
Schriftstück – sämtliche sprachliche Prozesse in ihrer medialen bzw. materialen oder korporalen conditio 
sine qua non auszeichnen. Tritt im Gedicht »ein Abwesender« an einen »noch Abwesenderen heran«, dann 
ist damit allerdings auch gesagt, daß die eben genannte conditio eine durchaus vergängliche und veränder-
liche ist. Das gilt zunächst für diejenigen, die dem Gedicht schreibend oder lesend begegnen. Es gilt aber 
auch für das Gedicht. Als geschriebenes Dokument kann es vernichtet oder durch Überschreibungen, Er-
gänzungen, Löschungen und Abschriften verändert werden. Spätestens aber bei seiner Vervielfältigung im 
Druck erfährt ein geschriebenes Dokument noch einmal eine grundsätzliche Wandlung.” (Ibid., pp. 124-
125.) On “alteration”, cf. p. 41: “die fortwährende Alteration, der endliche Gegebenheiten gegenüber 
anderen endlichen Gegebenheiten jeweils ausgesetzt sind, kennzeichnet diesen [dialogischen] 
Richtungssinn”. Zanetti also discusses Celan’s translation of Sonnet 65 (on pp. 168-170). 
209 Krieger, A Reopening of Closure, pp. 74-75; Shakespeare, Sonnet 105, ll. 7-8: “Therefore my verse, to 
constancy confined, / One thing expressing, leaves out difference.” (Cit. Krieger, p. 22.) 
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may well help us to understand what Paul Celan, perhaps the most anti-metaphoric poet and 
poetician of modern times, means by the wish of the tropes and metaphors in the poem to be 
carried ad absurdum.210  However, there are also irreducible differences between Krieger’s 
view of the Renaissance mock-metaphor and Celan’s view of the essentially anti-metaphoric 
nature of poetry. We can be stricken by poetry without being stricken by metaphor and with-
out quite “feel[ing] ourselves within its enclosing verbal power”.211 
 
 
210 Der Meridian (GW 3:199). As an epigraph to one of his texts on Celan, Jacques Derrida cites two distinct 
works by Murray Krieger. Actually even the original title of that text, published first in German and then in 
English, contained a quotation from the end of the first of the three Wellek Library Lectures that we have 
been reading and quoting here (p. 29): “‘A Self-Unsealing Poetic Text’: Poetics and Politics of Witnessing”, 
trans. Rachel Bowlby (2000) — here is the first of the two epigraphs: “The world becomes its language and 
its language becomes its world. But it is a world out of control, in flight from ideology, seeking verbal secu-
rity and finding none beyond that promised by a poetic text, but always a self-unsealing poetic text.” (Cit. 
on p. 180; the other epigraph is from Ekphrasis: The Illusion of the Natural Sign.)  
211 Cf. A Reopening of Closure, p. 61: “The counter-metaphorical consciousness of language’s continuing in-
completeness keeps us open to the differential realm beyond metaphor even while we feel ourselves within 
its enclosing verbal power.” 
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P R O L E G O M E N O N  I V  
 
Let me introduce, instead of theories and themes, methods and hypotheses, this time three 
minor characters. They appear on stage in the first act, third scene of Twelfth Night, and we 
shall quote an episode consisting of seventy lines; our reading revolves around a question by 
one of these three characters, “Wherefore (sweet-heart?) What’s your metaphor”, and the 
other’s reply: “It’s dry Sir.” The discussion of that episode constitutes the first section of the 
present prolegomenon; the second half consists of a reading of a few poems by Emily Dickin-
son, especially “Because I Could Not Stop for Death”, and a critique of a certain ‘cognitive’ 
perspective as applied to this poem. 
 We are still dealing with the ‘naturality’ of the gift of metaphor, the natural talent for 
metaphor. Or at least “almost natural” (as Sir Andrew is described by the lady’s maid Maria in 
the episode we shall quote and discuss below), for as we can see from Aristotle’s discussion of 
metaphor, this talent is a token of another, perhaps even more natural, more primordial gift-
edness: the eye for resemblances, the theoretical aptitude that is common to both the poet 
and the philosopher; but it is the philosopher who must observe, not only the similarities but 
the differences, first and foremost, the distinctions without which there would be no resem-
blance in the first place, but rather a homogeneous identity. So the gift of metaphor, presup-
posing resemblance but also difference and a pretense that there is no difference, is an almost 
natural gift. 
 “Almost natural” is also abigail Maria’s description, addressed to Sir Toby Belch, her fu-
ture husband, of his comrade Sir Andrew Aguecheek; and these are the three characters we 






“ALMOST NATURAL”: UNDERTAKING METAPHOR  
AND FAILING TO UNDERTAKE (SHAKESPEARE, DICKINSON) 
 
 
Parler pour ne rien dire, c’est toujours la meilleure technique pour garder un secret.212  
 
* * * 
 
La fraternité : nous les aimons, nous ne pouvons rien faire pour eux, sinon les aider à 
atteindre le seuil. 
     Le seuil, comme il y aurait de l’indiscrétion et de la lourdeur à en parler comme si 
c’était la mort. D’une certaine façon et depuis toujours, nous savons que la mort n’est 
qu’une métaphore pour nous aider à nous représenter grossièrement l’idée de limite, 
alors que la limite exclut toute représentation, toute « idée » de limite.213  
 
 
“WHEREFORE (SWEET-HEART?) WHAT’S YOUR METAPHOR?” (TWELFTH NIGHT, 
I. I I I .15-85) 
 
Three so-called minor characters appear on stage, first there are Sir Toby Belch and his 
neice’s chambermaid Maria, who will in the end marry him; then enters Sir Toby’s comrade, 
Sir Andrew Aguecheek. One of these characters asks: “What’s your Metaphor?” And another 
replies: “It’s dry sir.” The third is momentarily more passive, stands aside and listens to this 
exchange that has puzzled many commentators since then. Maria is the first to speak, ad-
dressing Sir Toby, whom she will marry in the end: 
 
Ma[ria]. That quaffing and drinking will vndoe you: I heard my Lady talke of it yes-
terday: and of a foolish 
knight that you brought in one night here, to be hir woer 
To[by]. Who, Sir Andrew Ague-cheeke? 
Ma. I he.  
To. He’s as tall a man as any’s in Illyria. 
Ma. What’s that to th’purpose? 
To. Why he ha’s three thousand ducates a yeare. 
Ma. I, but hee’l haue but a yeare in all these ducates:    
He’s a very foole, and a prodigall. 
To. Fie, that you’l say so: he playes o’th Viol-de-gam- 
boys, and speaks three or four languages word for word 
without booke, & hath all the good gifts of nature. 
Ma. He hath indeed, almost naturall: for besides that 
he’s a foole, he’s a great quarreller: and but that hee hath 
the gift of a Coward, to allay the gust he hath in quarrel- 
ling, ‘tis thought among the prudent, he would quickely 
haue the gift of a graue. 
Tob. By this hand they are scoundrels and substra-    
ctors that say so of him. Who are they? 
                                                 
212 Jacques Derrida, Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999), p. 87. 
213 Maurice Blanchot, Le pas au-delà (Paris: Gallimard, 2002, first publ. 1973), p. 75. The most fortunate trans-
lation of the title is, as far as I know, not Step Not Beyond, but the one suggested by Jari Kauppinen: “The 
Step Beyond Nothing”. 
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Ma. They that adde moreour, hee’s drunke nightly 
in your company. 
To. With drinking healths to my Neece: Ile drinke 
to her as long as there is a passage in my throat, & drinke 
in Illyria: he’s a Coward and a Coystrill that will not 
drinke to my Neece, till his braines turne o’th toe, like a 
parish top. What wench? Castiliano vulgo: for here coms 
Sir Andrew Agueface. 
Enter Sir Andrew. 
And[rew]. Sir Toby Belch. How now sir Toby Belch? 
To. Sweet sir Andrew. 
And. Blesse you faire Shrew. 
Mar. And you too sir. 
Tob. Accost Sir Andrew, accost. 
And. What’s that? 
To. My Neeces Chamber-maid. 
And. Good Mistris accost, I desire better acquaintance 
Ma. My name is Mary sir. 
And. Good mistris Mary, accost. 
To. You mistake knight: Accost, is front her, boord 
her, woe her, assayle her. 
And. By my troth I would not vndertake her in this 
company. Is that the meaning of Accost? 
Ma. Far you well Gentlemen. 
To. And thou let part so Sir Andrew, would thou 
mightst neuer draw sword agen. 
And. And you part so mistris, I would I might neuer 
draw sword agen: Faire Lady, doe you thinke you haue 
fooles in hand? 
Ma. Sir, I haue not you by’th hand. 
An. Marry but you shall haue, and heeres my hand. 
Ma. Now sir, thought is free: I pray you bring your 
hand to’th Buttry barre, and let it drinke. 
An. Wherefore (sweet-heart?) What’s your Meta- 
phor?  
Ma. It’s dry sir. 
And. Why I thinke so: I am not such an asse, but I 
can keepe my hand dry. But what’s your iest? 
Ma. A dry iest Sir. 
And. Are you full of them? 
Ma. I Sir, I haue them at my fingers ends: marry now I let go your hand, I am barren.  
 Exit Maria214 
 
 
We shall stop here briefly and proceed with the few remaining lines in a moment. Maria en-
tertains no high opinion of Sir Andrew, and perhaps Sir Toby fears that the “wench” might let 
her contempt show to “Sir Andrew Agueface” and therefore requests Castiliano vulgo, what-
ever that be (perhaps “common Spanish” as has been suggested, although this is not the only 
conjecture).215  Apparently her countenance does betray her preconception, to the extent that 
                                                 
214  Act I, Sc. III, ll. 15-77. A New Variorum Edition of Shakespeare, edited by H.H. Furness. Vol. XIII: Twelfe 
Night, or, What You Will. 7th Impression (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1901). 
215 “Common Spanish”, i.e. “familiar language”, is Halliwell’s suggestion; cit. Furness, op. cit., p. 37; but cf. 
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Sir Andrew greets her as “faire Shrew”, after Sir Toby has replied to his question “What’s 
that?” that the object of the question is Sir Toby’s neice’s chambermaid. Sir Toby’s reply, as 
well as Sir Andrew’s question, could in principle be understood to concern either Maria’s 
person or the word “accost”, and Sir Andrew decides to take it both ways. The seeming bru-
tality of Sir Andrew’s “what” (the first of his three “whats” in this episode, besides the ques-
tion: “Is that the meaning of Accost?”) and “that”, the interrogation taken to concern Maria’s 
person, may have been customary of Shakespeare’s day and his plays, but it also adds to the 
fruitful equivocality of the episode; in any case, Sir Andrew’s straightforward lack of deli-
cacy is well exhibited, if not otherwise, then at least by his “undertaking” of the word “ac-
cost”. He “would not undertake her in this company”.216  But he would indeed like to under-
take, namely understand the meaning, the “what” and the “wherefore” of her metaphor, when 
she bids him to bring his “hand to the buttery-bar, and let it drink”. 
 As it is in the case of the ambiguous reference of Sir Andrew’s “What’s that?”, again 
when he asks, “Wherefore (sweet-heart?) What’s your Metaphor?”, the subject of Maria’s 
reply, “It’s dry sir”, is ambiguous: it might mean either Sir Andrew’s hand or Mary’s meta-
phor, and this latter possibility seems to be confirmed by her next reply: “A dry iest Sir.” Sir 
Andrew’s question “What’s your Metaphor?” seems to presuppose the possibility of translat-
ing metaphor into “familiar language” (Castiliano vulgo, if you will, “common Spanish”), 
here the supposed metaphor upon which “thought is free: I pray you bring your hand to’th 
Buttry barre, and let it drinke”. But the chambermaid seems only to suspend her explanation 
by referring to his “dry hand”. This “jest of a dry hand”217  would, according to Kenrick, cited 
by Furness, be explained by proverbial usage: “The ‘bringing the hand to the buttery-bar, and 
letting it drink’ is a proverbial phrase among forward Abigails, to ask at once for a kiss and a 
present.”218  But perhaps this abigail Mary is not as forward as that? In any case, Kenrick con-
tinues: “Sir Andrew’s slowness of comprehension in this particular, gave her a just suspicion 
at once of his frigidity and avarice. She, therefore, calls his hand dry; the moistness of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Leslie Hotson, The First Night of Twelfth Night (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1954), p. 115.  
216 The seeming brutality of Sir Andrew’s “what” (the first of the three “whats” of his in this episode, besides 
the question: “Is that the meaning of Accost?”) and “that”, the interrogation taken to concern Maria’s per-
son, may have been customary in Shakespeare’s day and his plays, but it also adds to the fruitful equivocal-
ity of the episode. (Cf. OED: “what, pron., a.1, adv., conj., int. (n.) [A.I.2] Of a person (or persons), in 
predicative use [...]: formerly generally, in reference to name or identity, and thus equivalent to who; in later 
use only in reference to nature, character, function, or the like. Also in phr. what for a... = what kind of: see 
FOR prep. 19c. [...] 1596 SHAKES. Tam. Shr. IV. ii. 62 Tra. What is he Biondello? Bion. Master, a Mar-
cantant, or a pedant, I know not what. 1604 Oth. I. i. 94 Bra... What are you? Rod. My name is Rodorigo.” 
(OED, 00284122. Accessed Sept. 2002.) 
217  “What is the jest of dry hand, I know not any better than Sir Andrew,” admits Dr. Johnson (cit. in Furness’ 
New Variorum Edition, op. cit., p. 42n71). 
218  In his footnote to line 71 (p. 42), Furness cites W. Kenrick, Review of Johnson’s Shakespeare (London, 
1865) (the “List of Books” is on pp. 421ff, here p. 424). 
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hand being a sign of liberality, as well in matters of love as money.”219  This explains Maria’s 
jest only partly. Her words obviously do not refer only to Sir Andrew’s “dry hand”, since the 
ambiguity of the subject of “It’s dry sir” is echoed by her next reply: “A dry iest Sir.” If “dry” 
in this second case would now mean “stupid, tedious”, as Furness suggests, alongside her 
last word, “barren”, which would mean here, still according to Furness, “witless” — if 
Maria’s words would mean only this and nothing more — it would underestimate the jest-
ress’s power to “put downe” her tall jestee.220  For after Maria’s exit Sir Andrew is indeed put 
down, no question (ll. 78ff): 
 
To[by]. O knight, thou lack’st a cup of Canarie: when did | I see thee so put downe? 
An[drew]. Neuer in your life I thinke, vnlesse you see Ca- 
narie put me downe: mee thinkes sometimes I haue no 
more wit then a Christian, or an ordinary man ha’s: but I 
am a great eater of beefe, and I beleeue that does harme 
to my wit. 
To. No question.  
 
Maria may well feel “barren” in the sense of “witless” after meeting such a dry-handed and 
“beefe-witted Lord”221  to be a man of chivalry. But it is rather the jestee who seems to be in 
need of a drink in spite of — or rather, because of — the dryness of the jestress’s jest. The 
“metaphor” in the sense of a proverbial phrase destined to have an immediate effect may 
seem to have missed its point but another jest, a dry jest, the figure of irony has met its target 
— if not otherwise, then by “confounding the ear” of the jestee. It seems to have escaped 
Furness’s attention that ‘dry’ is also lexicalized as an equivalent of ‘irony’ (and, in the OED 
as well), even with specific reference to Maria’s use of the word in our episode.222  By the 
word “dry” Maria affirms the ironical character of her jest, as she probably never truly ex-
pected Sir Andrew to respond to her proverbial “metaphor” with “a kiss and a present”. The 
metaphor was never meant to result in a present and a kiss, as it was dry to begin with: that is, 
the figure of dry jest, namely irony, was attached to it in the first place. There was never such 
a plain metaphor in Maria’s line, never as plain as Sir Andrew and also Furness and many 
other commentators after him would have it. If only Sir Andrew’s confusion — real or pre-
                                                 
219 Loc. cit.; Kenrick refers to Othello III, iv, 44 (cit. Furness, loc. cit.). 
220 As Sir Andrew allegedly is “as tall a man as any’s in Illyria”, i.e. wealthy, Maria’s “bring your hand to the 
buttery-bar and let it drink” may be taken to jest upon his “tallness”, too, tallness both physical and eco-
nomic. I am grateful to Jeremy Dallyn for this suggestion. 
221  “SHAKES. Tr. & Cr. II. i. 14 Thou mungrel *beefe-witted Lord” (cit. OED, 00019354). “Beef-eater” is of 
course generally a well-known and traditional epithet of an Englishman, also used by Saint-Preux in Rous-
seaus’s Nouvelle Héloïse : “Vous autres Anglais, grands mangeurs de viande, avez dans vos inflexibles ver-
tus quelque chose de dur et qui tient de la barbarie.” (IV partie, lettre X à Milord Edouard; éd. Michel Lau-
nay [Paris: Flammarion, cop. 1967], p. 339.) 
222  “dry, a. (adv.) [...] [A.]II. Figurative senses. [...] 14. Said of a jest or sarcasm uttered in a matter-of-fact 
tone and without show of pleasantry, [...]; in early use, ironical. [...] 1589 PUTTENHAM Eng. Poesie III. 
xviii. (Arb.) 199 The figure Ironia, which we call the drye mock. 1601 SHAKES. Twel. N. I. iii. 81[sic? Ac-
cording to Furness’s Variorum edition, quoted above, this should be I.iii.71 & 74], I. v. 45 [Variorum: ll. 
42-43: “for giue the dry foole drink, then is the foole not dry”].” (OED, 00070347, Sept. 2002; cf. the other 
note below on “dry”.) 
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tense — on the “wherefore” of her proverbial metaphor would first have given “her a just 
suspicion at once of his frigidity and avarice” she could not call her metaphor or her jest 
“dry”: only the probability of his “dry hand” in the first place makes it possible that her 
metaphor-jest is “dry” in another sense. 
 “Dry” would mean here, ambiguously, at least two things: both avarice, or here rather 
poverty resulting from the opposite of avarice in certain matters, and irony. Maria does not 
only call his hand dry, since her “metaphor” was not a simple metaphor in the first place. The 
“metaphor” was already dry when she expressed it, since she already was suspicious of Sir 
Andrew’s “dry hand”, its dryness, or what Furness calls his avarice, resulting from his prodi-
gality: he would soon, if he were not a coward — if he had not the “almost natural” gift of 
cowardice — be killed in a duel and “have the gift of a grave”, since he would, “there being 
no assets for funeral expenses, be buried as a pauper, — at the cost of the parish”, due to his 
dispensation of his patrimony, as one of Furness’ footnotes explains.223  Of course, in playing 
with the proverb (if it is that, or only that) Mary takes the risk that Sir Andrew catches the 
proverbial meaning and actually courts her by a kiss on the hand and a present, or perhaps 
returns with some ironic gesture, although this is unlikely from Sir Andrew, who “always en-
joys a joke, but never understands it”.224  Would that be the case, despite the improbability, 
there would have been the risk that the dry metaphor may be taken simply as a metaphor and 
that Sir Andrew takes action accordingly, or, on the other hand, that he does “undertake” (i.e. 
understand) the irony of her dry metaphor and responds to it accordingly — perhaps by dryly 
kissing her hand and giving her some ironic present. 
 But what about Maria’s last word before her exit? Is “barren” not yet almost an extra 
synonym for “dry”?225  The strange series of dry — dry — barren should merit our attention 
in the latter part of this episode. She is by no means short of jest, as we see, she has them at 
her fingers’ ends — she has the “foole in hand”, the jestee, without whom there would be no 
jest at all. Why should she say she’s barren now? Obviously because she has run out of jest as 
soon as she lets go of the jestee’s hand and leaves the company, as she just does: “[...] now I 
let go your hand, I am barren.” The jestress runs out of jest as soon as she lets go of the 
“foole in hand”, for she knows that there is no jest without jestee. But what if she meant it 
more literally — not quite but somewhat more literally and, if not less metaphorically, then 
metaphorically in another sense, at least so that to replace the word “barren” by some syno-
nym, such as “witless”, would more or less disturb the scene? To give herself as dry and bar-
                                                 
223 Twelfe Night, ed. Furness, p. 34, note to line 33. 
224 Cf. Hotson, The First Night of Twelfth Night, p. 11.  
225 OED: “dry, a. (adv.) [...] [A.]II. Figurative senses. [...] 15. a. Yielding no fruit, result, or satisfaction; barren, 
sterile, unfruitful, jejune. [...] Obs. [...].b. Of persons: Miserly, stingy; reserved, uncommunicative. (Cf. 4.) 
Obs. [...] 1611 COTGR. s.v. Acquests, He is but a drie fellow, there is nought to be got by dealing with him. 
[...] [Cf.]4. a. [...] 1642 FULLER Holy & Prof. St. IV. xiii. 304 It must be a dry flower..out of which this bee 
sucks no honey. [...] b. spec. Of cows, sheep, etc.: Not yielding milk.” (OED, 00070347. Accessed Sept. 
2002.) 
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ren — to present herself as being that — would have been Maria’s way out of the situation, 
out of the situation with this beef-witted “foole in hand”, while all the while retaining the 
ambiguity of the subject of being “dry” and “barren”. To finish by claiming that she is “bar-
ren” is to claim, at once, that now she will be short of her dry jest as she lets go of the jestee 
— the handful of jest in Sir Andrew’s character — and, on the other hand, that she wilfully 
declines to have such an intercourse of meaning that would be expected from such a meta-
phorical proverb or riddle as “bring your hand to the buttery-bar and let it drink”, if this 
metaphor was not dry in the first place and if it corresponded to forwardly asking for a pre-
sent and a kiss. The dry metaphor refuses the performance of such a “wherefore”.  
 Maria plays barren as an animal in danger would play dead, but she plays barren in a 
disguisedly fruitful way — she will in the end marry Sir Toby. The sense of her metaphor is, 
to an extent, of secondary importance in the situation. That is, if there is any precise sense to 
it. But its translatable meaning does not yield its “wherefore”, as its purpose lies rather in 
irony. The metaphor, or the “proverbial phrase among the forward Abigails” as which Ken-
rick explains it, says very little here, while perhaps articulating something that must be left 
unsaid “in this company” — it is so ambiguous that it rather protects her person than reveals 
anything, it is not even double entente. 
 Nevertheless, the episode with its real or pretended mal-entendu seems to be sup-
ported by a more or less figured bass (basso continuo) of double- or sous-entendu, a horizon 
of ambiguity: most notably in the play with the word “accost” and in the “jest of a dry hand”. 
Let us suppose that there is a certain unarticulated and even, to an extent and in a certain 
sense, inarticulatable level of sense — or, if you will, nonsense or absurdity — involved in 
the figured bass of our Twelfth Night episode. Let us imagine the unimaginable, let us drama-
tize, let us articulate this scene with Sir Andrew Aguecheek, who probably doesn’t really ar-
ticulate, if we are to trust his name. What if Maria would have misheard — or, rather have 
pretended to mishear —  the word “metaphor” and the word “jest”?226  Or if she would jest 
on the possibility of mishearing or misunderstanding them? When Maria replies to Sir An-
drew’s question, “Wherefore (sweet-heart?) What’s your Metaphor?” by “It’s dry sir” and 
then replies to the other question, a variant of the first (since Sir Andrew would only have her 
jest in the mode of metaphor), “A dry iest Sir” — the previous double-entente of the word 
“accost” and the whole setting taken into account, all the way to the discussion of the “beef” 
after her exit, and also the assonance of “wherefore — Metaphor” — it might well be that 
the jestress pretends to mishear the jestee’s questions as follows, and this is indeed wild 
speculation: “Wherefore (sweet-heart?) What’s your meat for? — It’s dry sir” and: “But 
what’s227  your chest? — A dry chest, sir”. The “coarse slang” meaning of the word “meat” 
                                                 
There is no need to suppose that she would not be familiar with the schola226 rly rhetorical term “metaphor”, 
227  
since a lady’s chamber-maid would by no means be uneducated in Elizabethan society (cf. Furness’s foot-
note to I, iii, 51, on pp. 39-40, concerning a chambermaid’s social rank).  
OED: “what, pron., a.1, adv., conj., int. (n.) [A.II.]17. In predicative use, corresponding to a predicative adj.
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was known and used by Shakespeare, as the OED tells us (“the human body regarded as an 
instrument of sexual pleasure”),228  and “dry” is synonymous both to Maria’s last word before 
her exit, “barren”, and to “not yielding milk” — therefore our suggestion of the sous-entendu 
“dry chest”. What about the last two lines in the passage, namely “Are you full of them?” — 
“I Sir, I haue them at my fingers ends”? As we already said, the reply would refer to the 
“foole in hand”, the jestee who holds her hand and was foolish enough to play with the word 
“accost” — play with it, deliberately or not. Maria’s affirmative “aye” to Sir Andrew’s ques-
tion is ironic, too, since “to be full of them” is certainly not the same as “to have them at her 
fingers’ ends”. She is full of jest only as long as she has the jestee at her fingers’ ends, the 
fool at hand, so she has “them” not simply by heart, as in a treasury always readily at her dis-
posal. Her treasury of jest, the content of her chest as it comes to jesting, depends on the 
commerce with the exterior and on the exposure that necessarily belongs to irony, as irony’s 
exposure to its own return.  
 The phonetic variance between “metaphor” and “meat for” is not great, nor that of 
jest” “ and “chest”; these tiny diacritics would perfectly allow for the mal-entendu — espe-
cially if pronounced by an Aguecheek.229  But to dramatize such a complexity of figures so as 
to “express”, i.e. “explain the subject”230  in the very situation would not be the plainest case 
of mimesis. Meat for its master, here “Metaphor” would be: concentrated in this one word, 
“There is a good deal of meat for the actors.”231  Meat for articulation; meat for the mouth of 
an Aguecheek, the “beefe-witted Lord” to be realized on-stage; meat or rather flesh, body 
proper, speech organs and gesticulation, not to mention the ear of the listener, the conscious 
imagination of the spectator and what has been called the subconscious; all these elements 
must be taken into account in dramatizing the episode. The word “metaphor” as well as the 
word “jest” would work here somewhat like the eye-rhyme: they would demand a certain 
looseness of articulation. But even if one were to dramatize the scene with such a silly idea 
                                                                                                                                                        
in direct statement: usually referring to quality (cf. 15) = of what kind, character, or disposition. [...] 1601 
SHAKES. Twel. N. I. v. 269, I see you what you are, you are too proud. 1605 Lear II. ii. 121 What was th' 
offence you gaue him? [...] III. adv. 19. For what cause or reason? for what end or purpose? why? Obs. [...]” 
(OED, 00284122, accessed Sept. 2002.) 
228 OED: “meat, n. [... 3]e. coarse slang. The penis; the female genital organs; the human body regarded as an 
instrument of sexual pleasure; a prostitute. / 1595 GOSSON Pleasant Quippes sig. B2 That you should 
coutch your meat in dish, And others feele, it is no fish. 1597 SHAKES. Henry IV: Part Two (1623) II. iv. 
83/1 Away you mouldie Rogue, away; I am meat for your Master.” (OED,00142835, Sept. 2002.) This last 
quote is spoken by Mistress Doll Tearsheet as she is trying to get rid of the ruffian “Captaine Pistol” in a 
scene which is much more of an aggressive, offensive scene of harassment than the one between Sir An-
drew and Maria: “Pist. I will murther your Ruffe, for this. [...] Dol. [...] You a Captaine? you slaue, for 
what? for tearing a poore Whores Ruffe in a Bawdy-house?” (Folio, ll. 1161-9.)  
229 “Elizabethan pronunciation was very little troubled by snobbery”, as William Empson remarks in discussing 
Nash’s line “Brightness falls from the air”, where “air” may have been misspelled for “hair” (Seven Types 
of Ambiguity [New York: New Directions, 1984], p. 26 [first published 1930]). 
230  Cf. above the excerpt from Boileau and its translation by Soames and Dryden. 
231  Cf. OED, entry “meat, n.”, subentries 6.c. (“meat for a person’s master: someone or something intended for a 
person’s betters, esp. as a source of sexual gratification; someone or something too good to be wasted on a 
person. Obs.”; cf. above) and 11 (“colloq. Matter of importance or substance; the gist or main part [...] 1897 
Westm. Gaz. 28 Dec. 7/1 There is a good deal of meat for the actors.”) (OED, 00304134.) 
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and yet remain true to the text, one should not overdo it. The moment of sharing Sir An-
drew’s perplexion, either due to a failure of understanding or to a suspicion of some vague 
and unmentionable sense, should be left for the audience. 
 Who would be convinced by such an exposition of the sous-entendu in the double-
entendu yet doubly disguised as a mal-entendu, if we based it on the possibility of pronounc-
ing or hearing “metaphor” as “meat for” and “jest” as “chest”? Although no one in the scene 
said or would say such things aloud, and Shakespeare or anyone else may never have thought 
that someone could mishear “metaphor” for “meat for” and “jest” for “chest”, we might think 
that “meat” and “chest” do articulate something unarticulated in the whole scene, from Sir 
Andrew’s “What’s that?” and all the ado with “accost” and his willingness to “undertake”232 
the meaning of her metaphor in this company without literally “undertaking” her in this com-
pany (“Is that the meaning of Accost?”), through the innuendo with “drawing sword” and 
Maria’s reference to the buttery-bar and all her play with “dry” and “barren” to Sir Andrew’s 
affirmation of being a great beef-eater. Such fantastic interpolation of loose articulation 
would articulate Maria’s decline to have such an intercourse of meaning whose code would 
be set in the key of the former innuendo of “accost” and “drawing sword”. And yet, our in-
terpretation may be far-fetched and even ridiculous, as it comes to the words “meat” and 
“chest”: the dry jest of irony may always double itself and reflect upon the “Agueface” of the 
interpreter; we may always find or fail to find ourselves being held at the fingers’ ends, as 
readers and spectators.  
 Insofar as we ask the text only “what” and “wherefore”, as Sir Andrew does, insofar 
as we focus too exclusively on the meaning and purpose of its metaphor, we may find our-
selves being “put down”, that is defeated, outwitted, by the more delicate gestures that frame 
the alleged metaphor and that may render its “what” and “wherefore” dry and barren. We 
may always find or fail to find ourselves being held at the fingers’ ends, as readers and listen-
ers and spectators of such episodes, such “fantasies, more than cool reason ever compre-
hends”, as Hermann Ulrici has reportedly said of Twelfth Night.233 
 
 
                                                 
232 Cf. OED, entry “undertake, v.”: “I. trans. / 1. a. To take by craft, to entrap; to overtake, seize upon. Obs. [...] 
3. To understand. Obs. [...] [5.]b. To engage with, enter into combat with. [...]” (OED, 50265110, last ac-
cessed March 2007.) 
233  “ULRICI, who, in the alternative title [Twelfe Night, or, What You Will], verily sees ‘fantasies, more than 
cool reason ever comprehends’. ‘This What You Will,’ says Ulrici (ii, 5), ‘refers indeed to the relation be-
tween the public and the play, but not, as has been supposed, in the sense quite inadmissible, that the piece 
was to give and to represent whatever the spectators wished. This is not the case; the play rather creates 
what it wishes, and the better it is the less can that which it gives be different from what it is. [etc.]’” 
(Furness, p. 6.) It would seem plausible to take the title as a last-minute’s tag, perhaps referring to the date 
of its first performance: “Call it Twelfth Night, or what you will.” 
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“[...] MORE THAN COOL REASON EVER COMPREHENDS”  
 
We may extract, for our purposes, two contrasting figures from the above episode of Twelfth 
Night. One is that of Sir Andrew Aguecheek who would “undertake” the other’s figure as 
metaphor and moreover “undertake” its meaning, its “what” or its “wherefore”, a.s.a.p., in 
spite of the possible intricacies of the situation, the in-definite irony234  of the ‘context’ or the 
possible loss of common code. The other figure is that of Maria who would resist such under-
taking while superimposing figure upon figure — the figure of “dry jest” upon the assumed 
metaphor. Maria’s ambiguous reply would be one way to decline the gift of metaphor — the 
metaphor was already dry, the jest was already dry, since the jestee was already dry. As if it 
was his metaphor in the first place and not hers — and precisely this is the case with Maria’s 
dry jest. 
 There are metaphors of course. There are dry metaphors and stinking235  metaphors. 
There are  —  
 
Very General Metaphors 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS 
STATES ARE LOCATIONS 
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS 
 
Metaphors for Time 
TIME IS A CHANGER 
TIME MOVES 
TIME IS A PURSUER 
 
Metaphors for Life and Death 
LIFE IS A JOURNEY 
DEATH IS DEPARTURE 
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS 
A LIFETIME IS A YEAR 
A LIFETIME IS A DAY 
DEATH IS SLEEP 
DEATH IS REST 
LIFE IS A PRECIOUS POSSESSION 
LIFE IS A PLAY 
LIFE IS A FLAME 
LIFE IS A FLUID 
LIFE IS BONDAGE 
LIFE IS A BURDEN236 
                                                 
234 ‘In-definite’: I would call the irony of the situation both definite and indefinite. Definite, because Maria her-
self declares that her ‘metaphor’ or ‘jest’ is dry, while at the same time holding her jestee at her fingers’ 
ends by keeping this designation, ‘dry’, ambiguous. Indefinite, because irony may, in principle, always fold 
back upon itself: Sir Andrew might reply wittily, if he only could. 
235 Cf. All’s Well that Ends Well, V, II, ll. 4-5 (Folio 2640 ff): “Clo[wn]. Truly, Fortune’s displeasure is but 
sluttish if it smell so strongly as thou speakest of: I will henceforth eat no fish of Fortune’s buttering. 
Prithee, allow the wind. / Par[oles]. Nay, you need not to stop your nose, sir: I spake but by a metaphor. / 
Clo. Indeed, sir, if your metaphor stink, I will stop my nose; or against any man’s metaphor. Prithee, get 
thee further.” (The Oxford Shakespeare [London: Oxford University Press, 1914].) 
236  George Lakoff & Mark Turner, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (Chicago: Uni-




This is not some poet’s list of clichés that are to be avoided at any cost. George Lakoff and 
Mark Turner call it “the list of basic conceptual metaphors”; we find these at the beginning of 
the chapter “Life, Death and Time” of their influential book More than Cool Reason: A Field 
Guide to Poetic Metaphor. Such metaphors cannot be avoided, they are inevitable, as it 
seems. “Metaphor isn’t just for poets”, Lakoff and Turner say. But they also suggest that 
metaphor is indeed for poets, too, and almost all that there is for the poets to use if they wish 
to be understood: there is a set of such basic conceptual metaphors, and also poets must have 
recourse to such “basic conceptual resources” that are “available to us all”: “Poets may com-
pose or elaborate or express them in new ways, but they still use the same basic conceptual 
resources available to us all. If they did not, we would not understand them.” We understand 
Death the Reaper but we would not understand Death the Baker, which is their example of 
what “does not seem apt” (p. 26).237    
 Lakoff and Turner do allow for “three stances that poets have chosen to take toward 
[metaphors]”, namely, first their mere automatic versification resulting in trite verse, sec-
ondly their masterful combination, extension and crystallization in strong images which 
would be Shakespeare’s and Dylan Thomas’s stance, and then there is the third stance, which 
is to “attempt to step outside the ordinary ways we think metaphorically and either to offer 
new modes of metaphorical thought or to make the use of our conventional basic metaphors 
less automatic by employing them in unusual ways, or otherwise to destabilize them and thus 
reveal their inadequacies for making sense of reality”. This third stance is, according to La-
koff and Turner, “part of what characterizes the avant-garde in any age” (More than Cool 
Reason, pp. 51-52). To destabilize the conventional metaphors seems to be the most a poet 
can do if he or she is not to have recourse to cliché in some way or another. But refusing to 
fiddle with clichés at all — does this not lead to incomprehensibility? To such figures as 
Death the Baker? 
 The figure of Death the Baker is perhaps not as inapt as the authors of “A Field Guide 
to Poetic Metaphor” claim. Actually we can see how this specific figure, this impossible 
“conceptual metaphor” secretly (yet undeniably, I think) supports the following lines of  Peter 
Weiss’s play “Die Ermittlung”, inspired by the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials in 1963-1965; yet 
this figure is not simply a metaphor, and it might be termed allegorical rather than symboli-
cal, inasmuch as the Grim Reaper presumably has a spontaneous symbolical power of persua-
sion while Death the Baker requires a more complex motivation, a detour across a network of 
interrelations which is not that of a proportional analogy: 
 
RICHTER Was sahen Sie vom Lager 
                                                 
237  The citation has been modified to fit the syntax. 
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ZEUGE 2 Nichts  
Ich war froh, dass ich wieder wegkam 
RICHTER Sahen Sie die Schornsteine am Ende der Rampe 
und den Rauch und den Feuerschein 
ZEUGE 2 Ja 
Ich sah Rauch 
RICHTER Was dachten Sie sich dabei  
ZEUGE 2 Ich dachte mir  
das sind die Bäckereien 
Ich hatte gehört 
da würde Tag und Nacht Brot gebacken 
Es war ja ein großes Lager.238  
 




“WITHOUT — THE POWER TO DIE — ” 239   
(READING EMILY DICKINSON — A JOURNEY BEYOND METAPHOR) 
 
The first sub-chapter of the chapter “Life, Death and Time” in More than Cool Reason bor-
rows its title from the first line of Emily Dickinson’s poem, “Because I could not stop for 
Death” (No.  712 in Johnson’s standard edition, whose numbering we shall follow): 
 
Because I could not stop for Death —  
He kindly stopped for me —  
The Carriage held but just Ourselves —  
And Immortality. 
  
We slowly drove — He knew no haste  
And I had put away  
My labor and my leisure too,  
For His Civility —  
 
We passed the School, where Children strove  
At Recess — in the Ring —  
We passed the Fields of Gazing Grain —  
We passed the Setting Sun —  
 
Or rather — He passed Us —  
The Dews drew quivering and chill —  
For only Gossamer, my Gown —  
My Tippet — only Tulle —  
 
We paused before a House that seemed  
A Swelling of the Ground —  
The Roof was scarcely visible —  
The Cornice — in the Ground —  
 
 
238 Peter Weiss, “Die Ermittlung” [1965], in Dramen 2 (Frankfurt  a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968), p. 15. 
239  Emily Dickinson, “My Life had stood — a Loaded Gun”, in The Poems of Emily Dickinson, Including 
variant readings critically compared with all known manuscripts, 3 vols., ed. Thomas H. Johnson  (Cam-
bridge, MA: The Harvard U.P., 1955), Vol. II, p. 546; No 754; henceforth we refer to Dickinson’s poems by 
their quasi-chronologically ordered standard numbering given by Johnson.  
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Since then — ‘tis Centuries — and yet  
Feels shorter than the Day  
I first surmised the Horses’ Heads  
Were toward Eternity. 
 
Lakoff and Turner interpret this poem in their manner. Their manner, to put it short, is to ana-
lyse the poem into sequences that refer to a set of what they call “basic conceptual meta-
phors”. Right after citing the whole poem they interpret it as follows: 
 
In this poem, Death is taking the speaker on a journey, and the first part of the journey 
reviews the stages of life that one traverses during life’s journey. We interpret the 
children at school as referring to the stage of childhood, the field of ripe crops as re-
ferring to full maturity, the setting sun as referring to old age, the dews and chill and 
the near darkness suggested by the phrase “scarcely visible” as referring to the onset 
of death, and the swelling of the ground as referring to the final home of the body — 
the grave, the end of life’s journey.   
    How do we understand so easily and naturally that the sequence of things the 
speaker mentions refers to the sequence of life-stages, to childhood, maturity, old age, 
death? The answer, in part, is that we know unconsciously and automatically many 
basic metaphors for understanding life, and Dickinson relies on our knowledge of 
these metaphors to lead us to connect the sequence she gives to the sequence of life-
stages. As we shall see, we use the basic metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS to under-
stand that the “Fields of Gazing Grain” suggests maturity. We use the basic metaphor 
A LIFETIME IS A DAY to understand both that the setting sun refers to old age and 
that the dew and chill and near darkness refer to the onset of death. In understanding 
the swelling of the ground as referring to the final “home” of the body, we use both 
what we will call an “image-metaphor” and the basic metaphor DEATH IS GOING 
TO A FINAL DESTINATION. Let us see how each of these metaphors works in de-
tail. [More than Cool Reason, pp. 5-6.] 
 
We shall not follow their argument further in detail now — its main point may already be 
seen here as they follow Dickinson’s poem almost line by line and refer these lines to the few 
basic conceptual metaphors we so “easily and naturally”, “unconsciously and automatically” 
are familiar with. Almost line by line, but not quite. Almost naturally, but not quite. To what 
purpose is it that she “relies on our knowledge of these metaphors”? What is her final purpose 
besides “to lead us to connect the sequence she gives to the sequence of life-stages”? Why 
lead us to connect the sequence she gives to the sequence that is already familiar to us 
through the tradition of “basic conceptual metaphors”? Why this repetition of an age-old se-
quence? 
 The poem is at least as strange and as resistant to clichés as Death the Baker. First of 
all, should Death stop for me, it would not simply mean that “Death is taking the speaker on a 
journey” (as Lakoff and Turner would have it), but also that such an event suspends both liv-
ing and dying in an unheard-of way. Immortality — here a ride with Immortality — is sus-
pended between two limits: life and death.240   The next to last ‘metaphor’ in Emily Dickin-
                                                 
240 Life and death are also the two limits of literature, as we may gather from Maurice Blanchot’s work. Cf. 
L’espace littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, cop. 1955), and “La littérature et le droit à la mort”, in Part du feu 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1949): “La littérature [...] n’est pas la nuit ; elle en est la hantise ; non pas la nuit, mais la 
Prolegomena 115
son’s “Because I could not stop for Death” is fortunately not filed by Lakoff and Turner un-
der the rubric “A LIFETIME IS A DAY”, namely the one on the first two lines of the last stanza: 
 
Since then — ’tis Centuries — and yet 
Feels shorter than the day 
I first surmised the Horses’ Heads 
Were toward Eternity. 
 
This seems to invert a traditional metaphor rather than to rely upon any cliché. A day does 
not now feel like a century, as it might do according to a hyperbolical metaphor, but centuries 
feel shorter than a day — or the day (“the day / I first surmised ...”). The turn of speech in-
verts the cliché, turns it about, or turns it away from the mortal dimension. When can such a 
‘now’, such a ‘today’ be? The poem is in the past tense all over, except for the “feels” in 
“Since then [...] and yet / Feels shorter than the day”. The structure of the first stanza seems 
to have certain parallels to the last one: 
 
Because I could not stop for Death — 
He kindly stopped for me — 
The Carriage held but just Ourselves — 
And Immortality. 
 
The inability to stop for Death corresponds to an inability, in everyday life, to “put away / My 
labor and my leisure too” for such an event.241  But is it not remarkable that if I should be 
taken on a journey the carriage should stop for me? And that if I should respond to such civil-
ity and accept the invitation, I should “put away / My labor and my leisure too” — that is, 
also, to stop living the everyday life, which is, also, to stop dying? That not only Death but 
also dying should stop for me? 
 This figure of Death is kind and civil and not at all hostile. There are other poems 
which give a certain — ironical yet to an extent obscure — sense to immortality, which 
seems to correspond to that of suspense (No. 705): 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
conscience de la nuit [...]. Elle n’est pas le jour [...]. Et elle n’est pas non plus la mort, car en elle se montre 
l’existence sans l’être [l’existence ... sans l’être: both of these terms are to be taken in a Hegelian sense], 
l’existence qui demeure sous l’existence, [...] la mort comme impossibilité de mourir. [...] La littérature est 
cette expérience par laquelle la conscience découvre son être dans son impuissance à perdre conscience, 
[...]. L’écrivain se sent la proie d’une puissance impersonnelle qui ne le laisse ni vivre ni mourir : 
l’irresponsabilité qu’il ne peut surmonter devient la traduction de cette mort sans mort qui l’attend au bord 
du néant ; l’immortalité littéraire est le mouvement même par lequel, jusque dans le monde, un monde miné 
par l’existence brute, s’insinue la nausée d’une survie qui n’est pas une.” (These extracts are from pp. 330-
331, 333, 341.) 
241 This might bring to mind Heidegger’s analysis, in Sein und Zeit, of Dasein’s “everydayness” and the aver-
age inability to face one’s own finitude and mortality in the middle of our labour and leisure. But there may 
be more striking parallels to be found for Dickinson’s poetics of immortality in Maurice Blanchot’s work. I 
don’t know whether Blanchot ever actually read Emily Dickinson. 
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Suspense — is Hostiler than Death  — 
Death — tho’soever Broad,
Is Just Death, and cannot increase  — 
Suspense — does not conclude  —  
 
But perishes — to live anew  — 
But just anew to die  — 
Annihilation — plated fresh
With Immortality —  
 Here Immortality is something with which to “plate fresh” Annihilation, an Annihilation of 
Suspense, a suspense which but perishes — “But perishes — to live anew — / But just anew 
to die”. This Immortality, or rather what is “plated fresh / with Immortality”, is not a relief 
from dying but constant suspense of dying and of conclusion.  
 We might distinguish two kinds of immortality. First, there is the eternal life promised 
by religion, for which death is just a transition from finite life to another life or an afterlife, a 
life after death which actually cancels death. Second, there is the impossibility of dying, an 
impossibility of experiencing death as such, as one’s own death; this second kind of immor-
tality is what Dickinson calls “Suspense” and “Annihilation — plated fresh / with Immortal-
ity”. Both of these ‘immortalities’ amount to what Maurice Blanchot calls the “impossibility 
of death”242  — they can both be seen as cancellations of death as such. 
 There is a very abrupt line which concludes or — rather — cancels the conclusion of 
what Lakoff and Turner would call a metaphorical sequence of life and death (at the very 
“onset of death”, whatever that may be): 
 
We passed the School, where Children strove 
At Recess — in the Ring — 
We passed the Fields of Gazing Grain — 
We passed the Setting Sun —  
 
Or rather — He passed Us — 
The Dews drew quivering and chill — 
For only Gossamer, my Gown — 
My Tippet — only Tulle —  
 
The strange line “Or rather — He passed Us” is so strange and abrupt (its abruptness is en-
hanced by the line break, as “The Dews”243  still belong to the same metrical unit) that the 
infamous early, heavily conventionalized edition of Dickinson’s poems left out the whole 
stanza that contains it.244  Also Lakoff and Turner pass over it in silence, as their aim is to 
                                                 
242  “De l’impossibilité de la mort, certaines religions ont fait l’immortalité. [...] être homme par delà la mort ne 
pourrait avoir que se sens étrange : être, malgré la mort, toujours capable de mourir, [...]. C’est ce que 
d’autres religions ont appelé la malédiction des renaissances : [...]” (Blanchot, “La littérature et le droit à la 
mort”, in Part du feu [1949], p. 339.) 
243 Note the (dead metaphor?) “funeral dew” for “tears” (OED, etry “dew”, 3b., 00062774; Sept. 2002). 
244 Paul Celan also translated this poem without the fourth stanza, in 1959, from the grossly conventionalized 
and heavily tampered 1927 edition  (GW 5:382-3). On this translation and a few others, and Celan’s unreal-
ized plans for a book of Dickinson translations on the basis of Johnson’s critical edition, cf. Andreas Lohr, 
“‘Engel in Grau’: Emily Dickinson”, in Axel Gellhaus, ed., Fremde Nähe: Celan als Übersetzer (Marbach: 
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disclose the “basic conceptual metaphors” lying beneath the “image metaphors” of the poem, 
and because here it seems difficult or unnecessary to make such a move. They had just ex-
plained the stanza preceding this scandal as portraying phases of life, and without being be-
wildered by the Gazing Grain (“Wheat that has put forth its grain is mature” [More Than 
Cool Reason, p. 6] — but why does it gaze? Wheat has ears but does not have eyes, does it?) 
or by the choice of “metaphors”. Schoolchildren are hardly a metaphor to portray a phase of 
life, at least not in the same sense as the grain and the setting sun would be. Why does the 
poem stray from such an image of children to those of “the Fields of Gazing Grain” and “the 
Setting Sun”, which seem to be simply two metaphors of maturity and old age that are almost 
identical to some examples used by Aristotle (except that in one of Aristotle’s examples, 
‘stubble’ stands for old age, and this is therefore a sort of privation with regard to the mature 
corn and fertility)? Are they metaphors? Are they simply instances of modern usage of an-
cient metaphors? 
 Who are the We who passed those sights and who are the Us that were passed by 
Him? Who is this He who passed Us? The Setting Sun? This would seem plausible, insofar as 
the speaker of the poem tells us, in the first stanza, that “The Carriage held but just Ourselves 
— / And Immortality”, and this ambiguous Ourselves seems to refer to the I of the poem and 
to Death, the only He in the poem until the He who passed Us. But if “He passed Us” refers 
to the Setting Sun, as it seems, should it not surprise us that the figure of Death, indeed the 
only ‘He’ the poem has mentioned so far, has now somehow silently dissolved into the back-
ground? Into the cooling weather and landscape scarcely visible, the Dews, the quivering, the 
chill, the grave (“A Swelling of the Ground” — “The Outer Grave — I mean”, as another 
poem explains [No. 411]) while still, perhaps, sitting silently in the carriage with the speaker? 
 And why refer the “House that seemed / A Swelling of the Ground” back to “the basic 
metaphor DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION” while it is something that “We paused 
before” and something the speaker precisely remains without — without final destination, as 
“the Horses Heads / Were toward Eternity”? The Setting Sun may well be seen as what La-
koff and Turner would call an image metaphor of the nearness of death (since “A LIFETIME IS 
A DAY”), but He (the Sun) passes Us and yet no death ensues, but instead, the centuries fol-
lowing the surmise concerning the Horses Heads. Here is Lakoff’s and Turner’s suggestion 
(that is, to apply a basic conceptual metaphor, something that we usually do “easily and natu-
rally”, “unconsciously and automatically”): 
 
We apply the DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION metaphor to understand the 
Dickinson poem as presenting death in terms of a departure from this life and a jour-
ney toward a final destination, namely, the grave. The scarcely visible “House” she 
mentions is her grave, the final residence of the body, in which the body will dwell. 
The carriage is the hearse, moving slowly, with “no haste”. The gossamer gown is her 
death shroud. [More Than Cool Reason, pp. 7-8.] 
                                                                                                                                                        
Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1997), pp.  460-475. 
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The carriage moves with no haste. But it is Lakoff and Turner who move with haste back to 
the carriage, without facing the scandal itself, the fact that the carriage, with the poem’s 
speaker still in it, the carriage which may well be seen as a hearse, as well as her dress may 
be a shroud, only pauses before the “House” and is therefore not moving “toward a final des-
tination, namely, the grave”, at least not any longer. If the carriage is a hearse, it arrives  
too late, since the grave is already a mound, piled up with earth. 
 The authors end their discussion of Dickinson’s poem, after enumerating the “five ba-
sic metaphors for death that are used naturally, automatically, and largely unconsciously in 
understanding the Dickinson poem” as “DEATH IS THE END OF LIFE’S JOURNEY, DEATH IS 
DEPARTURE (an inference from LIFE IS BEING PRESENT HERE), DEATH IS NIGHT (from A 
LIFETIME IS A DAY), HUMAN DEATH IS THE DEATH OF A PLANT, [...] and DEATH IS GOING TO A 
FINAL DESTINATION (an instance of CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION)”, as follows: 
 
Dickinson extended and composed these metaphors in novel ways. But, though she 
created the poem, she did not create the basic metaphors on which the poem is based. 
They were already there for her, widespread throughout Western culture, in the eve-
ryday thought of the least literate of people as well as in the greatest poetry in her tra-
ditions. [More Than Cool Reason, p. 8.] 
 
So this would be Dickinson’s stance toward metaphor, namely the stance of extension and 
composition based upon a few traditional metaphors, and not the stance of “the avant-garde 
in any age”. But what if — what if a poet should give voice to such a question as this one 
(No.  277, first stanza):  
 
What if I say I shall not wait?
What if I burst the fleshly Gate  — 
And pass escaped — to thee! 
 
And what if she herself, the poetic voice itself replied, in another poem (No.  1646): 
 
Why should we hurry — why indeed?
When every way we fly
We are molested equally
By immortality.245 
 
What if there were only — what if she surmised for herself only — a survival that is both life 
and “dying multifold — without / The Respite to be dead”? (No.  1013):246  
 
                                                 
245 No. 1646, ll. 1-4 of 10. An “unfinished poem”, as T.H. Johnson tells us, and: “In the center of the leaf [an 
unsent draft of a letter] ED wrote ‘Tragedy’ and underlined it twice.” (Vol. III, p. 1127.) 
246 It must be said, on the conjectures concerning the inability to die, that I would refrain from claiming that 
there is no contrary surmise to be found in Dickinson’s poetry. 
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Too scanty ’twas to die for you, 
The merest Greek could that. 
The living, Sweet, is costlier  —  
I offer even that  —  
 
The Dying, is a trifle, past, 
But living, this include 
The dying multifold — without 
The Respite to be dead. 
 
What if, after the Setting Sun which would be considered the next to last in the sequence of 
life’s and death’s metaphors, was not followed by death proper but rather a surmise of eter-
nity in a gown of gossamer, a suspense with no conclusion? What if the He who passed Us 
does not only refer to the nearest candidate, the Sun, but at once — in the very realm of am-
biguity in which the poem breathes without breathing, holding its breath as it holds ours, cap-
tive, in suspense — at once also to the only He that was named before the Setting Sun, 
namely Death? What if Death, while situated in the carriage among the Ourselves of the first 
stanza, and among the We who passed the sequence of what Lakoff and Turner would call 
“image metaphors”, including that of the Setting Sun, was the He who passed Us in the be-
ginning of the fourth stanza, passed Us the mortals and passed what We see, and passed also 
what gazes at Us, what regards Us, and passed all the personifications and figures of Life and 
Death, including the Setting Sun who, in the unconscious and automatic, easy and almost 
natural sequence would precede the black night, “death’s second self” (as in Shakespeare’s 
Sonnet 73, which Lakoff and Turner also interpret in terms of cognitive metaphor; cf. More 
Than Cool Reason, pp. 27f)? And what if He (Death) passed even His own personification 
whom we imagine still silently sitting among Us in the carriage, among the Ourselves and 
Immortality? What if He passed beyond metaphor? What if Life — or at least Survival — 
just passed the life and death of metaphor? 
 Dickinson’s extraordinary poetics of Immortality or Suspense, a poetics of survival, 
cannot be understood by recourse to “basic metaphors”; if her poetry resembles, by metrical 
elements, the simplicity of religious hymns, this does not justify reducing these absolutely 
unorthodox songs to such clichés as “DEATH IS GOING TO A FINAL DESTINATION”, “LIFE IS A 
BURDEN”, and so on and so forth. Of course, it must be said in favour of Lakoff and Turner, 
that they do concede the limitedness of their approach, at least in their consideration of 
Shakespeare’s sonnets.247  However, this does not change the fact that their reading of Dick-
inson’s poem is scandalously simplistic. 
                                                 
247 “But we are not suggesting that to understand the metaphors is to understand the poem. Sonnet seventy-
three is a striking example of this fact. Though the metaphors in the poem suggest that the speaker is near 
death, there are other aspects of the poem that can be taken as suggesting that he is not. For example, take 
the phrases ‘thou mayst in me behold’, ‘in me thou seest’, and ‘this thou perceiv’st’. It is strange to tell 
someone you are talking to what it is that they see.” (More Than Cool Reason, p. 33.) Is it really that 
strange? If so, we should perhaps ask ourseves how we conceive of seeing and perceiving in the first place. 
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 I think the appropriate direction for seeking dialogue between this poetic ‘practice’ 
and a philosophical or post-philosophical ‘theory’, a conversation between texts to support 
our understanding of Dickinson’s uncanny vision, would be Maurice Blanchot’s and Jacques 
Derrida’s reflections on survivre. Dickinson is astonishingly close to their work on survival, 
even though neither Blanchot nor Derrida ever mentions having read her, as far as I know. 
 However, reading Emily Dickinson in conjunction with Blanchot and Derrida shall 
not be undertaken here. Let it suffice to note that Derrida has often pointed out the obvious 
fact that being friends or lovers means also submitting (or rather being submitted, because 
this is not a conscious choice made by the subject) to the necessity that one must survive the 
other and endure the death of the other. As he points out in his essay “Aphorisme contre-
temps”, only Romeo and Juliet have both been forced to experience this inevitable fate of 
lovers and friends, to attest to the other’s death, one after the other. Love and friendship, no 
doubt also the fraternity to which Blanchot’s ‘fragment’ testifies, as well as being mothers 
and fathers and sons and daughters, requires the impossible: to take the mortality of the other 
upon oneself. “Die Welt ist fort, ich muß dich tragen”: this is the oath that must be con-
firmed, the death sentence that must be countersigned by every survivor, and that is, every 
friend and lover and sister and brother and son and daughter, the promise to survive even the 
end of the world, your world as my world after the end of the world.248 
 And to this unbearable, impossible situation of survival Emily Dickinson’s poetry also 
testifies: 
 
I could not Die — with You  — 
For One must wait
To shut the Other’s Gaze down  — 
You — could not  —  
 
And I — could I stand by
And see You — freeze  — 
Without my Right of Frost  — 
Death’s privilege?249 
 
And here is the other side of the coin, a faithful antitype to the two stanzas just quoted, telling 
us the surviving lover’s “privilege”: 
 
Promise This — When You be Dying —  
Some shall summon Me —  
Mine belong Your latest Sighing —  
Mine — to Belt Your Eye  —  
                                                 
248 The verse ends Paul Celan’s poem “Grosse, glühende Wölbung” (GW 2:97) and has a central role in Der-
rida’s memorial speech for Gadamer: Béliers. Le dialogue ininterrompu : entre deux infinies, le poème 
(Paris: Galilée, 2003). On Romeo and Juliet, cf. “Aphorisme contretemps”, in Psyché — inventions de 
l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1987), pp. 519-533. This thematics has been many times touched on by Derrida also 
elsewhere. 
249 No. 640, stanzas four and five of twelve.  
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Not with Coins — though they be Minted
From an Emperor’s Hand  — 
Be my lips — the only Buckle
Your low Eyes — demand  — 250 
 
Nothing could be further away from mere metaphor than this “only Buckle” — coin and en-
gagement ring both at once, both engaged in this single image or non-image, the “only 
Buckle”, the token of mortality that one must accept when accepting to be engaged to the 
other — this “realism of the soul” (Seelenrealismus: for Paul Celan, this is one of the antithe-
ses to metaphor, as we shall see). And yet an extra exhibit of the sharpest irony — true irony, 
the only irony worthy of the name, is the one of which we do not really know whether it is 
irony or not — the uncanniest, un-homeliest irony (or perhaps not irony but the most biting, 
frostiest sincerity?), naming “The Beads upon the Forehead / By homely Anguish strung”:  
 
I like a look of Agony,
Because I know it’s true  — 
Men do not sham Convulsion,
Nor simulate, a Throe  —  
 
The Eyes glaze once — and that is Death  — 
Impossible to feign
The Beads upon the Forehead
By homely Anguish strung.251 
 
One more thing must be said, before concluding this prolegomenon. To anyone who would 
like to quibble that the “Beads” upon the forehead are indeed ‘metaphorical’ beads, I would 
point out that the OED lists among the transferred acceptations of the word “bead” also “the 
great beads of exhausted toil [upon the] forehead”, and that in principle, “bead” applies to 
anything that has the shape of  beads, anything “bead-like”, and last but not least, that the 
noun has been metonymically transferred from the noun or verb meaning “prayer” or “to 
pray”: “The name was transferred from ‘prayer’ [ME bede etc.; cf. the Modern German bitte, 
beten, and Gebet] to the small globular bodies used for ‘telling beads,’ i.e. counting prayers 
said, from which the other senses naturally followed.”252  This “naturally follow[ing]”, or this 
almost natural string of beads, or rosary of meanings, belongs to the originary poetics of all 
language, and it would be an abuse of the traditional Aristotelian or post-Aristotelian notion 
of metaphor to reduce all such “language in statu nascendi” (Celan) to metaphoricity, even 
                                                 
250 No. 648, first two stanzas (of eight). 
251 No. 241. This poem is cited by Archibald MacLeish in his remarkable Poetry and Experience (Cambridge, 
MA: The Riverside Press, 1960): “And I mean precisely courage”, he says, in introducing the poem and 
with continuous reference to “universal analogy”, courage “not only to seize upon experience but to hold it 
long enough to turn it true” (p. 113). MacLeish is one of the poets and poeticians who retain a critical dis-
tance from the concept of metaphor, and distinguishes his notion of universal analogy from its metaphori-
cal effects.  
252 OED, 50018735, 12 Dec. 2006. 
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though this reduction, too, is quite traditional. Instead of reducing affirmations of human fini-
tude and mortality — even the ‘allegorical’ affirmations — and the ‘worldliness’ of language 
to “sets of accepted commonplaces” (as constituent elements of metaphor or as “basic meta-
phors” upon which also the poetic metaphor is constructed), and, on the other hand, instead of 
detaching language from these conditions by quasi-religious aestheticism that aspires to tran-
scend time and worldliness (by metaphor), we should perhaps try to understand being-in-the-
world in other terms. 
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P R O L E G O M E N O N  V  
 
This final prolegomenon concerns “being away as a way of being there” (“Wegsein [als] eine 
ausgezeichnete Weise des Daseins”), namely Heidegger’s reduction of an Aristotelian “meta-
phor”, which turns out to be, in Heidegger’s own consideration, anything but metaphorical: 
the apparently figurative talk of death as an “end [telos]” or as “completion [teleion]”  rather 
delimits the human being-there (Dasein) in its ownmost, most proper authenticity (Eigentlich-
keit). This is a restricted discussion of Heidegger’s famously paradoxical relation to the con-
cept of metaphor and its less famous aspects, and serves as a final introduction to Paul 
Celan’s parallel, albeit different, resistance to this “overall key of all poetics”. 253 
 
 
BEING AWAY AS A WAY OF BEING THERE 
 
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE HEIDEGGEREAN “GARDEN OF WILDERNESS” 
 
Martin Heidegger’s “attack against metaphor” is fairly well known. Fairly well, at least when 
it comes to the two best known “adages”,254  one from Der Satz vom Grund and the other 
from “Das Wesen der Sprache”, in Unterwegs zur Sprache: 
 
                                                 
253 An early version of this chapter was presented in Finnish in a colloquium on Heidegger’s thought  in Janu-
ary 2004 and appeared in 2006 in a slightly modified form, as “Tiessäänolo paikallaolon tapana: ‘Kieliku-
van’ tällä puolen”, in Jussi Backman and Miika Luoto, eds., Heidegger: Ajattelun aiheita (Tampere: Eu-
rooppalaisen filosofian seura, 2006), pp. 81-97. 
254 Cf. Paul Ricœur, “Huitième étude”, in La métaphore vive (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p. 357 (“adage” is Ricœur’s 
word): “Chez Heidegger lui-même, le contexte limite considérablement la portée de cette attaque contre la 
métaphore, au point qu’on peut penser que l’usage constant que Heidegger fait de la métaphore a finalement 
plus d’importance que ce qu’il dit incidemment contre la métaphore.” To Ricœur’s discussion of this “at-
tack” a couple of things must be noted here, but only briefly. Many of the relevant texts in Heidegger’s œu-
vre had not yet been published before the eighties, at the time when for instance Ricœur, Greisch and Der-
rida discussed Heidegger’s paradoxical denouncement of the concept of metaphor (Derrida emphasizes that 
in the “attack” it is a question of the metaphysical concept of metaphor — and it is questionable whether 
there is any other concept of metaphor than this “classical philosopheme”; Heidegger’s attempt to overcome 
this concept must not be confused with, for instance, Nietzsche’s “empiricist” solicitation of the meta-
phoricity of metaphysical concepts). When we say that the “attack” is fairly well known, it must be noted 
that until Derrida’s “Le retrait de la métaphore” (1978) and until the lectures on Hölderlin’s hymns were 
published (and discussed, with respect to this issue, for instance in Joseph Kockelman’s article mentioned 
below), the discussion revolved around two sentences, one from Der Satz vom Grund (p. 89: “Das metapho-
rische gibt es nur innerhalb der Metaphysik.”) and the other from “Das Wesen der Sprache”, in Unterwegs 
zur Sprache (p. 207: “Wir blieben in der Metaphysik hängen, wollten wir dieses Nennen Hölderlins in der 
Wendung »Worte wie Blumen« für eine Metapher halten.”). Heidegger’s remarks have actually turned out 
to be anything but mere side remarks, after the publication of the three volumes of lecture courses on Höld-
erlin’s hymns which Heidegger gave in the thirties and fourties (Gesamtausgabe volumes 39, 52 and 53); 
and as we shall see, Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle should also be consulted with respect to this problem-
atic (cf. e.g. GA 33:§§ 8-9). Besides the final chapter of Ricœur’s book, and among other studies, cf. the fol-
lowing: Jean Greisch, “Les mots et les roses : la métaphore chez Martin Heidegger”, in Revue des sciences 
philosophiques et théologiques, Tome 57 (1973), pp. 433-455; Ronald Bruzina, “Heidegger on the Meta-
phor and Philosophy”, in Cultural Hermeneutics 1 (1973), pp. 305-324; Joseph Kockelmans, “Heidegger on 
Metaphor and Metaphysics”, in Christopher Macann, ed., Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Volume 
III: Language (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 293-320; Françoise Dastur, “Réflexions sur l’espace, la 
métaphore et l’extériorité autour de la topo-logie heideggérienne”, in Alter, no 4 (1996), pp. 161-178; 
Jacques Derrida, “Le retrait de la métaphore”, in Psyché — inventions de l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1998 [1st 
ed. 1987]), pp. 63-93. I would consider Derrida’s, Kockelman’s and Dastur’s readings to be the most com-
prehensive and accurate with respect to Heidegger’s remarks on metaphor in their context.  
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[1.] Das metaphorische gibt es nur innerhalb der Metaphysik. [2.] Wir blieben in der 
Metaphysik hängen, wollten wir dieses Nennen Hölderlins in der Wendung »Worte 
wie Blumen« für eine Metapher halten.255 
 
Contrary to the received opinion,256  these two brief remarks and their immediate contexts are 
very far from being the only passages we should discuss with regard to Heidegger’s anti-
metaphoric view of language and poetry. Also a third paradoxical anti-metaphoric statement 
has sometimes been cited, from the “Letter on ‘Humanism’”: 
 
Das Denken baut am Haus des Seins, als welches die Fuge des Seins je geschickhaft 
das Wesen des Menschen in das Wohnen in der Wahrheit des Seins verfügt. Dieses 
Wohnen ist das Wesen des »In-der-Welt-seins« (vgl. » S. u. Z. «, S. 54). Der dortige 
Hinweis auf das »In-Sein« als »Wohnen« ist keine etymologische Spielerei. Der 
Hinweis in dem Vortrag von 1936 auf Hölderlins Wort »Voll verdienst, doch 
dichterisch wohnet / der Mensch auf dieser Erde« ist keine Ausschmückung eines 
Denkens, das sich aus der Wissenschaft in die Poesie rettet. Die Rede vom Haus des 
Seins ist keine Übertragung des Bildes vom »Haus« auf das Sein, sondern aus dem 
sachgemäß gedachten Wesen des Seins werden wir eines Tages eher denken können, 
was »Haus« und »wohnen« sind.257 
 
The fact that Heidegger refuses to explain in more detail the extravagant claim upon the non-
metaphoricity of his talk of “the house of being” (which is language, but not a metaphor for 
language) by referring to the “one day” in the future and to his own texts, does not mean sim-
ply that he evades the question, let alone that he judges it unimportant, but rather that he 
points to its importance and difficulty, as if hoping that someone would, “some day [eines 
Tages]”, pick up these leads and grapple the question of metaphoricity and non-metaphoricity 
(which cannot be sufficiently done here, either). 
 These three examples are so far from being the only relevant passages, so far from 
being the “only places” where the concept of metaphor (Metapher, Übertragung) and some 
                                                 
255 Quote 1: Der Satz vom Grund ([2nd ed.] Pfullingen: Neske, 1958), p. 89 (also: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 10 [GA 
10]). Trans. Reginald Lilly: “The metaphorical exists only within metaphysics.” (The Principle of Reason, 
trans. Lilly [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991].) Quote 2: Unterwegs zur Sprache  ([11th ed.] 
Stuttgart: Neske, 1997), p. 207. Trans. Peter D. Hertz: “It would mean that we stay bogged down in meta-
physics if we were to take the name Hölderlin gives here to ‘words, like flowers’ as being a metaphor.” (On 
the Way to Language, trans. Hertz [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982].) 
256 As recently as 2001, it was still claimed in a treatise on Paul Celan’s anti-metaphoric poetics that there are 
“only two places in Heidegger’s work where he expressly speaks of metaphor [Allerdings finden sich in 
Heideggers Werk überhaupt nur zwei Stellen, an denen er ausdrücklich von der Metapher spricht]”. (Astrid 
Poppenhusen, Durchkreuzung der Tropen. Paul Celan’s Die Niemandsrose im Lichte der traditionellen 
Metaphorologie und ihrer Dekonstruktion [Heidelberg: Winter, 2001], p. 79.) 
257 “Brief über den »Humanismus«”,  in Wegmarken, GA 9:358. En. trans. Frank A. Capuzzi: “Thinking builds 
upon the house of being [upon language, that is; it builds upon the home of being while it already dwells 
there], the house in which the jointure of being, in its destinal unfolding, enjoins the essence of the human 
being in each case to dwell in the truth of being. This dwelling is the essence of ‘being-in-the-world.’ The 
reference in Being and Time (p. 54) to ‘being-in’ as ‘dwelling’ is not some etymological play. The same 
reference in the 1936 essay on Hölderlin’s word, ‘Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells upon this earth,’ 
is not the adornment of a thinking that rescues itself from science by means of poetry. The talk about the 
house of being is no the transfer of the image ‘house’ onto being. But one day we will, by thinking the es-
sence of being in a way appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to think what ‘house’ and ‘dwelling’ 
are.” (In Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill [Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1998], p. 272.) 
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more or less closely related concepts (Sinnbild, which is for Heidegger a general term for the 
aesthetic or poetic categories of figurativity, comprising also Symbol, Allegorie, Gleichnis, 
Vergleich) have been discussed by Heidegger, that we might almost apply the following 
lines, concerning Hölderlin’s hymn “Wie wenn am Feiertage...”, to Heidegger’s own insistent 
debate over figures and tropes: 
 
Nicht einmal ein Vergleich ist das Gesagte, etwa ein ›Bild‹, eine ›Metapher‹, obwohl 
das  Gedicht beginnt mit: »Wie wenn...« und Strophe II fortfährt: »So steht ihr...«. [...] 
›Dichterischer Vergleich‹ — was ist das am Ende für ein undichterischer Begriff! 
Aber man ist mit dem Bücherschreiben, der Neugründung von Zeitschriften, der 
Organisation von Sammelwerken der Literatur, mit dem Nicht-zu-spät-kommen so 
beschäftigt, daß man für solche Fragen keine Zeit findet. Es könnte ja darüber ein 
ganzes Leben hingehen, sogar die Arbeit einer ganzen Generation. Allerdings! 
Solange wir es nicht an solche Fragen setzen, ist das Wort von der ›heroischen 
Wissenschaft‹, die jetzt angeblich kommen soll, ein Gerede. [GA 39:254-255.]258   
 
These lecture texts from 1934-35, and those on the hymns “Andenken” (GA 52) and “Der Is-
ter” (GA 53) of the war years 1941-42, had not yet been published in the seventies when Jean 
Greisch, Paul Ricœur and Jacques Derrida wrote on Heidegger’s paradoxical resistance to 
metaphor; they appeared only between 1980 and 1984. It seems that before these publica-
tions, only Derrida took Heidegger’s words seriously enough to enquire into their “sense and 
necessity” in the overall context of his work; his conference paper “Le retrait de la méta-
phore” was first presented in 1978, and the texts by Greisch and Ricœur had appeared in 
1973 and 1975.259  Later, perhaps most notably, Françoise Dastur and Joseph Kockelmans 
have taken Heidegger’s corpus very well into account in discussing his anti-metaphoric atti-
tude. But it must also be noted that Maurice Merleau-Ponty was undoubtedly among the very 
first who took seriously Heidegger’s anti-metaphoric argument and profoundly understood its 
purport. For him, there is “no metaphor between the visible and the invisible”, and he sum-
marizes Heidegger’s argument in Der Satz vom Grund concerning thinking as a way of see-
                                                 
258 It is impossible to disregard the historical context of this statement. The sarcastic (or ambivalent, if you 
will) remark on the “heroic science” is directed at Alfred Rosenberg, a central theorist of race and culture in 
the National Socialist movement (cf. Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts [München: Hohenei-
chen, cop. 1930 (2. p. 1935)], p. 151; the header of the page reads “heroische Wissenschaft”). — On these 
lectures, mainly concerned with the hymns “Der Rhein” and “Germanien”, Heidegger unequivocally dis-
tances himself from the all-pervading ideology of Blut und Boden and the “biologist-organicist world view” 
more generally, but also from the previous fad of psychoanalytic interpretation of art and literature; these 
are all for him only reiterations of old metaphysical schemes, even if, after Nietzsche, the Platonic schemes 
and hierarchies have been inverted (cf. GA 39, passim). Also against this backdrop, Heidegger’s attempt to 
‘deconstruct’ the traditional aesthetic paradigm of art interpretation, which he more or less condenses into 
his vehement critique of the concept of Sinn-bild (literally, and at the same time equivocally, ‘sense-image’; 
this ordinary German term is the general label that Heidegger uses for metaphor, symbol, allegory, and par-
able as ‘sensible images’ portraying ‘non-sensible meaning’), shows itself in its larger context. It is of 
course not only an attempt to influence contemporary ideology (‘from within’ the ‘movement’, as Heideg-
ger has later conceded), but also — perhaps just as desperately — an invitation to problematize the tradi-
tional metaphysical received models of thought concerning for instance art, culture, language and national-
ity. 
259 Cf. above, and the bibliography. 
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ing and hearing and the one in “Brief über den Humanismus” concerning the “house of be-
ing” by saying that “the visible is pregnant with the invisible”.260  The argument remains 
valid even for this “pregnancy” itself. 
                                                
 On the hymn lectures, Heidegger insistently objects to the “doctrine of metaphor” as 
an “overall key of all ‘poetics’”, which nevertheless “opens no doors for us”, for instance in 
the realm of Hölderlin’s hymn poetry.261  On several occasions, and not only in the relatively 
well-known passages of Der Satz vom Grund, “Das Wesen der Sprache” (in Unterwegs zur 
Sprache) and “Brief über den ‘Humanismus’”, Heidegger argues that the concept of meta-
phor, as well as related poetical, rhetorical and aesthetical concepts (symbol, allegory — 
Sinnbild in general), are altogether inadequate for understanding both poetry and philosophi-
cal concepts.262  One of the surprising things is that in the numerous passages of this deconstruc-
tive critique of this originally Aristotelian concept, Heidegger does not usually refer the con-
cept of metaphor back to Aristotle — who was after all the first theorist of metaphor, as far as 
we know, and of course, Heidegger must also have been aware of this — but rather to what 
would seem to be the common origin of the whole metaphysical tradition of aesthetics, 
Plato’s philosophy and Platonism: for Heidegger, even Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism is 
still a Platonism of sorts, an inverted Platonism perhaps, but not any less Platonic. No doubt 
Heidegger might be thinking of certain texts by the young Nietzsche in saying this, such as 
Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne and Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter 
der Griechen (both from 1873).263 
 However, Heidegger also discusses metaphor, the concept of metaphor as an insuffi-
cient instrument for understanding language and poetry and the structure of understanding 
itself, in some of his texts on Aristotle. As we have noticed, the relatively famous 1931 lec- 
 
260 “Notes de Travail”, in Le visible et l’invisible (Paris: Gallimard, cop. 1964, repr. 2006), pp. 265-266, 271. In 
a manner analogous to Greisch’s and Ricœur’s quest for such elements in Heidegger’s work that would con-
tribute positively to giving new life to metaphor, Luca Vanzago finds in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, which 
for him is obviously “highly metaphorical in character” (this has of course many times been said of Heideg-
ger’s work, too), suggestions for a “right account of metaphor” alongside the “wrong account” that is 
pointed at by Merleau-Ponty’s disqualification of the concept of metaphor, in spite of the fact that Merleau-
Ponty never in Le visible et l’invisible calls “metaphor” what Vanzago makes him call by that name; Van-
zago does not mention Merleau-Ponty’s agreement with Heidegger in his article (“The Visible and the Un-
representable. The Role of Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty’s Last Writings”, in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ed., 
Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXXVIII: Logos of Phenome-
nology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book One: Phenomenology as the Critique of Reason in Contem-
porary Criticism and Interpretation [Dordrecht: Springer, 2005], pp. 429-440). 
261 “[…] der Hauptschlüssel aller ›Poetik‹, […] die Lehre […] von der ›Metapher‹, im Bereich der Hölderlin-
schen Hymnendichtung keine einzige Tür öffnet und uns nirgends ins Freie bringt.” (GA 52:40.) 
262 Der Satz vom Grund (1958), pp. 86-90; “Das Wesen der Sprache”, in Unterwegs zur Sprache (1997), p. 
207;  “Brief über den »Humanismus«”, in Wegmarken (GA 9:358); “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, in 
Holzwege (1972, pp. 9-10; GA 5:4); Hölderlins Hymnen »Germanien« und »Der Rhein« (GA 39, passim); 
Hölderlins Hymne »Andenken« (GA 52, passim); Hölderlins Hymne »Der Ister« (GA 53, passim); et 
passim; cf. below. 
263 “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn”, in Werke in drei Bänden: 3. Band, ed. Karl 
Schlechta (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1956), pp. 309-322; Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der 
Griechen, ed. Manfred Riedel (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994). Cf. Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche et la métaphore (op. 
cit., 1983). 
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tures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics ? 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force [Von Wesen 
und Wirklichkeit der Kraft], published for the first time in 1981 (the excellent English  
translation appeared in 1995), and that are also important with regard to the notion of
analogy in Aristotle, contain two chapters (§§ 8, 9) where, among other things that are 
relevant with respect to the metaphor problem, Heidegger laconically lists no less than eight 
points that should problematize our tendency to understand “forces of nature” in terms of 
transferring subjective capabilities to the inanimate natural objects and phenomena (GA 
33:75-76).
264 There is also another very important, more recently published text on Aristotle 
that we shall direct our attention to.
 
 We shall first restrict our discussion of Heidegger’s vehemently anti-metaphoric atti-
tude to the three most well-known statements. These three texts were also well known to Paul 
Celan, to whose phenomenology of poetry we shall proceed after this final prolegomenon. 
After the brief remarks on those statements and some related passages that Celan had marked 
in his personal copies of Heidegger’s works, we shall move to the recently published tran-
script of Heidegger’s early lectures on Aristotle, which contain a very remarkable and impor-
tant discussion of metaphors, one that is related to the discussion of “being-towards-the-end” 
or “being-towards-death” in Sein und Zeit (1927). These lectures were of course not known to 
Celan, but he did read the passages concerning these issues in Sein und Zeit with great inter-
est, judging by the markings and notes he made in his personal copy of the book. 
 
 
WORDS, LIKE FLOWERS 
 
Now we shall discuss very briefly the passages in Der Satz vom Grund (lectures of 1955-56), 
“Das Wesen der Sprache” (1957-58) and the 1946 “Letter”.265 
 In the apparent “digression [eine Abschweifung]” of some four pages in Der Satz vom 
Grund, leading to the assertion that “the metaphorical exists only within the metaphysics”, 
Heidegger reflects upon his own talk of thinking and understanding in terms of seeing and 
hearing, Erhören und Erblicken, and mentions also Plato’s and Heraclitus’ parallel ways of 
speaking of idea and logos as if these were something visible or audible; this has sometimes 
been misunderstood to mean that Heidegger considered these terms of philosophical dis-
course as ‘metaphysical metaphors’, but this is not at all what Heidegger claims. To the con-
trary: the concept of metaphor is not any better suited for understanding philosophical con-
                                                 
264 Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 33: Aristoteles, Metaphysik ? 1-3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, 2. durchge-
sehene Auflage, ed. Heinrich Hüni (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1990 [1st ed. 1981). En. trans. Walter 
Brogan and Peter Warnek, Aristotle’s Metaphysics ? 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force (Bloom-
ington: Indiana U.P., 1995). 
265 I would like to urge the reader to read the relatively brief discussions in those texts him/herself, preferably 
in their contexts of course, and then perhaps turn to the discussions by for instance Derrida, Kockelmans 
and Dastur. 
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cepts than it is for reading poetry. The point is, rather, that when we grasp the irreducibility of 
the allegedly purely intelligible idea and logos in the allegedly sensible perception, the meta-
physical dichotomy of the sensible and the intelligible shows itself to be altogether insuffi-
cient. If we only heard “with our ears [mit dem Ohr]”, in a purely sensible manner, we would 
never hear a Bach fugue, for example.266 Sensible hearing or seeing would be only an ab-
straction from the concrete phenomenon, and never to be experienced as such. This argument 
is quite often repeated by Heidegger, not elsewhere so explicitly linked with the question of 
metaphor, I think, but also in contexts where aesthetic presuppositions are being questioned, 
such as Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935/37).267  Sensible and non-sensible perception 
can be separated only artificially, by abstraction. 
 Because our final aim is to discuss Paul Celan’s antimetaphoric poetics, I point out 
that he knew this argument very well from Heidegger’s works.268  For instance, in his per-
                                                 
266 Der Satz vom Grund, p. 89; trans. R. Lilly (1991), p. 48. Cf. pp. 86-87: “Wir sind jedoch schnell bei der 
Hand zu erklären: Ein Hören und Sehen kann das Denken nur in einem übertragenen Sinne heißen. In der 
Tat. Das im Denken Erhörte und Erblickte läßt sich nicht mit unseren Ohren hören, nicht mit unseren Augen 
sehen. Es ist nicht durch unsere Sinnesorgane wahrnehmbar. Fassen wir das Denken als eine Art Hören und 
Sehen, dann wird das sinnliche Hören und Sehen übernommen und hinübergenommen in den Bereich des 
nicht-sinnlichen Vernehmens, d.h. des Denkens. Solches Hinübertragen heißt griechisch metafe/rein. Die 
Gelehrtensprache nennt eine solche Übertragung Metapher. Das Denken darf somit nur im metaphorischen, 
übertragenen Sinne ein Hören und Erhören, ein Blicken und Erblicken genannt werden. Wer sagt hier 
»darf«? Derjenige, der behauptet, das Hören mit dem Ohr und das Sehen mit dem Auge sei das eigentliche 
Hören und Sehen. / Die Weise, wie wir im Hören und Sehen etwas wahrnehmen, geschiecht durch die 
Sinne, ist sinnlich. Diese Feststellungen sind richtig.  Sie bleiben dennoch unwahr, weil sie Wesentliches 
auslassen. Wir hören zwar eine Bachsche Fuge durch die Ohren, allein wenn hier nur dies das Gehörte 
bliebe, was als Schallwelle das Trommelfell beklopft, dann könnten wir niemals eine Bachsche Fuge hören. 
Wir hören, nicht das Ohr. Wir hören allerdings durch das Ohr, aber nicht mit dem Ohr, wenn »mit« hier 
sagt, das Ohr sei das, was uns das Gehörte ermittelt.” 
267 “Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. [Viel näher als alle Empfindungen sind uns 
die Dinge selbst.] [...] In order to hear pure noise, we must turn our hearing away from the things, withhold 
our ear from them, i.e. hear abstractly. [Um ein reines Geräusch zu hören, müssen wir von den Dingen 
weghören, unser Ohr davon abziehen, d. h. abstrakt hören.]” (GA 5:10, 11.) Trans. A. Hofstadter. 
268 Reportedly, he also carefully read Der Satz vom Grund and marked the passages concerning metaphor. This 
is not, however, reported in the recently published catalogue of Celan’s “philosophical library”, La biblio-
thèque philosophique (2004), cf. pp. 338-339. Nevertheless, James K. Lyon, the author of Paul Celan and 
Martin Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation, 1951-1970  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 2006), re-
ports that there are indeed markings more or less throughout Celan’s personal copy of the book  (pp. 68ff). 
By his permission, I quote Professor Lyon’s reply to my inquiry concerning this puzzling matter: “In 1993 
at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach I was allowed to copy every page of Heidegger’s works that 
Celan had marked.  That is no longer allowed, but at that time it was, and since I  have the copies of the 
marked pages in Der Satz vom Grund in front of me that I obtained legally at the time, I can say unequivo-
cally that what I have does not correspond with what you read in B.P. [i.e. La bibliothèque philosophique.] 
The claim that there are ‘keine Annotationen’ from pp. 11-188 is simply not accurate. The copy  Celan 
owned and that I copied (or at least the marked pages) was published by Guenther Neske, Pfullingen, 1957. 
It shows markings by Celan on pp. 46; 86-87; 90-91; 96; 106; 108-109; 113; 114; 133; 141; 146; 161-162; 
164; 178-179; and 187. I find no markings from p. 188 until 202-203, where they again occur; also on p. 
205; 207; 208; 209; and 210. On p. 211, the last page in this edition, he records the reading date of 10.5.57. 
I have no idea where the editor of B.P. got his information, but I have the copied pages in front of me, so 
what I say is accurate. / On the matter of Unterwegs zur Sprache, [...].  It is surprising that there are no an-
notations or dates in the volume owned by the Dt. Literaturarchiv in Marbach, which is the one containing 
the handwritten dedication by Heidegger in the front.  I pursued this question and learned that there was 
probably another copy of this work.  My guess is  that Celan purchased it on his own when it first appeared 
and probably read it,  and that the Heideggerian inscribed copy was a second one he received somewhat 
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sonal copy of Sein und Zeit, he has marked sentences reminding us that we never, “in the first 
instance” (»zunächst«; the quotation marks are added by Heidegger), hear just noises and 
sound-complexes, but a “creaking wagon, a motorcycle”, “marching troops, the north wind, a 
woodpecker tapping, a crackling fire [Man hört die Kolonne auf dem Marsch, den Nordwind, 
den klopfenden Specht, das knisternde Feuer]”, and in the margin he has written the word 
‘phenomenology’; on the next page there is a double stroke in the margin, marking the fol-
lowing sentence: “Es bedarf schon einer sehr künstlichen und komplizierten Einstellung, um 
ein »reines Geräusch« zu »hören«.” And on the same page he has marked some of the corre-
sponding ‘linguistic’ implications: 
 
Sogar dort, wo das Sprechen undeutlich oder gar die Sprache fremd ist, hören wir 
zunächst unverständliche Worte und nicht reiche Mannigfaltigkeit von Tondaten. / Im 
»natürlichen Hören« des Worüber der Rede können wir allerdings zugleich auf die 
Weise des Gesagtseins, die »Diktion« hören, [...]. 269 
 
These ‘reading traces’ (Lesespuren, an established term among the Celanists), probably dat-
ing from 1953, still echo in his Büchner Prize speech of 1960. 
 The second “famous adage”, as Paul Ricœur calls it (La métaphore vive, p. 357), con-
cerning Hölderlin’s “words, like flowers”, is not as directly explained by Heidegger in its 
context as the one in Der Satz vom Grund. The paradoxical denial concerns a strophe in the 
elegy “Brot und Wein”: 
 
So ist der Mensch; wenn da ist das Gut, und es sorget mit Gaben 
       Selber ein Gott für ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht. 
                                                                                                                                                        
later. I inquired repeatedly about what might have happened to it, since there’s strong evidence that this and 
one or two other works by Heidegger in Celan’s original library had disappeared when they were moved to 
or from Paris or to and from his country home in Normandy, or perhaps even when they were transported to 
Marbach. We know they disappeared because, as I was told, (I believe Dietlind Meinecke was one of the 
persons) [the Marbach archive personnel?] made [sic] a complete index of the books moved to and from 
these various locations. That index apparently was entered in the card catalogue in Marbach, but the original 
index has disappeared. In Marbach they assured me that several of the works by Heidegger in Celan’s li-
brary that they had listed there in fact originated with that original index, but they had no idea where they 
were now. As I said, I suspect that Unterwegs zur Sprache existed in another edition that Celan read and 
marked, and that somehow it disappeared as his library was dispersed or moved around. But he certainly did 
read it.” (James K. Lyon, electronic mail, November 12th, 2006; I have corrected a few minor clerical er-
rors.) As I made further enquiries about this and asked the editors of the catalogue, Bertrand Badiou 
forwarded to me  the following message from Nicolai Riedel (Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach): “Vor 
mir liegt Heideggers Buch Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen 1957), mit den Lese-Datierungen Celans. / Ich 
habe den Band Seite für Seite langsam durchgeblättert und bis Seite 204 keine sichtbaren Lesespuren 
gefunden, d.h. keine An- oder Unterstreichungen. Die erste Anstreichung findet sich auf Seite 205, Zeile 25 
bis 27 (Winkelklammer rechts); weitere Anstreichungen auf Seite 207 (‘weil’) bis zum Schluss (S. 210), 
also insgesamt gar nicht so viel.” (Cit. Bertrand Badiou, electronic mail, December 8th, 2006.) 
269 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (7th ed.) (Tübingen: Neomarius, 1949), pp. 163, 164; cit. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 
378, nos. 596-600. Heidegger’s italics, Celan’s underlining. Celan has added to his underlining of the sen-
tence concerning the simultaneous hearing of the content and the “diction” the following marginal remark: 
“wichtig für die Dichtung”. — Cf. also James K. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger (2006), pp. 12-
14. 
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Tragen muß er, zuvor; nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes, 
      Nun, nun müssen dafür Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn.270 
 
We shall not try to penetrate deeper into the context of Heidegger’s citation of this strophe at 
the moment; it is actually hard to determine the exact limits of that context, since the difficult 
thematic of the fourfold mirror-play (Spiegelspiel des Gevierts) of gods and mortals, earth 
and sky, or Ereignis as enteignende Vereignen that is here evoked, pervades all of Heideg-
ger’s discourse of that period.271   We shall return to this expanding context near the end of 
our discussion of Celan’s poetry and poetics and his relationship to Heidegger, however. Let 
us instead take a look at another passage where these “words, like flowers” are mentioned, 
the open letter of 1955 to Ernst Jünger: 
 
Die Mehrdeutigkeit jener Worte, die »wie Blumen entstehen« (Hölderlin, Brod und 
Wein), ist der Garten der Wildnis, worin Wachstum und Pflege aus einer 
unbegreiflichen Innigkeit zueinander gestimmt sind. [“Zur Seinsfrage”, GA 9:423-4.] 
 
The non-metaphoricity of these “flowers of the mouth” (Blumen des Mundes) is actually ‘the 
same as’ their equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit) or, as I would say, following Derrida, their dis-
seminality. For Heidegger, the “like” of “likeness” (Gleichnis) is precisely a sign of the multi-
faceted unity of the foursome mirror-play of the world: gods, mortals, earth, and sky. The 
“earthy” materiality of language, of which it is spoken also in the context of the second “ad-
age”,272  does not reside only in the sonorous idiomaticity of a dialect, for instance (“Die 
Mundart ist nicht nur die Sprache der Mutter, sondern zugleich und zuvor die Mutter der 
Sprache”), but also in the “naming power” (Nennkraft) that is not different from the essential 
equivocality of “primordial speaking” (ursprüngliches Sprechen).273 
 The equivocality of the primordial words is not reducible to the binary logic of either-
figurative-or-literal, and it is not some wordplay that brings the figurative and literal together 
in one fell swoop;274  rather, it clears the way for both ‘figurative’ and ‘proper’. An example 
                                                 
270  “Brot und Wein”, ll. 87-90; cit. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 206. “Man’s nature is such: when 
the good is there and a god / Himself is the giver, the gifts are out of sight and out of mind. / First he must 
learn to endure [tragen: to bear]; but now he names what he loves, / Now, now must the words come into 
being, like flowers.” (Translated by Christopher Middleton.) 
271 Cf. e.g. “Das Ding”, in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959 [1st ed. 1954]), p. 172. 
272 “Wird das Wort die Blume des Mundes und Blüte genannt, dann hören wir das Lauten der Sprache erdhaft 
aufgehen. Von woher? Aus dem Sagen, worin sich das Erscheinenlassen von Welt begibt.” Unterwegs zur 
Sprache, p. 208. 
273 Cf. “Sprache und Heimat” (GA 13:155-180). Nennkraft is a word that appears at least in Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes (GA 5:32) and in Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), p. 38; cit. in 
Celan, La bi. phi., p. 351, No. 153. The expression  ursprüngliches Sprechen is from Was heißt Denken? 
(GA  8:189); cf. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 45
274 Cf. Poppenhusen, Durchkreuzen der Tropen, pp. 82ff. We find in “Wozu Dichter?” a remarkable ‘corre-
spondent’ to the “adage” of Der Satz vom Grund, underlined by Celan: “Nur innerhalb der Metaphysik gibt 
es die Logik.” (Holzwege, GA 5:[287]; cit. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 364, No. 395; cf. also No. 394.) Cf. 
also “Sprache und Heimat” (1960): “Von altersher, seit dem Aufkommen der griechischen Logik und 
Grammatik bestimmt man das Sagen der Sprache aus dem Hinblick auf die feststellende Aussage. Demzu-
folge gilt alles, was sprachlich über den logischen Satzinhalt hinausgeht, als bloßer Redeschmuck, als nach-
getragene Umschreibung, als Übertragung (Metapher).” (GA 13:179.) “Sprache und Heimat” is a remark-
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of this is the word Nachbarschaft, denoting the “neighbourhood” or “neighbourliness” of po-
etry and thinking, Dichten und Denken: 
 
Die Rede von der Nachbarschaft des Dichtens und Denkens meint [...], daß beide 
einander gegenüber wohnen, eines gegenüber dem anderen sich angesiedelt hat, eines 
in die Nähe des Anderen gezogen ist. Dieser Hinweis auf das Kennzeichnende der 
Nachbarschaft bewegt sich in einer bildlichen Redeweise. Oder sagen wir schon etwas 
von der Sache? Was heißt denn »bildliche Redeweise«? Wir sind mit dieser Auskunft 
schnell bei der Hand, ohne daran zu denken, daß wir uns auf sie solange nicht in einer 
verläßlichen Form berufen dürfen, als unbestimmt bleibt, was Rede ist und was Bild 
und inwiefern die Sprache in Bildern spricht, ob sie überhaupt so spricht. Darum 
lassen wir hier alles weit offen. Halten wir uns an das Nötigste, nämlich daran, die 
Nachbarschaft von Dichten und Denken aufzusuchen, d.h. jetzt: das Gegen-einander-
über der beiden. [Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 187.]275 
 
The figurative way of speaking is here juxtaposed with “saying something to the point”. Once 
again, this positing of the question concerning figurativity may seem an evasion of the ques-
tion, since it is not really clearly elaborated in the text, at least not immediately. On the other 
hand, what Heidegger means by “neighbourhood” can only be clarified by reading what he 
says later in the same text and elsewhere says about Nachbar, with the characteristic recourse 
to etymology (cf. e.g. “Bauen Wohnen Denken” [1951], in Vorträge und Aufsätze), but we 
shall not dwell upon that now. Instead, let us take a shortcut to another extravagant claim, 
already cited, the denial of the metaphoricity of the expression “house of being”. And let us 
ask, instead of taking the laborious excursion to determine what the “neighbourhood” of po-
etry and thinking could be, if not a metaphor or metaphor for metaphor, a simple question: 
What if everything depends, after all, upon leaving everything wide open? Leaving open the 
door that is not opened with the overall key of all poetics? 
 This is to say, the question whether the outrageous caveats, according to which we 
might not know yet what neighbourhood means, what figurativity means, what house or 
dwelling mean, are the most important signposts on the way to understanding why we are not 
dealing with metaphors here. That is, whether this openness, this vacancy as an absence of 
determined content is not essential to the primordial equivocality of poetic language, lan-
guage as poetic language. Perhaps we are dealing with neither lack nor plenitude, but rather a 
hospitality offered within the four corners of the home of being, Haus des Seins? A certain 
                                                                                                                                                        
able text on Johann Peter Hebel, offering actually a positive discussion of the poetic image, or even ‘par-
able’ (Bild, Gebild, Gleichnis), but we shall not discuss it in detail.  
275 En. trans. Peter D. Hertz, in On the Way to Language (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982 [1st ed. 
1971]), p. 82: “[...] the phrase of the neighborhood of poetry and thinking means that the two dwell face to 
face with each other, that the one has settled facing the other, has drawn into the other’s nearness. This re-
mark about what  makes a neighborhood is by way of figurative talk. Or are we already saying something to 
the point? What, really, does ‘figurative talk’ mean? We are quick to give the answer, never giving it a 
thought that we cannot claim to have a reliable formulation so long as it remains unclear what is talk and 
what is imagery, and in what way language speaks in images, if indeed language does speak so at all. There-
fore we will leave here everything wide open. Let us stay with the most urgent issue, which is, to seek out 
the neighborhood of poetry and thinking — which now means the encounter of the two facing each other.” 
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vacancy, occupiability, as Celan says, and an exposure that means also giving a chance 
within the limits of the poetic form — we shall return to this. Heidegger and Celan are actu-
ally quite close in the way they understand the gift that the poem is. Or the poetic image 
(Gebild) that is no metaphor: 
 
Das dichtende Sagen, das zeigendere Zeigen bringt solches zum Scheinen, was im 
schon Vorliegenden und sonst Vorkommenden nirgends auffindbar, was nicht 
vorgegeben ist, vielmehr im dichtenden Sagen allererst gegeben, her-vor-gebracht, 
gebildet wird. D a s  i m  d i c h t e n d e n  S a g e n  G e s a g t e  h a t  k e i n e n  
I n h a l t ,  s o n d e r n  i s t  G e b i l d . [GA 13:171-172.]276 
 
We must understand, in view of the following, that for Heidegger, already for the so-called 
early Heidegger, poetry is originary language, and the so-called ordinary language is origi-
nally poetic, and that, on the other hand, the poetic saying overpowers — ‘over-dicts’, so to 
say (überdichtet) — the poet and his particular intention.277  Poetry is preter-intentional, so to 
speak. With certain reservations and differentiations, this also applies to Celan’s poetics. Yet, 
to add an extra counter-signature to these two, we must also think of the primordial equivo-
cality in Derridean terms of dissemination or disseminality.278  We shall leave all of these 
questions wide open here, for the moment at least, and proceed to the remarkable early text 
on Aristotle, which may well indicate something to us about the primordial equivocality that 
we are dealing with here.  
 
 
‘COMPLETION’ AND ITS METAPHORS: HEIDEGGER’S READING OF ARISTOTLE’S 
METAPHYSICS, V, 16, AND ITS RELATION TO THE THEME OF “BEING-TOWARDS-
THE-END” IN SEIN UND ZEIT  
 
With regard to Heidegger’s vehement objections to the concept of metaphor and to the para-
doxical fact that he almost never quite directly links Aristotle to this concept, a certain chap-
ter in the transcript of the 1924 Marburg lectures with the title Grundbegriffe der Aristo-
telischen Philosophie (GA 18; published in 2002) contains a great surprise. Heidegger shows, 
in a positive fashion, that the verb metapherein [metafe/rein] has a certain methodological 
                                                 
276 Heidegger’s emphasis by letterspacing. 
277 “Das Wort des Dichters und das in ihm Gedichtete überdichten den Dichter und sein Sagen. Wenn wir dies 
von ›der Dichtung‹ behaupten, meinen wir überall nur die wesentliche Dichtung. Sie allein dichtet An-
fängliches; sie allein entbindet Ursprüngliches zu seiner eigenen Ankunft.” (GA 52:7.) Celan marked, in his 
copy of Holzwege, for instance in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, among many other markings, a pas-
sage which begins: “Die Sprache selbst ist Dichtung im wesentlichen Sinne.” (Holzwege [Frankfurt a.M.: 
Klostermann, 1950], p.61; cit. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 359, No. 237.) 
278 “Disseminality” is, unlike the earlier “dissemination” that also reappears for instance in the late text on 
Gadamer and Celan (Béliers. Le dialogue ininterrompu : entre deux infinis, le poème [Paris: Galilée, 2003]), 
a word used by Derrida precisely in at least one of his readings of early Heidegger: “Différence sexuelle, 
différence ontologique (Geschlecht I)” (1983), in Heidegger et la question. De l’esprit et autres essais 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1990), pp. 145-172 (also included in the first edition of Psyché — inventions de l’autre, 
1987). We shall return to this.
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function in the fifth book of the Metaphysics and especially in section 16, dealing with the 
fundamental concept of ‘complete’ or ‘completeness’, teleion [te/leion]. 
 The fifth book as a whole has been seen as composing an independent treatise con-
cerning the several meanings of certain fundamental concepts. It consists of thirty sections, 
each discussing some particular concept in its several meanings or manners of address.279  
These thirty are not, of course, all the fundamental concepts of Greek or Aristotelian philoso-
phy. The verb metapherein [metafe/rein] and its derivatives occur here and there in the book, 
and quite a few times actually. This does of course not make metaphor [metafora/] one of 
the basic concepts, but it turns out to have a very remarkable role in the discussion of the 
thirty concepts. The sixteenth of these thirty fundamental concepts is teleion, “complete”, and 
we shall concentrate on this concept and its metaphorical and non-metaphorical derivatives. 
 The brief section on te/leion also has an important role in Heidegger’s lecture 
course.280  The role is obviously important and emphatic, since the lecture transcript contains 
Heidegger’s own interpretative translation and commentary of almost the entire, albeit rela-
tively short, section 16 of book Delta (GA 18:§ 11, pp. 80-91), even though these lectures 
only occasionally deal with the Metaphysics and concentrate rather on other works, especially 
the Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics and De anima. This special status granted to the section 
already anticipates the discussion on entelecheia at the end of the book (§ 26) where this fun-
damental concept of Aristotle’s doctrine of being is rendered as Sich-im-Fertigsein-Halten 
(Joe Sachs translates this concept as “being-at-work-staying-itself”,281  while Heidegger’s 
rendering could be approximated by something like “staying-in-being-complete”); this final 
aim is the reason that Heidegger himself gives for this specific discussion of ‘completeness’ 
in the earlier part of the lecture course (cf. pp. 84-85). But what is to be suggested here is that 
only three years later the interest in teleion and a certain specific metaphorical application of 
this term will be explained otherwise, albeit altogether indirectly, with regard to one of the 
central concepts or themes of Sein und Zeit, namely Sein zum Ende, being-towards-the-end 
that is a way to speak of being-towards-death, Sein zum Tode. 
 In what follows, we will concentrate on section 11 of Heidegger’s 1924 lectures, in-
asmuch as the problematics of metaphor seem to be concerned, although it is actually not 
metaphor itself that is at the centre of the discussion. I will bring into relief only the passages 
                                                 
279  Diogenes Laertius has referred to the book, in his catalogue of Aristotle’s works, under the heading peri\ 
tw=n posaxw=j legome/nwn. The procedure of the whole book V (D) is such that each one of the 30 chap-
ters begins with the fundamental concept to be discussed and in what sense or senses it is being spoken of, 
and the incipits range from “ a0rxh\ le/getai ...” (1), “ai1tion le/getai ...” (2), through “fu/sij le/getai ...” 
(4) and “to\ o2n le/getai ...” (7), all the way to  “sumbebhko\j le/getai ...” (30); chapter 16 begins with 
“te/leion le/getai ...”. And like to\ o2n, many of these are “said in many ways [pollaxw=j le/getai]”, spo-
ken of as according to several meanings or usages. 
280  This volume (GA 18) was published in 2002 on the basis of students’ transcripts, most notably Fritz 
Schalk’s. It was first, in 1991, announced to bear the title “Aristoteles: Rhetorik”. 
281 “Glossary”, in Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), p. 
245. 
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that deserve the most specific attention with regard to the issue at hand. We should indeed 
pay detailed attention to these extracts divided over a few pages, in order that the apparent 
digressions concerning metapherein can be seen in the right perspective, whose whole exten-
sion is nevertheless not yet revealed in the context of these  lectures on Aristotle. Book Delta, 
section 16, receiving special treatment in Heidegger’s text, concerns the different meanings 
of the term teleion, which can be translated as “complete” or “completeness”, and the term 
means both something completed and the way of being that pertains to this being that is 
brought into completion, as Heidegger points out. Teleion is something that has reached its 
own limit, a complete being in its completion.  
 The first meaning of teleion that is mentioned here by Aristotle is a temporal mean-
ing: completion or being-carried-out of something as having had its time. The time for some-
thing is full or complete when no such moment can be found outside it that would still con-
tribute to its constitution. The famous term telos itself is, according to Heidegger,  an end as a 
limit rather than an end in a teleological sense, as a final cause. When something is complete, 
teleion, it has reached its limit. 
 The verb metapherein occurs for the first time, but not the last, in this section, in the 
next passage that concerns the second acceptation of teleion (the order is the order of presen-
tation and not the logical or ontological order, or any other order of hierarchical primacy): 
 
kai\ to\ kat' a)reth\n kai\ to\ eu)= mh\ e)/xon u(perbolh\n pro\j to\ ge/noj, oi(=on te/leioj 
i)atro\j kai\ te/leioj au)lhth\j, o(/tan kata\ to\ ei)=doj th=j oi)kei/aj a)reth=j mhqe\n 
e)llei/pwwsin. ou3tw de\ metafe/rontej kai\ e)pi\ tw=n kakw=n le/gomen sukofa/nthn 
te/leion kai\ kle/pthn te/leion, e)peidh\ kai\ a)gaqou\j le/gomen au)tou/j, oi(=on 
kle/pthn a)gaqo\n kai\ sukofa/nthn a)gaqo/n. kai\ h( a)reth\ telei/wsi/j tij. [Met. D 
16, 1021b15ff.] »Weiter wird als fertig angesprochen das, was im Umkreis des 
Verfügens über eine eigene Seinsmöglichkeit in ihrer Herkünftigkeit kein 
Darüberhinaus mehr hat. Wir sprechen von einem vollendeten Arzt und von einem 
vollendeten Flötenspieler. Ein Arzt, ein Flötenspieler ist vollendet, wenn im Hinblick 
darauf, wie das ihnen eigene Verfügen über ihr Sein da ist, sie in nichts zurückbleiben 
[wenn also der Flötenspieler in seiner a)reth/ in nichts zurückbleibt hinter seiner 
Möglichkeit]. [GA 18:80-81.]282 
 
So there is no hyperbolical opportunity for further perfection hovering somewhere above the 
essential possibilities of completion belonging to the ‘provenance’ (Herkünftigkeit, genos) of 
the human flautist or the human physician. But with reference to this original meaning, there 
are also metaphorical, transferred variants: 
 
In diesem Sinne aber [wie er in dieser Bestimmung gegeben war] sprechen wir auch 
einen Sykophanten (Angeber) oder einen Dieb als vollendet an, in der Weise, daß wir 
das Wie der Gemeintheit [von te/leion], metafe/rontej, übertragen auch auf das 
Schlechte, da wir sie ja offenbar auch gut nennen, z.B. nennen wir einen einen guten 
Dieb un einen guten Angeber. Und das Verfügen über eine Seinsmöglickeit ist ja eine 
                                                 
282 Square brackets, as to indicate Heidegger’s addition to the text he is translating, are in the original text, ex-
cept the one indicating the passage in the Metaphysics. 
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gewisse Weise des Die-Fertigkeit-des-betreffenden-Seienden-Ausmachens [dieses 
bestimmten Seienden, das in der a)reth/ ist].« [GA 18:81.]283   
“And thus by an extension of the meaning”, as the translation by Tredennick says, 
metapherontes, “we use the term in a bad connection”. So it would seem that by this 
metapherein the meaning of teleion is transferred from the good to the bad, from the proper 
or predominant meaning (good, agathon) to the metaphorically extended meaning (bad, ka-
kon). To say that someone is a complete bastard would seem to be more figurative than to call 
someone a perfect saint, taken that these things are said more or less earnestly. This is what 
the standard translations, such as by Bonitz, let us believe. The translation by Joe Sachs 
comes much closer to how Heidegger understands this passage, even though the punctuation 
of the original text is read differently:  
 
Complete means, in one sense, that of which it is impossible to find even one of its 
parts in any way outside it (as the complete time of each thing is that outside of which 
it is not possible to find any time which is part of that one), and also means that which 
has nothing of its kind exceeding it in excellence appropriate to their kinds (and by 
transferring this meaning to bad things, we speak of a perfect slanderer or a complete 
                                                 
283 Square brackets as in the original text. Cf. Tredennick’s translation, whose interpretation of the text differs 
in some crucial respects from that of Heidegger’s, as we shall see: “That which, in respect of goodness or 
excellence, cannot be surpassed in its kind; e.g., a doctor and a musician are ‘perfect’ when they have no de-
ficiency in respect of the form of their peculiar excellence. And thus by an extension of the meaning we use 
the term in a bad connection, and speak of a ‘perfect’ humbug and a ‘perfect’ thief; since indeed we call 
them ‘good’ — e.g. a ‘good’ thief and a ‘good’ humbug. And goodness is a kind of perfection.” (PDLP. 
Source according to the editors: Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cam-
bridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.) Let us note Heideg-
ger’s translation of the last sentence of the passage [kai\ h( a)reth\ telei/wsi/j tij]: “Und das Verfügen über 
eine Seinsmöglickeit ist ja eine gewisse Weise des Die-Fertigkeit-des-betreffenden-Seienden-Ausmachens 
[dieses bestimmten Seienden, das in der a)reth/ ist].” It differs radically from the English translation by Tre-
dennick: “And goodness is a kind of perfection.” The latter makes indeed perfect sense in English, it is eas-
ily understood, but, first of all, it would indeed seem odd if Aristotle should use both agathon and arete to 
denote simply and synonymously “goodness” in subsequent phrases. Heidegger, who seldom lets such dis-
tinctions slip and seldom trusts the comfortable “standard” translations, is quite consistent in his interpreta-
tion of arete here as “das Verfügen über eine Seinsmöglickeit”, “taking [one’s] feasibility of Being in 
[one’s] disposition”. The “virtue” is not simply a property (Eigenschaft) attached to some subject (in the ba-
sic sense with reference to substratum) or a constant quality or a disposition in another, static sense; in Hei-
degger’s very concrete interpretation of Aristotle, a0reth/ is there only to-be-put-to-practice, a presence of 
“virtue” to be put to practice at a given moment.  0Areth/ bears several references to temporality, most em-
phatically to the given moment, kairo/j (cf. esp. GA 18:179-191). Such seizing of the moment as grasping a 
given possibility pertaining to one’s being, not as a natural property but as a capability gained by practice, 
practice understood as repetition, is this “certain way of completing-the-perfection-of-the-being-that-is-
being-concerned”.  0Areth/ is not completion or perfection itself, but “an active condition that makes one apt 
at choosing”, as Joe Sachs translates Aristotle (Eth. Nic. B 6, 1106b36; trans. Sachs, 2002, p. 29; cf. Hei-
degger, GA 18:188). —  It is remarkable that while Tredennick, for instance, divides the text so that the 
phrase “and goodness is a kind of perfection” belongs already to the next section (as follows: “[...] and a 
‘good’ humbug. (c) And goodness is a kind of perfection. For each thing, and every substance, is perfect 
when, and only when, in respect of the form of its peculiar excellence, it lacks no particle of its natural 
magnitude. (d) [etc.]”), Heidegger attaches it to the passage concerning the metaphorical extension of 
“good” to the “slanderer”, and punctuates it accordingly (with a full stop at the end instead of a colon), al-
though the edition of the Greek text he is using is W. Christ’s 1886 edition which seems to attach the 
phrase, by a colon, to the next part of the discussion, the one concerning the third meaning of te/leion (“[...] 
kai\ sukofa/nthn a)gaqo/n. kai\ h( a)reth\ telei/wsi/j tij: e(/kaston [etc.]”), while the punctuation in 
W.D. Ross’s edition (used by Tredennick) would ambiguously allow for both readings (“[...] kai\ su-
kofa/nthn a)gaqo/n: kai\ h( a)reth\ telei/wsi/j tij: e(/kaston [etc.]”; ed. W.D. Ross; PDLP). 
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thief and therefore even call them good, a good thief and good slanderer). And excel-
lence is a certain completeness, for each thing is complete and every sort of thinghood 
is complete at the time when the form of its proper excellence lacks no part of the 
fullness it has by nature. [kai\ h( a)reth\ telei/wsi/j tij: e(/kaston ga\r to/te te/leion 
kai\ ou)si/a pa=sa to/te telei/a, o(/tan kata\ to\ ei]doj th=j oi)kei/aj a)reth=j mhde\n 
e)llei/ph| mo/rion tou= kata\ fu/sin mege/qouj.] [Met. 1021b12-23, trans. Sachs; ed. 
Christ.] 
 
In Heidegger’s reading, it is “the how of the intendedness [das Wie der Gemeintheit]”284  that 
is thus transferred, when we call someone a perfect thief or a complete slanderer, and further, 
a good thief or a good sycophant; it is because the thief and the sycophant excel in their art 
that we use such ‘metaphors’. It is not because completeness would be essentially connected 
with goodness in a moral sense that these are ‘metaphors’, even though we may make that 
connection by force of habit.  
 So it seems that if we speak of the virtue of thieving or of slandering by such an “ex-
tension of meaning”,285  we detach the primary meaning of arete (“an active condition that 
makes one apt at choosing”) from the conventional moral attachment to agathon. And now 
we can see that the metapherein is here not only a detachment of arete from agathon, but also 
a revelation of a more primordial attachment of arete to kairos and energeia (cf. GA 18, §§10, 
12).286  When we speak of a good thief, we do not mean that he is a good man, but a good 
thief is someone who has developed his skill to the utmost, to its limit.287 
 First, there is completeness in the temporal sense [xro/noj te/leioj], which character-
izes completion [te/leion] as the limit beyond which nothing remains to be completed, as the 
temporal limit after which there is nothing more that would belong to the completion of a be-
ing whose characteristic is completion.288  Secondly, completeness means also that there is no 
“hyperbolical”289  possibility above or beyond reaching the ownmost possibility of being, the 
ownmost authenticity; for instance, the completion of being a flautist or a thief or a syco-
phant. 
                                                 
284 This term Gemeintheit is also used by Husserl. 
285 “Extension of meaning” is Tredennick’s translation of metafora/ and for the derivatives of the verb 
metafe/rein in Aristotle’s text (e.g. 1021b, passim; PDLP). 
286 Actually it seems that “virtue” is not a bad translation of a0reth/ at all, since Joe Sachs argues as follows: 
“When applied to human beings, the word has no necessary moral implications, though it carries them con-
ventionally. [...] The English word ‘virtue’ is an apt translation, just because of its own fruitful ambiguity, 
combining durable moral connotations with amoral uses such as ‘the virtue of this tax-avoidance scheme...’ 
Aristotle distinguishes virtue of intellect from virtue of character, but uses the word primarily for the latter, 
which he defines as a stable active condition of the soul, by which one consistently chooses the mean [to\ 
me/son] in matters of feeling and action knowingly and for its own sake [...]. This human mean does not, in 
Aristotle’s view, require the sacrifice or holding back of any of our powers, but sets free the full being-at-
work of them all.” (Sachs, “Glossary” to the Nicomachean Ethics [2002], p. 212.) So the moral implications 
of the word a0reth/ are carried by the word only conventionally. 
287 Or as Heidegger says: “Ein »guter Dieb«[, …] ein vollendeter Dieb besagt einen solchen, der in seinem Sein 
zu seiner rechten Seinsmöglichkeit gekommen ist, diese Möglichkeit zu ihrem Ende gebracht hat.” (GA 
18:83.) 
288 “[...] das, worüber h inaus n ichts  da is t , worüber es nichts gibt, nichts, das das Sein des Seienden, 
dessen Charakter te/leion ist, mit ausmacht.” (GA 18:83.) 
289  “to\ eu)= mh\ e)/xon u(perbolh\n pro\j to\ ge/noj” (1021b15; ed. Christ). 
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 In the following passage the possibility of our speaking metafe/rontej is still, or 
again, from a third angle, under consideration: 
 
e)/ti oi(=j u(pa/rxei to\ te/loj spoudai=on, tau=ta le/getai te/leia: kata\ ga\r to\ e)/xein 
to\ te/loj te/leia. w(/st' e)pei\ to\ te/loj tw=n e)sxa/twn ti/ e)sti, kai\ e)pi\ ta\ fau=la 
metafe/rontej le/gomen telei/wj a)polwle/nai kai\ telei/wj e)fqa/rqai, o(/tan mhde\n 
e)llei/ph? th=j fqora=j kai\ tou= kakou= a)ll' e)pi tou= e)sxa/tou h)=?. [Met V, 16, 1021b23-
28.]290  »Ferner ist te/leion Sein im Wie des Fertigseins, das Seiende, in dem als 
solchem seine Fertigkeit ernsthaft vorhanden ist. Und zwar wird ein solches Seiendes 
als te/leion angesprochen im Hinblick auf das Haben des Endes im Sinne der 
Fertigkeit. Daher wir denn, da ja te/loj zu den Äußersten gehört, auch auf das 
Schlechte dieses Wie der Gemeintheit übertragen. Wir sprechen von einem völligen 
Vernichtetwordensein, wenn nichts mehr fehlt beim Untergang, sondern es beim 
Äußersten steht, ganz, völlig untergegangen ist.« [GA 18:81-82.] 
 
This passage introduces a further distinction among the meanings of teleion, namely the hav-
ing of “an end” (telos) in an “earnest” or “serious” manner [spoudai=wj].291  Let us try to 
approximate Heidegger’s rendering: “Furthermore, teleion is [means] Being in the ‘how’ of 
being-completed, the being in which, as such [als solchem: in this ‘how’ of being-completed], 
its completedness is seriously present-at-hand. And such a being is indeed addressed as 
teleion with regard to the having of the end in the sense of being completed. Hence it is that 
we, as telos does indeed belong to the extremes [among ‘the utmost’, ‘the last things’], then 
transfer this ‘how’ of the meantness [i.e. intendedness] also upon the bad. We speak of com-
plete annihilation [complete having-become-annihilated], when nothing anymore lacks from 
the destruction but it has been taken to the utmost [beim Äußersten steht seems quite loyal to 
the genitive in W. Christ’s edition: e)pi tou= e)sxa/tou h]? , [something] being wholly, totally 
destroyed.”292  Heidegger explains the term spoudaios and his translation by ernsthaft a few 
                                                 
290  Here the edition by W. Christ, used by Heidegger, somewhat differs from the W. D. Ross edition (e0pi tw=| 
esxa/tw| i. e. dative in stead of e)pi tou= e)sxa/tou i.e. genitive). Cf. Tredennick’s translation, based on 
Ross’s edition: “ (d) [i.e. this is the fourth distinction of the meaning of te/leion according to Tredennick:] 
Things which have attained their end, if their end is good, are called ‘perfect’; for they are perfect in virtue 
of having attained the end. Hence, since the end is an ultimate thing, we extend the meaning of the term to 
bad senses, and speak of perishing ‘perfectly’ or being ‘perfectly’ destroyed, when the destruction or calam-
ity falls short in no respect but reaches its extremity.” (PDLP.) 
291 In Sachs’s translation, this is rendered in a very different manner: “And further, those things are said to be 
complete to which a good end belongs, since it is by having the end that they are complete, and so, since the 
end is one of the extremes, transferring the meaning, we speak of the degenerate things as completely ruined 
or completely decayed, when they lack nothing of ruin and evil but are at the extreme point of them.” 
(1021b23-28, Sachs, trans., Aristotle’s Metaphysics [2002], p. 98.)  
292  Aristotle takes seriousness seriously and plays with it, as we may gather from the following passage from 
the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics: “[...] we choose everything, so to speak, for the sake of some-
thing else, except happiness, since this is the end. But to be earnest and to labor for the sake of play seems 
foolish and too childish. But to play in order that one might be serious, as Anacharsis says, seems to be 
right, since play seems like relaxation, [...] [but] relaxation is not the end, since it comes about for the sake 
of being-at-work. [a(/panta ga\r w(j ei)pei=n e(te/rou e(/neka ai(rou/meqa plh\n th=j eu)daimoni/aj: te/loj ga\r 
au(/th. spouda/zein de\ kai\ ponei=n paidia=j xa/rin h)li/qion fai/netai kai\ li/an paidiko/n. pai/zein d' 
o(/pwj spouda/zh?, kat' )Ana/xarsin, o)rqw=j e)/xein dokei=: a)napau/sei ga\r e)/oiken h( paidia/ [...] ou) dh\ 
te/loj h( a)na/pausij: gi/netai ga\r e(/neka th=j e)nergei/aj.]” (1176b30-1177a1; trans. Joe Sachs [Met., 
2002], p. 191.) Moreover, “a great-souled person seems to have a slow way of moving, a deep voice, and a 
steady way of speaking, since a person who takes few things seriously is not anxious, [kai\ ki/nhsij de\ 
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pages later: “Es muß ernst gemacht werden mit einer Möglichkeit seines eigenen Seins.” (GA 
18:87.) 
 Heidegger does not add any immediate comments to this passage, but continues to 
follow the text and to translate it, only to comment on this metapherein later, and we will, 
accordingly, follow him to the citation and translation of the next passage: 
 
dio\ kai\ h9 teleuth\ kata\ metafora\n le/getai te/loj, o3ti a1mfw e1sxata. [Met. V, 
16, 1021b28f.] »Daher wird auch das Lebensende, der Tod, im Hinblick auf eine 
Übertragung Vollendung genannt, ein Fertigsein des Lebens ausmachend.« Die 
Übertragung gründet darin, daß das Lebensende den Charakter des Äußersten hat, 
teleuth/ ist te/loj. 
 te/loj de\ kai\ to\ ou[ e3neka e1sxaton. [Met. V, 16, 1021b29f.] »Te/loj, Ende als 
Fertigsein ausmachend heißt auch das, worum willen etwas ist, das Worumwillen als 
das Äußerste.« [GA 18:82.]293 
 
This is where Heidegger ends his translation of the section, paraphrasing in a few words the 
rest of its content, namely Aristotle’s summary, and promising to return to it later.294   
 The verb metafe/rein and the noun metafora/ occur here, in the sixteenth section of 
book Delta, on three different occasions, and each time the transference of meaning seems to 
amount to a certain change for the worse: first, the metaphor of the complete slanderer (or a 
good thief, etc.), then the metaphor of the complete ruin or annihilation, and third, the meta-
phor of calling death an “end”, a “completion” of life. The editors have included in the title of 
the next subchapter, namely the passage following the actual translation and the few com-
ments, the expression “Die Methode der Übertragung”, and Heidegger indeed ends this spe-
cific subchapter of a couple of pages by saying: “Es ist kein Zufall, daß Aristoteles nicht nur 
hier, sondern in einer ganzen Reihe von Analysen immer in dieser Weise des metafe/rein die 
Betrachtungen vollzieht.” (GA 18:84.) We can already see that this does not by any means 
amount to saying that Aristotle would himself use metaphor, he rather mentions metaphorical 
                                                                                                                                                        
bradei=a tou= megaloyu/xou dokei= ei)=nai, kai\ fwnh\ barei=a, kai\ le/cij sta/simoj: ou) ga\r speustiko\j o( 
peri\ o)li/ga spouda/zwn,] [...]” (IV, 1125a12-15; trans. Sachs.) Here we should pay attention to the fact 
that spouda/zein means not only “to be earnest” and “to be anxious” but also “to hurry”, “to make haste” 
(LSJ)! So Aristotle certainly plays here — perhaps in order to be serious? 
293  Cf. Sachs: “And for this reason even death is by a transference of meaning called an end, because both are 
extremes, and the end for the sake of which something is is an extreme.” (1021b28-30. Emphasis by Sachs. 
The punctuation here makes an odd impression, and it seems to make more sense to read this as Heidegger 
does, so that the last part, “[A]nd the end for the sake of which something is is an extreme”, is separated by 
full stop from the preceding sentence.) 
294  “Zum Schluß folgt eine zusammenfassende Gliederung der genannten Bedeutungen, eine Einteilung unter 
dem Gesichtspunkt der Kategorien, auf die wir zurückkommen werden, um zu sehen, wie gerade te/loj 
Grundkategorie des Seienden ist.” (GA 18:82.) Heidegger maintains that the term te/loj here has nothing to 
do with teleology and that Aristotle has no “teleological world-view” as many would have it; even a super-
ficial reading shows that te/leion and te/loj here have nothing to do with final causes, while te/loj is ex-
plicitly stated to be tw=n e)sxa/twn ti/, “one of the extremes”, and while it is so that also “the end for the 
sake of which” is an end, a completion, one of the extremes: “Ziel und Zweck sind bestimmte Weisen, in 
denen te/loj als »Ende« ist, aber sie sind nicht primäre Bestimmungen, sondern Zweck und Ziel sind im 
te/loj als »Ende« als der ursprünglichen Bedeutung fundiert.” (GA 18:85.) The end as a final cause is not 
what founds the other meanings of “end”, but the “end” in a more comprehensive and original sense is what 
also founds the end understood in the specific sense of aim or purpose. 
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uses of a term, and what still remains to be seen even more clearly, he also utilizes these us-
ages for quite specific purposes of analysis. What we can see already, even without further 
specifications of this “method”, is also that for instance ‘metaphorising’ would not be an apt 
translation for this methodical metafe/rein. Aristotle invents neither the metaphors nor the 
proper meanings of the terms or basic concepts he examines, but he indeed aims to discover, 
in each case, a certain guiding meaning through examining the usual acceptations of a given 
term, a unity of meaning which governs these several ways of using a word. And this exami-
nation happens also through the transferred meanings, the metaphors. 
 Here is the description of Aristotle’s specific method of  metafe/rein, which is not 
only carrying-over as when something is carried over by metaphor, but a carrying-over-
along-with: 
 
Aristoteles erwähnt ausdrücklich das metafe/rein, er führt die Übertragung selbst an, 
zu einem bestimmten Zweck. In einem Übertragen des Sprechens nehmen wir aus 
dem nächsten und ursprünglichen Ansprechen, aus der nächsten und ursprünglichen 
Bedeutung von te/leion eine Bedeutung noch mit (meta/) und tragen sie über auf ein 
neues Angesprochenes. Bei diesem Übertrag, wo wir eine Bedeutung mitnehmen, 
wird gerade das, was wir mitnehmen, sichtbar. Und darin wird sichtbar, was wir in der 
Grundbedeutung, von woher wir mitnehmen, schon gemeint haben. Beim vollendeten 
Arzt: es kommt nicht auf moralische Güte an, sondern in diesem te/leioj liegt das 
Zu-Ende-Bringen. Das metafe/rein macht sichtbar, was mit te/leion eigentlich 
gemeint ist, wobei der Arzt a0gaqo/j ist und der Dieb auch a0gaqo/j qua Dieb, in 
einem anderen Sinne kako/j. Es ist kein Zufall, daß Aristoteles nicht nur hier, sondern 
in einer ganzen Reihe von Analysen immer in dieser Weise des metafe/rein die 
Betrachtungen vollzieht. [GA 18:84.] 
 
We should notice the two tiny words here, ‘with’ (mit) and ‘already’ (schon). In the 
metafe/rein, in the Übertragen of the term te/leion to designate a perfect thief or a complete 
slanderer or, further, a good thief or good slanderer, we bring into view what we already 
meant when we spoke of a perfect doctor, and that we did not mean him to be a good doctor 
by virtue of his moral excellence, in his being a good man. The co-intended meaning that was 
meant along with the original expression ‘good doctor’, which was not the moral meaning at 
all, becomes clear through the metaphor, or at least through this thematization of metaphor. 
We may see that it is not necessarily the simple use of metaphor that brings this co-intended 
meaning to light, thematically, although only this co-intended meaning makes the so-called 
metaphor possible in the first place. Moreover, the thematization of the preposition meta 
[meta/] as mit, ‘with’, or ‘along with’, ‘among’, is highly significant here. In an earlier stage 
of the lecture course (§ 7), when Heidegger dealt with the ‘genealogy’ of the term ou0si/a, the 
verb mitmeinen (co-signify, co-intend) played an important role, and as we can read from the 
famous method paragraph (§ 7) of Sein und Zeit, for Heidegger, phenomenology means the-
matizing the unthematized but implicitly co-intended levels of experience.  
 So what does the method of metapherein reveal to us here? First of all, it reveals indi-
rectly what we actually meant when we spoke of a perfect, good doctor, namely what we 
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meant as if by definition, even though we probably did not expressly represent this co-
signification to ourselves, and were not constantly aware of it. 295  In this co-intended com-
pleteness it was not a question of moral values at all, in the first place, but instead of that, a 
certain bringing-to-completion was meant, the achieving of an end in the sense of reaching 
essential limits (“in diesem te/leioj liegt das Zu-Ende-Bringen”; GA 18:84). 
 
In dieser Bestimmung des Zu-Ende-Gekommenseins eines Seienden liegt die 
Möglichkeit der Übertragung des te/leion. Sofern wir sprechen von einem »guten 
Dieb«, wird in dieser Übertragung sichtbar, was mit te/leion eigentlich gemeint ist, 
wenn wir von einem »guten Arzt« sprechen. Das Prädikat ›gut‹ hat die 
Nebenbedeutung von ausgezeichnet, wertvoll. Te/leion meint dies nicht, sofern wir 
eben auch von einem »vollkommenen Dieb« sprechen, so daß die Bedeutung von 
te/leion einen Seinscharakter ausmacht, der nicht gebunden ist an die spezifische 
Bedeutung von a0gaqo/n, wofern eine bestimmte Eigenschaft eines Seienden 
ausgedrükt zu werden pflegt. [GA 18:85-86] 
 
So it is by way of metapherein that we see what is properly meant by teleion!296   
 Heidegger makes an eight-point division among the various meanings of teleion: 
1) The completion of something in time. 2) The completion which, in addition to the first 
point, designates the being of a being such that it has reached the limit with regard to its own 
possibilities of being. 3) The second point makes the third possible, namely the transferred 
uses of teleion in ‘complete slanderer’ and ‘perfect thief’.297  4) The completion towards 
which virtue is always directed without having necessarily always fully attained its end. 
5) This fifth point is again essentially linked to the preceding one: the completion which 
                                                 
295 To be sure, we speak here of the ordinary standard case which Aristotle and Heidegger refer to and exclude 
all the further possibilities of figuration, such as irony. 
296 The ‘proper’ meaning of the terms that we would translate as complete or perfect and good is, for Aristotle, 
undoubtedly other than their moral meaning, which is a specific usage derived from this basic, guiding 
meaning. Aristotle calls the speaking of a “perfect (or good) thief” and a “complete (or good) sycophant” 
metaphorical, even though the relation of these expressions to the guiding meaning of ‘complete’ and 
‘good’ seems to be quite different from the case of the geometrical usage of the term ‘power’, for instance, 
which is not reducible to the basic guiding meaning of du/namij which is to be the source of movement (or 
change) in another or as another (Met. V, 12). The meaning of ‘the good’ as completion in Aristotle’s anal-
ogy should perhaps in the final analysis be understood in the analogical relation of relations that ‘the good’ 
on the whole (as well as ‘beautiful’, to\ faino/menon ka/lon) entertains with “the highest good in nature” or 
with “the best” and the highest “for-the sake-of-which” (to\ ou[ e3neka) (cf. Met. XII, 7; cf. also I, 2, 
982b2ff). On the other hand, it should perhaps be noted that the speaking of a “good thief” or a “perfect 
slanderer” is not a simple metaphor even in the sense that such expressions are rather characterized by 
irony, which can either affirm the usual ‘proper’ connection of these attributes ‘good’ and ‘perfect’ to moral 
values, or make this connection questionable. And such figures may also suggest something of the relation 
that these predicates entertain with the notion of e0ne/rgeia or e0ntelexei/a (“actuality” or “being-at-work” 
and “complete-being-at-work”, Wirklichkeit, Im-Werke-sein and Sich-in-seinem-Ende-halten; cf. GA 18 
[§ 10]:70-71; § 27), while ‘completeness’ is always related to a determined ontological ability or possibility 
(Seinkönnen, Seinsmöglichkeit), such as the ‘art’ of the doctor, the flautist, the thief or the slanderer. 
297 These ‘metaphors’ that reveal the ‘proper’ meaning are indeed metaphors in the sense that they are para-
doxical, i.e. they are beside the do/ca that attaches the predicates ‘perfect’, ‘complete’ and ‘good’ to moral 
values; they represent a “deviant predication” with regard to this current opinion or predisposition. They are 
extra-ordinary ways of speaking, in that respect. But the basic or guiding meaning that Aristotle seeks is not 
always the prevailing, current, ordinary way of using the term; it is rather something upon which the differ-
ent acceptations are based, their common source. 
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properly (im eigentlichen Sinne) belongs to a being, such that it belongs to it in an ‘earnest’ 
manner. 7) The seventh point — let us hop over the sixth for the moment — the seventh 
meaning of teleion is “that for the sake of which [to\ ou[ e3neka]”. 8) The eighth point is re-
lated by Aristotle to the categories: something can be called complete either as an independ-
ent thing or in relation to some independent thing. Now it is time for the sixth point, last but 
not least: 6) This point combines the second and third metaphor in Aristotle’s text in the fol-
lowing way: 
 
In der weiteren Bestimmung des te/leion wird nun erst eigentlich deutlich, in 
welchem Sinne te/leion ein Seinscharacter ist. Es wird gesprochen von einem 
telei/wj e0fqa/rqai [1021b27]. Ferner wird die teleuth/, der »Tod«, als te/loj 
bezeichnet. Was wird in dieser Übertragung sichtbar?  Wir sagen von einem 
Menschen: »Er ist ganz fertig, erledigt, verbraucht.« Das besagt hier: Er ist nicht mehr 
der, der er früher war, er ist als der, der er früher eigentlich gewesen ist, nicht mehr 
da. Fertigsein ist Aus-dem-Dasein-Wegsein. Was ist der Sinn der Übertragung, wenn 
teleuth/ als te/loj bezeichnet wird? Mit dem Tod ist das Leben zu Ende, der Tod 
macht das Leben fertig dadurch, daß er das Sein aus dem Da wegnimmt, das Leben 
verschwindet. Mit dieser Übertragung zeigt sich te/leion, te/loj als ein 
Daseinscharakter, sofern to\ te/loj, te/leion dasjenige Dasein bezeichnet, das wir als 
Nicht-mehr-Dasein, als Wegsein bezeichnen. Wegsein ist eine ausgezeichnete Weise 
des Daseins. Gerade in dieser Übertragung von te/loj und te/leion auf den Tod zeigt 
sich die ausgezeichnete Funktion von te/leion, der Charakter des Daseins zu sein in 
der ausgezeichneten Möglichkeit des Verschwindens. [GA 18:87-88.] 
 
The reader familiar with Sein und Zeit might raise an eyebrow here. Does this not forestall 
the theme of being towards death (Sein zum Tode), or being towards the end (Sein zum Ende) 
in that major work of Heidegger’s? And the reader familiar with Heidegger’s insistent cri-
tique of the concept of metaphor may raise another eyebrow. Could this not be seen as a pos-
sible opening towards a more positive critique of that concept, and precisely as an Aristote-
lian concept this time? The relation between these two questions must now be examined. 
 Let us paraphrase the last sentence of the passage just quoted. By this metapherein in 
which telos (end) and teleion (completion) are ‘transferred’ to signify death, life’s end, a re-
markable function of teleion is revealed: as a characteristic of being-there,298  a characteristic 
of being-there in the singular possibility of disappearing. The disappearance of beings was 
the Greeks’ greatest fear, as Heidegger has elsewhere claimed. We might imagine that this 
fear was the prime motivator for the birth of philosophy and for the Greek conception of be-
ing as permanent presence, ständige Anwesenheit [ou0si/a]. 
 In the metaphor in question, a certain determination of being and of being-there be-
comes visible:  
 
                                                 
298 In these 1924 lectures, the term Dasein is used in a strikingly broader fashion than in Sein und Zeit: it is 
often used, for instance, as a translation of ou0si/a, and here it must be taken in the broad sense of existence, 
not only as human existence, but existence understood as presence, the ‘there-being’ of anything. 
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Tod eine Weise des Daseins, das Nicht-mehr-Dasein, das Wegsein, die a0pousi/a. Das 
Nicht-mehr-da ist ein Character des Da, sofern teleuth/  als te/loj angesprochen 
wird, wobei es sich aber um eine Übertragung handelt. [GA 18:89.] 
 
Let us pay attention to the tiny adverb aber here. The no-longer-there is a characteristic of 
‘the there’, insofar as teleute is addressed as telos, but in this case, in the case addressing the 
matter in such a manner, however, we are dealing with a metaphor. When we speak of death 
as an end, we do not speak literally, but we are using metaphor. This is at least what Aristotle 
seems to be saying. Heidegger continues:  
 
Damit ist gemeint, daß bei diesem Ansprechen des Todes als te/loj die eigentliche 
Bedeutung von te/loj und te/leion in gewissem Sinne verloren gegangen ist, insofern 
mit te/loj gemeint ist ein solches Ende, daß dieses Ende das Betreffende nicht 
einfach verschwinden läßt, es nicht aus dem Da wegnimmt, sondern im Da hält, es in 
seinem eigentliche Da bestimmt. Te/loj besagt also ursprünglich: zu Ende sein so, 
daß dieses Ende das eigentliche Da ausmacht, ein Seiendes in seiner Gegenwärtigkeit 
eigentlich bestimmen. Weil das die Grundbedeutung von te/loj ist, kann man 
übertragender Weise von te/loj im Sinne des Todes sprechen. [GA 18:89-90.] 
 
Heidegger maintains emphatically that non-being or not-being-there can only be interpreted 
after being-there (Dasein) has already been positively expounded. And yet, it is the thrust of 
absence, of the not-there or the being-away as the most extreme way of being-there that 
throws the interpretation back toward this necessary construal of the ‘there’: “Wegsein ist die 
extremste Weise des Daseins, so daß die Interpretation des Seins zurückgeworfen wird auf 
die Auslegung des Da.” Telos and teleion mean limit (Grenze), and an essential limit indeed 
(und zwar der Grenze im Sinne des Seins) in the sense that such a limit of something deter-
mines the ‘there’ of what it limits (diese Grenze das Seiende in seinem Da bestimmt): 
 
Ende etwa in dem Sinne, daß dieses te/loj zurückgreift auf das, dessen Ende es ist, 
und dieses in seinem Da bestimmt — Character des rückgreifenden Umfassens. Ein 
vollendeter Geiger ist durch sein Vollendetsein in seinem eigentlichen Sein. [GA 
18:90.] 
 
For instance, with regard to this talk of the complete violinist, to speak of death as completion 
seems strange. Strange and metaphorical. Death as being away (Wegsein) does not maintain 
and determine anything or anyone, any being-there in its being and its there (Da), or in its 
here and now. It does not establish the character of being complete or being an end, if we 
mean by ‘end’ what Aristotle means by telos. To speak of death as an end, a limit or a com-
pletion is, from an Aristotelian perspective, merely metaphorical.  
 It would seem that it is precisely this metaphor, and the question of whether it is 
merely a metaphor, that Heidegger tackles in a certain important part of Sein und Zeit. The 
metaphor mentioned by Aristotle or cited by him, according to which death is the limit, the 
end or the completion of life, while ‘end’ or ‘limit’ is understood in the very specific sense 
that Aristotle defines for the word telos on the basis of the usage of this term, is insufficient, 
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but perhaps it thrusts, precisely in all its insufficiency and alleged metaphoricity, Heidegger 
back toward the explanation that the ‘there’ calls for (zurückgeworfen … auf die Auslegung 
des Da), insofar as this Da belongs to the human Dasein. Thus death as the limit of being-
there gains a new place within the structure of Dasein and is no longer excluded, and the 
metaphor turns into a sort of inclusive figure, a metonymy of sorts. Quasi-metonymy. Hei-
degger speaks of the way by which death enters into the sphere of human being-there: “seine 
Weise, in das Dasein hereinzustehen” (Sein und Zeit, p. 258). The finite and singular being to 
which the name Dasein in each case belongs, a name that is in Sein und Zeit reserved for the 
human way of being-there, turns out to be mortal in a fundamental way.  
 
 
BEING-TOWARDS-THE-END — ON THE HITHER SIDE OF ‘METAPHOR’ 
 
Sein-zum-Ende, Sein-zum-Tode: these are precisely the turns of speech in the name of which 
Heidegger will, in Sein und Zeit (1927), only a couple of years after the lectures on Aristotle, 
deconstruct the allegedly metaphorical talk of death as the end, the final limit, the completion 
of human life. 
 The human finitude is thematized in the context of Being and Time precisely as a rela-
tion to death, but within the limits of life (as being-there) it can be thematized only ‘from 
within’. It is actually astonishing to see how patiently Heidegger in the lectures of 1924 re-
stricts himself to the close reading of Aristotle’s text and restrains himself from commenting 
upon the ‘metaphor’ that ceases to be metaphorical in the major work that was to be pub-
lished so soon. In Sein und Zeit, being-toward-the-end, death as the end of being there, as the 
completion of human life, is the very opposite of metaphor: it gives to Dasein its most au-
thentic, most proper meaning in a thoroughly analysed manner. 
 In the summer of 1924 the term Dasein is indeed still used in a much broader sense 
than in Sein und Zeit, namely as an equivalent of ou0si/a, except in such cases when it is speci-
fied: Dasein des Menschen, das menschliche Dasein. In these lectures ou0si/a is characterized 
by what Heidegger calls Verfügbarsein (disposability, availability, having at one’s com-
mand). But this having-at-one’s-disposal as the characterization of ‘thinghood’ in general is 
of course sharply distinguished from the human Dasein, and this is done precisely in the con-
text of the analysis of Sein zum Ende, being-towards-the-end, which is a certain, quite ade-
quate way of naming being-towards-death. In section 48 this distinction is made very clearly, 
word for word: “Im Tod ist das Dasein weder vollendet, noch einfach verschwunden, noch 
gar fertig geworden oder als Zuhandenes ganz verfügbar.” (SuZ, 245.) Heidegger also pro-
ceeds to state the distinction between Zu-Ende-Sein (being-ended, being-finished) and Sein 
zum Ende: 
 
So wie das Dasein vielmehr ständig, solange es ist, schon sein Noch-nicht ist, so ist es 
auch schon immer sein Ende. Das mit dem Tod gemeinte Enden bedeutet kein Zu-
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Ende-Sein des Daseins, sondern ein Sein zum Ende dieses Seienden. Der Tod ist eine 
Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, sobald es ist. [SuZ, 245.] 
 
On the one hand, Heidegger seems to take Aristotle’s ‘metaphor’ just about in the same man-
ner as Aristotle takes it, as mere metaphor, but on the other, everything in the analysis of Sein 
zum Tode suggests the insufficiency of such metaphor as metaphor, and also the fact that Ar-
istotle disregards the possibility of another, more profound and more important sense that 
could be co-intended by the said metaphor. 
 Dasein does not reach its end in the way a fruit ripens or in the way a road ends (these 
are the counter-examples in the already quoted section 48 of Sein und Zeit), but it is always 
already its own end. Death is a way of being that Dasein assumes as soon as it is. Death be-
longs to the very being of the human being-there. And: “Enden als Sein zum Ende verlangt 
seine ontologische Aufklärung aus der Seinsart des Daseins.” (SuZ, 245.) Already in the 
1924 lectures Heidegger bids us to proceed carefully: 
 
Wenn wir zusammenfassen, so ist primär festzuhalten: Te/loj hat die Bestimmung 
von Grenze. Dieser Grenzcharakter ist so aufzufassen: das, worüber hinaus nichts 
weiter da ist, Ende, das, wobei etwas aufhört. Hier müßen wir aber vorsichtig sein. 
Ein Pfad durch eine Wiese hört auf bei einem Gartenzaun. Der Gartenzaun ist aber 
nicht te/leion. Das Pfad-Sein als solches ist nicht bestimmt durch den Gartenzaun. 
Das, wobei der Pfad aufhört, ist selbst ein Seiendes, das in derselben Weise ist wie 
das, was bei ihm aufhört. Vermutlich ist te/leion nicht ein Seiendes, ein Stück des 
Seienden, dessen Ende es ausmacht, sondern te/leion ist ein Sein, eine Weise des 
Seins selbst. Te/leion ist Grenze nicht als ein Seiendes zu einem Seienden, dessen 
Grenze es ist. In diesem Sinne ist der Dieb fertig, wobei die Grenze nicht außerhalb 
seiner liegt. Das Wie seines Seins, das Stehlen selbst, ist zu seiner bestimmten 
Möglichkeit gekommen. Er ist nicht deshalb ein Guter Dieb, weil er auf eine große 
Menge Gelder stößt. Das te/leion ist eine Bestimmung des Seins des Seienden und 
nicht irgendeine Eigenschaft wie etwa weiß oder schwarz. Das Worüber-hinaus-nichts 
hat den Charakter der Grenze im Sinne einer Bestimmung des Seins. 
       Dieser Grenzcharacter des te/leion als Seinsbestimmung wird deutlich in der 
weiteren Übertragung: Tod eine Weise des Daseins, […] wobei es sich aber um eine 
Übertragung handelt. [GA 18:89.] 
 
The whole analysis of being-towards-death and being-towards-the-end (at least the first chap-
ter of the second section of Sein und Zeit, namely §§ 46-53 and further § 62) can be read 
against the metaphor mentioned by Aristotle. In this analysis it is a question of Dasein’s be-
ing complete and of its ability to be complete (Ganzsein, Ganzseinkönnen) (cf. pp. 235ff; 
§ 62, p. 309; § 72, p. 372, and passim). From this perspective, we may see that a certain sort 
of reductio ad absurdum of the said metaphor, resembling Aristotle’s corresponding method, 
belongs essentially to this analysis. As was already mentioned, in the section 48 of Sein und 
Zeit Heidegger takes a detour through the various meanings that it cannot be a question of 
when we speak of the end of Dasein and its being-towards-the-end, or when we say that the 
human being-there, Dasein, is always already its own end; the not-yet (das Noch-nicht) that 
characterizes Dasein cannot be like that of the moon that is not yet full, and the end toward 
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which Dasein always is cannot be like the ripening of a fruit, for example, although there are 
some significant similarities between the not-yet belonging to the structure of Dasein and the 
not-yet of the fruit: 
 
Die Unreife Frucht zum Beispiel geht ihrer Reife entgegen. Dabei wird ihr im Reifen 
das, was sie noch nicht ist, keineswegs als Noch-nicht-vorhandenes angestückt. Sie 
selbst bringt sich zur Reife, und solches Sichbringen charakterisiert ihr Sein als 
Frucht. [...] Das Noch-nicht der Unreife meint nicht ein außenstehendes Anderes, das 
gleichgültig gegen die Frucht an und mit ihr vorhanden sein könnte. [...] Die reifende 
Frucht jedoch ist nicht nur nicht gleichgültig gegen die Unreife als ein Anderes ihrer 
selbst, sondern reifend ist sie die Unreife. Das Noch-nicht ist schon in ihr eigenes Sein 
einbezogen und das keineswegs als beliebige Bestimmung, sondern als 
Konstitutivum. Entsprechend ist auch das Dasein, solange es ist, je schon sein Noch-
nicht. / Was am Dasein die »Unganzheit« ausmacht, das ständige Sichvorweg, ist 
weder ein Ausstand eines summativen Zusammen, noch gar ein Noch-nicht-
zugänglich-geworden-sein, sondern ein Noch-nicht, das je ein Dasein als das Seiende, 
das es ist, zu sein hat. Gleichwohl zeigt der Vergleich mit der Unreife der Frucht, bei 
einer gewissen Übereinstimmung, doch wesentliche Unterschiede. Sie beachten heißt, 
die bisherige Rede von Ende und Enden in ihrer Unbestimmtheit erkennen. [SuZ, 
§ 48, pp. 243-244.]299 
 
We shall not follow the further distinctions and examples with which Heidegger continues; 
let it now suffice to add what he asserts after introducing the few counter-examples to 
Dasein’s end or ownmost completion, whose counterpart is its essential not-yet (Noch-nicht), 
namely the incompleteness (die »Unganzheit«) that characterizes it from the empirical birth 
to the empirical death, from beginning to end: “Durch keinen dieser Modi des Endens läßt 
sich der Tod als Ende des Daseins angemessen charakterisieren.” (SuZ, 245.) What makes 
such adequation impossible is the difference of the modes of being between Dasein and Vor-
handensein and Zuhandensein (cf. ibid.). Neither shall we follow the positive analysis of 
Dasein’s ownmost finitude further, except for the remark that might perfectly well allude to 
the lectures given two or three years earlier and Aristotle’s use of the term ‘metaphor’ in the 
book Delta: 
 
Wie soll die ontologische Möglichkeit eines eigentlichen Seins zum Tode »objektiv« 
charakterisiert werden, wenn das Dasein sich nie eigentlich zu seinem Ende verhält 
oder aber dieses eigentliche Sein seinem Sinne nach den Anderen verborgen bleiben 
muß? Ist der Entwurf der existenzialen Möglichkeit eines so fragwürdigen 
existenziellen Seinkönnens nicht ein phantastisches Unterfangen? Wessen bedarf es, 
damit ein solcher Entwurf über eine nur dichtende, willkürliche Konstruktion 
hinauskommt? [SuZ, § 53, p. 260.] 
 
It is precisely as if these questions concerning the suspicions of a merely poetic, arbitrary 
construction were forwarded in the dialogue with Aristotle, who more or less disregards, after 
all, the thought of death as a completion of life (which is to say, at the same time: end and 
                                                 
299 Cf. Derrida, Apories. Mourir — s’attendre aux « limites de la vérité » (Paris: Galilée, 1996), pp. 55ff. 
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limit of life) as a mere metaphor, without engaging himself in a positive analysis of what we 
could perhaps call the co-intended fundamental meaning of this figure. 
 No doubt, Heidegger conceives of his own “philology”300  and phenomenology, as 
well as Aristotle’s (in a certain sense and to a certain extent) ‘doxographical’ philosophy or 
phenomenology, as thematization of the co-intended but unthematized, of the pre-
comprehended or the pre-predicative, and on the other hand, of the unthought in the history 
of Western thought. This is possible, in the first place, only insofar as the historicity and the 
multiplicity of what has been articulated in this history, as well as concept-formation which is 
a central theme of the 1924 lectures on Aristotle, are understood in ways other than through 
the concept of metaphor. In an early stage of the lectures Heidegger distinguishes two of the 
possible ways in which a term may become a term (Terminus): first, there is what we may 
call neologism, in which “the word is coined together with the thing”, and second, a term 
may be generated so that an already extant word is used in a new relationship, in a new ter-
minological sense, meaning that the terminological function is attached, so to say, to an exist-
ing word. This does not have to happen altogether arbitrarily, but rather so that a certain mo-
ment of meaning, which was already implied by and co-intended in the colloquial usage, 
becomes thematized in the terminological employment (cf. GA 18:23, already cited above). 
In such a case, the meaning of an existing word is not extended as in metaphor, but rather 
something is brought into relief that was already ‘meant along with’ in the current colloquial 
usage; something already co-signified, co-intended (mitgemeint) becomes clear for the first 
time. Such is the case for instance with the term ou0si/a, which is perhaps the most fundamen-
tal of all the fundamental concepts of Greek philosophy. Aristotle does not coin neologisms 
for the needs of a philosophical system, but rather reveals meanings that in a peculiar way 
already belong to the horizon of the Greek being-in-the-world, as something co-intended and 
even essentially inherent but at the same time implicit, not fully thematized.  
 The term ou0si/a is of course a privileged example in this respect. Aristotle himself 
uses it occasionally in the economic sense of real property, the immovables. But we should 
not try to ‘somehow deduce’ the terminological sense from the colloquial, as Heidegger 
warns us, while this colloquial meaning can indeed give us some indications in the direction 
of the terminological meaning. Ou0si/a in the colloquial sense, as for instance household 
commodities, is something that is in a quite specific way there for me, at my disposal and in-
deed on a daily basis (tagtäglich), more or less constantly. In this colloquial meaning already 
resides, as co-intended, the way of being that characterizes the philosophical concept of 
ou0si/a, namely being as permanent presence (ständige Anwesenheit) or “being there in the 
sense of being at one’s disposal [Dasein in der Weise des Verfügbarseins]”.301  So here it is 
                                                 
300  Heidegger designates his 1924 lectures on Aristotle as Philologie rather than philosophy, insofar as philol-
ogy means “passion for the knowledge concerning the articulated [die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis des Aus-
gesprochenen]” (GA 18:3-7, 333-334). 
301 “Ousi/a ist ein solches Seiendes, das in einer betonten Weise für mich da ist, so daß ich es brauchen kann, 
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not a question of the metaphysical grinding stone that wears off the concrete and real prop-
erty first by metaphor and then by abstraction, then forgets this genealogy of its concepts and 
pretends to have drawn its currency, whose finite value has been lost but also replaced by an 
alleged infinity of value, out of the heavens of ideas (as in Anatole France’s mythologie 
blanche),302  but of revealing what was already co-signified in the current market, namely in 
the colloquial usage. It is the ways of being that already accompany, as co-intended, the eve-
ryday discourse on beings, the thinghood of the things in question. 
 Thus when analysing being-towards-death and further, in connection to this, ontologi-
cal guilt (Schuldigsein) in Sein und Zeit (§ 62), Heidegger can distinguish his terminology 
from the theological themes that undoubtedly sound similar to these ontological questions of 
guilt and many other themes of his Fundamentalontologie, by referring to the fact that this 
ontology of Dasein as a properly philosophical questioning principally ‘knows’ nothing of 
sin (“sofern sie als philosophisches Fragen grundsätzlich nichts von der Sünde »weiß«”) or 
of the theologically understood status corruptionis, whereas theology may, in return, find for 
the fact of fallenness its condition of possibility in the existentially determined guilt provided 
by the ontological analysis.303  The disclosure of the co-intended meanings as an ontology 
of Dasein may reveal the conditions of possibility for the nearest and most original ways of 
meaning (cf. GA 18:84), of which it does not itself ‘know’ anything, by virtue of its principal 
status as philosophical questioning (though these specific meanings certainly belong histori-
cally to the hermeneutic situation of which the ontologist must begin his analysis); this enter-
prise of disclosure aims to reach what is on the principal level (grundsätzlich) nearer and 
more original than the more immediate near and original out of which it is possible to carry-
over-along-with [metafe/rein] the “how of the intendedness”. This is indeed an Aristotelian 
method: from that which is better known and clearer for us [h9mi=n] we proceed toward what is 
better known and clearer by nature [th|= fu/sei], that is, the governing sources [a0rxai/] (see 
for instance the very beginning of the Physics). But on the ontic level, the level better known 
and clearer to us, the thematization of the ontological meaning, which is in a certain way al-
                                                                                                                                                        
daß es mir zu Verfügung steht, mit dem ich tagtäglich zu tun habe, dasjenige Seiende, das in meinem tag-
täglichen Umgang mit der Welt da ist, auch wenn ich Wissenschaft treibe, ein bevorzugtes, fundamentales 
Seiendes als in seinem Sein Seiendes, im Wie seines Seins. Auch in der geläufigen Bedeutung ist das Wie 
des Seins mitgemeint.” (GA 18:25. On “ständige Anwesenheit”, cf. e.g. GA 31:52.) On Verfügbarsein as 
distinguished from mere Vorhandenheit, cf. the much later text “Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vor-
trag »Zeit und Sein«” (1962), with examples from the poets Trakl and Rimbaud to confirm that the expres-
sions es gibt and ist are often meant in ways altogether other than that of the pure and simple “presence-at-
hand” of objects (in Zur Sache des Denkens [1976], pp. 42-43). Verfügbarsein (availability, being at one’s 
disposal) stands in relation to human beings but it does not characterize the way of being that is proper to 
the human Dasein; as was already noticed, even a corpse is not quite verfügbar (disposable) in Heidegger’s 
analysis. 
302  Cf. the “Exergue” of Derrida’s “La mythologie blanche” (in Marges, 1972), and Ricœur’s objection to 
what he takes to be Derrida’s thesis on the “white mythology” and its usure (La métaphore vive [1975], esp. 
p. 371). 
303  “Die Theologie kann in dem existentiale bestimmten Schuldigsein eine ontologische Bedingung seiner [i.e. 
de statu corruptionis] faktische Möglichkeit finden.” (SuZ, 306n1.) 
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ways already co-intended, is by no means a carrying over and lifting above, or a bridge from 
the sensible to the suprasensible realm. The transparency of one’s own possibility of being, 
Seinsmöglichkeit, is not some purification from worldliness, but is established only when the 
priority of being-guilty (“vorgängige und ständige Schuldigsein … in seiner Vorgängigkeit”) 
“has been enlisted in [hineingestellt] that possibility which is simply not to be out-
stripped”:304 
 
wenn diese [Vorgängigkeit] hineingestellt wird in die Möglichkeit, die für das Dasein 
schlechthin unüberholbar ist. Wenn die Entschlossenheit vorlaufend die Möglichkeit 
des Todes in ihr Seinkönnen eingeholt hat, kann die eigentliche Existenz des Daseins 
durch nichts mehr überholt werden. [SuZ, § 62, p. 307.]305 
 
The ownmost possibility of Dasein, death as the possibility of the impossibility to be there 
anymore (“Sein Tod ist die Möglichkeit des Nicht-mehr-dasein-könnens”), which fully assigns 
Dasein to its ownmost ability to be (“Wenn das Dasein als diese Möglichkeit seiner selbst 
sich bevorsteht, ist es völlig  auf sein eigenstes Seinkönnen verwiesen”), cannot be 
outstripped, overtaken, or surpassed by anything else and not by Dasein itself either:  
 
Als Seinkönnen vermag das Dasein die Möglichkeit des Todes nicht zu überholen. 
Der Tod ist die Möglichkeit der schlechthinningen Daseinsunmöglichkeit. So enthüllt 
sich der Tod als die eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare Möglichkeit. [SuZ, § 50, p. 
250.]  
 
Dasein cannot overtake or surpass its ownmost possibility of being: its ‘completeness’ re-
sides in its constant incompleteness, in its “anticipatory resoluteness [vorlaufende 
Entschlossenheit]”. Unlike the beings whose way of being is either presence-at-hand (Vor-
handenheit) or readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), Dasein has no such end “at which it just 
stops, but it exists finitely”.306  Speaking of the end that is proper to the human being-there is 
indeed a struggle at the frontiers of ‘language’, the ‘standard’ language and what is sayable in 
it,307  because this end is radically different from all the other ends. And it is a struggle 
against metaphor too, an attempt to reduce the alleged metaphoricity of this way of speaking 
ad absurdum: being-towards-the-end is not a metaphor for the human way of being, but the 
                                                 
304 En. trans. Macquarrie & Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 355 [307]. Emphasis and the addition in 
square brackets are as in the original text of the translators. 
305 The rest of this passage is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as follows: “When, in anticipation, reso-
luteness has caught up the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein’s authentic existence 
can no longer be outstripped by anything.” (P. 355. I leave off the translators’ additions in brackets, since 
the original German text is cited above. Because the translation also adds the pagination of the original text 
in its margins, I shall not hereafter add the page numbers of the English version.) 
306 “Es hat nicht ein Ende, an dem es nur aufhört, sondern existiert endlich.” (SuZ, 329-330, trans. Macquarrie 
& Robinson.) 
307  Cf. Wittgenstein’s formerly “little known” but by now famous note from 1929 on Heidegger’s talk of Sein 
and Angst (“This running-up against the limits of language is Ethics”), translated and commented on by Mi-
chael Murray in Murray, ed., Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (1978), pp. 80-81 (and the editor’s com-
mentary on pp. 81-83). 
Prolegomena 149
most outstanding and proper characteristic of the human life, or as Heidegger would rather 
have it called, Dasein. 
                                                
 So all this, the whole analysis of being-towards-the-end and being-towards-death, 
could be read against the exemplary ‘metaphor’ mentioned by Aristotle. Seen from this per-
spective, Aristotle disregards what in that allegedly merely ‘metaphorical’ way of speaking 
already speaks of the pre-ontological understanding of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit).  
Death as the end of “being-there” is (only) in this being’s being-towards-its-end: “Der 
Tod ist als Ende des Daseins im Sein dieses Seienden zu seinem Ende.” (SuZ, § 52, p. 259.) 
 
 
THE “UNSTABLE MULTIPLICITY” OF PRIMORDIAL SPEECH 
 
But how are we to understand the primordial equivocality characterizing the non-thematized, 
but implicit co-intendedness of Dasein’s openness to its own being as manifested in such 
non-metaphorical, pre-metaphorical turns of speech as ‘death is the end of life’ (meaning 
completion of life, that which brings life to its limits, that which essentially determines life 
from within — as its internal limit)? Is this horizon of equivocality an originary richness of 
meaning residing in the original spontaneity of Dasein’s implicit, pre-thematic self-
interpretation (in other words, the ontological precomprehension whose explication, in the 
sense of unfolding and thematization is, for Heidegger at least, the task of phenomenology), 
or rather poverty as an openness toward future? Or both at once? Both of these suggestions 
could be discussed with regard to Heidegger’s works. Perhaps we might also say that it is a 
question of neither positivity nor negativity but a certain type of neutrality. I would borrow 
Derrida’s words in order to designate this neutrality or this unstable, potential multiplicity (cf. 
Apories, pp. 26-27) as disseminality. It precedes the actual dispersion (or dissemination) of 
meanings (and thereby also the restricted polysemy that can be included in a dictionary) and 
corresponds to the dispersion in space of the primordial “meaningfulness of the world” for 
Dasein, of which Heidegger speaks in a passage of Sein und Zeit that Paul Celan marked with 
a double stroke in the margin.308  In a passage of his important essay “Différence sexuelle, 
différence ontologique (Geschlecht I)” (published first in 1983, henceforth “Geschlecht I”), 
Derrida writes:  
 
Toute langue est d’abord déterminée par des significations spatiales (Raumbedeutun-
gen). Le phénomène desdites métaphores spatialisantes n’est nullement accidentel ou 
à la portée du concept rhétorique de « métaphore ». Ce n’est pas une fatalité ex-
térieure.309 
 
308 SuZ, § 34, p. 166 [GA 2:221]; the passage (which we have already cited) was marked by Celan with a dou-
ble stroke in the margin (La bi. phi., 379, No. 609). 
309 In Heidegger et la question: De l’esprit et autres essais (Paris: Flammarion, 1990), p. 164. En. trans. Ruben 
Bevezdivin, in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia U.P., 1991), 
pp. 380-402, here p. 395: “Every language is first of all determined by spatial significations [...]. The phe-
nomenon of so-called spatializing metaphors is not at all accidental, nor within the scope of the rhetorical 
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The concept of metaphor is irrelevant at the level where the languages not only ‘contain’ but 
are determined by spatial significations, while this primary determination of all languages 
indicates “the phenomenon of Dasein’s dispersion in space”.310  As the title suggests, Der-
rida’s essay is primarily concerned with the theme of sexual difference — which might seem 
conspicuously absent from Heidegger’s work, including the fundamental ontology of Sein 
und Zeit — with respect to ontological difference in early Heidegger’s thought, but this ques-
tion is related to the general theme of Dasein’s ontological “neutrality” with respect to “all 
factual [and ontic] concretion [vor aller faktischen Konkretion]”. In the 1928 lectures on the 
metaphysical foundations of logic (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von 
Leibniz, GA 26), Heidegger writes:  
 
Die eigentümliche Neutralität des Titels ›das Dasein‹ ist wesentlich, weil die 
Interpretation dieses Seienden vor aller faktischen Konkretion durchzuführen ist. 
Diese Neutralität besagt auch, daß das Dasein keines von beiden Geschlechtern ist. 
Aber diese Geschlechtslosigkeit ist nicht die Indifferenz des leeren Nichtigen, die 
schwache Negativität eines indifferenten ontischen Nichts. Das Dasein in seiner 
Neutralität ist nicht indifferent Niemand und Jeder, sondern die ursprüngliche 
Positivität und Mächtigkeit des Wesens. Die Neutralität ist nicht die Nichtigkeit einer 
Abstraktion, sondern gerade die Mächtigkeit des Ursprunges, der in sich die innere 
Möglichkeit eines jeden konkreten faktischen Menschentums trägt. [GA 26:171-172; 
cf. also p. 173.] 
 
The notion of Dasein’s neutrality means, first of all, and already before this adverb auch 
(“also”) is applied to the example of sexual difference, “the neutralization of everything but 
the naked trait [le trait nu]” of Dasein’s relation to itself; it means the reduction or subtrac-
tion, neutralization of  “every anthropological, ethical or metaphysical predetermination so as 
to keep nothing but a relation to itself, a bare relation, to the Being of its being [de rapport 
dépouillée à l’être de son étant]” (“Geschlecht I”, p. 152/384). Terms like ‘neutrality’ and 
also ‘asexuality’ (Geschlechtslosigkeit) are problematic because of the negativity they sug-
gest, and therefore Heidegger has to make the distinction that in Dasein’s neutrality it is not a 
question of indifference or of  an empty abstraction from ontic determinations, “a neither-
nor” (ein Weder-noch), but “the authentic concrete of the origin [das eigentlich Konkrete des 
Ursprunges]”, more concrete than the concrete since it is originary neutrality and since it 
precedes the ontic determinations as their ontological a priori, as “the not-yet of  dispersed-
ness [das Noch-nicht der faktischen Zerstreutheit]”. The neutrality of the name Dasein is es-
                                                                                                                                                        
concept of ‘metaphor’. It is not some exterior fatality.” Henceforth cited as “Geschlecht I”,  p. 164/395, the 
first page number referring to the French and the second to the English version. — For Heidegger’s discus-
sion of “spatial meanings [Raumbedeutungen]”, cf. GA 26:173; Derrida refers here also to Sein und Zeit, p. 
166 (GA 2:221). 
310 Heidegger himself writes: “Das Phänomen der Zerstreuung des Daseins in den Raum hinein zeigt sich z.B. 
darin, daß alle Sprachen primär durch Raumbedeutungen bestimmt sind.” (GA 26:173.) As Derrida para-
phrases: “La dispersion spatiale ou espaçante se manifeste par exemple dans la langue.” (“The spatial or 
spacing dispersion is manifested, for instance, in language.” Loc. cit.)  
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sential, since the interpretation of this being must be accomplished before any  concretion, 
including such corporeal ‘dispersion’ as sex, “before and outside of a concretion of that 
type”.311  This neutrality is neither abstraction nor negation but, on the contrary, the very 
positivity and power of origin, power of essence (Mächtigkeit des Ursprunges [Heidegger 
underlines the word Ursprunges], Mächtigkeit des Wesens): it is an “originary positivity”. 
And furthermore, speaking of this originary neutrality (preceding the sexual division but per-
haps not sexuality itself — or Geschlechtlichkeit, which is itself more equivocal than the Eng-
lish term ‘sexuality’ — in a more primordial sense, not yet divided into the two sexes) does 
not mean to deny the fact that Dasein always does exist in its  concretion. (“Dieses neutrale 
Dasein ist nie das Existierende; es existiert das Dasein je nur in seiner faktischen Konkre-
tion.”) This “‘power of the origin’ bears within itself the internal possibility of humanity in its 
concrete factuality”, as Derrida paraphrases.312 
 So Dasein on the whole (or “in general”, überhaupt) “hides, shelters in itself the in-
ternal possibility of a factual dispersion or dissemination in its own body and ‘thereby in 
sexuality’”, as Derrida and his translator Bevezdivin partly paraphrase, partly translate Hei-
degger’s sentence: “Das Dasein überhaupt birgt die innere Möglichkeit für die faktische Zer-
streuung in die Leiblichkeit und damit in die Geschlechtlichkeit.” Every Leib, every ‘lived 
body’, as Leib is sometimes translated, or “proper body of one’s own [corps propre] is sexed, 
and there is no Dasein without its own body”.313  But the “neutral” Geschlechtlichkeit which 
precedes the factual dispersion or division denoted by its ontico-empirical homonym is, as 
Derrida notes, pre-sexual or, rather, pre-differential, pre-dual or pre-dualistic. It is disseminal-
ity before dissemination (inasmuch as the latter term is understood as dispersion, Zer-
streuung). And of course, this neutrality which is also a “pre-sexual” neutrality (and pre-
dualistic sexuality) is not only related to sexuality. It originally, originarily belongs to the 
primordial concretion of Dasein, which is also “worldliness” and “spatiality”, not to mention 
the major theme of Being and Time, temporality. 
 This is how Derrida (in  Bevezdivin’s translation) paraphrases or partly translates a 
passage in Heidegger’s lectures:  
 
                                                 
311 GA 26:173; on the a priori, cf. p. 183; Derrida, “Geschlecht I”,  p. 152/385. 
312 “Geschlecht I”,  p. 158/389; cf. Heidegger, GA 26:171-173. As Derrida suggests, the ontological negativity 
of this originary Geschlechtslosigkeit “is not deployed with respect to sexuality itself […], but with respect 
to the marks of difference, or more precisely to sexual duality”. Dasein is not deprived of sex, but its sexu-
ality must be conceived of as “predifferential, or rather a predual, sexuality”. And this “Geschlechtslosigkeit 
would not be [any] more negative than aletheia”: we are thus perhaps even invited to think of this suffix 
“-los-” in the same manner as we may think of the privative alpha of a-letheia, ‘truth’ as un-concealment 
(“Geschlecht I”,  p. 155-6/387-8). — It must be noted, with Derrida, that Heidegger does not use the word 
Sexualität here, but the much more polyvalent word Geschlechtlichkeit. As Derrida points out, this enables 
Heidegger later to use the concepts of generation, race, mankind, ancestry, descent, etc., along with sexual 
division, or all at once, all of these concepts bundled into one ‘Geschlechtlichkeit’, and also with reference  
to Georg Trakl’s enigmatically emphasized “E i n  Geschlecht” (cf. “Geschlecht I”,  p. 159/390-391; cf.  
“La main de Heidegger [Geschlecht II]” and “De l’esprit: Heidegger et la question”, in the same volume). 
313 Derrida, “Geschlecht I”,  p. 160-161/391-392; Heidegger, GA 26:173. 
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First of all, Dasein never relates to an object, to a sole object. If it does, it is always in 
the mode of abstraction or abstention from other beings which always co-appear at the 
same time. [We remember the other abstraction: the ‘abstract hearing’ that would turn 
away from the ‘things themselves’, which are nevertheless far more familiar to us, as 
Heidegger maintains, than pure noise or mere sensations in general. I think musique 
concrète is a way to bring this enigma into relief, and not at all to forget it; modern art 
in general can be seen as a sort of practical phenomenology.] This multiplication does 
not supervene because there is a plurality of objects; actually it is the converse that 
takes place. It is the originary disseminal structure, the dispersion of Dasein, that 
makes possible this multiplicity.314   
 
This multiplicity is originally no aggregate of objects subsisting by themselves, each of them 
subsisting by itself, and confronted by a subject. Instead, it is the multiplicity, or rather the 
multiplying structure (Mannigfaltigung), that makes this appearing-together or co-apparition 
possible. This primordial disseminality, pre-disseminated dissemination (ursprüngliche 
Streuung), belongs to Dasein, belongs to the very essence of the human being-there itself. It 
is the human being-there, Dasein, and this ‘is’ must indeed be taken ‘transitively’, as Heideg-
ger sometimes insists.  
 Indeed, the ‘linguistic’ disseminality must also be seen in a relation of equiprimor-
diality with the originary spatio-temporal multiplicity that characterizes Dasein.315  It is a 
question of a pre-metaphoric, pre-literal, preter-intentional disseminality. If we accept Hei-
degger’s view of language as essentially poetic (Dichtung im wesentlichen Sinne) and of po-
etry as the most essential and primordial language,316  and his view of the essentially poetic 
equivocality as a “garden of wilderness”, we must also concede that our words overpower us, 
that they ‘over-dict’ themselves in a strange manner, that they are both indebted to their his-
tory and open to their future. And yet, the equiprimordiality of being and being-there (Sein, 
Dasein), and on the other hand, the relation of equiprimordiality that resides between being 
and language (logos, “conversance”), the relation that deploys itself (west) as logos itself, 
                                                 
314 “Tout d’abord, le Dasein ne se rapporte jamais à un objet, à un seul objet. S’il le fait, c’est toujours sur le 
mode de l’abstraction ou de l’abstention à l’égard des autres étants qui co-apparaissent toujours en même 
temps. Et cette multiplication ne survient pas en raison du fait qu’il y a pluralité d’objets, c’est en vérité 
l’inverse qui a lieu. C’est la structure originairement disséminale, c’est la dispersion du Dasein qui rend 
possible cette multiplicité.” (“Geschlecht I”, p. 163/393-394.) Cf. Heidegger, GA 26:173: “Hierzu ein roher 
Hinweis: Das Dasein verhält sich als existierendes nie je nur zu einem Objekt, und wenn, dann nur in der 
Weise des Absehens von zuvor und zugleich immer miterscheinenden anderen Seienden. Diese 
Mannigfaltigung geschieht nicht dadurch, daß es mehrere Objekte gibt, sondern umgekehrt.” — Cf. also 
Rodolphe Gasché, “Du trait non adéquat : la notion de rapport chez Heidegger”, in Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, eds., Les fins de l’homme : à partir du travail de Jacques Derrida [Colloque de 
Cérisy, 23 juillet – 2 août 1980] (Paris: Galilée, 1981), pp. 133-159 (and “Debat” on pp. 159-161); En. 
trans. Leonard Lawlor, “On the Nonadequate Trait”, in Gasché, Of Minimal Things (Stanford: Stanford 
U.P., 1999), pp. 195-220; “Joining the Text” (1980), also in Of Minimal Things, pp. 221-241; and “Meta-
phor”, in The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 
1986), pp. 293-318. 
315 Equiprimordiality (Gleichursprünglichkeit) is one of the key concepts of Heidegger’s early thought. Cf. 
Gasché’s article “On the Nonadequate Trait” for a concise discussion of this term (pp. 197ff); “Du 
trait non adéquat”, pp. 135ff. 
316 “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, in Holzwege (1950), op. cit., p. 61; Celan, La bi. phi., p. 359, No. 237 
(loc. cit.). 
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“manifests itself always (es gibt) only in an extreme singularity”.317  In the vocabulary of 
Celan’s Meridian speech, this ‘corresponds’ (while it is exactly this word ‘corresponds’ that 
is altogether irrelevant here) to “radical individuation” (which is actually part of Heidegger’s 
vocabulary, too: cf. Sein und Zeit, § 7, p. 38: “radikalsten Individuation”):  
 
[...] das Gedicht behauptet sich am Rande seiner selbst; es ruft und holt sich, um 
bestehen zu können, unausgesetzt aus seinem Schon-nicht-mehr in sein Immer-noch 
zurück. 
Dieses Immer-noch kann doch wohl nur ein Sprechen sein. Also nicht Sprache 
schlechthin und vermutlich auch nicht erst vom Wort her »Entsprechung«.  
Sondern aktualisierte Sprache, freigesetzt unter dem Zeichen einer zwar radikalen, 
aber gleichzeitig auch der ihr von der Sprache gezogenen Grenzen, der ihr von der 
Sprache erschlossenen Möglichkeiten eingedenk bleibenden Individuation. 
Dieses Immer-noch des Gedichts kann ja wohl nur in dem Gedicht dessen zu finden 
sein, der nicht vergißt, daß er unter dem Neigungswinkel seines Daseins, dem 
Neigungswinkel seiner Kreatürlichkeit spricht. [TCA/Meridian, Endf. 32-33.]318 
 
As we can gather from both the Edgar Jené essay of 1948 and the Bremen Prize Speech of 
1958, language is, for Celan, sedimented as “ashes of extinguished sense-giving and not only 
these!”, and “enriched” (“angereichert” — this is also a geological term, presented with the 
ironic distance of the quotation marks) by all that it has had to pass through, including the 
Nazi verbicide (and not only that!),319  but also something “reachable” (erreichbar) and actu-
                                                 
317 Gasché, “On the Nonadequate Trait”, p. 210; cf. “Du trait non adéquat”, p. 149. “Conversance” is Warnek 
and Brogan’s very fortunate translation of logos and for Heidegger’s translation of logos as Kundschaft; cf. 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics ? 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1995), 
i.e. the translation of Heidegger, GA 33. 
318 The word between  quotation marks, Entsprechung, has caused some perplexion, especially in one very 
specific reader of the Meridian, as it seems, namely Martin Heidegger, who has added a question mark in 
his personal copy of the speech. However, it seems to me that the denial of a poem’s being Entsprechung is 
not a critical remark in Heidegger’s direction, because Celan elsewhere has written very approvingly of the 
Heideggerean talk of “responding to the addressing of language”. Cf. Hadrien France-Lanord, Paul Celan et 
Martin Heidegger : le sens d’un dialogue (Paris: Fayard, 2004); James K. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin 
Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation 1951-1970  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 2006). — Cf. Sein 
und Zeit, § 7, p. 38: “Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin. Die Transzendenz des Seins des Daseins ist eine 
ausgezeichnete, sofern in ihr die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der radikalsten Individuation liegt.” The 
first of these two sentences, “Sein ist das transcendens schlechthin”, has been marked by Celan in his per-
sonal copy of the book (cf. La bi. phi., p. 375, No. 553). 
319 “So mußte ich auch erkennen, daß sich zu dem, was zutiefst in seinem Innern seit unvordenklichen Zeiten 
nach Ausdruck rang, auch noch die Asche ausgebrannter Sinngebung gesellt hatte und nicht nur diese!” 
(“Edgar Jené und der Traum vom Traume”, GW 3:155-161, here p. 157.) Cf. Zanetti, »zeitoffen«, pp. 56ff, 
56n24. — I wonder if Celan had come across the paleontological (or paleobiological as well as geological) 
term Konzentratlagerstätte (or Konzentrat-Lagerstätte, “concentration deposit”, distinguished from Konser-
vat-Lagerstätte): “In [a Konzentrat-Lagerstätte, concentration deposit] organic remains are concentrated by 
sedimentological and biological processes which generally exclude the preservation of organic soft parts.” 
(Peter A. Allison, “Konservat-Lagerstätten: cause and classification”, in Paleobiology, 14(4), 1988, pp. 
331-344, here p. 331.) Cf. Michael Streng, Gerd Geyer, Graham E. Budd, “A bone bed without bones: the 
Middle Cambrian ‘fragment limestone’ of Scania, Sweden”: “The fragment limestone is considered here to 
be a condensation deposit (Konzentratlagerstätte) in which phosphatic-shelled organisms have been en-
riched by long-term sedimentary reworking and winnowing of finer material.” [Abstract from: “The Palae-
ontological Association 50th Annual Meeting, 18th–21st December 2006, University of Sheffield. Ab-
stracts.” URL: http://www.palass.org/downloads/Annual 2006 Schedule&Abstracts.pdf. Accessed Dec. 
2006.] Cf. “Glossar” in Palaeo-Online.de: “Konzentratlagerstätte | Fossillagerstätte, die sich durch eine 
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alized only in “radical individuation” — not only the words containing the adjective reich 
(perhaps alluding to the noun Reich, as has been suggested; and this is indeed not only a con-
jecture, if we take the context of the word “angereichert” and its counter-word erreichbar 
into account), but also the word hindurch have a double aspect at least: it is through (hin-
durch) all the atrocities that language has had to pass, but also the poem is a narrow passage 
that life must pass through.320  Here is the passage in the Bremen Speech: 
 
Erreichbar, nah und unverloren blieb inmitten der Verluste dies eine: die Sprache. 
Sie, die Sprache, blieb unverloren, ja, trotz allem. Aber sie mußte nun hindurchgehen 
durch ihre eigenen Antwortlosigkeiten, hindurchgehen durch furchtbares 
Verstummen, hindurchgehen durch die tausend Finsternisse todbringender Rede. Sie 
ging hindurch und gab keine Worte her für das, was geschah; aber sie ging durch 
dieses Geschehen. Ging hindurch und durfte wieder zutage treten, »angereichert« von 
all dem. [GW 3, 185-186.] 
 
The proximity, the “neighbourliness [Nachbarschaft]”321  between Celan and Heidegger is 
sometimes quite astonishing (we can actually touch upon only a couple of its aspects here); 
and yet, it is also shadowed by a certain, very specific silence: Heidegger’s relative silence 
concerning the atrocities committed by his former party comrades. And not only that: obvi-
ously enough, Celan thematizes the semantic ‘enrichment’, the historicity and sedimentation 
of language or the ‘names’ contained in it, with an ongoing reference to the verbicide and 
genocide committed in the name of the Third Reich. Celan’s poetics of “straitening”322  must 
                                                                                                                                                        
hohe Konzentration von Fossilien auszeichnet, z. B. aufgrund von Anreicherung durch Strömungen oder 
Stürme, auch durch natürliche Tierfallen wie Sümpfe oder Senken mit giftigen vulkanischen Gasen.” (URL: 
http:// www.palaeo-online.de/d/allg/glossar html#Anchor-39943.) 
320 “Gedichte sind Engpässe / ‘Du mußt hier hindurch, Leben’: Daseinsentwürfe.” (TCA/Meridian Ms. 352; cf. 
passim and below.) “Daseinsentwürfe” seems to have a Heideggerian motivation, and not only, or primar-
ily, through the term Dasein (which is indeed the place where truth, as unconcealment and openness and 
clearing takes place); cf. Celan’s highlighting (by a stroke in the margin and underlining) of the following 
sentences in Heidegger’s “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, which have had an obvious importance for his 
poetics: “Dichtung aber ist kein schweifendes Ersinnen des Beliebigen und kein Vershweben des bloßen 
Vorstellens und Einbildens in das Unwirkliche. Was die Dichtung als lichtender Entwurf an Unverborgen-
heit auseinanderfaltet und in den Riß der Gestalt vorauswirft, ist das Offene, das sie geschehen läßt und 
zwar dergestalt, daß jetzt das Offene erst inmitten des Seienden dieses zum Leuchten und Klingen bringt. 
Im Wesensblick auf das Wesen des Werkes und seinen Bezug zum Geschehns der Wahrheit des Seienden 
wird fraglich, ob das Wesen der Dichtung, und das sagt zugleich des Entwurfs, von der Imagination und 
Einbildungskraft her hinreichend gedacht werden kann. [...] Der Dichtende Entwurf kommt aus dem Nichts 
in der Hinsicht, daß er sein Geschenk nie aus dem Geläufigen und Bis-herigen nimmt.” (Holzwege [Frank-
furt a.M.: Klostermann, 1950], pp. 60, 63; cit. Celan, La bi. phi., pp. 358-359, nos. 235, 239.) Cf. e.g. in the 
poem “Aber”: “vom Nichts her, ein Wurfholz” (GW 1:182), and the discussion concerning that poem be-
low. 
321 Cf. Celan’s draft for a letter to Heidegger, which he never sent, however, as far as we know; cited  by Ha-
drien France-Lanord (2004); cited also by James K. Lyon (2006); also in Celan, Mikrolithen (2005). 
322 “[...] geh mit der Kunst in deine allereigenste Enge. Und setze dich frei.” (TCA/Meridian Endf. 42). Trans. 
John Felstiner: “Enlarge art? / No. But with art go into your very selfmost straits. And set yourself free.” 
(Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan [2001].) “Straitening” is Michael Hamburger’s translation of the 
title “Engführung”, which has also been translated by the technical term “Stretto” (by Felstiner, in the men-
tioned collection; I think the French title “Strette” was first introduced by André du Bouchet, who had con-
sulted Celan himself for the translation). Several other poems (only one example: “Sprich auch du”, 
GW 1:135) and also the poetological fragments (in e.g. TCA/Meridian) often repeat the thematics of “strait-
ening” or “constriction”, and this should be related also to Heidegger’s discussion of Angst and its  lan-
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be understood with respect to this double bind — let us say, the necessity of purifying words 
(ironically evoked by speaking of a “circumcision of the word”) with respect to its very im-
possibility (every word is exposed to being prostituted, “enwhored by the flayer’s-ears”, um-
hurt von den Schinderohren) — or these double binds (also as an ongoing, profoundly am-
bivalent dialogue with Heidegger), and this aporetic must also be related to the incitement of 
the tropes and metaphors, in a poem, to be “carried ad absurdum”.323 
 
 
PRAYER ON THE HITHER SIDE OF PRAYER (CELAN: “WIRK NICHT VORAUS”) 
  
Paul Celan marked in his personal copy of Sein und Zeit several passages dealing with death 
as the limit that enters the very structure of Dasein itself as its ownmost possibility;  here is 
one of the sentences he marked:  
 
Die Analyse des Todes bleibt aber insofern rein »diesseitig«, als sie das Phänomen 
lediglich daraufhin interpretiert, wie es als Seinsmöglichkeit des jeweiligen Daseins in 
dieses hereinsteht. [SuZ, § 49, 248.]324 
 
This inclusion instead of exclusion, this standing-into or coming hither (hereinstehen) and 
this sub-lunar “behither” (as I would render »diesseitig«) correspond to the antimetaphoric 
characteristics in Paul Celan’s poetry and poetics. Heidegger has reduced the Aristotelian 
‘metaphor’ into a structure of inclusion and insists that this talk of death as an ‘end’ of life 
belongs to the structure of life itself. 
 The last poem of the book Lichtzwang (1970), written in December 1967, contains 
certain terms that we encounter in reading the discussions of Sein-zum-Ende, Sein-zum-Tode 
in Heidegger’s work: these words are hereinstehen, unüberholbar, and the line “durch-
gründet vom Nichts”, which seems an unmistakable allusion to Heidegger’s discussion of  
Angst in Sein und Zeit and especially in “Was ist Metaphysik?” (1929).325  Remarkably 
                                                                                                                                                        
guage-related aspects. (See also below.) 
323 Cf. GW 1:242, 275; GW 3:199; and below; the translation of the expression “umhurt von den Schin-
derohren” is mine. 
324 Cf. Celan, La bi. phi., pp. 380ff (this quote on p. 381, No. 647). Celan has underlined and otherwise marked 
passages dealing with death in Sein und Zeit at least  in §§ 46-53, on each of the pages between pp. 237-
257, then again on pp. 263-267; there are, according to the catalogue, some seventy-five markings on these 
twenty-five pages. 
325 Cf. SuZ, “§ 40. Die Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst als eine ausgezeichnete Erschlossenheit des Daseins” 
(pp. 191ff, and on p. 186: “Das bedrohende [im Angst] [...] ist schon »da« – und doch nirgends, es ist so 
nah, daß es beengt und einem den Atem verschlägt – und doch nirgends.”), and esp. “Was ist Metaphysik?”: 
“Die Angst offenbart das Nichts. / [...] Nur das reine Da-sein in der Durchschütterung dieses Schwebens, 
darin es sich an nichts halten kann, ist noch da. / Die Angst verschlägt uns das Wort. [...] Mit der Grund-
stimmung des Angst haben wir das Geschehen des Daseins erreicht, in dem das Nichts offenbar ist [...]. [...] 
das Dasein vom Nichten des Nichts durchschüttert bleibt. Abgründiger als die bloße Angemessenheit der 
denkenden Verneinung ist die Härte des Entgegenhandelns und die Schärfe des Verabscheuens. [...] Die 
Durchdrungenheit des Daseins vom nichtenden Verhalten bezeugt die ständige und freilich verdunkelte Of-
fenbarkeit des Nichts, das ursprünglich nur die Angst enthüllt. Darin liegt aber: diese urpsrüngliche Angst 
wird im Dasein zumeist niedergehalten. Die Angst ist da. Sie schläft nur. Ihr Atem zittert ständig durch das 
Dasein: [...] am sichersten durch das im Grunde verwegene Dasein. [...] So endlich sind wir, daß wir gerade 
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 enough, this vocabulary is used together with several easily recognizable theologemes: not 
only prayer but also predestination, the sending out of the apostles; these theologemes are 
denied to the addressee of this prayer without prayer. There is also the Pre-Script that is un-
surpassable, not surpassed by Scripture, unlike the Old Testament which allegedly prefigured 
the New Testament and was then surpassed by it, according to the traditional Christian con-
ception. This Pre-Script is an antitype, a contra-figura resisting the typological order. What is 
especially striking at the first reading of this poem, consisting of a single sentence, is its syn-
tactic ambiguity, forcing this first reading to divide itself: 
 
WIRK NICHT VORAUS, 















The equivocality does not reside only in the fact that this poem seems to contradict its own 
manner of speaking: it begins in the imperative or optative mode, but the middle strophe con-
tains the clause “ledig allen / Gebets”. As if the poem said: pray — that is: please — be free 
of all prayer. Or: I beg you, and I receive you, but free of all prayer. The syntax allows for the 
reader’s ignorance as to the reference of the attributes (adjectives and whole clauses) in 
                                                                                                                                                        
nicht durch eigenen Beschluß und Willen uns ursprünglich vor das Nichts zu bringen vermögen. So ab-
gründig gräbt im Dasein die Verendlichung, daß sich unserer Freiheit die eigenste und tiefste Endlichkeit 
versagt. [...] Einzig weil das Nichts im Grunde des Daseins offenbar ist, kann die volle Befremdlichkeit des 
Seienden über uns kommen.” (Wegmarken, pp. 112, 117-118, 121.) 
326 In Lichtzwang (TCA/Lichtzwang, pp. 178-179; GW  2:328). Transl. John Felstiner: “Do not work ahead, / do 
not send abroad, / stand / in here: // deep-grounded by Nothingness, / free of all / prayer, / fine-fitted to / the 
Pre-Script / unoutstrippable, // you I take up / in place of all / rest.” (Selected Poems and Prose of Paul 
Celan [2001], p. 325.) I have attempted a more detailed and otherwise focused analysis of this poem in a 
forthcoming article entitled “‘Schreiben als Form des Gebets’ — An Impossible Form of Apostrophe? 
(‘P.S.’ on a Fragment by Kafka as Adapted by Celan)”, in Päivi Mehtonen, ed., Illuminating Darkness: Ap-
proaches to Obscurity and Nothingness in Literature (forthcoming, 2007). In the present context I will dis-
cuss the poem from a slightly different viewpoint. Here I will not discuss the previous readings of this poem 
by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Anders Olsson and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe either (Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Im 
Schatten des Nihilismus”, in Hubert Dethier, Eldert Willems, eds., Cultural Hermeneutics of Modern Art: 
Essays in honor of Jan Aler [Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989], pp. 233-244; also in Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 9 
[Tübingen: Mohr, 1993], pp. 367-382; En. transl. Monika Reuss and Lawrence K. Schmidt, “Under the 
Shadow of Nihilism”, in Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics, 
ed. Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson [Albany: SUNY Press, 1992], pp.111-123; Anders Olsson, “Epi-
log (Celan)”, in Läsningar av intet [Stockholm: Bonniers, 2000], pp. 424-436; Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
La poésie comme expérience [Paris: Bourgois, 1986], pp. 104ff.). 
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 that second strophe, namely whether these five distinct attributes, separated by 
commas, are attributed to the Thou or to the I of the poem, the Thou addressed in the first 
and the third strophe or the I who speaks through the poem and speaks of himself in the 
third strophe. 
 The phrase “durchgründet vom Nichts” could contain a theologeme, too. The rare 
verb durchgründen is not coined by Celan and need not be an “audacious word 
destruction” as Hans-Georg Gadamer takes it, one that “permits two completely 
incompatible meanings to melt together”, namely “‘founded upon something’ [gegründet 
auf etwas] and ‘governed by nothingness’ [durchwaltet vom Nichts]” (“Under the 
Shadow of Nihilism”, p. 117). The Grimm dictionary has an entry on the verb, offering 
the Latin equivalents perscrutari, ‘to scrutinize thoroughly’, and comprehendere, ‘to 
grasp, comprehend’. Many of the examples given by Grimm refer to the examination of 
holy texts, such as the citation from Johannes Reuchlin’s Augenspiegel referring to the 
alleged penetration to the Kabbalah in the book Apologia by Pico della Mirandola.327 If 
the poem would say ‘no one’ instead of “Nothing” or “nothingness [Nichts]”, we might 
suggest that the address concerns something like a Script coming ‘after the Pre-Script’, 
“nach / der Vor-Schrift”, ‘scrutinized by no one’; even when the ‘script’, the written 
form of the poem contained the word nichts without the capital letter, we might think that 
some impenetrable, inscrutable Script is being addressed here. But the capital letter 
complicates the matter even beyond this suggestion: we must not disregard the 
equivocality introduced by the difference between the lower case and the upper case, 
more or less inaudible when the poem is read aloud (more or less, since a hint might be 
given by intonation), and yet, the upper-case letter in the noun (das) Nichts is not nothing. 
This Nothingness could be read as another theologeme, as the Nothingness of God in the 
apophatic discourse (so-called ‘negative theology’, that is), or perhaps the Cabbalistic 
nothingness of God’s withdrawal, his trace or retreat into himself, his ‘contraction’ 
(Zimzum) into his own depths, as discussed by Gershom Scholem.328 It would be God’s 
nothingness, his absence or his withdrawal, his trace that is irreducible to the dichotomy 
of presence and absence, that ‘deeply grounds’ the speaker, the I of the poem. But the fact 
that the (Christian) theologemes are, in the first strophe and perhaps also later, denied to 
                                                 
327 The Grimm dictionary attributes this perscrutation falsely to the Pope himself: “breve apostolicum 
Alexandri VI, darin er die bücher der cabala durchgründt REUCHLIN Augenspiegel 13a” (DWB); cf. 
Johannes Reuchlin, “Augenspiegel” (1511), in Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV: Schriften zum Bücherstreit; 1. 
Teil: Reuchlins Schriften, ed. W.W. Ehlers, H.G. Roloff und P. Schäfer, unter Mitw. v. B. Sommer 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1999). 
328 Über einige Grundbegriffe des Judentums (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996 [1st ed. 1970]), pp. 
84-89. 
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 the addressee, could also mean that this Thou is not God in the first place. Or perhaps his 
identity remains uncertain? Perhaps a little like in the tales dealing with hospitality that 
belong to the Greek as well as the Jewish tradition: the stranger is to be received as if he 
or she might be a god or goddess in disguise or a divine incarnation.329 
 Indeed, the equivocality — and we might do well not to decide hastily for one 
option or the other — might be motivated by the radical openness of the poem’s 
hospitality, a prayer free of all prayer. Who does the poem’s speaker invite? Who does 
the poem invite, perhaps itself an “unoutstrippable”, unsurpassable Script following a 
“Pre-Script”? The verb hereinstehen means, in the largely Austrian idiom which was also 
Celan’s mother tongue, ‘to enter’, ‘to come in’, and thus the third request of the first 
strophe, “steh / herein”, divided by an enjambment that might even be taken as a moment 
of suspense between ‘standing’ and ‘entering’, may well be rendered as “stand / forth” or 
“stand / in here”. And another division takes place when the word Ruhestatt (place of 
rest) is inverted into the syntagm “statt aller / Ruhe”, “in place of all / rest”. 
 The fact that the verb hereinstehen as well as the adjective unüberholbar occur 
also in Celan’s underlinings of Sein und Zeit is perhaps not altogether incidental or 
insignificant. The latter belongs to at least four passages marked by Celan, speaking of 
death as the ownmost, non-relational, unoutstrippable possibility, and of anxiety facing 
death (Angst vor dem Tode) as that which brings Dasein face to face with itself as 
delivered to this unoutstrippable possibility, namely the possibility of the impossibility of 
being-there.330 
                                                 
329 One of the hasidic tales told by Martin Buber is entitled “Gottes Wohnung”: “»Wo wohnt Gott?« / Mit 
dieser Frage überraschte der Kozker einige gelehrte Männer, die bei ihm zu Gast waren. Sie lachten 
über ihn: »Wie redet Ihr! Ist doch die Welt seiner Herrlichkeit voll!« / Er aber beantwortete die eigene 
Frage: / »Gott wohnt, wo man ihn einläßt.«” (Die Erzählungen der Chassidim [Zürich: Manesse, 
1990], pp. 784-785.) This resembles the anecdote concerning Heraclitus, told by Aristotle and quoted 
by Heidegger in his “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (Wegmarken [Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1996 (1st ed. 
1967)]  [=GA 9], pp. 355-356). 
330 “[Der Tod ist die Möglichkeit der schlechthinnigen Daseinsunmöglichkeit.] So enthüllt sich der Tod als 
die eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare Möglichkeit. [...] Die Angst vor dem Tode ist Angst »vor« 
dem eigensten, unbezüglichen und unüberholbaren Seinkönnen. [...] In der Angst vor dem Tode wird 
das Dasein vor es selbst gebracht als überantwortet der unüberholbaren Möglichkeit. [...] Dem Dasein 
geht es auch in der durchschnittlichen Alltäglichkeit ständig um dieses eigenste, unbezügliche und 
unüberholbare Seinkönnen, wenn auch nur im Modus des Besorgens einer unbehelligten 
Gleichgültigkeit  g e g e n  die äußerste Möglichkeit seiner Existenz.” (SuZ, 250, 251, 254, 254-255; cit. 
Celan, La bi. phi., pp. 382-383, nos. 659, 660, 677, 681. The addition in square brackets is by the 
editors of La bibliothèque philosophique, in order to clarify the context of the highlighted passage; the 
italics and emphasis by letter-spacing are by Heidegger, the underlining by Celan; the last of these 
passages has been marked with a double stroke in the margin in Celan’s personal copy. In Sein und 
Zeit, cf. also e.g. § 52, p. 258: “der Tod als eigenste, unbezügliche, unüberholbare, gewisse 
Möglichkeit”; this is an occurrence not marked by Celan.) — The verb hereinstehen  (cf. above) is also 
part of a sentence underlined by him in “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”: “Die Lichtung, in die das 
Seiende hereinsteht, ist in sich zugleich Verbergung.” (Holzwege [Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1950], 
Prolegomena 159
  If we are willing to accept the possibility that the verb hereinstehen alludes to 
Heidegger’s use of this rather unusual verb, the context might add yet another aspect to 
the equivocal unity — iterable uniquity — of the poem. In the passage already cited, 
Heidegger maintains that the analysis of death remains purely “on the hither side [rein 
»diesseitig«]” inasmuch as the phenomenon is interpreted in terms of a possibility of 
being (als Seinsmöglichkeit) of each Dasein that “stands forth into” this Dasein;331 the 
phenomenon of death is a phenomenon of life. Or rather, a phenomenon of being-there. 
The limit is an internal limit, and, as such, unoutstrippable, an unsurpassable limit. 
 A whole decade after reading Sein und Zeit for the first time (in 1952-1953, 
judging by the “reading traces” reported by the catalogue La bibliothèque philosophique), 
in April 1963, Celan marked a sentence in Margaret Susman’s Gestalten und Kreise 
(1954), comparing Gurewitsch with Heidegger; I add in square brackets the few 
sentences preceding and following the underlinings, in order to clarify the context:  
 
[Die Grundform, in der sich diese Unendlichkeitsfülle des Seins gestaltet, nennt 
Gurewitsch die » Transzendenz-Immanenz  «. Diese etwas schwerfällige 
Bezeichnung für die Einheit vom Uebersinnlichem und Sinnlichem ist der 
Ausdruck der mystischen Gewissheit, dass nichts, gar nichts, weder Göttliches 
noch Menschliches, weder Uebersinnliches noch Sinnliches ausserhalb des 
menschlichen Daseins gegeben, dass alles in seinen Kreis ursprünglich 
einbezogen ist, alles uns nur in ihm offenbar wird.] Es ist dieselbe Gewissheit, die 
                                                                                                                                                 
p. 42; cit. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 357, No. 217.) 
331 “Die Analyse des Todes bleibt aber insofern rein »diesseitig«, als sie das Phänomen lediglich daraufhin 
interpretiert, wie es als Seinsmöglichkeit des jeweiligen Daseins in dieses hereinsteht.” (SuZ, § 49, 248, 
loc. cit.). The verb hereinstehen occurs a few times also in sentences not underlined or otherwise 
marked by Celan, such as the second occurrence on the page just quoted: “Wenn schon das Dasein 
überhaupt nie zugänglich wird als Vorhandenes, weil zu seiner Seinsart das Möglichsein in eigener 
Weise gehört, dann darf um so weniger erwartet werden, die ontologische Struktur des Todes einfach 
ablesen zu können, wenn anders der Tod eine ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit des Daseins ist. / 
Andererseits kann sich die Analyse nicht an eine zufällig und beliebig erdachte Idee vom Tode halten. 
Dieser Willkür wird nur gesteuert durch eine vorgängige ontologische Kennzeichnung der Seinsart, in 
der das »Ende« in die durchschnittliche Alltäglichkeit des Daseins hereinsteht.” (SuZ, § 49, p. 248. 
Partly cit. in Celan, La bi. phi., p. 381, No. 651; underlinings by Celan; he has not highlighted the two 
sentences following the paragraph break, signalled here by a slash.) And earlier, in the important 
section 32, containing only one sentence marked by Celan, which is not this one: “Und wenn wir nach 
dem Sinn von Sein fragen, dann wird die Untersuchung nicht tiefsinnig und ergrübelt nichts, was hinter 
dem Sein steht, sondern fragt nach ihm selbst, sofern es in die Verständlichkeit des Daseins 
hereinsteht.” (§ 32, p. 152.)  And later, in a section that contains no markings by Celan (§ 61): “Noch 
bleibt als methodisch einzig möglicher Weg, von dem in seiner existenziellen Möglichkeit bezeugten 
Phänomen der Entschlossenheit auszugehen und zu fragen: weist die Entschlossenheit in ihrer 
eigensten existenziellen Seinstendenz selbst vor auf die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit als ihre eigenste 
eigentliche Möglichkeit? Wenn sich die Entschlossenheit ihrem eigenen Sinne nach erst dann in ihre 
Eigentlichkeit gebracht hätte, sobald sie sich nicht auf beliebige und je nur nächste Möglichkeiten 
entwirft, sondern auf die äußerste, die allem faktischen Seinkönnen des Daseins vorgelagert ist und als 
solche in jedes faktisch ergriffene Seinkönnen des Daseins mehr oder minder unverstellt hereinsteht?” 
(§ 61, p. 302.) Cf. also below, the quote from SuZ, § 52, p. 255. 
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 dreissig Jahre später Heidegger in dem Wort formuliert hat, dass »die 
Transzendenz (d.h. das Uebersinnliche) in das Dasein hereinsteht«. [Denn bei 
beiden, bei Gurewitsch wie bei Heidegger, bleibt das Uebersinnliche eine 
selbständige Sphäre, löst es sich nicht in der Sphäre des Daseins, in der allein es 
sich offenbart, auf. Transzendenz-Immanenz ist also nur ein anderer Ausdruck für 
ein Dasein, in dem alles: Göttliches wie Menschliches in einer lebendigen Einheit 
erfahren und gelebt wird.]332 
 
The ‘quotation’ here (“die Transzendenz [...] in das Dasein hereinsteht”) is not to be 
found as such in Heidegger, at least not in Sein und Zeit. The passage that corresponds 
most verbatim with it seems to be the following: 
 
Niemand zweifelt daran, daß man stirbt. Allein dieses »nicht zweifeln« braucht 
nicht schon das Gewißsein in sich zu bergen, das dem entspricht, als was der Tod 
im Sinne der charakterisierten ausgezeichneten Möglichkeit in das Dasein 
hereinsteht. [SuZ, § 52, p. 255.] 
 
“Transcendence” is precisely that which remains beyond experience. Susman’s use of the 
term “suprasensible” must be understood in these terms, as lying beyond what can be 
experienced; and yet, it is indeed a question of that which could be called “transcendence-
immanence” — which is not Heidegger’s term, of course, but Gurewitsch’s. The 
transcendence of death, this end or limit or unsurpassable ‘completion’ is indeed 
‘immanent’ to Dasein’s structure, it enters, “stands forth” into the innermost core of 
“being-there”, as the possibility of its impossibility (“die Möglichkeit der 
schlechthinnigen Daseinsunmöglichkeit”). It is a radical openness toward the future, a 
future that never comes to be experienced as something presently ‘there’; this openness is 
also the temporality characterizing all “being-there”. Being away as a way of being there. 
The poem understood as a gift (Geschenk) and Daseinsentwurf (“projection of 
existence”) must be seen in this light: a projection that cannot be experienced as 
completed by the one who ‘projects’ it.333 
 Seen in this light, the invitation ending the first strophe of “Wirk nicht voraus” 
seems an affirmation of something that already “stands / in here” — perhaps death, 
mortality, finitude? In the prose drafts written for the Meridian speech (or while 
preparing that speech), we find such fragments that seem to correspond to this strange 
form of apostrophe, addressing Death as a ‘Thou’. Or addressing death in another sense, 
                                                 
332 Margarete Susman, “Ein Frühvollendeter”, in Gestalten und Kreise (Zürich: Diana, 1954), pp. 318-319. 
Cit. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 540, No. 790. Underlinings by Celan. 
333 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Endf. 46; cf. also ibid., D.O.M., 21 (p. 221): “Gedichte sind Daseinsentwürfe.” 
(Also in »Mikrolithen...«, p. 206.) In the already mentioned letter to Hans Bender, Celan also writes: 
“Gedichte, das sind auch Geschenke – Geschenke an die Aufmerksamen. Schicksal mitführende 
Geschenke.” (GW 3:178.) 
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death as a form-bestowing principle, a principle of delimitation and unity.334 Perhaps the 
Thou of the poem is, in a certain sense, always Death? Writing a poem means “talking 
oneself literally to death”,335 and poems are, as written, “speech of an absent one”, 
addressed to someone who is even more absent.336 So the invitation of sorts, the prayer 
without prayer in the poem we are dealing with, might even be an affirmation of this 
radical openness, occupiability to which the voice of the poem’s “I” exposes itself. So it 
might be an invitation by a mortal to another mortal — to the wholly other who arrives as 
a mortal, receives the address and the figure without figure, prayer without prayer, at 
another time. This wholly other is not the one of Christian theology, the one who 
predestines and sends abroad, yet even this possibility is left open, inasmuch as the 
syntagm “free of all / prayer” (“ledig allen / Gebets”) applies equivocally to both the 
speaker and the addressee of the poem: if I say ‘pray, be free of all prayer’, I really 
cannot exclude anything; I cannot give orders to the other or prescribe or request 
anything, only address the other, unconditionally invite the other to “stand / in here”, to 
arrive where the other has perhaps already arrived, even before me. Unconditional 
hospitality. 
 But on the other hand, in all its equivocality, the poem also ‘prescribes’ our 
relation to itself, our relation as its readers, in a most powerful way.337 We repeat its 
invitation, in response, word for word, and as its readers, we cannot but repeat it. Even 
when we choose to disregard the poem, we cannot annihilate its injunction. We remain 
“fine-fitted to / the pre-script” and to the script coming ‘after’ the pre-script (“feinfügig,
nach / der Vor-Schrift”), we remain given over  to the words of the other, delivered to 
                                                 
334 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 321=800: “22.8.60. – B[üchner-Rede?] – / Stimme – Rhythmus – / Person, 
Geheimnis, Gegenwärtigkeit / aber: Frage nach Grenze und Einheit der Person / das Gedicht als Ich-
Suche? / Der Tod als Einheit und Grenze schaffendes Prinzip, daher seine Allgegenwart im Gedicht. – / 
-i- Das Gedicht als Personwerdung des Ich: im Gespräch – die Wahrnehmung des anderen und 
Fremden. Das aktive Prinzip also ein so oder so gesetztes (»besetzbares«) Du. – / (der Tod als Du?)” 
Cf. Ms. 272: “Stimme / ? Timbre \ – Richtung (woher ? Beseelung / wohin ? Tod, Gott)” The 
typography of these notes has been conventionalized here, especially as it comes to spacing, which is 
here indicated by slashes; e.g. “Timbre” is written below “Stimme” and the two-way arrow is 
positioned vertically between these words. 
335 In a fragment Celan writes: “Das Gedicht als das sich buchstäblich zu-Tode-Sprechende.” 
(TCA/Meridian Ms. 304.) But on the other hand: “Gedichte [...] haben die Lebendigkeit sterblicher 
Seelenwesen – ” (TCA/Meridian Ms. 302.) 
336 Cf. TCA/Meridian Ms. 458: “Freud, Unbehagen S. 49: »Die Schrift ist ursprüngl. die Sprache des 
Abwesenden« – im Gedicht wird ein abwesendes nahe, tritt es an dich | einen noch Abwesenderen | 
heran = / Im Gedicht, und das Gedicht ist, als Schrift, »Sprache eines Abwesenden«, tritt ein 
Abwesender an dich, den | noch | Abwesenderen, heran. / Der Gedanke, die Begegnung der 
Abwesenden könnte ausbleiben, liegt nahe.” (The editorial typography has been modified. The text 
from “Im Gedicht, und...” onward has been emphasized by Celan by a double stroke in the margin.) 
337 Typically enough, Gadamer writes: “It is a poem since we are this I.” (“Under the Shadow of 
Nihilism”, p. 119.)  
 them (überantwortet: this is also a frequently used term in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, not 
in direct relation to this theme of death and survival in words, but in relation to 
mortality), preceding our speech and following our speech, whether we are willing to 
acknowledge this or not. We have no other alternative than to receive the injunction by 
the other, to receive the invitation “in place of all / rest”. 
 In the famous letter of May 18, 1960 to Hans Bender, Celan writes that he sees no 
difference of principle between a handshake and a poem (“Ich sehe keinen prinzipiellen 
Unterschied zwischen Händedruck und Gedicht”). And in one of the prose fragments 
written while preparing for the Büchner Prize Speech, about the same time, he quotes 
Kafka’s striking fragment, “Schreiben als Form des Gebets”, pointing out that in Kafka’s 
words it is not primarily a question of praying but of writing, and this is something that 
cannot be done with folded hands.338 The poem “Wirk nicht voraus” is a case in point. It 
is a hand unfolded, reaching toward the other, free of all prayer.339 It is not simply 
metaphorical to say that the poem is a hand reaching toward the other.  
 These extravagant claims shall have to serve here as a transition from these 
prolegomena to the main part of the present treatise. I think “Wirk nicht voraus” is a 
poem that demonstrates what Derrida writes, in response to a couple of other poems by 
Celan, about indecision and attention, about life and giving ear: 
 
L’indécision tient à jamais l’attention en haleine, c’est-à-dire en vie, éveillée, 
vigilante, prête à s’engager dans tout autre chemin, à laisser venir, tendant 
l’oreille, l’écoutant fidèlement, l’autre parole, suspendue au souffle de l’autre 
parole et de la parole de l’autre – là même où elle pourrait sembler encore 
inintelligible, inaudible, intraduisible. [Béliers, pp. 37-38.] 
Intraduisible is a word that could be translated from the German equivalent 
unübersetzbar; often this corresponds to unübertragbar, which also sometimes means, 
depending on the context, ‘untransferable’ or ‘untransportable’ in general, and sometimes 
more specifically, ‘unmetaphorizable’. Metaphor, or the notion of metaphor, is indeed all 
too often a shortcut out of  aporia, an instrument of decision where we should perhaps 
rather suspend decision and give an ear to indecision and equivocality instead. We shall 
see that this failure or unwillingness to pay attention, associated with the concept of 
metaphor, is indeed one of the many contraindications, in Celan’s view, for the application 
of this concept to poetry.  
                                              
 
338 Cf. GW 3:177; TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582; I will return to both of these motives, and I have discussed 
them also in the article already mentioned. 
339 Perhaps a poem is, not only an unfolded, but also and at once, a folded hand: “une main donnée, à la 
fois ouverte et pliée” (Derrida, Béliers — Le dialogue ininterrompu : entre deux infinis, le poème 
[Paris: Galilée, 2003], p. 33). In the context of these words, Derrida discusses the poem “Wege im 
Schatten-Gebräch” and Gadamer’s reading of it (cf. ibid., pp. 30-37): “WEGE IM SCHATTEN-GEBRÄCH  / 
deiner Hand. // Aus der Vier-Finger-Furche / wühl ich mir den / versteinerten Segen.” (DGKG, p. 177; 
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mit der untrüglichen Spur: 
 
Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiß, 
mit den Schatten der Halme: 
Lies nicht mehr – schau! 
Schau nicht mehr – geh! 
 
Geh, deine Stunde 
hat keine Schwestern, du bist – 
bist zuhause. [...]340  
 
Before being properly introduced, without the formalities of introduction, the reader finds 
himself, herself (perhaps the sexual difference counts here less than the ontological: “your 
hour / has no sisters” addresses itself, at this point, indifferently to any of us, whether a 
brother or a sister) here deported into the terrain with the unmistakable trace: this trace is 
unmistakable, first of all, because it is right there, in front of our eyes, as the text we are read-
ing. But not only as the visible black-on-white, the empirical text, but also as the “singable 
residue”341  that addresses us in an unheard-of way. 
 After the uncanny lines from the beginning of Paul Celan’s poem “Engführung” 
(1958), and still before any proper introduction to the present essay on Paul Celan’s poetry 
and poetics, let us quote a few sentences from Peter Szondi’s reading of these opening lines, 
in his essay “Reading ‘Engführung’”; it is an early study on Celan showing rare ability and 
will to resist metaphorical interpretation, an essay first published in French 1971, and we cite 
it in Susan Bernofsky’s translation: 
 
The difficulties of reading become apparent the moment the poem begins, but at the 
same time, they show us that the approaches traditionally employed in literary inter-
pretation — particularly when applied to texts said to be obscure — distort both the 
reading itself and the text being read. [...] [W]e should stop wondering for the moment 
what is meant by the “unmistakable trace” and instead note that these first three lines 
do not tell us what it is, although the repeated use of the definite article suggests that 
the reader does know what “terrain” and “trace” are being invoked. The opening of 
 
340 “Engführung”, in TCA/Sprachgitter, p. 89 (GW 1:197); trans. John Felstiner: “TAKEN OFF into / the terrain / 
with the unmistakable trace: // Grass, written asunder. The stones, white / with the grassblades’ shadows: / 
Read no more — look! / Look no more — go! // Go, your hour / has no sisters, you are — / are at home. 
[...]” (Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, p. 119.) Cf. Susan Bernofsky’s translation: “Deported to the 
/ terrain / with the unmistakable trace: // grass, written asunder. The stones, white, / with the shadows of 
grassblades: [etc.]”; the rest of Bernofsky’s translation of these lines, as part of her translation of Peter 
Szondi’s essay (cf. below), follows Felstiner’s rendering. 
341 “Singbarer Rest”, in TCA/Atemwende, p. 53; we shall return to the poem a couple of times. 
“Engführung”, then, is characterized less by the (potential) meaning of the expres-
sions used in it than by the fact that the reader finds himself being at the same time 
drawn into a context he does not recognize and treated as though it were familiar to 
him; or, to be more precise, he is being treated like someone who has no right to 
know. From the very beginning, the reader has been deported — verbracht, “forcibly 
brought” —  to a terrain that is both foreign and strange. Is this the “terrain / with the 
unmistakable trace”? We do not know, do not yet know. But it has now been estab-
lished that if these first few lines specify a referent, the reader cannot safely assume 
they do not refer to him. Here, too, then, we should stop asking ourselves to whom the 
phrase “Deported to the / terrain / with the unmistakable trace” refers and instead note 
that this information is being withheld, and that it is precisely this absence of informa-
tion that lets the reader assume the phrase refers to him (though not necessarily to him 
alone) [qu’il s’agit (aussi) de lui]. And so the opening lines of “Engführung” give us 
to understand that while it is not true that the poet is addressing the reader directly (as 
is the case in a great many poems), nor even that the words have anything to do with 
him, the reader finds himself transported [que l’on est déplacé] to the interior of the 
text in such a way that it is no longer possible to distinguish between the one who is 
reading and what is being read. The reading subject coincides with the subject of 
reading [le sujet lecteur coïncidant avec le sujet de la lecture]. 342 
 
This uncanny coincidence does not by any means signify that the reader would now be per-
mitted to interpret the text ‘subjectively’, as though the text was his own, or addressed to him 
— or just anyone who happens to read it and is free to receive it as he will. To the contrary: it 
forces the “deported” reader into an immanent reading which tries to open itself up, as much 
as it can, to the very letter of the text as a text which urges him forward without telling very 
much (not even whether this addressing concerns him directly — him or her, the brother or 
sister whose hour has no sisters). Nor does it mean that the “landscape” or “terrain” is a 
metaphor for the text. To the contrary, this terrain one finds oneself deported into is the text, 
primarily and before being anything else; before being, for instance, a mimetic representation 
of some real or fantastic landscape. Even if one knows nothing else yet, this sense of being 
forcibly taken into the terrain which is, strangely and paradoxically, both literally visible and 
yet otherwise invisible at the same time (what else is there to look at this first sight but the 
terrain with the unmistakable trace — and you are allowed only a glimpse, as it seems, before 
you are told just to “go”); black and white on the page, but not to be read; to be seen, but only 
as in passing; to be gone into, deported.  
 What makes the address and coincidence so strange (namely, the coincidence due to 
which the reader faces the literality of the text as the terrain into which he is being deported, 
and yet does not even know whether he is being directly concerned and whether this is the 
only signification of the terrain he is now facing, as if blindfolded by the very visibility of the 
empirical text itself), so very uncanny, is spelled out, in the middle of this “terrain that is both 
                                                 
342 Peter Szondi, “Reading ‘Engführung’”, trans. Susan Bernofsky, in Szondi, Celan Studies (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 2003), pp. 27-29. The original version: “Lecture de Strette. Essai sur la poésie de 
Paul Celan”, in Critique 288 (mai 1971), pp. 387-420, here pp. 387-388; it was translated into Szondi’s na-
tive language after his death by Jean Bollack et al. as “Durch die Enge geführt. Versuch über die Ver-




foreign and strange”, by the affirmation: “You are — / are at home [Du bist — / bist zu-
hause].” In this primarily verbal, textual terrain you are “at home”. There already. You are 
already there, deported into this terrain and gone, as if already before you are even told to 
“go”, there where “your hour / has no sisters”. 
 Let us follow Szondi’s lead a little further on this lonely trail where all assistance is 
welcome: 
 
The scene is a landscape, but one described as a written landscape. The grass is “writ-
ten asunder.” A traditional explication de texte, one based on a traditional notion of 
rhetoric, would no doubt say that the grass in this landscape is being compared to 
written characters and that it is the analogy between the one and the other  (according 
to the Aristotelian definition of metaphor) that allows the poet to say: “grass, written 
asunder” and the reader to understand that this grass is like something that has been 
broken down into letters. It isn’t literally a matter of letters — and what is the poetic 
text if not the texture of language [sinon la texture du verbe]? — but of grass. It is the 
grass that has been “written asunder.” In other words, this grass is also language, and 
the landscape is text. It is because the “terrain with the unmistakable trace” is (also) 
text that the reader can be deported to it. 
 One might wonder what this landscape-text is, or, perhaps more modestly: what 
it is like. The stanza’s second sentence seems to provide an answer: “The stones, 
white...” This is a terrain [étendue] composed of whiteness, of void, but also of stones 
and shadows. Are these stones tombstones, or merely those hard, lusterless, impene-
trable bodies — the forms, both crumbling and protective, of stars and eyes — that 
occupy an important position within Paul Celan’s “imaginary universe”? We do not 
know, and this means quite precisely that it is not for us to know. What can be known, 
can be seen, is the textuality of the terrain. [Nous ne le savons pas, et cela veut dire 
très précisément que nous n’avons pas à le savoir. Ce qui se sait et se voit, c’est la 
textualité de l’étendue.] Once the grass has become letter, the white of the stones is 
also the white of the page — whiteness itself [n.: Cf. J. DERRIDA, La double séance. 
Tel Quel, 42, p. 20 sq.], interrupted only by the “grassblade” letters [tiges-lettres], or, 
rather, by the shadows they cast. This landscape-text is a fateful, funereal terrain [Ce 
paysage-texte est une étendue funeste et funèbre]. One might be tempted to say that 
the reader finds himself deported to a landscape dominated by death and shadow — 
the dead and their memory. But once again, such interpretations are precluded by the 
textuality of a landscape that is not merely the subject of what we are reading — it is 
what we are reading [la textualité d’un paysage qui n’est pas le sujet de ce qu’on lit, 
mais bien ce que l’on lit]. This is why the orders issued by the poet — to himself, the 
reader? no doubt to both — do not serve as an introduction, as they might in poetry of 
a certain sort. One can receive and follow these orders only once one has been “de-
ported” to the text-terrain. [Celan Studies, pp. 30-31; “Lecture de Strette”, pp. 389-
390.] 
 
The terrain is no metaphor for the text, the text is no metaphor for the terrain. Szondi’s faith-
fulness to the experience of being deported to the text-terrain, and of being deprived of the 
traditional instruments of interpretation, is one of the ways to resist the temptations of meta-
phorical undertaking: before interpreting, before taking the metaphorical shortcut, one should 
read the text to the letter, as closely as possible, and this incipit indeed forces the reader to do 
that, insofar as he is willing to bestow any real attention to what he is actually reading. The 




and they do not, in the first place, name anything but themselves in this text-terrain or terrain-
text, themselves “written asunder”. And this is what is so uncanny in this experience: this ter-
rain is a fateful, funereal terrain and a landscape dominated by death and shadow, even before 
we interpret it as something else than text (as a representation of some other terrain, a grave-
yard perhaps, which the text itself hardly allows at this point), even before we try to break 
through its opacity. An opacity of which we do not even know whether it is the opacity of a 
tombstone or not; this not knowing and yet being addressed as if we already knew, this arriv-
ing at home as utter strangers even to ourselves (since the unknown addressee is indeed also 
the reader, unmistakably) makes this deportation into the text so very real in its apparent un-
reality (it is also an “imaginary universe”, no doubt). What we see, what we do know, the lit-
tle that we do know in facing this poem, is that we are dealing with words, unmistakably. 
Words, lines, such as these:  
 
Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiß,  
mit den Schatten der Halme.  
 
And indeed, the words have their own reality, and they have the same names as the things — 
namely the things that they are thought to denote — as it is said in another poem, through a 
negative turn of speech: 
 
kein Wort, kein Ding, 
und beider einziger Name,343 
 
Interpretation, or what the imperative in the poem calls reading and what it forbids us, say-
ing: “Read no more — look!”, or knowing about the terrain into which we are being de-
ported, is denied to us at the outset; we are just urged to look instead of read (perhaps to look 
how this landscape deploys itself before our hurried glimpse) and then, right away, to go in-
stead of looking (perhaps to go into the terrain which thus opens before us — but opens only 
as something that is, at the very same moment, essentially inaccessible to us — or to you: the 
address of this poem is unmistakably singular). The access to the text is at the one and the 
same instant both inevitable and denied: inevitable, since the address concerns, in principle, 
anyone who understands the language, any Thou at all; denied, since I cannot quite recognize 
myself in being addressed like this, cannot quite identify myself as the addressee; and yet, in a 
peculiar way, I cannot escape the fact that I am being “deported” into this unknown territory, 
either. It seems that I am concerned by the address, perhaps more than ever (as the one whose 
hour has no sisters, namely anyone, any single mortal; personal and impersonal at the same 
time, someone, anyone, no one in particular), and yet, it also seems that I am only overhear-
ing it (I can never be certain that I understood the nature of the address correctly, even 
though it seems undeniable that it concerns me too, someone, anyone, no one in particular). 
                                                 
343 “Fahlstimmig”, in Lichtzwang, GW 2:307. Trans. John Felstiner: “not a word, not a thing, / and of both the 




 On the other hand, this urging onward in the poem has its point: it hurries in order not 
to hurry. The poem’s imperative hastens the reader in order that he would not make too much 
haste in deciding about the meaning of such deportation yet, when it is too early, and finally, 
in order also not to decide and select one of several meanings, but to respect an ambiguity 
that is “neither a defect nor purely a stylistic trait” but one which “determines the structure of 
the poetic text itself” (Celan Studies, p. 29):  
 
He who has learned to “read” Celan’s writing knows it isn’t a matter of selecting one 
of several meanings [significations], but of understanding that they do not differ, but 
coincide. Ambiguity, which has become a means of knowledge, shows us the unity of 
what only appeared to be difference. This ambiguity serves the cause of precision. 
[Elle sert la précision.] [Celan Studies, pp. 81-82; “Lecture de Strette”, p. 420.]  
 
This is one of the most important lessons that we may learn from Szondi about Celan’s poet-
ics, one of the many important lessons. 
 In a conversation with Hugo Huppert in 1966, Celan said that he saw his own way of 
writing as characterized by “ambiguity without a mask [Mehrdeutigkeit ohne Maske]”, concep-
tual overlapping and multifacetedness.344  On the other hand, this unity of the apparently sepa-
rate, delineated by Szondi, does not do away with all the difference and distance involved 
in the poem. In the famous conversation with Huppert — to which we shall later return — 
Celan emphasized the necessary distance between the individuals engaged in conversation 
across what he calls Sprachgitter (translated as “language mesh” or “speech-grille”; in its 
primary lexical meaning it means concretely the parlatory window in a convent, a lattice 
through which the nuns talked with the worldly; we shall return to this, too), the distanced or 
deferred comprehension of which it is a question also in reading poetry. And he opposed this 
poetics of distanced comprehension and ambiguity without a mask to the hide-and-seek be-
hind metaphors (which he conceded to having sometimes exercised in his early poetry) and, 
on the other hand, to the treacherous little word “like” pertaining to comparison, simile or, 
more implicitly, metaphor.345 
 This ambiguity of course allows for the presence of metaphor, the empirical presence 
of metaphor which appears to be inescapable. The words in the poem are not absolutely im-
mune to their metaphorical sense, whether we mean by ‘metaphoricity’ the inescapable ne-
cessity of using the words tied with established commonplaces, or whether metaphor is rather 
understood as the secondary effect that belongs to the effort of interpretation; still, as it is said 
in one of Celan’s manuscript fragments written in preparation for the Büchner Prize Speech 
(i.e. Der Meridian, 1960), the words in the poem mean to be untransportable, untranslatable, 
unmetaphorizable.346  The poem requires attention, which is to say, in other words, it requires 
                                                 
344 Hugo Huppert, “»Spirituell«: Gespräch mit Paul Celan”, in Werner Hamacher & Winfried Menninghaus, 
eds., Paul Celan  (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1988), pp. 319-324, here p. 321. We shall return to this. 
345 Cf. Huppert, “Spirituell”, pp. 319-320. 




time. The unique punctual presence of the poem347 demands time and attention (while atten-
tiveness is a necessary but not always sufficient condition for the encounter [Begegnung],348 
of which the Meridian speech also speaks). This is to say that the poem, as a whole, the po-
etic corpus or the verbal body that the poem is, requires its own time, the time which already 
belongs to it, as its ownmost property. And this is why it resists the metaphorical shortcut of 
interpretation. The poem’s time cannot be reduced into my time by any shortcut. Not even by 
the “overall key of all poetics”, as Heidegger describes the concept of metaphor.349   
 Szondi actually demonstrates something about this “unheard-of demand”350 by direct-
ing our attention to the suspension of knowledge and the contrapuntal structure of “Eng-
führung”, in which the uncanny beginning is reiterated at the end of the relatively long poem, 
where we have come to know and understand more (inasmuch as we have been reading atten-
tively enough) at least about the motivation for this suspension of knowledge.351 This request 
for time and attention — these inseparable conditions,352  which are also, in Celan’s poetics, 
                                                                                                                                                        
meinen die Worte im Gedicht, unübertragbar zu sein; das Gedicht erscheint als der Ort, wo alle Metaphorik 
ad absurdum geführt wird.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 71; cf. below.) 
347 “Noch im Hier und Jetzt des Gedichts – das Gedicht selbst hat ja immer nur diese eine, einmalige, punk-
tuelle Gegenwart –, noch in dieser Unmittelbarkeit und Nähe läßt es das ihm, dem Anderen, Eigenste 
mitsprechen: dessen Zeit.” (“Der Meridian”, TCA/Meridian, Endf. 36b.) 
348 ”Sprung — als eintritt ins Gedicht […] Sprung (O[skar] Becker) / Spra schöpf. Sprung des Dichters, schöpf. 
Sprung des Lesers (Du) — Voraussetzung (nicht Gewähr!) ist das Einanderzugewendetsein” 
(TCA/Meridian, Ms. 428, 429). Celan refers here to Oskar Becker, Von der Hinfälligkeit des Schönen und 
der Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers & Von der Abenteuerlichkeit des Künstlers und der vorsichtigen 
Verwegenheit des Philosophen (Berlin: Alexander Verlag, 1994); these essays first appeared in 1929 and 
1958. 
349 “Was Hölderlin denkt, wenn er vom »feurigen Geist« und der »guter Fahrt« spricht, muß sich bei gegebener 
Gelegenheit klären. Wir sollen jetzt nur darauf merken, daß der Hauptschlüssel aller ›Poetik‹, die Lehre 
vom ›Bild‹ in der Dichtung, von der ›Metapher‹, im Bereich der Hölderlinschen Hymnendichtung keine 
einzige Tür öffnet und nirgends ins Freie bringt. Es genügt hier, nur dies Eine zu bedenken: Auch die 
›Dinge selbst‹ sind schon, bevor sie zu sogenannten ›Symbolen‹ werden, jedesmal gedichtet. Die Frage 
bleibt nur, in welchem Wesensbereich und aus welcher Wahrheit des Dichtens.” (GA 52:40.) 
350 Cf. Der Meridian, TCA/Meridian, Endf. 38d, & below. 
351 Near the end of his essay, Szondi writes: “The reader who was ‘Deported to the / terrain / with the unmis-
takable trace’ (I, I) was neither able nor supposed to know what this ‘unmistakable trace’ was. Now, having 
reached the end of the progression that was our reading, a reading of something that is itself a progression, 
he understands. And this is why no explanation is being offered him. Once again, the reader has the oppor-
tunity to ignore the laws of musical composition and ask: What is the meaning of  ‘the conversations, day-
gray, / of the groundwater traces’? And again, it is not by studying other passages in Celan’s work where 
such expressions appear that the answer will be found (though readers are encouraged to engage in such 
study by the existence of a concordance that was published several years ago). While at the beginning of the 
poem the reader was forced to come to terms with the fact that he was apparently not yet supposed to know 
what was being spoken of, it is now assumed that he already does know what is being referred to, that the 
‘groundwater traces’ are ‘the / grooves, the // choruses, once, the / psalms,’ but at the same time also the 
‘unmistakable trace’ that characterizes this ‘terrain’ in which he has been moving since he began to read, 
without knowing where he was. The poem’s opening is repeated for the purpose of his knowing.” (Celan 
Studies, pp. 79-80.) Cf. also pp. 31-32, e.g. the following: “Poetry is ceasing to be mimesis, representation; 
it is becoming reality. To be sure, this is a poetic reality: The text no longer stands in the service of a prede-
termined reality, but rather is projecting itself, constituting itself as reality.” By this, Szondi is very close to 
what Celan writes, not only on the “constitution” of reality in the poem, in the  finalized version of the Me-
ridian (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 36b), but of poetry, not only as “narrow straits” but as drafts for existence or 
projected reality: “Gedichte sind Engpässe / ‘Du mußt hier hindurch, Leben’: • Daseinsentwürfe” 
(TCA/Meridian, Ms. 352.) 




inseparable from the resistance to the metaphorical undertaking — is perhaps also what 
makes poetry so unbearable (unerträglich) for so many.353  
 Metaphor — metaphorical interpretation — could be an escape from this uncanny de-
portedness, a shortcut back from the landscape of the text.354 
 
 
“AND  THEN  WHAT  WOULD  THE  IMAGES  BE?”  
Introductory remarks on “carrying metaphors ad absurdum”: 
The Meridian speech and its margins 
 
Und was wären dann die Bilder?  
Das einmal, das immer wieder einmal und nur jetzt und nur hier Wahrgenommene 
und Wahrzunehmende. Und das Gedicht wäre somit der Ort, wo alle Tropen und 
Metaphern ad absurdum geführt werden wollen.355 
 
It is by no means immediately clear what is meant by this “carrying to the absurd” of tropes 
and metaphors in a poem. Tropes are also mentioned later on in this Büchner Prize Speech, 
given on October 22nd, 1960, in a passage near the end of the speech introducing the word  
that provides the famous title, Der Meridian:  
 
Ich finde das Verbindende und wie das Gedicht zur Begegnung Führende. 
Ich finde etwas – wie die Sprache – Immaterielles, aber Irdisches, Terrestrisches, 
etwas Kreisförmiges, über die beiden Pole in sich selbst Zurückkehrendes und dabei – 
heitererweise – sogar die Tropen Durchkreuzendes –: ich finde ... einen Meridian.  
Mit ihnen und Georg Büchner und dem Lande Hessen habe ich ihn soeben wieder zu 
berühren geglaubt.356  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
gegenwärtigung — as well as “Wahrnehmung eher: Gewahrwerden” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 434; cf. Ms. 440: 
“Sehen als Gewahren, Wahrnehmen, Wahrhaben, Wahrsein”; cf. passim), a whole phenomenology of tem-
poral consciousness that nevertheless has to detach itself from Husserl’s notion of perceiving temporal ob-
jects, must be at least briefly discussed later on. 
353 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 896 (cf. below). The resistance is also the resistance of immediacy — not only the 
resistance, offered by opacity, to an immediate grasp or “cultivation of intimacy”, but also the resistance of-
fered by immediacy, the immediacy endowed to the poem: “Wer dem Gedicht nicht die Widerstandskraft 
des Unmittelbaren mitgibt, hat kein Gedicht geschrieben –” (Mikrolithen, p. 53, No. 84; dated “2.1.1966”. 
These notes and fragments often end with a dash.) 
354 “Von der Hybris (der Vermessenheit) derer, die Wissen in Form von versandfertigen und unmittelbar wirk-
samen Sinnbildern verwalten wollen.” (Mikrolithen, p. 46, No. 67.7; cf. pp. 396ff; written in 1963.) 
355 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 39. Trans. John Felstiner: “And then what would the images be? / Something per-
ceived and to be perceived only now and only here, once, again and again once. And so a poem would be 
the place where all tropes and metaphors will be carried ad absurdum.” (Pp. 410-411.) 
356 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 50c-e. (GW 3:202.) Trans. Felstiner: “I find something that binds and that leads to 
encounter, like a poem. / I find something — like language — immaterial yet earthly, terrestrial, something 
circular, returning upon itself by way of both poles and thereby — happily — even crossing the tropics (and 
tropes): I find ... a meridian.” (P. 413.) 
173
Meridian is the name for something like the poem, something like language. It is a trope 
“crossing through the tropes” (and not only, or primarily, the tropics):357  a counter-trope of 
sorts. The fact that this word “meridian” gives the speech its title, should already be enough 
to suggest that the couple of remarks earlier in the speech, concerning images, tropes and 
metaphors, were never mere side remarks. But in any case, it is not immediately clear how 
this crossing-through (Durchkreuzen) and this carrying ad absurdum would take place in the 
poem. 
 Among the manuscript material written for the Meridian speech (or at least around the 
time of composing it), published a few years ago as part of the Tübingen edition of Celan’s 
works, we find many notes that much more ardently denounce metaphor, or rather the con-
cept of metaphor, as a means of interpreting poetry. It seems that towards the completion of 
the final version of the speech, Celan wanted to moderate the vehemently anti-metaphoric 
impetus into a counter-metaphoric, counter-tropic movement of which he speaks in the Me-
ridian. For instance the following manuscript fragment concedes that the words also carry 
along their “transferred sense”, but also maintains that in the poem, the words mean to be un-
transferable, untransportable, unmetaphorizable (unübertragbar, which in other contexts also 
means untranslatable): 
 
Es gibt kein Wort, das, einmal ausgesprochen, nicht auch seinen übertragenen Sinn 
mitbrächte; und doch meinen die Worte im Gedicht, unübertragbar zu sein; das 
Gedicht erscheint als der Ort, wo alle Metaphorik ad absurdum geführt wird.358 
 
Perhaps it is a significant detail that in the final version, the verb werden (wird) has been re-
placed by the verb wollen: 
 
Und das Gedicht wäre somit der Ort, wo alle Tropen und Metaphern ad absurdum 
geführt werden wollen. 
 
The poem would be the place where all tropes and metaphors would be carried to the absurd 
(perhaps submitted to a reductio ad absurdum?): the verbs werden and meinen have been re-
placed and, as it were, condensed into the slightly more equivocal verb wollen, and thus it is 
as if the tropes and metaphors in the poem had a will of their own to be carried ad absurdum. 
Here this will seems to be equivalent to the will for being unübertragbar, untransportable, 
untranslatable, unmetaphorizable. 
 In other, presumably earlier notes, Celan speaks of “an antimetaphoric character” of 
poetry (and this emphatic anti-metaphorisch is connected with the slightly more ambiguous 
adjective unübertragbar), “even where it is most image-laden [noch da wo es am bildhaft-
esten ist]” (we shall quote the fragment in more detail in just a moment); so we can see that in 
                                                 
357 In a draft Celan still added: “ich sage nicht: die Wendekreise” (TCA/Meridian, p. 44 [“aus: Nr. 81 
(C 8/9)”]). But this addition was erased, again, in the final version: we might think that the crossing of the 
“tropics” is not excluded, but it is  primarily the tropes that are crossed through. 




this poetics, in this draft for a phenomenology of poetry, it is not a question of an attempt to 
write poetry simply without images, some sort of realistic prose poetry that would naïvely try 
to use only the most ordinary words, but the ‘images’ themselves are something other than 
metaphors; the poem is the place where all synonymy ends, where all tropes and everything 
“inauthentic” is carried ad absurdum, and the place where the images have a phenomenal 
character: 
 
Das Gedicht ist der Ort, wo alle Synonymik aufhört; wo alle Tropen und alles 
Uneigentliche ad absurdum geführt werden; das Gedicht hat, glaube ich, noch da wo 
es am bildhaftesten ist, einen antimetaphorischen Charakter; das Bild hat einen 
phänomenalen, durch Anschauung erkennbaren Zug. – Was dich von ihm trennt, 
überbrückst du nicht; du mußt dich zum Sprung entschließen.359 
 
This phenomenality of the image is actually the phenomenality of the non-phenomenal, the 
visibility of the invisible, and the distance to be leaped is not bridged by metaphor, as the 
meta-rhetoric, meta-metaphoric sentence closing this note suggests. These paradoxes will be-
come clearer, little by little, I hope, as we proceed. In the meanwhile, we shall note that the 
phenomenality of the poem and its images and figures (Gestalt is a word often used by Celan, 
more or less as a synonym for Figur, but not for “figure of speech [Redefigur]”)360  is the be-
coming phenomenal of language, in the singular figure that is taken on by language in the 
poem: 
 
Das Gedicht ist der Ort, wo das Synonyme unmöglich wird: es hat nur seine Sprach-* 
/ und damit Bedutungsebene. Aus der Sprache hervortretend, tritt die Spr das Gedicht 
der Sprache gegenüber. Dieses Gegenüber ist unaufhebbar.  
 
To this manuscript fragment, to the word Sprach[ebene] in it, Celan has added a footnote of 
sorts: 
 
*) [D]arum auch ist das Gedicht, von seinem Wesen und nicht erst von seiner 
Thematik her – eine Schule wirklicher Menschlichkeit: es lehrt das Andere als das 
Andere {d.h. in seinem Anderssein} verstehen, es fordert zur Brüderlichkeit mit {zur 
Ehrfurcht vor} diesem Andern auf, zur Hinwendung zu diesem Andern, auch da, wo 
                                                 
359 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 68. Cf. Ms. 66: “Das Bild? Die Metapher? Sie sind das Gesehene, Wahrnehmbare, sie 
haben phänomenalen Charakter. Das Gedicht ist der einmalige Ort, wo alle Tropen ad absurdum geführt 
werden –” Cf. Ts. (Ms.) 70: “Gedichte, n’en déplaise à Mallarmé, werden nicht aus Worten und auch nicht, 
n’en déplaise à certains autres, aus Wort-material gemacht; Im Gedicht wird alle Synonymik und Tropik ad 
absurdum geführt; im Gedicht wiederholt sich, im Einmaligen* und Endlichen, die Sprache als geistige 
Gestalt. / *) Im Einmaligen und Endlichen wird das Wort zum Namen – Nomen, Hang zum 
Substantivischen[.] Es ist einem Namen zugeordnet, der unaussprechlich ist.” 
360 Cf. Der Meridian: “Lucile nimmt Sprache als Gestalt und Richtung und Atem wahr”; “ich suche Lenz 
selbst, ich suche ihn – als Person, ich suche seine Gestalt: um des Ortes der Dichtung, um der Freisetzung, 
um des Schritts willen”; “Aber Dichtung versucht ja, wie Lucile, die Gestalt in ihrer Richtung zu sehen”; 
“wäre das Gedicht [...] gestaltgewordene Sprache eines Einzelnen”; “Jedes Ding, jeder Mensch ist dem 
Gedicht, das auf das Andere zuhält, eine Gestalt dieses Anderen” (TCA/Meridian, Endf., passim.) Cf. 
TCA/Meridian, Ms. 239:  “Das Gedicht ist als Figur der ganzen Sprache eingeschrieben [...]”; cf. also Ms. 




das Andre als das Krummnasige und Mißgestalte – keineswegs Mandeläugige – 
auftritt – angeklagt von den »Geradnasigen« ... 361 
 
The encounter with language (the poem stepping forward from language toward language, 
standing forth from language to confront language), in the place or as the place where syno-
nyms become impossible,362  is an encounter with the human other. The meridian, the 
counter-trope crossing through the tropes, something like the poem and like language, is also 
something that leads the way to the encounter. While of course, we do not know yet what is 
an encounter, or the secret of the encounter of which the Meridian speaks: 
 
Das Gedicht ist einsam. Es ist einsam und unterwegs. Wer es schreibt, bleibt ihm 
mitgegeben. 
Aber steht das Gedicht nicht gerade dadurch, also schon hier, in der Begegnung – im 
Geheimnis der Begegnung?363 
 
The writer of the poem remains “mated” with it (as Felstiner translates), given with the gift of 
the poem, endowed to it: mitgegeben. Is this, then, the sense in which we can say that the 
poem has a will of its own, that it bears witness to the unique moment of writing, to the sin-
gularity of an existence? And is this the singularity of the writer himself? Or is it rather so 
that the poem bears witness to the singularity of the “perception”, Wahrnehmung or An-
schauung, which is at once a vision and an address directed at a singularity:364 
                                                 
361 Ms. 240. “19.8.60”. The braces, i.e. “{}”, denote an addition by Celan. 
362 This could even be seen as an objection to the Aristotelian tradition seeing the poet as a man of synonymy, 
namely operating on the paradigmatic axis of choice (cf. Jakobson on this), and thereby a man of metaphor, 
in contradistinction to the sophist seen as a man of homonymy. (Cf. Rh. III, 2, 1404b37ff.) 
363 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 34. Trans. Jerry Glenn: “The poem is alone. It is alone and underway. Whoever writes 
it must remain in its company. / But doesn’t the poem, for precisely that reason, at this point participate in 
an encounter — in the mystery of an encounter.” (“Appendix: The Meridian”, in Jacques Derrida, Sover-
eignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen, trans. T. Dutoit, O. 
Pasanen, Joshua Wilner [revised T. Dutoit], Philippe Romanski [New York: Fordham U.P., 2005], pp. 173-
185, here p. 181.) We shall be using variably both Glenn’s and Felstiner’s translation. 
364 Cf. e.g. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 463: “Wahr nehmung: im aller-wörtlichsten Sinne”. — Cf. also the following: 
“Die Dichtung entsteht nicht da, wo »Wandermetaphern« Station machen; sondern da, wo das Bild im 
einmalig-sterblichen Auge des Dichters als ein von ihm Gesehenes erwacht.” (In Barbara Wiedemann, ed., 
Paul Celan –  Die Goll-Affäre. Dokumente zu einer ›Infamie‹ [Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 2000], p. 460, doc. 
No. 122.) This note and the next one are classified by the editor as belonging under the rubric “Texte, 
Entwürfe und Notizen zu den Plagiatvorwürfen” and they belong to a “Konvolut” related to the work in 
progress that became the volume of poems entitled Die Niemandsrose (1963). — In the drafts for the Me-
ridian speech, Celan often uses the term Anschauung (Anschauen), which is actually the opposite of the 
‘seeing through’ implied by percipere, and the term Wahrnehmung is qualified thus: “Wahrnehmung eher: 
Gewahrwerden”. (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 434=804; “22.8.60”.) On the verb gewahrwerden or gewahr werden, 
cf. DWB, entry “GEWAHR, adj.”, e.g.: “gewar = aufmerksam, die aufmerksamkeit auf etwas wendend”; 
“wahrnehmen, inne werden”; “erkennen, inne werden”. —  “Perception” and “to perceive” are in any case 
obviously insufficient translations for Celan’s use of the verb wahrnehmen. Without pretending to know 
what Celan exactly meant by this “most literal sense”, let us only indicate the proximity of Wahrnehmen to 
another central term of the Meridian, namely Aufmerksamkeit. The German understanding of the verb 
wahrnehmen comprises not only percipere, the philosophical equivalent which the native verb wahrnehmen 
was designed to translate, while these terms were introduced to each other actually as late as in the 18th 
century, but also attendere: one of the primary determinations for wahrnehmen given by the Grimm dic-
tionary is “seine aufmerksamkeit schenken”, to grant one’s attention, to pay heed. (“WAHRNEHMEN,  





Der Ort wo die Bilder phänomenalen Charakter haben: aber als Gesehenes, als 
Angesprochenes — als Zeugen eines einmaligen Daseins. [TCA/Meridian, Ms. 333.] 
 
The anti-metaphoric, counter-tropic will of the poem’s images is associated with phenome-
nality, attentiveness, uniquity, testimony and Wahrnehmung, while metaphors and rhetorical 
tropes are rather associated with a failure or unwillingness to pay attention: 
 
Wer im Gedicht nur die Metapher findet, der hat auch nichts anderes gesucht; er 
nimmt nichts wahr; [...]. [TCA/Meridian, Ms. 470.] 
 
In another fragment, Celan writes that whoever concentrates on “snuffling” for metaphors in 
a poem — often “ambulant” metaphors that wander from one poem to the other —  will 
never even find anything else.365  The images in the poem imply neither an abundance of aes-
thetic or synaesthetic, sensuous or affective qualities, nor their supra-sensible counterpart or 
paradigm (i.e. “antitype” or “counterfigure” in the sense of the “spiritual” counterpart of a 
sensible figure or emblem, Sinn-bild)366  in an elevated, transfigured, “higher” reality; here is 
                                                                                                                                                        
tragen, [etc.]”, “seine aufmerksamkeit auf etwas richten”; Wahrig explains the etymology of this verb as 
follows: “mhd. war nemen < ahd. wara neman; zu ahd. wara ‘Aufmerksamkeit’”.) In the Meridian, the 
passage on the attentiveness that the poem tries to dedicate to all that it encounters (“Die Aufmerksamkeit, 
die das Gedicht allem ihm Begegnenden zu widmen versucht”) is followed by a paragraph on Wahrneh-
mung and on  the “unavoidable question” and “unheard-of demand” that are later referred to; this arrange-
ment confirms the connection between Wahrnehmung and Aufmerksamkeit in Celan’s text, and we may re-
late Wahrnehmung back to Celan’s famous citation of Malebranche’s sentence, quoted by Celan through 
Walter Benjamin’s essay on Kafka: “Aufmerksamkeit ist das natürliche Gebet der Seele.” “Attentiveness 
is the natural prayer of the soul.” (Trans. Felstiner.) In an earlier version Celan misquotes the 
translation Benjamin uses by subtituting ‘piety’ (Frömmigkeit) for ‘prayer’ (Gebet): “Aufmerksamkeit  
ist das natürliche Frömmigkeit der Seele.” (Variant of the section 35d in TCA/Meridian, p. 36.) 
This attentiveness in question is “a concentration that stays mindful of all our dates” (cf. TCA/Meridian, 
Endf. 35a-c).  — An earlier version, written for the radio essay on Mandelstam, adds the word 
aufmerksam to the context of the passage that found its way, modified, to the Meridian: “Die Gedichte 
Ossip Mandelstamms {sind die Gedichte eines Wahrnehmenden} dem Erscheinenden {aufmerksam} zuge-
wandten, [etc.]” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 56.) Cf. also the context  from which Celan quotes Malebranche’s sen-
tence, in Benjamin’s essay on Kafka: “Wenn Kafka nicht gebetet hat – was wir nicht wissen –, so war ihm 
doch aufs höchste eigen, was Malebranche »das natürliche Gebet der Seele« nennt – die Aufmerksamkeit. 
Und in sie hat er, wie die Heiligen in ihre Gebete, alle Kreatur eingeschlossen.” (Schriften II, [Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1955], p. 222; cf. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 297, No. 399.) — Still, besides ‘attentive concen-
tration’, we might also use a constellation of other expressions to explain “the most verbatim sense” of 
Wahrnehmung, such as ‘true reception’ with the implication of ‘[taking under] protection’, and also 
‘[ap]prehension’, inasmuch as this is also ‘hand-clasping’... 
365 “Kein ‘trobar cluz’. Ich bin dein, du bist mein, ›verloren ist das slüzzelin‹. Wer das Gedicht aufsucht, um 
nach Metaphern zu schnüffeln, wird immer nur – Metaphern finden. Sofern sich seiner, denn er befindet 
sich ja – und hier darf ich mit diesem Wortspiel wohl seine Denkweise ebenfalls ein wenig naseweis »nach-
vollziehen« – in den »Tropen«, sofern sich seiner nicht dieses oder jenes Schlinggewächs annimmt. Dem 
Gedicht, das eines Menschen Gedicht ist, ist der Mensch mehr als ein durch Bildung hypertrophiertes 
Riechorgan, und schon gar nicht ein Rüssel(Tier) (wesen)” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 584; Mikrolithen, pp. 138-
139, No. 251.1; the typography has been conventionalized by Wiedemann.)  TCA/Meridian, Ms. 65:  “Die 
an ambulante Metapher glauben. / Toposforschung, Freund? Gewiß – aber im Lichte des zu Erforschenden, 
im Lichte der U-topie.” The apostrophe to the friend here might be directed at Otto Pöggeler, a long-time 
friend and the author of the article “Dichtungstheorie und Toposforschung” (in Heinrich Lützeler et al., eds., 
Jahrbuch für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft. Bd. 5 [Köln: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag, 1960], 
pp. 89-201.) 




an excerpt from Celan’s polylogue on Mandelstam, written for radio and broadcast on March 
19th, 1960: 
 
Die zwanzig Gedichte aus dem Gedichtband »Der Stein« befremden. 
Sie sind keine »Wortmusik«, keine aus »Klangfarben« zusammengewobene, 
impressionistische »Stimmungspoesie«, keine das Wirkliche sinnbildlich 
überhöhende »zweite« Wirklichkeit. Ihre Bilder widerstehen dem Begriff der 
Metapher und des Emblems; sie haben phänomenalen Charakter.367 
 
So the images in the poem are neither metaphors nor emblems of some supralunary, supra-
sensible second reality, nor symbolistic or impressionistic synaesthetic textures of correspon-
dences between colours and sounds. However, the so-called materiality of language, in the 
restricted sense, coincides with the singular “untransportability” of the poetic token: Timbre 
— the grain of the voice as Roland Barthes would say — is also one of the things that makes 
poetry not only untranslatable with regard to all its idiomatic aspects but also untransferable 
in a more extensive sense (unübertragbar).368 
 In any case, the ‘images’ are indeed tokens for a voice and for an ‘I’, vocals endowed 
with consonants that are not only graphemes or phonemes but carry along a singular voice 
onto another time: 
 
Das Gespräch mit den Dingen (die Dinge nicht eben kongruent mit dem Zeichen oder 
so ähnl<ich>) – die Dinge als {(künftige)} Zeugen* – die {vokalischen} Dinge, denen 
{sich} der Mensch {das Ich}  als Mitlaut mitgibt in eine andere Zeit / *) = als 
Ichträger = der Mensch überträgt sich ihnen (sein Ich)369 
 
In the untransportable poems the ‘I’ is indeed ‘carried over’, but neither metaphorically nor 
so that we could, as readers and receivers, bridge the distance and appropriate these “vocal 
                                                                                                                                                        
ger, GA 53:17ff.  
367 “Die Dichtung Ossip Mandelstamms” = TCA/Meridian, D.O.M. 5 (p. 215). Cf. Ms. 525: “Mandelstamm / 
Die Dinge: dinglicher im Sinne ihres Gegenwärtigseins, dem sie Sehenden und sich mit ihnen 
Auseinandersetzenden Gegenwärtigsein. Nicht verklärt, nicht überhöht[,] nicht in ein symbolisches 
Ungefähr getaucht[,] – sondern angeschaut[,] und in Worte gefaßt (eingefaßt?) (sertis dans des mots) – aus 
der nähe mit sterblichen Augen[.]/ Dingfest[.]” (Typography slightly conventionalized. Cf. also Dsl./Ts. 
(Ms.) 17.) 
368 “Das Anklingen der Sprache (als Ganzes) im Gedicht. – / ? Timbre = / Unübertragbare” (TCA/Meridian, 
Ms. 249=763.) — In speaking of “untranslatability”, we must of course remember that Celan was a great 
translator of poetry, but perhaps one whose translations originated rather for the sake of difference than for 
similarity, as Axel Gellhaus has observed, readings “recast in new form”: “Vielleicht ist nur um dieses 
Unterschiedes willen die Übersetzung enstanden?” (Gellhaus, “Fergendienst – Einleitende Gedanken zum 
Übersetzen bei Paul Celan”, in Axel Gellhaus, ed, »Fremde Nähe« – Celan als Übersetzer [Marbach: 
Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1997], pp. 9-16, here p. 9.) Gellhaus refers here primarily to Celan’s early 
translation of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 57, but this emphasis on (productive) difference could indeed be ap-
plied to Celan’s activity as a translator in general. Cf. p. 10: “Eine poetische Übersetzung [...] ist Lesevor-
gang und zugleich dessen Umschmelzung in eine neue Gestalt: Dokument einer Rezeption und einer 
Neuschöpfung.” — To adopt Celan’s own figures for the unmetaphorical process of translation, it is a ques-
tion of creative leaps across an abyss and not bridges that would ensure the transmission of messages or in-
formation (cf., however, Mikrolithen, pp. 95-96, No. 156, and below). 
369 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 506. Date of the fragment: “6.10.60”. The additions between braces are Celan’s; the one 




things” as if they were simply our own. The gift of the poem is endowed with the ‘I’, the hu-
man being. But this endowment or complicity with the poem (Mitwisserschaft) is obviously 
not very simple or one-sided, and the emphasis on the “person” has nothing to do with reduc-
ing poetry to biography. “Authentic poetry” is not only anti-metaphoric, but also “anti-
biographic”, as Celan a few years earlier wrote.370 
 Also the ‘Thou’ is endowed to the poem, given with the gift. This cannot mean that 
someone could, once and for all, appropriate the poem or ‘transport’ himself into it, as if into 
a mirror. Neither the writer nor the reader can do that: 
 
Metapher, d.i. mitunter nur ein (Hilfs)wort {eine (Not)lüge} im Munde derer, die über 
das Gedicht hinweg und in den Spiegel gucken; es ist Selbstübertragung, 
Selbsttransport, Selbstbeförderung. Es steht für Überheblichkeit. Mit Transit als 
primum und Exit als secundum movens. [TCA/Meridian, Ms. 585.] 
 
Metaphor, as an interpreter’s short-circuit between transit and exit, is a “(white) lie” and self-
transport, self-promotion, a pretext for self-reflection on the far side of the poem. This carry-
ing-over-oneself-into-the-poem-and-out-of-it implies an unwillingness to bear with the poem 
itself: “Wer das Gedicht nicht mit-tragen will, überträgt und spricht gern von 
Metaphern.”371  And this failure or unwillingness may result from experiencing the untrans-
portability, unmetaphorizability and untranslatability of the poem — its uniqueness, its singu-
larity, its bearing witness to uniqueness and singularity — as something unbearable, as a tyr-
anny of sorts: 
 
Zu Metapher: 
Die Unübertragbarkeit des Gedichts erleben viele als ein Unerträgliches, als eine 
Tyrannis; aber unter Menschen-Sein, das kann auch so verstanden werden: unter 
Königen sein – 
? 
Gerade wegen seiner Unübertragbarkeit wird das Gedicht so oft als ein Unerträgliches 
empfunden – und gehaßt. Es gibt zweifellos eine Tyrannis des Gedichts: sie hat das 
Gebieterische des Gedankens, daß unter Menschen sein auch heißen kann: unter 
Königen sein. [TCA/Meridian, Ms. 896.]372 
 
                                                 
370 “Echte Dichtung ist antibiographisch. Die Heimat des Dichters ist sein Gedicht, sie wechselt von einem 
Gedicht zum andern. Die Entfernungen sind die alten, ewigen: unendlich wie der Weltraum, in dem jedes 
Gedicht sich zu behaupten sucht als – winziges – Gestirn. Unendlich auch wie die Entfernung zwischen 
seinem Ich und seinem Du: von beiden Seiten, beiden Polen her wird die Brücke geschlagen: in der Mitte, 
auf halbem Wege, da wo der tragende Pfeiler erwartet wird, von oben her und von unten her, ist der Ort des 
Gedichts. Von oben her: unsichtbar und ungewiß. Von unten her: aus dem Abgrund der Hoffnung auf den 
fernen, den zukunftsfernen Nächsten.” (»Mikrolithen, pp. 95-96, No. 156.) In this fragment from 1954, 
Celan indeed speaks of “building a bridge”, an image he would later renounce. 
371 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 587. Cf. the Grimm dictionary (DWB): “MITTRAGEN, verb. vereint tragen, am tragen 
theilnehmen [...] MITTRÄGER, m. der vereint trägt; ohne umlaut: der mittrager, socius laboris. [...] fem. 
mitträgerin: [...]”. The typography of the Tübingen edition has been conventionalized in the quote. 
372 The typography of the Tübingen edition has been simplified, once again, but the apparent clerical error 
(“unter Menschen-Sein”) has been preserved. The latter paragraph, obviously a revision of the former, has 




The anti-metaphoricity of the poem (here the term is Unübertragbarkeit, while in our next 
quote we have the adjective anti-metaphorisch, together with das Einmalige Unübertrag-
bare) and its images or figures is associated with “naming [Nennen]” which is also, at the 
same time, an “invoking [Anrufen]”, even when it is a silent “looking-at [Anschauen]”, and 
an “incorporation [sich verkörpern]” which is an “objectification [Vergegenständlichen]” 
and, as such, “dialogue”, even a dialogue with that which is mute and opaque: 
 
Das Vergegenständlichen, zum Gegenstand-Werden (Dialog) des Gedichts: auch im 
Vokabular (wie es ja überall {um ein s<ich>}  verkörpern {geht}. – Ein  Nennen – 
das ist, ehe es etwas anderes ist, immer noch ein Anrufen (auch da wo es stumm ein 
Anschauen ist): daher, von diesem Nennen her, ist das Gedicht seinem Wesen nach 
anti-metaphorisch; übertragen wird allenfalls das Ich auf die Dinge: es ist, vom 
Nennen her, der stumme Mitlaut am Genannten[.] 
Warum es nicht extrem formulieren?: Das Gedicht ist das Einmalige Unübertragbare 
Gegenwärtige –  
Es kann, als das Gegenständliche, auch dessen Stummheit und Opazität haben; es 
erwacht erst in der wirklichen Begegnung, die es als sein Geheimnis hat. Darum ist 
jede wirkliche Begegnung auch Erinnerung an das Geheimnis des Gedichts. 
[TCA/Meridian, Ms. 508.]373 
 
It is perhaps this silence and opacity that is experienced as so unbearable, so impossible to 
bear with, by many readers of the allegedly ‘cryptic’ or ‘hermetic’ poetry of — for instance 
— Paul Celan, who has himself denied that it is a question of hermeticism: “Ganz und gar 
nicht hermetisch.”374  This opacity that is not hermetic is a dialogue with that which is 
opaque, an encounter with the manifest opacity of the other, with the singularity and untrans-
portability, the uniqueness of the other, every other, wholly other (“Tout autre est tout 
autre”), in the antitypous, counter-figurative resistance that belongs to every single being or 
every “creature”, and that is, to every single “figure [Gestalt]” in which we encounter the 
otherness, or in which the poem encounters it, to every figure assumed by the otherness of the 
wholly other: “Jedes Ding, jeder Mensch ist dem Gedicht, das auf das Andere zuhält, eine 
Gestalt dieses Anderen.”375  And this is why every authentic encounter takes  place in the 
memory of the secret of the poem, as Celan writes. This inversion of the order of representa-
tion, or in other words, of the order of prescription and description, or let us say the order of 
‘literature’ and ‘reality’, is also what defies the notion of metaphor. This chiasmatic inversion 
crosses through the tropes. Such an overturning has also been called “inverted metaphoricity” 
or “quasi-metaphoricity”;376  but with respect to Celan’s insistence on anti-metaphoricity, I 
                                                 
373 Date of the fragment: “ab 5.10.60”. Cf. Ms. 507: “In jedem Gedicht wartet die Sprache als Stimme / das 
Stimmlos-stimmhafte des Gedichts – / ? Anrufen” (Date: “ab 5.10.60”.) 
374 Reported by Michael Hamburger in the introduction to his volume of English translations (in an earlier edi-
tion by the title Poems. A Bilingual Edition, 1980; I only had the revised 2002 edition at hand when writing 
this, with a different preface, and therefore could not look for the exact page of the famous quote in the 
preface I have earlier read). 
375 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 35b. 
376 Cf. Axel Schmitt, “Poetik der Beschneidung ...”, already cited above, and Derrida, “Le retrait de la méta-




would rather call it pseudo-metaphoricity, merely apparent metaphoricity that is no longer 
compatible with the doctrine of metaphor.377 
 I would not designate the poematic dialogue with silence and opacity in terms of lend-
ing language to silence, or giving voice to the unspeakable, at least not without reservations 
rising from Celan’s poetry and poetics themselves.378  Rather, it would be a question of pay-
ing heed to silence as silence, engaging in conversation with silence. The poet, insofar as I 
have understood Celan’s view of poetry as conversation, is not a representative of those who 
have fallen silent, but speaks always from the limited perspective of his own existence 
(“unter dem Neigungswinkel seines Daseins”), even when he would include all creatures 
within the scope of his attentiveness, like Kafka did, according to Benjamin, “as saints in-
clude them in their prayers”.379  And speaking from within this kind of limited sphere of im-
manence is perhaps the only authentic possibility of opening up to a conversation with the 
transcendent other. An egological perspective that cannot be simply surpassed in a phenome-
nology of poetry, even when the limits of this perspective, such as the other’s time which is a 
central theme in Celan’s poetics, are called into question.  
 So the resistance to metaphor is motivated not only by the phenomenal character of 
the poetic images, but also by the non-phenomenality that inhabits the very heart of phenom-
ena. The apparition or appearance (Erscheinung), the phenomenality of the poetic “object 
[Gegenstand]” has its opposite, its counter-figure, to which it bears witness in its very figure 
(Gestalt), just as the term scheinbar (usually understood as ‘merely apparent’) has its own 
antonym (Gegenwort) when we are speaking of poetry: 
 
Das Gegenwort zu »scheinbar« ist nicht, wie man zunächst denken möchte, »real« 
oder »sinnfällig«; es ist im »Unscheinbaren«, nicht Erscheinenden, nicht zu Tage 
tretenden zu suchen; es ist das Verborgene, das erst erwacht, wenn es unser Auge 
offen und unterwegs und dadurch auch nahe weiß. ?  
                                                                                                                                                        
the concept of metaphor  would have to be guided by this figure of inversion or chiasmus — but this will be 
done elsewhere. 
377 In a fragment probably dating from 1961, Celan writes: “Das Gedicht, wo es wirklich überträgt (und 
keineswegs transponiert): nicht Metapher, sondern Metabasis (meta/basij ei0j a1llo ge/noj) – ins Andere... als in 
Dasselbe.” (Mikrolithen, p. 30, No. 46.2.; cf. Wiedemann’s commentary on p. 337.) Celan’s source for the 
Platonic term here, meta/basij ei0j a1llo ge/noj  (sometimes reformulated as “category mistake”), is proba-
bly a text by Lev Shestov that he read around the time of writing the note, “Cur Deus homo?” (Leo 
Schestow, Auf Hiobs Wage, trans. H. Ruoff, R. von Walter [Berlin: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1929], pp. 
260-268, here p. 265).  
378 Cf. William Franke, “The Singular and the Other at the Limits of Language in the Apophatic Poetics of 
Edmond Jabès and Paul Celan”, in New Literary History, 2005, 36: 621–638, here p. 621: “Edmond Jabès 
and Paul Celan, [...] [w]riting as post-Holocaust Jews, each in a different way lends language to silence in 
order to give voice to the unspeakable.” 
379 “Dieses Immer-noch des Gedichts kann ja wohl nur in dem Gedicht dessen zu finden sein, der nicht vergißt, 
daß er unter dem Neigungswinkel seines Daseins, dem Neigungswinkel seiner Kreatürlichkeit spricht.” 
(TCA/Meridian, Endf. 33.) On “attention as a natural prayer of the soul” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 35d), cf. 
Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka”, in Schriften 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1955), p. 222 (En. trans. 
Harry Zohn, in Benjamin, Illuminations [London: Fontana Press, 1992], p. 130). Cf. TCA/Meridian, Endf. 
35: “Die Aufmerksamkeit, die das Gedicht allem ihm Begegnenden zu widmen versucht, [...] ist vielmehr 




»Ne nous reprochez pas l’obscurité, das ist ein Wort von Pascal, [...] [“Ne nous re-
prochez pas le manque de clarté puisque nous en faisons profession!”]380 
 
The opposite to apparent is not the real but the non-apparent, the non-apparent in the reality 
of the real, the non-phenomenal in the heart of the phenomena themselves. 
 
 
MILLS OF DEATH 
 
Celan’s probably most famous so-called metaphor — pseudo-metaphor — is the one that 
opens “Todesfuge”, written in Bucharest in May 1945 and first published in Vienna in 1948, 
in Celan’s first collection of poems Der Sand aus den Urnen, namely the words “Schwarze 
Milch der Frühe” (“Black milk of daybreak”): 
 
SCHWARZE Milch der Frühe wir trinken sie abends 
wir trinken sie mittags und morgens wir trinken sie nachts 
wir trinken und trinken 
wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Lüften da liegt man nicht eng381  
 
According to the poet’s own testimony, this “black milk of dawn” is no metaphor, no “geni-
tive metaphor” and no figure of speech at all, not even an oxymoron any longer, it is reality;  
and from this “no longer [keine ... kein ... mehr]” we may infer that it has become reality: 
 
Schwarze Milch der Frühe: Das ist keine jener Genitivmetaphern, die {wie sie} uns 
{von} unseren sogenannten Kritikern vorgesetzt bekommen, damit wir nicht mehr 
zum Gedicht gehen; das ist keine Redefigur und kein Oxymoron mehr, das ist 
Wirklichkeit.  
 
Genitivmetapher = Nein, ein unter Herzensnot Zueinander-Geboren-Werden der 
Worte 382 
 
“Black milk” is no metaphor, no mere figure of speech, not even oxymoron. The primary 
contraindication for applying the usual tropological terms is what Celan in this fragment calls 
Herzensnot: in this apparent “genitive metaphor”, the words are brought together by neces-
sity, by heart’s destitution, the privation which still has the heart’s strength to call forth it-
self.383   
                                                 
380 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 153 (“1.6.60”); the citation from Pascal is retained, in its correct form, in the final ver-
sion (Endf. 27). 
381 GW 1:41; GW 3:63; DGKG, p. 40. Trans. Felstiner: “Black milk of daybreak we drink it at evening / we 
drink it at midday and morning we drink it at night / we drink and we drink / we shovel a grave in the air 
where you won’t lie too cramped” (Selected Poems and Prose, p. 31). 
382 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 588. The typography of the edition is here retained as well as possible. Barbara 
Wiedemann re-edits the fragment as follows: “Schwarze Milch der Frühe: Das ist keine jener 
Genitivmetaphern, wie sie uns von unseren sogenannten Kritikern vorgesetzt [wird], damit wir nicht mehr 
zum Gedicht gehen; das ist keine Redefigur und Oxymoron mehr, das ist Wirklichkeit. | Genitivmetapher = 
Nein, ein unter Herzensnot Zueinander-Geboren-Werden der Worte” (cit. by Wiedemann in her 
“Einzelkommentar”, in DGKG, p. 608). 




 “Die Todesfuge ist ein Grabmal”, Celan wrote in 1959.384 The only monument for 
those who sing and dig the grave in the air, in the poem, for those who drink the black milk of 
the dawn that will not be a dawn anymore, not as we know it anyhow, their only grave is in 
their song, in the air, in the black ink. This is what Celan wrote to Ingeborg Bachmann the 
same year:  
 
die Todesfuge auch dies für mich ist: eine Grabschrift und ein Grab. [...]  Auch meine 
Mutter hat nur dieses Grab.385   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
zensnoth, / denk ich dein, o Lottchen. // GÖTHE 1, 84.” If Celan here ‘cited’ Goethe by using the word 
Herzensnot (of course we do not know whether he thought of this as a citation at the time of using the 
word), this would imply a remarkable irony, if we take into account the allusions, in “Todesfuge”, to 
Goethe’s Faust and the apostrophes: “dein goldenes Haar Margarete” — “o Lottchen”. Goethe’s poem “An 
Lottchen” also contains the verse “Ganz den Herzensausdruck in dem Munde”, and these: “Lottchen, wer 
kennt unsre Sinnen? / Lottchen, wer kennt unser Herz? / Ach, es machte gern gekannt sein, überfließen / In 
das Mitempfinden einer Kreatur.” (http://www.textlog.de/18390.html. Accessed Jan. 2007.) — There are 
also several other ways to understand “black milk”, when detached from the context of the poem, either as 
metaphor or as something other than metaphor. For instance, as a metonymic condensation of the expres-
sion “black market milk” — which was another item belonging to the reality of the camps. In her commen-
tary, Barbara Wiedemann cites Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung, one of the articles on the Frankfurt Ausch-
witz trials and concerning the accused Wilhelm Boger, an article entitled “Boger hatte Angst vor Gift” by 
Kurt Ernenputsch (June 15th, 1964[?]; I could not locate the article in the FAZ of that day). The article cites 
one of the other main accused of the trial, Josef Klehr, and interprets his laconic words: “‘Meine Milch war 
schwarz’, antwortet Klehr, womit er offenbar sagen will, er habe sich die Milch organisiert, obwohl sie ihm 
als Leiter des Versagungskommandos nicht zugestanden habe.” Among Celan’s papers there is a clipping of 
this article, in which he has emphasized Klehr’s words by strokes in the margin. — This remark does of 
course not mean to suggest that the inmates of concentrations camps in general or those in Celan’s poem 
had black market milk to drink! But even when we do not know what Celan exactly meant by “black milk”, 
the reference to a specific jargon (an officer’s talk of his black milk) might be enough to make it question-
able whether we can overrule the possibility of an idiom referred to in the poem and its turns of phrase by 
generalizing and aestheticizing “black milk” into a metaphor. — On the other hand, “black milk” could al-
ways be a citation from a poem. “Schwarze Milch der Frühe” is actually one of the expressions that Claire 
Goll accused Celan of plagiarizing from her husband’s poetry. “Nous buvons le lait noir / De la vache 
misère”: this is how Yvan Goll begins his poem “Chant des invaincus”. On the other hand, “black milk” is 
almost something like a poetic archetype, and it is no wonder that it has imposed itself on many poets, either 
knowing of each other’s use of this “oxymoron” or not. The “secret blackness of milk [la noirceur secrète 
du lait]” that Merleau-Ponty mentions as Paul Valéry’s phrase (Le visible et l’invisible [Paris: Gallimard, 
cop. 1964, repr.2006], p. 195) is actually Jacques Audiberti’s and has also been cited by Gaston Bachelard 
(cf. Claude Zilberberg, “L’éloge de la noirceur”, Protée, Volume 31, numéro 3, hiver 2003, pp. 43-55, here 
p. 48; URL: http:// www.erudit.org/ revue/ pr/ 2003/ v31/ n3/ 008436ar html). In any case, the image of 
“black milk” in a poem could always be a citation, either conscious or an unconscious reminder (anamnesis, 
as it could be called) of some other poem. The verse “Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlan-
gen” seems like an obvious allusion to the verse in Trakl’s “Psalm”: “In seinem Grab spielt der weiße Mag-
ier mit seinen Schlangen.” Celan himself seems to have considered this as an unconscious reminder of his 
own reading of Trakl, and told Walter Jens that such a discovery sheds light on something truly decisive: 
“daß erst Wiederbegegnung Begegnung zur ... Begegnung macht.” (“[Paul Celan an Walter Jens] Paris, am 
19. Mai 1961”, in Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre [2000], p. 533. Cf. p. 532: “Es gibt also – Anamnesis! – da, 
wo wirkliche Begegnungen stattfinden, im Grunde ... Wiederbegegnungen.”) Cf. also: “Leichtfertige 
Vorwürfe gegen einen Dichter”, Die Zeit 9.6.1961, repr. in Paul Celan — Die Goll-Affäre, p. 368 (doc. No. 
85); and Rainer Kabel, “Unpublizierter Leserbrief an ‘Christ und Welt’”, repr. in Paul Celan – Die Goll-
Affäre, p. 337 (doc. 79); cf. passim. 
384 In a letter to Rolf Schroer, dated 25.10.1959; cit. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, in Celan, DGKG, pp. 607-
608. 




The mother’s name is literally inscribed in this monument, albeit in an encrypted form: Su-
lamith, a name out of the Song of Songs as Celan pointed out, alludes to ‘peacefulness’ and is 
thus more or less equivalent to the German name Friederike, which was his mother’s.386 
 The contraindication for applying tropological terms is here called reality: Wirklich-
keit. Even the song, even the text have their reality. A reality which is not simply, or only, the 
link with the ‘external’, historical reality of which the poem speaks. And certainly not only 
the material concreteness of the empirical text-object present-at-hand. But instead of these, or 
alongside these, this reality is also the reality to which the poem speaks, as well as the reality 
of the heart: Herzensnot. Applying tropological terms, such as the term metaphor, would be 
an attempt to make the necessary combinations of words harmless, mere art, mere ‘art of po-
esy’ or mere rhetoric: 
Topoi: / Mühlen des Todes – Todesmühlen, – es zeugt allerdings von ganz anderem,  
wenn man die Todesmühlen zur bloßen Metapher verharmlosen will. Das ist ein  
wichtiger Punkt. – 387  
 
“Mühlen des Todes” is a citation from Celan’s early book Mohn und Gedächtnis (1952), from 
the thematically important poem “Spät und Tief” — important in regard to its explicit thema-
tization of blasphemy which is so central to Celan’s poetry.388  These words belong to the fol-
                                                 
386 Cf. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, p. 609. In the commentary, and again in Mikrolithen, Wiedemann also 
quotes the following notes that Celan made on “Todesfuge” between 1958 and 1960 (the poem itself was 
written in 1945): “in der Edda = Midgardschlange ? Weltuntergang / Faszination // Frühe (der Anbruch 
des Anderen [...] / Ein Gedicht mit dem Tod und »zum Tode« / Milch der Frühe – das Nährende des 
Anderen / Es sprechen die Sterbenden, sie sprechen nur als solche – der Tod ist ihnen sicher – sie sprechen 
als Gestorbene und Tote. Sie sprechen mit dem Tode, vom Tode her. Sie trinken vom Tode (sie trinken und 
trinken) sie trinken und trinken: dieses Trinken dauert fort, – es hört auch am Ende des Gedichts nicht auf. // 
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus = die andern – wir – sind draußen.” (Cit. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, p. 607; 
Mikrolithen, p. 109, No. 185.) 
387 Paul Celan — Die Goll-Affäre, p. 461 (doc. 123). 
388 Cf. “Zürich, zum Storchen” (GW 1:214-215): 
 
 ZÜRICH, ZUM STORCHEN 
    Für Nelly Sachs 
 
Vom Zuviel war die Rede, vom 
Zuwenig. Von Du 
und Aber-Du, von 






Am Tag einer Himmelfahrt, das 
Münster stand drüben, es kam 
mit einigem Gold übers Wasser. 
 
 Von deinem Gott war die Rede, ich sprach 
gegen ihn, ich 





lowing line: “Ihr mahlt in den Mühlen des Todes das weiße Mehl der Verheißung” (“You 
grind in the mills of death the white meal of the Promise”). The reference to Luther’s use of 
the word Verheiszung, as the promise inherent to the pledge of bread and wine, as cited in the 
Grimm dictionary, is clear.389  Here is the poem, written and published for the first time in 
1948 with the Ovidian title “Deukalion und Pyrrha”; we shall only concentrate on the appar-
ent metaphor whose metaphoricity is denied by Celan:390 
 
SPÄT UND TIEF 
 
Boshaft wie goldene Rede beginnt diese Nacht. 
Wir essen die Äpfel der Stummen. 
Wir tuen ein Werk, das man gern seinem Stern überläßt; 
wir stehen im Herbst unsrer Linden als sinnendes Fahnenrot, 
als brennende Gäste vom Süden. 
Wir schwören bei Christus dem Neuen, den Staub zu vermählen dem Staube, 
die Vögel dem wandernden Schuh, 
unser Herz einer Stiege im Wasser. 
Wir schwören der Welt die heiligen Schwüre des Sandes, 
wir schwören sie gern, 
wir schwören sie laut von den Dächern des traumlosen Schlafes 
und schwenken das Weißhaar der Zeit . . . 
 
Sie rufen: Ihr lästert! 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 auf 
sein höchstes, sein umröcheltes, sein 
haderndes Wort – 
 
 Dein Aug sah mir zu, sah hinweg. 
dein Mund 
sprach sich dem Aug zu, ich hörte: 
 
 Wir 
wissen ja nicht, weißt du, 
wir 




389 “VERHEISZUNG, f. versprechen, zusicherung  [...] es kan auch nicht Paris, aller irrthum ein mutter und 
ursprung anders sagen, denn das dis wort der verheiszung seien, in sich schliszen das pfand der verheisung, 
den leichnam und das blut Christi im brot und wein. LUTHER 2, 24” (DWB, Bd. 25, Sp. 558). 
390 In a letter to Walter Jens, Celan wrote: “Auch hier wird etwas (ach wie) Konkretes evoziert: die – das Wort 
war nach Kriegsende in allen Zeitungen zu lesen – Todesmühlen Auschwitz, Treblinka usw. Hier bin ich, 
mit dem Gedicht und durch das Gedicht – Anamnesis! – an etwas erinnert worden: das geht nicht nur aus 
dem Kontext, sondern schon aus den beiden überschriften ›Deukalion und Pyrrha‹ bzw. ›Spät und Tief‹ 
hervor.” (The letter is dated 9.5.1961; cit. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, in Celan, DGKG, p. 606, cf. pp.605-
606. Also in Paul Celan — Die Goll-Affäre, pp. 372-373.) The alternative title “Deukalion und Pyrrha” was 




Wir wissen es längst. 
Wir wissen es längst, doch was tuts? 
Ihr mahlt in den Mühlen des Todes das weiße Mehl der Verheißung, 
ihr setzt es vor unsern Brüdern und Schwestern – 
 
Wir schwenken das Weißhaar der Zeit. 
 
Ihr mahnt uns: Ihr lästert! 
Wir wissen es wohl, 
es komme die Schuld über uns. 
Es komme die Schuld über uns aller wandernden Zeichen, 
es komme das gurgelnde Meer, 
der geharnischte Windstoß der Umkehr, 
der mitternächtige Tag, 
es komme, was niemals noch war! 
 
Es komme ein Mensch aus dem Grabe.391  
 
                                                 
391 GW 1:35; trans. Felstiner, in Selected Poems and Prose, p. 27: 
 
 LATE AND DEEP 
 
Spiteful like golden speech this night begins. 
We eat the apples of the mute. 
We do a thing that is gladly left to one’s star; 
 in our linden’s autumn we stand, a flag’s pensive red, 
ardent guests from the south. 
We swear by Christ the New to wed dust to dust, 
 birds to a wandering shoe, 
our hearts to a stair in the water. 
We swear to the world the sacred oaths of the sand, 
we swear them gladly, 
 we swear them aloud from the rooftops of dreamless sleep 
and flourish the white hair of time... 
 
 They cry: Blasphemy! 
 
 We’ve known it long since. 
Known it long since, but who cares? 
You grind in the mills of death the white meal of the Promise, 
you set it before our brothers and sisters — 
 
 We flourish the white hair of time. 
 
 You warn us: Blasphemy! 
We know it full well, 
let the guilt come on us.  
Let the guilt of all forewarning signs come upon us, 
 let a gurgling sea, 
an armored windblast of conversion, 
a day of midnights, 
let come what never yet was! 
 





To call the mills of death a metaphor is, according to Celan, to make this image harmless. To 
call it metaphor is a sort of euphemism, and it can always  be an excuse for saving oneself the 
trouble of thinking what else it could be than metaphor. I have no final answer to this ques-
tion, of course, but the line in question appears to be rather metonymical, and thus more faith-
ful to reality than metaphor: this possibility is suggested by the composition of “the white 
meal of the Promise”, a metonymized citation from a canonical text. Metonymized, since “the 
Promise” is, according to Luther, inherent to what is here called “white meal”, the bread of 
the Communion. The Promise perfectly coincides with the white meal. They are inseparable: 
no Promise without meal, no meal without the Promise, no wafer without both these ingredi-
ents. The “mill of death” could be associated, metonymically and by no means metaphori-
cally, with the final line of the poem: “Es komme ein Mensch aus dem Grabe.”   
 The Mill of Death grinds a Promise out of the Flesh and Blood and White Bones of 
this Man, Son of Man, grinds and grinds. It is a Verbal Mill, a Conceptual Mill, and as such it 
appears to be a Metaphorical Mill, but since for the Consecrated Wafer we need both Meal 
and Promise, there must surely also be a Mill that grinds this Speech Act, the White Meal of 
the Promise. But this Mill of Life is a Mill of Death. In the eyes of the blasphemist or 
counter-blasphemist, the Promise is never fulfilled, never in Flesh. The Man never comes, 
even though the Hands of Faith just turn the Handmill and the Fabrication of Corpses yields 
Provision. The grinding continues, physically and verbally. Physically and verbally, inas-
much as these are linked as an Invisible Bond: the Economical Miracle and the Spiritual Re-
covery go hand in hand.  
 Knowing the metonymical relation of reference that belongs to the noun Verheißung 
makes the bitter critique of religion, or the blasphemy that is also a prayer of sorts (Es 
komme...), in this poem quite clear, even when certain lines of the poem, especially in the first 
strophe, remain unclear to us — and yet, they anticipate the reaction: “You slander!” This 
slander in the first strophe consists of apparently surrealistic audacity, poetry in its most rec-
ognizable form of artistic practice, making one odd couple after another, marrying “dust to 
dust, / birds to a wandering shoe”. What is, for instance, the “white hair of time”? What is it, 
if not the individuation of time in the white hair of an old person? And the individuation of 
the time of waiting for that which never comes... Es komme... 
 The poem “Spät und Tief” consists of a counter-blasphemy of sorts. And as such, it is 
a counter-figurative gesture as it addresses both the extermination camps and the religious 
practice of the Eucharist with a single turn of speech, and it also addresses the incom-
mensurability between the speech act of mixing the white meal of the Promise (i.e. mixing 
white meal with the Promise) to make consecrated wafer, to be “set before our brothers and 
sisters” (the verb vorsetzen means also ‘to prefer’, to ‘set before’ in estimation), and the in-




between these death mills (theological & necro-tropho-logical)392  by virtue of this very in-
commensurability, the one between the metaphorical bond (of the flesh of  the Son of Man 
and the consecrated bread) and the reality of producing commodities out of human corpses 
(which does not have to mean only the concrete industrial use of human hair and gold teeth 
— even if the “soap made of human fat” is just a rumour, the extermination of the Jews cer-
tainly also had its economic aspects).393   
 Such mock-metaphor of sorts, a juxtaposition which is by no means simply meta-
phorical, may be blasphemy or counter-religious, but as the second voice in “Zürich, zum 
Storchen” (a poem which consists, as it seems, of a reminiscence of Celan’s conversation 
with Nelly Sachs), says, we just don’t know what counts as what anymore:  
 
Wir  
wissen ja nicht, weißt du, 
wir  




                                                 
392 On the “fabrication of corpses in the gas chambers”, cf. Heidegger, “Das Ge-Stell” (GA 79:27). This is an 
example of an often wilfully misunderstood passage in Heidegger: he does not compare the Holocaust with 
“motorized agriculture” as if these were identical or proportionate things or events, but maintains that both 
are related to the same ‘principle’, so to say, the one and the same essence (of technology — which is noth-
ing technological any more than it is agricultural or nihilistic or genocidal or fabrication in itself) — we 
shall not discuss this pseudo-comparison here any further. — On vorsetzen as preferre, cf. DWB, Bd. 26 Sp. 
1559: “7)  übertragen, etwas vor ein anderes setzen, es höher schätzen, vorziehen; so natürlich auch von 
personen: anteporre ... ein ding dem andern vorziehen, vorsetzen [...]; vorsetzen, vorziehen, preferer 
FRISCH nouv. dict. (1730) 648; 'ein im hochdeutschen ungewöhnlicher gebrauch' [...]; dasz sie die todten 
den lebenden, oder das vergangene dem gegenwärtigen vorsetzen solten BESSER (1732) 1, 122; [...]”. Cf. 
also OED, entry “set, v.”: “[88]b. To place (a person or thing) before or after another in estimation. Now 
poet. / c1383 in Eng. Hist. Rev. Oct. (1911) 747 Religiouse possessioneris..shulden sette before [preferrent] 
þe comaundementis of god. [...]  c1400 Rule St. Benet (Verse) 2475 So þat þai set non erthly þing Be-for þe 
luf of crist. 1592 HUES Treat. Globes Pref. (Hakl.) 16 These Globes. may justly bee preferred before all 
other that have been set before them. [...] 1671 [MILTON] Samson 1375 Venturing to displease God for the 
fear of Man, and Man prefer, Set God behind.” — The term coined here, “necro-tropho-logical”, is a com-
bination of three roots: necrology, of course, and also necrotroph (“necrotroph, n. / Plant pathol[ogy] / A 
plant parasite, esp. a fungus, that feeds on dead tissue of its host.”), and trophology (“tropho- [...] trophol-
ogy [...], that department of physiology which deals with nutrition”) (OED). In stead of “theological”, I 
might have also used “theo-tropho-logical”, but perhaps that would have been hypertrophied. 
393 For example, whatever the raw material of the notorious RIF soap was, it can be in any case considered a 
by-product of the Shoah, and there is no piece of soap that could wash away the quasi-metonymic link be-
tween the German wartime industry on the one hand and the death camps on the other. On the “RIF soap” 
being symbolically buried by Romanian Jews, cf. Petru Weber, “The Public Memory of the Holocaust in 
Postwar Romania”, in Studia Hebraica 4/2004, pp. 341-348 (electronic version in http://www.ceeol.com). 
For example: “During the commemoration [in Bârlad, in March 1946], seven bags containing 5.000 pieces 
of RIF soap and shoelaces manufactured [from] torn Torah pieces were buried in the Jewish cemetery. [...] 
At the remembrance ceremony of those killed during the ‘legionary rebellion’, held in the city’s Choral 
Temple, the propaganda minister, Constantinescu-Ia?i, asserted that ‘the overwhelming majority of the Ro-
manian people played no part in the outrages committed by the Iron Guard.’ He admitted however [that] ‘all 
that happened will be a spot of shame in the history of our people, which will never be cleaned’.” (P. 345.) 
The collective guilt is not only that of the actual perpetrators but also that of the survivors, even though the 
difference between these types of guilt is irreducible.  
394 GW 1:214-215 (loc. cit.). Cf. also Celan and Sachs, Briefwechsel, ed. Barbara Wiedemann (Frankfurt a.M.: 




Perhaps the worst blasphemy would be not to slander. Good conscience, an untroubled rela-
tionship with that which is often called God, with oneself and with the wholly other, might be 
the worst kind of slander. 
 When we remember how certain theorists consider “Death the Baker” an inapt meta-
phor, we may see the force of these lines perhaps even better —  
 
Ihr mahlt in den Mühlen des Todes das weiße Mehl der Verheißung, 




SEA-MILLS, MILLS OF ICE 
 
Another mill and, according to Celan, another non-metaphorical image is the sea-mill, Meer-
mühle, on the last lines of the poem “Weiß und Leicht” (Sprachgitter, GW 1:165): 
 
Meermühle geht, 
eishell und ungehört, 
in unsern Augen. 
 
Clemens Podewils has reported what Celan once said to him of this compound word, Meer-
mühle: 
 
Das Gespräch war auf die Frage nach den Metaphern, nach deren Notwendigkeit, 
gekommen, aber auch auf den Einwand, den Friedrich Georg Jünger einmal 
formuliert hat: »Ich möchte das Eigentliche sagen, unmittelbar sagen.« Fällt dieser 
vermeintliche Gegensatz aber nicht in sich zusammen, da dieses Eigentliche der 
Bilder bedarf, um im Gedicht zu erscheinen? Dem dienen Celans Wortfügungen, 
Wortzusammenführungen. »Man hat mir diese substantiva composita vorgehalten, 
zum Beispiel Meermühle. Sind aber Kiesel, Felsen, Klippen denn nicht vom Meer zu 
dem gemahlen worden, was sie sind?« (Und hat nicht lange vor Celan die Sprache, ob 
es der Volksmund oder die Erkenntnis eines Geologen war, in Gletschermühle ein 
gleiches getan?) »Meine Wortbildungen sind im Grunde nicht Erfindungen. Sie 
gehören zum Allerältesten der Sprache. Worum es mir geht? Loszukommen von den 
Worten als bloßen Bezeichnungen. Ich möchte in den Worten wieder die Namen der 
Dinge vernehmen. Die Bezeichnung isoliert den vorgestellten Gegenstand. Im Namen 
aber spricht sich uns ein jegliches in seinem Zusammenhang mit der Welt zu.«395 
 
As Podewils’ remark on the term Gletschermühle suggests, here Celan seems to cite an origi-
nal linguistic possibility of combination rather than an already extant compound word; actu-
ally Celan leaves it unmentioned in the reported conversation that Meermühle is in fact an 
extant term and thus a citation (once again, this has been confirmed studying the poet’s ‘read-
ing traces’).396  Even if the term would not have been extant before its appearance in the 
                                                 
395 Clemens Podewils, “Namen / Ein Vermächtnis Paul Celans”, in Clemens Graf Podewils & Heinz Piontek, 
eds., Ensemble: Lyrik — Prosa — Essay 2 (München: Oldenbourg, 1971), pp. 68-69. 




poem, the image of the sea-mill is quite ‘concrete’, since the rocks are ground by the move-
ment of the sea.  
 Celan’s objection to description (Bezeichnung) inasmuch as it isolates the object is 
utterly important with respect to his antimetaphoric poetics (in a moment we shall con-
sider Podewil’s words on the “necessity of metaphors”). We might recall Derrida’s para-
phrase of Heidegger, already cited: “First of all, Dasein never relates to an object, to a sole 
object. If it does, it is always in the mode of abstraction or abstention from other beings 
which always co-appear at the same time.” (Cf. Heidegger: “Das Dasein verhält sich als ex-
istierendes nie je nur zu einem Objekt, und wenn, dann nur in der Weise des Absehens von 
zuvor und zugleich immer miterscheinenden anderen Seienden.”)397  The description of an 
isolated object is an abstraction from the structure of co-appearing (Miterscheinen) without 
which there would be neither objects nor a world in which they appear for a subject — and 
this structure of interrelatedness or interpenetration that precedes the subject-object-
opposition is the world, equiprimordial with what Heidegger calls das Dasein. I would ven-
ture to call this ontological structure, this constellation of co-appearance, quasi-
metonymical.398  Quasi-metonymical, since within this world at least, there is no object 
(Gegenstand) without contiguity with other objects and their totality. 
 Someone might object that it is another question whether the concrete image of the 
“sea-mill” does not become metaphorical when it “goes ... in our eyes” — when the sea-mill 
becomes a see-mill, if we may say so.  
 But how does this happen? How do the words become an image? And I do not mean 
here only the graphic form, Schriftbild, that we see in reading. In the Meridian notes, Celan 
refers a couple of times to Marion’s words to Danton in Büchner’s Dantons Tod (I.v.9): 
“Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen.” 
 
Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen: keine Metapher / ein Wissen / – Dein Mund 
spricht sich dem Aug zu –399 
 
In the poem “Zürich, zum Storchen” (GW 1:214) we meet with the construct Celan quotes 
here:  
 
                                                 
397 “Geschlecht I”, p. 163/393-394 (loc. cit.). Cf. Heidegger, GA 26:173 (loc. cit.). 
398 Cf. OED, entry “co-appear, v.”: “rare / intr. To appear together or in conjunction. So co-appearance, co-
apparition. // [...]1655-60 STANLEY Hist. Philos. (1701) 64/1 The Co-apparition of wandering Stars. Ibid. 
464/2 The co-apparition of Planets. 1697 J. SERJEANT Solid Philos. 228 The Co-appearance, Co-
existence, and..the Competition of the Contrary Motives.” (OED, 50042450. 12 Jan, 2007.)  
399 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 439: typography modified. Cf. Ms. 593: “»Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen«: das ist 
keine »moderne« Metapher, das ist Wissen, von weither, um das Wissen eines Mundes – “ Celan has added 
the adjective seherische into this note, after the word Wissen, so that the sentence can be also reconstructed 
as follows: “»Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen«: das ist keine »moderne« Metapher, das ist Wissen, von 




Dein Aug sah mir zu, sah hinweg, 
dein Mund 
sprach sich dem Aug zu, [...] 
 
Let us leave these questions open for the moment and return to the conversation reported by 
Podewils. When he speaks of the “necessity of metaphors”, it seems to me that he has not 
grasped the differentiations Celan perhaps attempted to make in their conversation. These 
“necessities” are juxtaposed with that which is not a novel invention or coinage (Erfindun-
gen), not mere description (bloßen Bezeichnungen), but naming as something primordial and 
archaic (Allerältesten der Sprache); in the composite nouns appearing in his poems, it is not a 
question of describing something by adding an epithet or a ‘genitive metaphor’, but of nam-
ing the thing, the phenomenon. 
 Yet another way of not being metaphorical in spite of appearances to the contrary, or 
at least of not making up words, not coining neologisms, is a citation of an already extant, but 
rare word, which is a well-known ‘technique’ of Celan’s. The word Gletschermühle, men-
tioned by Podewils, would be a good example: the glacial mill, or glacier-mill, synonym to 
the use of the French loan word moulin in English, is “[a] deep, nearly vertical circular well 
or shaft in a glacier, formed by surface water falling through a crack in the ice and gradually 
carving out a hole” (OED, entry “moulin”). We find examples that are very close to the ‘se-
mantic field’ of Gletschermühle, also in Celan’s poems themselves: 
 
WEGGEBEIZT vom 
Strahlenwind deiner Sprache 
das bunte Gerede des Anerlebten 






der Weg durch den menschengestaltigen 
Schnee, 
den Büßerschnee, zu 
den gastlichen 
Gletscherstuben und -tischen. 
 
Tief 
in der Zeitenschrunde, 
beim 
Wabeneis 
wartet, ein Atemkristall, 
dein unumstößliches 
Zeugnis.400 
                                                 
400 Atemwende, GW 2:31. Trans. Felstiner: “ETCHED AWAY by the / radiant wind of your speech, / the motley 
gossip of pseudo- / experience —  the hundred- / tongued My- / poem, the Lie-noem. // Whirl- / winded, / 





The vocabulary of this poem consists, to name some examples, first of all, of a few apparent  
(at least probable) neologisms: das Genicht, Zeitenschrunde, Atemkristall. Then there are 
some rare but lexical words used in an unusual connection in an equivocal or multifaceted 
way, one in which the ‘transferred signification’ is indeed ‘carried along with’ the other as-
pects,401  but only as one of them, for instance the verb wegbeizen: “WEGGEBEIZT vom / 
Strahlenwind deiner Sprache”.402  There are historical or literary allusions, whether to the 
more remote past (hundertzüngige)403  or to more contemporaneous issues (Meingedicht).404 
And then there are the numerous borrowings from technical or scientific terminologies as 
well as local idiolects: here the words ausgewirbelt, Büßerschnee, Gletschertisch, Gletscher-
stuben are not metaphors in themselves, they are not words coined by the poet, but belong 
originally to very specific contexts, all of them bearing reference to the formation of ice, 
snow and stone by water, superficial melting and other weather conditions, natural phenom-
ena that are familiar to people living in snowy and mountainous areas.405  We might think that 
Celan’s choice of such rare but lexical terms is not only related to the poetic principles of 
language being historically determined, formulated already in the 1948 Jené essay, namely 
the “ashes of extinguished sense-giving”406  sedimented in language, but their function would 
also be to furnish a partial safeguard against the accusations and insinuations of plagiarism 
and the notion of “ambulant metaphors”: when the exact source of a word could be shown to 
be somewhere else than in the head of one poet or several, or somewhere else than in other-
worldly speculations, these accusations and insinuations and the all too lightly used instru-
                                                                                                                                                        
chambers and tables. // Deep / in the time crevasse, / by honeycomb-ice / there waits, a Breathcrystal, / your 
unannullable / witness.” 
401 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 71 (loc. cit.), and below: “Mehrdeutigkeit ohne Maske”. 
402 Cf. DWB, sub-entries ‘wegbeiszen’ and ‘wegbeizen’; the former is sometimes used as a ‘parallel form’ of 
the latter; for example: “[...] die von fiebern weggebaizte lebensfarbe J. PAUL [...]” (DWB, entry “Weg”, 
Bd. 27, Sp. 2931ff.) 
403 Cf. DWB: “HUNDERTZÜNGIG, adj. und adv. mit hundert zungen: o sie müssen noch alle hervor, all die 
götter, die in mir verstummen, hervorgehen hundertzüngig, ihr dasein in die welt zu verkündigen. FR. 
MÜLLER 2, 35”. (Bd. 10, Sp. 1929.) 
404 This word alludes to the series “Mein Gedicht” in the weekly magazine Die Zeit and Claire Goll’s transla-
tions of Yvan Goll’s poems in that series, omitting the indication that they were her translations and not 
original poems by her late husband who wrote both in French and German. Cf. Wiedemann, “Einzelkom-
mentar”, in DGKG, p. 726, and Paul Celan — Die Goll-Affäre (2000), pp. 778-779. 
405 Cf. Wiedemann, “Einzelkommentar”, DGKG, p. 726. We are speaking, for instance, of the formations of 
snow which have taken on the form of man or pilgrim, “penitent snow” resembling white-cowled pilgrims 
and found especially in the Chilean Andes (Büßerschnee, nieve penitente, penitent). Cf. OED, entry “peni-
tent, a. and n.”: “5. Physical Geogr. A spike or pinnacle of compact snow or ice left standing after differen-
tial ablation of a snow [field] or ice field exposed to the sun, esp. in high mountains, and often occurring in 
large groups containing specimens of similar size and orientation. Also attrib. Cf. PENITENTE n. [...] 
2.1954 Jrnl. Glaciol. 2 336 When the snow field lies directly upon the ground, the channels between the 
penitents often succeed in reaching the ground, and the penitents, detaching themselves from one another, 
assume the vague appearance of an Easter procession of white-cowled Spanish penitents.” (OED, 
50174573; last accessed Dec. 2006.) 




mental notion of metaphor might show themselves as incorrect, and perhaps through this 
negative moment a certain poetics of ‘citation’ would also become more comprehensible. 
 But on the other hand, it is not only a question of established meteorological termi-
nology, and not only terms relating to the formations of snow and ice. It is also a question of 
another kind of formation and another kind of materiality, the formation of names and con-
cepts, Nennkraft as part of the materiality of language. Naming power, the force of catachre-
sis, a non-figurative trope in Fontanier’s terms.407  And it is indeed this force of naming 
(Nennen) that is, for Celan, an anti-metaphoric force. 




D E T AC H E D . . .  
... but contiguous: against quasi-identification, quasi-metonymy 
 
In addressing the resistance to metaphor and tropes, the reductio ad absurdum of metaphors 
and other tropes in the poem, and the crossing-through of tropes by the counter-trope whose 
name is “the meridian”, it might seem paradoxical that we still take advantage of a more or 
less major classical distinction between two kinds of tropes or figures: metaphor and meton-
ymy.  
 Against the metaphoric relation of quasi-identification, we take quasi-metonymic con-
tiguity. Only quasi-, in both cases, because 1) the relation of resemblance does not imply 
complete identification, and therefore literary metaphors may be seen as comprising within 
themselves the “counter-metaphorical thrust” (Krieger) that resists identification or assimila-
tion, and because 2) metonymy is also a trope, and often a rhetorical figure of speech. Yet the 
structure of metonymy, as a trope of “contiguity and / or inclusion”, can often be considered 
as a trope that is less figurative than metaphor, and one that is more often than metaphor 
characterizable as a pseudo-figure (“non-vraie figure”, says Fontanier).408  It is closer to be-
ing ‘literal’ or ‘proper’, although it is precisely the dichotomy between figurative and literal, 
 
407 “Non-vraie figure”, says Fontanier (Les figures du discours, pp. 213ff). Another thing that has already been 
noted is that Nennkraft is a word that appears at least in Heidegger’s “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, in 
Holzwege (GA 5:32), and Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), p. 38; cit. in Celan, 
La bi. phi., p. 351, No. 153. 
408 Sens extensif is another one of Pierre Fontanier’s terms characterizing catachresis, in contradistinction to 
sens figuré. Cf. Les figures du discours (Paris: Flammarion, 1999 [cop. 1977; originally 1821-1830]), pp. 
213ff. — Instead of Fontanier’s characterization of metonymy as a trope of correspondance and synecdoche 
as a trope of connexion, these two separated in several respects from the trope of ressemblance, namely 
metaphor, we simplify the structure into the bipolar, Jakobsonian opposition of metonymy as a trope of con-
tiguity and metaphor as a trope of resemblance — although Jakobson’s extension of these tropological 
terms is rather problematic, as he has himself been the first to observe. (This has already been briefly dis-
cussed above, in the “Prolegomena”.) For the relation of metonymy and synecdoche to catachresis, cf. e.g. 




or figurative and proper, that should be called into question. It remains closer to the earth and 
its atmosphere, “the air we have to breath”.409 
 In Derrida’s Le toucher — Jean-Luc Nancy (2000) we read the following, laconic but 
important characterization of metonymy: “Une métonymie porte au moins le deuil d’un sens 
propre ou d’un nom propre.”410  We might add something that Derrida’s sentence, with the 
expression au moins, already seems to imply: unlike metaphor, metonymy at least mourns the 
proper name and proper sense. It bears the trace of singularity and worldliness, instead of the 
abstraction that can be associated with metaphor, which in certain traditional discourses tends 
toward otherworldliness or a “higher reality” detached from the earth and its atmosphere 
(“das Wirkliche sinnbildlich überhöhende »zweite« Wirklichkeit”). 
 During the last few years, the publication of both primary literature by Paul Celan and 
secondary literature on his life and work has been abundant. For example, a two-volume cor-
respondence with his wife, Gisèle Celan-Lestrange, of which the second tome contains a 
commentary and her illustrations; a volume of prose fragments and other manuscripts care-
fully preserved by Paul Celan himself, containing a very detailed commentary; another vol-
ume containing documents on the so-called Goll Affair; poems and their variants in not only 
one critical edition but several; and even a catalogue listing the philosophical literature in his 
personal library as well as the reading traces in the volumes therein. All these have been pub-
lished during the last ten years, as well as the separate commentaries of the books Die Nie-
mandsrose and Sprachgitter, the first to have appeared so far. Not to mention all the doctoral 
theses and other dissertations, monographs and articles, and internet publications; virtually all 
of the poems published in print, except some of the posthumous ones and the translations 
composed by him, are available also electronically (whether the copyright laws have been 
observed or not), and therefore easily searchable for concordances and so on. 
 But while attentiveness (which includes also the scholarly work, the indispensable in-
terpretative effort, the encyclopaedic detour) is a necessary prerequisite for the “encounter” 
(Begegnung), for the secret of the encounter, it is not its guarantee (Gewähr); the willingness 
to “study the other” is a necessary but not sufficient condition.411  It can only be guidance, 
after which one is again “alone with the lamp”: 
 
Stimmen vom Nesselweg her: 
  
Komm auf den Händen zu uns.  
Wer mit der Lampe allein ist,  
hat nur die Hand, draus zu lesen.412  
 
                                                 
409 “Der Meridian”, GW 3:192; trans. Felstiner, Selected Poems and Prose, p. 405. 
410 Le toucher — Jean-Luc Nancy  (Paris: Galilée, 2000), p. 29. 
411 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 429 (loc. cit.); cf. Hugo Huppert, “Spirituell”, p. 320; and below. 




If we speak for instance of the Meridian speech and the very rich and inspiring draft material 
published by the side of this beautifully composed, ambivalently artistic speech (“against 
art”), we may note that these manuscript and typescript fragments bear testimony to a hand. 
‘Hand’ means, among other things, handwriting. ‘Hand’ is short for ‘handwriting’, and both 
of these ‘hands’, the corporeal organ (of prehension) and its material trace, are metonymies 
for each other, contiguous with each other. But contiguity is not always continuity, it rather 
divides ‘the hand’, marks the separation between the organ (i.e. the part of the body called 
‘hand’) or organism (the body as a whole, composed of cells, organs, limbs, etc., the whole 
singularity of a corporeal, animate, and spiritual life of an individual) and its trace. This ref-
erence to a handwriting, life and person, is not as banal as it might first seem, and does not 
aim to promote naïvely biographical interpretation. “Echte Dichtung ist antibiographisch”, 
Celan writes in a two-part note from around 1953-54. The first half of the note speaks of the 
infinite distance between the I and the Thou of the poem, but also of the hope to cross this 
distance, and the note’s second half speaks of the poem as a paradox: “Gedichte sind Para-
doxe.”413  The paradox here is, at least, that the anti-biographical trait does not abolish the 
personal trait. 
 Antimetaphoric, antibiographic, anti-computer: “‘Every poem is the anti-computer, 
even the one the computer writes [Jedes Gedicht ist das Anti-Computer, auch das vom Com-
puter Geschriebene]”.414  This remarkable sentence has been ascribed to Paul Celan — P. C. 
himself.  Even a poem written by a computer — not only ‘by computer’ but by a computer 
— remains a poem, that is, the anti-computer: even such a poem bears the trace of a hand, 
even such a computerized anti-computer remains the “speech of an absent one”.415  Jacques 
                                                 
413 Cf. Celan, Mikrolithen, pp. 95-96, No. 156.  
414 This is what Esther Cameron states in her “Hypertext Commentary on Paul Celan’s ‘Meridian’ Speech” 
(which seems unfortunately to have been left as a fragment, and the print version of the whole text, pri-
vately printed [Jerusalem, 1988], seems to be inaccessible): “Paul Celan was, to say the least, ambivalent 
about computer technology, which in his lifetime had barely gotten started. His poems contain at least one 
clearly negative reference to computers, and in the ‘Meridian’ speech, too, with its discussion of automa-
tons, there are signs of misgivings about the implications of artificial intelligence. / Yet as a poet of infinite 
resourcefulness and playfulness, he could not help being intrigued by anything that opened new possibili-
ties. In 1968 I heard at third hand — and startled as I was by it, the story seems credible to me — that on a 
tour of Germany he had said that the proliferation of advertising was interesting because it had invented 
many new words. And on the one occasion when I was privileged to speak with him (August 4, 1969), he 
pronounced, more or less out of the blue, the following sentence: ‘Every poem is the anti-computer, even 
the one the computer writes [Jedes Gedicht ist das Anti-Computer, auch das vom Computer Geschriebene].’ 
He then repeated the sentence, it being evidently his intention that I should write it down.” (The Impossible 
Way: A Hypertext Commentary on Paul Celan's “Meridian” Speech, electronic text, http://polyglot.lss.wisc.
edu/german/celan/cameron/index.html. Accessed March 22nd, 2006.) 
415 “Freud, Unbehagen S. 49: »Die Schrift ist ursprüngl. die Sprache des Abwesenden« – im Gedicht wird ein 
abwesendes nahe, tritt es an dich {einen noch Abwesenderen} heran = / Im Gedicht, und das Gedicht ist, als 
Schrift, »Sprache eines Abwesenden«, tritt ein Abwesender an dich, den {noch} Abwesenderen, heran. / 
Der Gedanke, die Begegnung der Abwesenden könnte ausbleiben, liegt nahe.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 458. 
The editorial typography has been modified. The text from “Im Gedicht, und...” forward has been empha-




Derrida, in whose later work there is an unmistakable imprint, even when not explicitly de-
signed, of his intensive reading of Celan’s poetry and poetics, has written:  
                                                
 
Tout ce que je fais, surtout quand j’écris, ressemble à un jeu de colin-maillard : celui 
qui écrit, toujours à la main, même quand il se sert de machines, tend la main comme 
un aveugle pour chercher à toucher celui ou celle qu’il pourrait remercier pour le don 
d’une langue, pour les mots mêmes dans lesquels il se dit prêt à rendre grâce.416 
 
This comes very close to what Celan has written, in the drafts for the Meridian, of language 
as an encounter with the invisible.417 
 In a famous letter, a few months before the Büchner Prize ceremony, Celan replies to 
Hans Bender’s repeated invitation to participate in an anthology of poets writing on writing 
poetry, which was to be the second augmented edition of the book bearing the “horrible title” 
Mein Gedicht ist mein Messer:418 
 
Ich erinnere mich, daß ich Ihnen seinerzeit [1954] sagte, der Dichter werde, sobald 
das Gedicht wirklich da sei, aus seiner ursprünglichen Mitwisserschaft wieder 
entlassen. Ich würde diese Ansicht heute wohl anders formulieren bzw. sie zu 
differenzieren versuchen; aber grundsätzlich bin ich noch immer dieser – alten – 
Ansicht. Gewiß, es gibt auch das, was man heute so gern und so unbekümmert als 
Handwerk bezeichnet.419 
 
The “differentiation” begins by mentioning this — at that time obviously fashionable and 
perhaps light-hearted — designation of poetry as “handicraft”, but it continues by determin-
ing what Celan himself would mean by approaching poetry by that name, Handwerk — and 
with no metaphor whatsoever: 
 
Handwerk – das ist Sache der Hände. Und diese Hände wiederum gehören nur einem 
Menschen, d.h. einem einmaligen und sterblichen Seelenwesen, das mit seiner 
Stimme und seiner Stummheit einen Weg sucht. / Nur Wahre Hände schreiben wahre 
Gedichte. Ich sehe keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied zwischen Händedruck und 
Gedicht. [...] Gedichte, das sind auch Geschenke – Geschenke an die Aufmerksamen. 
Schicksal mitführende Geschenke.420 
 
There is a fragment among the drafts for the Meridian which associates the handicraft of the 
poem — and thus the handshake — with congruency: “Handwerk: das von der Hoffnung auf 
Kongruenz begleitete Werk von Händen.”421  Congruency associated with hands and their 
 
416 Le monolinguisme de l’autre ou prothèse de l’origine (Paris: Galilée 1996), p. 122. 
417 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 241, 242. We shall return to this. 
418 “My poem is my dagger”: “entsetzlichen Titel”, as Celan designated it in another letter, addressed to Otto 
Pöggeler the same day, May 18th, 1960. (Cited by Barbara Wiedemann in her commentary on the letter, in 
Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre [2000], p. 406. Cf. Thomas Schestag, “Men Schen – Schnitte durch ein 
Gedicht Paul Celans”,  MLN 119, 2004, pp. 580–607, here p. 580.) 
419 GW 3:177. Also in Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre [2000], p. 404. 
420 GW 3:177-178. Cf. also e.g. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 32: “Gedichte [...] sind Geschenke an den Aufmerksamen.” 
421 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 444. Cf. Ts. 546: “[...] es geht um dieses Einssein, es geht um diese Kongruenz. [...] Es 
geht um die Aufhebung einer Dualität; mit dem Ich des Gedichts ist auch das Du gesetzt; es geht um ein 




work obviously relates to geometry: but solid material bodies, let alone the parts belonging to 
a living body, unlike triangles and other non-material objects, cannot coincide in the sense of 
occupying the same space at the same time. The congruency of hands is opposite to the in-
congruence between the right hand and the left hand, which could meet in the solitude of 
prayer (you can’t write with your hands folded, as Celan remarks),422  or the hand and its mir-
ror image — the right hand and the left as well as an object and its reflection in the mirror are 
Kant’s examples of incongruence.423 One does not possess two right hands, but when two 
right hands meet in a handshake and thus embrace each other, they remain absolutely sepa-
rate. The time and space of the other are not properly appropriable. The hands meet and then, 
they part, but each can also carry the warmth of the other, the warmth of the other’s heart 
transmitted into one’s own, mediated by the Herzfingern,424  namely through the hand’s 
quasi-metonymical contiguity with the heart. To speak of a “hearty hand-shake” is no meta-
phor.425 
 In Celan’s hand, we find these words in a draft for a letter to René Char, dated March 
22nd, 1962, but never sent: 
 
La poésie, vous le savez bien, n’existe pas sans le poète, sans sa personne — sans la 
personne — [...]. Vous — on vous exile dans le pays des ci-devant, mais il vous reste 
votre vrai pays ; quant à moi, on me redistribue, puis, on s’amuse à me lapider avec ... 
les pièces détachées de mon moi. [...] Voyez-vous, j’ai toujours essayé de vous com-
prendre, de vous répondre, de serrer votre parole comme on serre une main ; et 
c’était, bien entendu, ma main qui serrait la vôtre, là où elle était sûre de ne pas man-
quer la rencontre. Pour ce qui, dans votre œuvre, ne s’ouvrait pas, — ou pas encore — 
à ma compréhension, j’ai répondu par le respect et par l’attente : on ne peut jamais 
prétendre à saisir entièrement — : ce serait irrespect devant l’Inconnu qui habite — ou 
vient habiter — le poète ; ce serait oublier que la poèsie, cela se respire ; oublier que 
la poèsie vous aspire. (Mais se souffle, ce rythme — d’où nous vient-il?)426 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
auch der des Artistischen nicht.” The hand-work whose principle is not different from a handshake is an art-
less gesture: “es gibt sich dir, kunstlos, in die Hand” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 480). 
422 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582, and elsewhere in the present dissertation. 
423 “Ich nenne einen Körper, der einem anderen völlig gleich und ähnlich ist, ob er gleich nicht in eben demsel-
ben Grenzen kann beschlossen werden, sein incongruentes Gegenstück. Um nun dessen Möglichkeit zu zei-
gen: so nehme man einen Körper an, der nicht aus zwei Hälften besteht, die symmetrisch gegen eine einzige 
Durchschnittsfläche geordnet sind, sondern etwa eine Menschenhand. Man fälle aus allen Punkten ihrer 
Oberfläche auf eine ihr gegenüber gestellte Tafel Perpendikellinien und verlängere so eben so weit hinter 
derselben, als diese Punkte vor ihr liegen, so machen die Endpunkte der so verlängerten Linien, wenn sie 
verbunden werden, die Fläche einer körperlichen Gestalt aus, die das incongruente Gegenstück der vorheri-
gen ist, d. i. wenn die gegebene Hand eine rechte ist, so ist deren Gegenstück eine linke. Die Abbildung 
eines Objects im Spiegel beruht auf eben desselben Gründen.” (This excerpt from Kant’s “Von dem ersten 
Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raum” [1768] is copied from the Projekt Gutenberg electronic 
text, in the following URL: http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/kant/1grund/1grund htm; accessed April 8th, 2006.) 
424 ”Das Aug, dunkel: / [...] magnetisch / ziehts, mit Herzfingern, an / dir, Erde:” (“Hüttenfenster”, in Die 
Niemandsrose, GW 1:278). 
425 Cf. OED: “1873 TRISTRAM Moab xviii. 344, I gave him a hearty hand~shake.” (Entry “handshake, n.”; 
OED, 50102264; last accessed Jan. 2007.) 
426 ”[Paul Celan an René Char] 78 rue de Longchamp / Paris, le 22 mars 1962”, in Barbara Wiedemann, ed., 




A darkly, painfully comical piece of writing: “quant à moi, [...] on s’amuse à me lapider 
avec ... les pièces détachées de mon moi”. It has a biographical referent, of course: the letter 
campaign waged by Claire Goll against the former friend and translator of her late husband 
Yvan. The younger poet, who had travelled from Czernowitz through Vienna to Paris, where 
he acquainted himself with Yvan Goll in 1949 and was asked by the dying emigrant from Al-
sace to render his French poems into German, was accused of plagiarism by the widow; by 
the same person who first did not consent to publish the three collections of translations, be-
cause “they bore”, as she claimed, “too clearly the ‘signature’ of Paul Celan”.427  In this sad 
affair, the concept of metaphor was frequently used by those who took to investigate the ve-
racity of Claire Goll’s claims, including some of the well-meaning critics and philologists 
who preoccupied themselves with the “genitive metaphors”, the “ambulant metaphors”, and 
the poetical techniques of citation. 
 The phrase we just extracted from the unsent letter is also a metaphorical piece of 
writing, no doubt. But on the other hand, it is one that concerns tropes returning to their 
source, deformed, disfigured, thrown back at the dealer as second-hand metaphors. Back at 
the monger of used metaphors, Altmetaphernhändler: this is the mock-signature of another 
letter by Celan, still relating to the campaign.428  Deformed and disfigured, second-hand — 
but the hand that signed them never meant them to be mere metaphors in the first place. 
Rather, the place they were aimed at, the place they were destined to (like a message in a bot-
tle or delivered by a carrier pigeon), is where the tropes and metaphors would be carried ad 
absurdum. A u-topic place, perhaps. 
 Is the poetical corpus only analogical with the body of the person? And, vice versa, is 
the severing of pieces from the body proper, when we are actually speaking of detaching 
metaphorical expressions from poems, only metaphorical? 
 We shall neither try to reconstruct a voice or a person, nor act as if the pieces de-
tached out of the poetic corpus had no  “connexion” with a person, with the person who once 
wrote them and furthermore, to the person in general, singularity in general. We shall not act 
as if the poems were not contiguous with the hand that wrote them. But of course, the figure 
of prosopopoeia, assigning a voice to the absent, as well as the violence of fragmentation and 
the projection of its outcome, these metonymies pars pro toto, the severed and deformed 
splinters, projectiles whirled back at the residue of their source,429  namely the figure repre-
                                                 
427 John Felstiner, Paul Celan — Poet, Survivor, Jew (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 60, cf. pp. 
72, 95, passim. The volume of documents relating to the “Goll Affair”, collected, edited and commented on 
by Barbara Wiedemann, is indispensable also with regard to Celan’s poetics: Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre 
(2005). 
428 Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre [2000], No. 186, p. 533. 
429 Cf. the late and unmistakably very personal poem “Warum dieses jähe Zuhause” (Schneepart, GW 2:363):  
 
 WARUM DIESES JÄHE ZUHAUSE, mittenaus, mittenein? 
Ich kann mich, schau, in dich senken, gletschrig, 




sented by the major metonymy, the proper name whom we are to read, are inevitable, to an 
extent. 
 This is what Jacques Derrida told Évelyne Grossman in an interview on December 
12th, 2003: 
 
Comme tout corps propre, il est unique. Ce poème, une fois publié, il faut le respecter 
comme unique. Il n’a lieu qu’une fois. Même si on peut mettre en réseau certains de 
ses éléments avec tout le corpus de Celan, le corpus de Hölderlin, le corpus de Nelly 
Sachs et tant d’autres, le poème, lui, est unique. Donc, ce que j’appellerai ici « corps 
du poème » c’est cette unicité qui est incorporée, incarnée, dans ce qu’on appelait na-
guère les « signifiants », dans des graphèmes qui en eux-mêmes ne peuvent pas être 
traduits. Traduire c’est perdre le corps. La traduction la plus fidèle est une violence : 
on perd le corps du poème qui n’existe qu’en allemand et une seule fois. C’est un 
corps à corps, c’est une attaque. Elle est évidemment désirée par le poète — il veut 
qu’on le lise, qu’on le traduise — mais je reconnais qu’il y a de l’aggression et du 
corps à corps. J’essaie d’écrire un texte qui, lui aussi, toute proportion gardée, devrait 
rester unique, d’une certaine manière. C’est une certaine lecture, cela m’est arrivé une 
fois, je l’ai fait une fois, c’est un texte de moi. À quoi j’ajouterai, s’agissant du corps, 
que quand je dis « le poème de Celan appartient à la langue allemande », c’est déjà 
une simplification. La langue de Celan est elle-même un corps à corps avec la langue 
allemande qu’il déforme, qu’il transforme, qu’il aggresse lui-même, qu’il incise. Il 
s’en prend au corps de la langue allemande. À ma manière et modestement, je fais la 
même chose avec le français. C’est un corps à corps non seulement entre deux lan-
gues mais entre deux langues qui sont elle-mêmes chacune dans une guerre intestine. 
Il y a du corps à corps « à l’intérieur » de chaque langue nationale. Chaque fois qu’il y 
a de l’écriture. Il n’y a pas d’écriture qui fraye un passage sans cette violence du 
corps. Comment expliquer autrement la charge — d’autres diraient l’investissement 
—, la charge libidinale voire narcissique que chacun apporte à ses propres textes ? 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 eher als sie 
war ich bei dir, Geschneete. 
 
 Wirf deine Tropen 
zum Rest: 
einer will wissen, 
warum ich bei Gott 
nicht anders war als bei dir, 
 
 einer 
will drin ersaufen, 
zwei Bücher an Stelle der Lungen, 
 
 einer, der sich in dich stach, 
beatmet den Stich, 
 
 einer, er war dir der nächste, 
geht sich verloren, 
 
 einer schmückt dein Geschlecht 
mit deinem und seinem Verrat, 
 
 vielleicht 





C’est mon corps, ceci est mon corps. Chaque poème dit : « Ceci est mon corps » et ce 
qui suit : buvez-le, mangez-le, gardez-le en mémoire de moi. Il y a une Cène dans 
chaque poème qui dit : ceci est mon corps, ici est maintenant. Et vous savez ce qui 
suit alors : les passions, les crucifixions, les mises à mort. D’autres diraient aussi des 
résurrections... 430 
 
Derrida’s improvised reply to Évelyne Grossman’s question concerning “a physical wound-
ing of the words of the poem”, a question which obviously bears in mind the theme of cir-
cumcising the word in a poem by Celan (“Einem, der vor die Tür stand”) and Derrida’s read-
ing of it in Schibboleth, is in my view one of the most accurate responses to Celan’s poetry 
and poetics ever written.431 
 
 
“... TROPES AND METAPHORS ... AD ABSURDUM”? 
 
Let us return to the quotation with which we opened the present discussion: 
 
Und was wären dann die Bilder?  
Das einmal, das immer wieder einmal und nur jetzt und nur hier Wahrgenommene 
und Wahrzunehmende. Und das Gedicht wäre somit der Ort, wo alle Tropen und 
Metaphern ad absurdum geführt werden wollen.432  
 
John Felstiner translates the words “ad absurdum geführt”  by the correspondingly ambigu-
ous expression “carried ad absurdum”. This could imply something like carrying tropes and 
metaphors to an excess, beyond all moderation, far from the golden mean recommended by 
Aristotle and his followers in the classical rhetorical tradition. This exuberance in figuration, 
this euphuism beyond all measure is indeed one way of mocking metaphor, and Lautréamont 
is perhaps the most obvious master of this sort of reductio ad absurdum or “décalage de la 
comparaison” as Michel Deguy has called it.433  For reduction it is; even this counter-
reduction is a way to reduce metaphor ad ridiculum, whether the mocked metaphor be of re-
ligious or literary origin. This is how Deguy defines this discrepancy (décalage): 
                                                 
430 “La vérité blessante. Ou le corps à corps des langues. Entretien avec Jacques Derrida”, Europe, No. 901 
(May 2004), pp. 8-27, here pp. 26-27. An English translation of pp. 22-27 of this interview can be found in 
“The Truth that Wounds (From an Interview)”, trans. Thomas Dutoit, in Sovereignties in Question. The Po-
etics of Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 168-169. 
431 Some of the poems and poetic statements that, in my view, very well correspond to — or correspond with 
— this response shall be quoted and discussed later on. The term of correspondence is rather suspect with 
regard to Celan’s poetics, while he expressly denies that it is a question of “correspondence”, Entsprechung; 
however, he also speaks of poetry both as a “dialogue” [Gespräch] and, paradoxically enough, as “bottle 
post”. (Cf. TCA/Meridian, passim, and below.) 
432 Der Meridian (1960 = TCA/Meridian, Endf. 39a). Trans. John Felstiner: “And then what would the images 
be? / Something perceived and to be perceived only now and only here, once, again and again once. And so 
a poem would be the place where all tropes and metaphors will be carried ad absurdum.” (Selected Poems 
and Prose of Paul Celan, pp. 410-411.) 
433 Michel Deguy, “Citations de Maldoror”, in Figurations : Poèmes – propositions – études (Paris: Gallimard, 
1969), pp. 233-268, here p. 237. Celan possessed a copy of this book and highlighted some of its content in 
1969 (cf.  La bi. phi.) — Décalage is, in other words, “manque de correspondance” (Petit Robert), or: 





Il consiste à prendre à la lettre une comparaison, une tournure métaphorique inscrite 
dans la langue, un schéma où l’imaginaire se déploie en langue, et à en développer la 
logique jusqu’aux dernières conséquences. [Figurations, p. 237.] 
 
Reductio ad absurdum is of course yet another Aristotelian tradition, and Aristotle himself 
often both recommends and exercises “reduction to absurdity of metaphors”434  in an oppo-
nent’s discourse or argument. This form of reduction to absurdity occurs for instance when 
Aristotle scorns Plato for using “empty words and poetic metaphors” in speaking of the sen-
sible things as being ‘modelled after’ the paradigm of the ideas, and then asks: “For what is it 
that fashions things on the model of the Ideas?”435 
 We may often recognize something more or less similar happening in Jacques Der-
rida’s work,436  for instance in his late texts on forgiveness, such as Pardonner : 
l’impardonnable et l’imprescriptible,437  where the deconstructibility of a certain similarity, 
or of certain alleged analogies between gift and forgiveness is announced, but in favour of an 
undeconstructible gift and true forgiveness, only in view of a “proper meaning” that could be 
assigned to both gift and forgiveness, “if there is one”:  
 
And more than once we would have to carry over the problems and aporias of the 
‘gift’ (such as I have tried to formalize them, for example, in Given Time and in par-
ticular in the last chapter of this book, entitled ‘The Excuse and Pardon’), to transfer 
them, so to speak, to the problems and non-problems that are the aporias of forgive-
ness, aporias that are analogous and, what is more, linked. But one must neither yield 
to these analogies between the gift and forgiveness nor, of course, neglect their neces-
sity; rather, one must attempt to articulate the two, to follow them to the point where, 
suddenly, they cease to be pertinent.438 
                                                 
434  Cf. Julia Annas, in Aristole’s Metaphysics, Books M and N [1976], p. 217 [notes to Met. 1092a29-b3], pas-
sim; cf. above. 
435  Met. I, 9, 991a20-23; tr. Tredennick; cf. above. Paul Celan was actually familiar with this passage, through 
Lev Shestov at least, having emphatically underlined (probably in September 1959), among others, the 
words kenologei=n e0stin kai\ metafora/j le/gein poihtika/j in his copy of the French translation Le pou-
voir des clefs.  (Cf. Celan, La bi. phi., p. 616 [nos. 163, 164-165; for the Russian original, cf. p. 702, nos. 
734-736]; the source quoted is Celan’s personal copy of Leon Chestov, Le pouvoir des clefs (Potestas  
Clavium), trans. Boris de Schloezer, J. Schiffrin [Paris: Pléiade, 1928], p. 421; in a 1967 edition 
[Paris: Flammarion, 1967] the pages are 315-316.) 
436  For example, a certain important part of “La double séance” consists of demonstrating that what he calls 
“the position of the supplemetary mark” in Mallarmé is not rigorously metaphorical or metonymical, in 
spite of its being “always represented by metaphor or metonymy”, an extra trope or figure which is no 
longer metaphor, (no) more metaphor (plus de métaphore) (La dissémination, Paris: Seuil, cop. 1972 [repr. 
1997, pp. 307 ff]). 
437 The text was first presented in a conference in 1997 and appeared first in English: “To Forgive: The Unfor-
givable and the Imprescriptible”, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, in John Caputo et al., ed., Questioning God 
(Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 2001), pp. 21-51. Just a day before his death it also appeared in French, in the 
special issue of Cahiers de l’Herne; this French version was reprinted in the series “Carnets de l’Herne” as 
Pardonner — l’impardonnable et l’imprescriptible (Paris: L’Herne, 2005). 
438 “Et nous aurons plus d’une fois à reporter les problèmes et les apories du « don » (telles que j’ai tenté par 
exemple de les formaliser dans Donner le temps et notamment dans le dernier chapitre de ce livre, intitulé 
« L’excuse et le pardon »), pour les transférer, si je puis dire, sur des problèmes et ces non-problèmes que 
sont des apories analogues et d’ailleurs liées du pardon. / Mais il ne faudra ni céder à ces analogies entre 
don et pardon, ni bien sûr, en négliger la nécessité. Nous devrions plutôt tenter de les articuler ensemble, de 





This procedure that would show the expression “the gift of forgiveness” to be merely  meta-
phorical, an impertinent analogy or composed of several analogies which turn out, in the final 
analysis, to be insufficiently grounded, could then be applied to any metaphor in principle, to 
any analogy or resemblance as principles of metaphor. Indeed, as the English translation 
helps us to observe, here it is a question of “carrying over”, “transferring” the problems and 
aporias from one domain to another. Yet again, there is not only an analogy between gift and 
forgiveness but they are “linked” with each other (“des apories analogues et d’ailleurs 
liées”). Not only analogous but also linked. The connection between these analogues is not 
only the fanciful image of resemblance but the link of contiguity; neither the trans-generic 
carrying-over, nor a solid continuity within a common genus, nor pure heterogeneity without 
any link, but a relation of contiguity, which also allows for breaches and ruptures between the 
analogues. 
 Gift and forgiveness have affinities that make it possible to “carry over”, to “transfer” 
the analogous problems and aporias from one domain to the other, namely their “uncondi-
tionality of principle” and their “essential relation to time”, but they are also irreducible to 
each other by virtue of their different relations to time:  
 
Between giving and forgiving there is at least this affinity or this alliance that, beside 
their unconditionality of principle — one and the other, giving and forgiving, giving 
for giving [don par don] — have an essential relation to time, to the movement of 
temporalization; even though what seems to bind forgiveness to a past, which in a cer-
tain way does not pass, makes forgiveness an experience irreducible to that of the gift, 
to a gift one grants more commonly in the present, in the presentation or presence of 
the present. [“To Forgive”, p. 22; cf. pp. 21-22.] 
 
So gift and forgiveness are analogous to each other, but there are points where these analo-
gies “suddenly [...] cease to be pertinent” (cf. ibid.). The “carrying over”, the “transfer” be-
tween them must be accompanied by a counter-move, a reductio ad absurdum of sorts. A lit-
tle like the tropes and metaphors in a poem, as Celan suggests in the Meridian, tropes and 
metaphors which would be carried ad absurdum and crossed over by “the meridian”, in the 
secret of the encounter.439   
                                                                                                                                                        
439 But a poem, such as the poem “Todtnauberg”, might also be the place where gift and forgiveness meet, as 
Derrida claims, where they meet with all their analogous problems and aporias, not only analogous with re-
gard to each other but also linked in a strange relation of contiguity. — In Derrida’s text, the complexities 
multiply themselves from the outset. He continues: “I have just said ‘experience’ of forgiveness or the gift, 
but the word ‘experience’ may already seem abusive or precipitous here, where forgiveness and gift have 
perhaps this in common, that they never present themselves as such to what is commonly called an experi-
ence, a presentation to consciousness or to existence, precisely because of the aporias that we must take into 
account”. (“To Forgive”, p. 22.) — I will consider elsewhere, in a forthcoming article (“‘Undecidably 
Equivocal’: On ‘Todtnauberg’ and Forgiveness”), some of these aporias, with respect to the pores, euporet-
ics and aporetics of the poem “Todtnauberg”, also with regard to the antimetaphoric poetics of “ambiguity 




 A striking example of reducing metaphorical or quasi-metaphorical resemblance ad 
absurdum can also be recognized among the draft material for the Meridian. 
 
»Schreiben als Form des Gebets«, lesen wir – ergriffen – bei Kafka. Auch das 
bedeutet zunächst nicht Beten, sondern Schreiben: man kann es nicht mit gefalteten 
Händen tun.440 
 
By pointing to a certain affinity that does not exist between writing and praying, by making 
the assimilation between these two less obvious (if there ever was anything obvious in it), by 
refusing one of the attributes of praying to the practice of writing and thus perhaps suggesting 
other incompatibilities, this apparently ambivalent response to Kafka’s striking fragment is 
not its refutation, but rather makes way for the more interesting implications in it: perhaps it 
is not prayer that determines writing after all, ‘prayer’ as an unorthodox predicate metaphori-
cally determining the subject ‘writing’, but, inversely and paradoxically, rather writing that 
solicits prayer in a profound manner?441 
 But to say that one cannot write with one’s hands folded seems itself metaphorical. A 
metaphor juxtaposed with another, a figure against figure, a counter-figure and a certain — 
benevolent, as it seems — sort of  reductio ad absurdum of Kafka’s apparent metaphor. But 
against the identification of these figures with metaphor, Celan’s as well as Kafka’s figure, 
juxtaposed here with each other, both of these writers being so very critical of metaphor and 
its concept, and even if someone would quibble against Celan’s objection that one can indeed 
hold a pen in one’s folded hands and scribble, and that therefore his phrase is indeed meta-
phorical, we might remark that the folding of hands is not merely a matter of clasping one’s 
hands together, of joining one’s fingers across each other, but a gesture indicative of prayer 
which involves not only the body but the soul too, as believers would say. Even the jocular 
mocking of this gesture bears reference to prayer at least in its Christian outward appearance 
and form. The bodily gesture is not innocent,442  so to say, it is not exempt from being inter-
pretable as an indication of a certain ‘spiritual’ activity — it is as much exposed to interpreta-
tion as the alleged metaphor is. But writing is not just a matter of tracing one’s pen across 
paper, either. Neither one of these activities is just a five-finger exercise, nor is their combi-
nation (judged impossible by Celan, at least with regard to some of the incompatible features 
or missing analogies between writing and praying) a question of an acrobatic performance. 
 When Celan affirms Kafka’s fragment, that writing is a form of prayer, but affirms it 
with reservations, or when he suggests that there is no difference of principle between a poem 
and a handshake, he does not portray one through the image of the other, the less well-known 
                                                 
440 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582. “‘Writing as a form of prayer’, we read – seized – in Kafka. Though this does 
not mean praying in the first place, but writing: that cannot be done with folded hands.” (My translation.) 
441 Cf. my article “’Schreiben als Form des Gebets’ – An Impossible Form of Apostrophe? (‘P.S.’ on a Frag-
ment by Kafka as Adapted by Celan)” (forthcoming). 




phenomenon through the better known, through a “filter” or in a “stereoscopic vision”.443 
Instead, thinking of the principle common to a poem and a handshake, or to writing and pray-
ing, requires an eidetic reduction of sorts; the different representations are to be bracketed 
and yet, the differences are by no means to be effaced or forgotten. This does not mean kill-
ing metaphors by abstraction, but paying attention to language, manifestation and the “con-
versance” we are having with the world and with each other.444 
 
 
A WORD ON LUCILE’S COUNTER-WORD. THE INVISIBLE IMAGE 
 
Paying attention to language can be paradoxical through and through. Lucile’s figure in 
Büchner’s play Danton’s Tod and in Celan’s Meridian speech is a ‘counter-figure’ in a way 
that resembles Antigone:445  she too defies the inhuman order by her uncanny ‘speech act’, 
her “counter-word”. Let us read only a few of the many passages dedicated to Lucile in the 
Meridian speech:  
 
[...] da ist Lucile, die Kunstblinde, dieselbe Lucile, für die Sprache etwas Personhaftes 
und Wahrnehmbares hat, noch einmal da, mit ihrem plötzlichen »Es lebe der König!« 
Nach allen auf der Tribüne (es ist das Blutgerüst) gesprochenen Worten – welch ein 
Wort! Es ist das Gegenwort, es ist das Wort, das den »Draht« zerreißt, das Wort, das 
sich nicht mehr vor den »Eckstehern und Paradegäulen der Geschichte« bückt, es ist 
ein Akt der Freiheit. Es ist ein Schritt.446 
                                                 
443 “Filter” is Max Black’s term (“Metaphor”, in Models and Metaphors [1962]). Another popular metaphor for 
metaphor, “stereoscopic vision”, comes from W. Bedell Stanford’s Greek Metaphor. Studies in Theory and 
Practice (Oxford, 1936), p. 105; cit. Douglas Berggren, “The Use and Abuse of Metaphor” (1962), p. 243. 
This is how Berggren unravels this notion: “[T]he perspectives prior to and subsequent to the transformation 
of both referents, moreover, interacting with their normal meanings, which makes it ultimately impossible 
to reduce completely the cognitive import of any vital metaphor to any set of univocal, literal, or non-
tensional statements. For a special meaning, and in some cases even a new sort of reality, is achieved which 
cannot survive except at the intersection of the two perspectives which produced it.” (pp. 243-244.) — But 
what are normal meanings? If the intersection results rather from some primordial equivocality of “co-
intended [mitgemeint]” but mostly non-thematized aspects even belonging to the “normal meanings” (con-
ceptual grasp, namely comprehension, apprehension, always already involved in grasping something with 
the hands, and so on), or rather from the radical, disseminal openness of such co-intendedness (the inex-
haustibility of poetic language as an indeterminacy of horizons out of which its constituents are experi-
enced), the view of the “stereoscopic vision” might also be called into question. — On the principal affinity 
between a handshake and a poem, cf. Celan’s famous letter to Hans Bender (GW 3:177-178), and below. 
444 As we have already noted, the term “conversance” is a very fortunate translation, by Warnek and Brogan, 
for the Greek lo/goj and Heidegger’s translation of this term by Kundschaft; “conversance” far surpasses 
“discourse” also as a translation of Rede as used in Sein und Zeit. (Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics ? 1-3: On the 
Essence and Actuality of Force [Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1995], i.e. the translation of Heidegger, GA 
33.) 
445 “I began to think about Antigone a few years ago as I wondered what happened to those feminist efforts to 
confront and defy the state. It seemed to me that Antigone might work as a counterfigure to the trend cham-
pioned by recent feminists to seek the backing and authority of the state to implement feminist policy aims. 
The legacy of Antigone's defiance appeared to be lost in the contemporary efforts to recast political opposi-
tion as legal plaint and to seek the legitimacy of the state in the espousal of feminist claims.” (Antigone’s 
Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death  [New York: Columbia University Press, 2000], p. 1.) 
446 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 6-7. Trans. Felstiner: “here comes Lucile, blind to art, the same Lucile for whom lan-
guage is something personal and perceptible, once again with her sudden ‘Long live the King!’/ After all 





Speech is perceivable, of course, but not only in one sense. And perceiving speech is not just 
perceiving an object. In the Meridian, speaking of Danton’s Tod, Lucile is one who perceives 
speech, pays attention to speech. Paradoxically enough, she is also someone who, “when the 
talk concerns art, [...] is present and ... not really listening [...] someone who hears and listens 
and looks ... and then doesn’t know what the talk was about.” So, she perceives but does not 
listen, she pays attention without really paying attention. But she is the one who, in the third 
scene of the second act of Büchner’s play, “hears the speaker, ‘sees him speak’, perceives 
language and form [Gestalt] and, at the same time [...] perceives Breath as well, that is, direc-
tion and destiny.”447  She is “blind to art”, die Kunstblinde, and she perceives, nimmt wahr, 
perceives and has perceived, wahrgenommen hat. A little like another woman in Büchner’s 
play (I.v.9), Marion, who says — without metaphor as Celan maintains:  
 
»Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen«: das ist keine »moderne« Metapher, das ist 
Wissen, von weither, um das Wissen eines Mundes – 448 
 
Lucile sees and hears without really listening, she ‘perceives’ breath, direction and destiny. In 
the sublime eloquence of the moribund revolutionaries, Danton and Camille and their com-
rades, who are about to be executed, it is a question of such words that already stand in their 
“last-thingliness” (Letztdinglichkeit), and this is also how these “vocal things” stand in the 
poem. In extremis.449 
 Lucile herself is blind to art. To the art of speaking well, including the art of speaking 
well about art. Instead of art, she perceives, sees and hears speech as form or figure, Gestalt 
(“Das Gedicht ist als Figur der ganzen Sprache eingeschrieben”).450  She perceives 
‘blindly’, blind to art, and hears without always listening to what is said, and thus, paradoxi-
cally enough, she is the one in whose figure we may encounter poetry, she is like poetry: 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
snaps the ‘wire,’ a word that no longer bows to ‘history’s loiterers and parade-horses,’ it is an act of free-
dom. It is a step.” (Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, pp. 402-403.) 
447 “Aber es gibt, wenn von der Kunst die Rede ist, auch immer wieder jemand, der zugegen ist und ... nicht 
richtig hinhört. / Genauer: jemand, der hört und lauscht und schaut... und dann nicht weiß, wovon die Rede 
war. Der aber den Sprechenden hört, der ihn »sprechen sieht«, der Sprache wahrgenommen hat und Gestalt, 
und zugleich auch – wer vermöchte hier, im Bereich dieser Dichtung, daran zu zweifeln? –, und zugleich 
auch Atem, das heißt Richtung und Schicksal.” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 5a-b / trans. Felstiner, p. 402.) In 
Dantons Tod: “CAMILLE. Was sagst du, Lucile? / LUCILE. Nichts, ich seh dich so gern sprechen. / CAMILLE. 
Hörst mich auch? / LUCILE. Ei freilich. / CAMILLE. Hab ich recht? Weißt du auch, was ich gesagt habe? / 
LUCILE. Nein, wahrhaftig nicht.” (Georg Büchner, Sämtliche Werke [Berlin: Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft, 
1963], p. 38.) Celan had underlined this last line by Lucile in his personal copy of the play (TCA/Meridian, 
Anmerkungen, p. 225). 
448 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 593. Celan has added the adjective seherische into this note, after the word Wissen, so 
that the sentence can be also reconstructed as follows: “»Danton, deine Lippen haben Augen«: das ist keine 
»moderne« Metapher, das ist Wissen, von weither, um das [seherische] Wissen eines Mundes.” 
449 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 517, 518, 519, 524.  
450 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 239:  “Das Gedicht ist als Figur der ganzen Sprache eingeschrieben; aber die Sprache 
bleibt unsichtbar; das sich Aktualisierende – die Sprache – tritt, kaum ist das geschehen, in den Bereich des 




Ich habe bei Lucile der Dichtung zu begegnen geglaubt, und Lucile nimmt Sprache 
als Gestalt und Richtung und Atem wahr –: [...]451 
 
Figure and direction and breath — it is a question of mortality, and yet, also of spirituality: 
the figure (Gestalt) perceived when we perceive language is, as Celan says, a “spiritual figure 
[geistige Gestalt]”. This spirituality to be perceived, to be seen when we perceive language as 
a figure and direction and breath — or when Lucile, like poetry, sees it — remains invisible: 
 
Das Gedicht entsteht durch den Umgang mit einem uns unsichtbar bleibenden: im 
Umgang mit der Sprache. 
Begegnung mit der Sprache ist Begegnung mit Unsichtbarem. [TCA/Meridian, Ms. 
241, 242.]  
 
This is to say, on the one hand, that language, as a whole, remains invisible to us, immedi-
ately recedes from its actualization in the poem which is written, as Celan writes in yet an-
other fragment, as a figure of language as a whole.452  This recession, this retreat belongs to 
the figure itself, as what makes it possible while remaining invisible, while receding into in-
visibility. On the other hand, it means that even while we — like Lucile — may perceive 
someone’s speech, even while we — like Marion — may see eyes, our own perhaps (our 
visible or invisible eyes), on the lips that speak, we are always dealing with something invisi-
ble when we are dealing with speech. Even when we are dealing with the “speech of the ab-
sent”, namely writing.453  This invisibility — while it is something spiritual, ein geistiges 
Phänomen as Celan writes — belongs to the body, the verbal body and the corporeal body 
and their “corps à corps”, and the whole of language resonates in the singular and untranslat-
able timbre of that bodily struggle. 
 In one of the fragments, we may read this definition of poetic imagery as a “spiritual 
phenomenon”: 
 
Zu Metapher, Bild etc: 
Bildhaftes, das ist keineswegs etwas Visuelles; es ist, wie alles mit der Sprache 
Zusammenhängende, ein geistiges Phänomen. Sprache: ist das nicht Begegnung mit 
Unsichtbarem[?] Es ist, noch im Stimmfernsten, eine Frage an den des Akzents; zum 
wahrgenommenen Bild im Gedicht gehört das Wahrnehmen auch seines Schallbilds. 
An den Atemhöfen, in denen es steht, erkennst du’s; an den Kammzeiten[.] Das ist 
keineswegs dasselbe wie irgendeine billige impressionistische Lautmalerei, 
Klangfarbe etc. Es ist, auch hier, eine Erscheinungsform der Sprache, eine aus dem 
Geschriebenen, also Stummen, herauszuhörende Sprechart (Sprachgitter, das ist auch 
das Sprechgitter macht das sichtbar.) [TCA/Meridian, Ts. 256.]454 
                                                 
451 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 23. Trans. Felstiner: “I believe I have encountered poetry in Lucile, and Lucile per-
ceives language as form and direction and breath” (p. 406). 
452 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 239. 
453 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 458. (loc. cit.). 
454 This note has been dated “9.10.60”. The word Kammzeiten is explained in the editors’ notes 
(TCA/Meridian, “Anmerkungen”, p. 236): “Bei der Definition der metrischen Zeit einer Dichtung 
unterscheidet Franz Saran zwischen Lautzeit, Silbenzeit, Kammzeit und Abstandszeit. Die Kammzeit 






Writing, and the visible speaking or the visibility of speaking, as well as gestures and so on, 
are the visibility of the invisible. But this invisibility, this ‘spirituality’, “a spiritual phenome-
non [ein geistiges Phänomen]” is nothing other-worldly; it is temporal rather than supratem-
poral. It is voiceful and voiceless, embodied and disembodied, both at once.455  Verbal figura-
tivity or poetic imagery (Bildhaftes) is nothing visual, as Celan here writes, except to the 
extent that it is indeed a question of writing as a phenomenal form of language (Erschein-
ungsform).456  Writing is one of the forms that make language — speech (Sprache) — visible; 
but this visibility of writing or of speaking in the colloquial sense is something else than, for 
instance, mental imagery in the mind of the writer or the reader. 
 
 
                                                 
455 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 55: “Anfang: / die Sprache ist, {zumindest ihrer Intention nach,} nicht mehr 
Wortmusik, das Gedicht ist das Gedicht dessen, der weiß, daß er unter dem Neigungswinkel seiner Existenz 
spricht, daß die Sprache seines Gedichts nicht Sprache schlechthin, sondern {sich freisetzende und sich} 
aktualisierende Sprache ist, stimmhaft und stimmlos zugleich [...]/ Der Ort, wo solches sich vollzieht, ist ein 
menschlicher Ort – »ein Ort im All« gewiß, aber hier, auf Erden, in der Zeit.*/ *) Das Gedicht: ein 
terrestrisches, ein kretürliches Phänomen, {es steht in die Zeit hinein} ein poröser, zeitoffener Gegenstand 
von Menschenmund dorthin gesprochen, {körperhaft und körperlos zugleich,} auffindbar – wann 
aufgefunden? / Symbolik und Metaphorik treten zurück, die Poesie ist ein irdisches, terrestrisches 
Phänomen, das Hieratische beginnt dem Demotischen zu weichen, das Gedicht öffnet sich der Zeit,” (the 
note ends with this comma). 
456 We can of course also consider Schriftbild, the graphic image in the poem, as a concrete element of its ‘im-
agery’; Sandro Zanetti has given very acute attention to this aspect in Celan’s poetry in his dissertation »zei-




                                                 
T H E  P H E N O M E N A L  —  M E T E O R I C  —  I M A G E  
 
“And what, then, would the images be?”, Celan asks, and part of his reply is this: “And the 
poem would then be the place where all tropes and metaphors are developed ad absurdum.” 
These then’s and the so’s, accompanied by the would-be’s, indicate that the reduction, or de-
veloping or carrying tropes and metaphors ad absurdum, follows as a consequence of some-
thing. In the immediate context, the question “And then what would the images be?” follows 
the paragraph speaking of “this unavoidable question, this unheard-of demand”, the open and 
endless question concerning the “whence and whither” of the things dealt with in the poem 
and the address (perhaps address rather than demand: Anspruch means both address and de-
mand, a demand being a sort of address, of course) in which the thing addressed is named and 
its otherness is brought along into this presence, into the here and now in which the other’s 
time participates in the conversation. The place of the poem, the place where all tropes and 
metaphors are “developed” or “carried ad absurdum” — or where they would be reduced ad 
absurdum, as I would say — is the singular “here and now”, “this one, unique, limited pre-
sent”, this “one time, one time over and over again, and only now and only here” in which the 
other’s time participates, the other’s time as an irreducibly other time.457   
 
 
TIME-FRINGES (ZEITHÖFE ) 
 
Among the contraindications against applying the doctrine of metaphor to poetry we find, in 
Celan’s notes, such characterizations as the phenomenality of the poetic image and “percep-
tion” — Wahrnehmung, sprachliche Wahrnehmung. In the final version of the speech, a few 
lines before the rhetorical question rises for the first time explicitly, “The poem with its im-
ages and tropes?”, we can read the following: 
 
Das Gedicht wird – unter welchen Bedingungen! – zum Gedicht eines – immer noch – 
Wahrnehmenden, dem Erscheinenden Zugewandten, dieses Erscheinende 
Befragenden und Ansprechenden; es wird Gespräch – oft ist es verzweifeltes 
Gespräch.  
Erst im Raum dieses Gesprächs konstituiert sich das Angesprochene, versammelt es 
sich um das es ansprechende und nennende Ich. Aber in diese Gegenwart bringt das 
Angesprochene und durch Nennung gleichsam zum Du Gewordene auch sein 
Anderssein mit. Noch im Hier und Jetzt des Gedichts – das Gedicht selbst hat ja 
immer nur diese eine, einmalige, punktuelle Gegenwart –, noch in dieser 
Unmittelbarkeit und Nähe läßt es das ihm, dem Anderen, Eigenste mitsprechen: 
dessen Zeit. 458 
 
457 The translations quoted in this paragraph are by Jerry Glenn, in “Appendix: The Meridian”, in Derrida, Sov-
ereignties in Question (2005), p. 182-183 (emphases added). The notion of “participation” as a translation 
of the verb mitsprechen appears in Glenn’s translation: “only in this immediacy and proximity does it [i.e. 
the poem] allow the most idiosyncratic quality of the Other, its time, to participate in the dialogue” (p. 182); 
this is a good choice, because Celan himself uses the verb partizipieren often in his working drafts (cf. 
TCA/Meridian, Ms. 59, passim). 





The phenomenological terminology of this passage (especially the verbs erscheinen, zu-
wenden, konstituieren) of the Meridian speech is not merely incidental. If we just take a 
glimpse at the index of names in the Tübingen edition of the Meridian, we find confirmation 
of Celan’s interest in phenomenology: in the manuscript notes he refers not only to Heideg-
ger, whose position as Celan’s interlocutor (Gegenüber) has often been noticed, and to sev-
eral works by Husserl, but also such important phenomenologists as Franz Brentano, Edith 
Stein and Max Scheler are featured. The fact that Celan has in his poems borrowed the word 
Zeithof  from Husserl’s Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness of 
1905 is well known, and we find both this Husserlian coinage and direct references to this 
work among the manuscript material. For example in this draft for the radio essay on Man-
delstam, which is one of the earliest occurrences of the Husserlian neologism Zeithof in 
Celan’s texts: 
 
sprachliche Wahrnehmung, Gespräch mit dem ihm Gegenüber-, dem ihm 
Entgegenstehenden, Gespräch mit dem Anderen und Fremden, Gespräch mit 
Menschen und Dingen, Gespräch mit dem Erscheinenden, mithin auch Gespräch{, 
fragendes Gespräch} mit sich selbst – inmitten eben dieses Erscheinenden.  
2. Sprecher:  
Dieses Erscheinende hat, wie der es mit seiner Sprache Wahrnehmende, seine eigene 
Zeit. So kommt es auf einen zu: noch in seiner Nähe spricht seine Ferne mit, spricht 
seine eigene Zeit mit; im Gedicht verklammern sich diese – verschiedenen – Zeiten, 
spricht die Stunde und der Äon, der Herzschlag und die Weltuhr.  
1. Sprecher:   
Sie sprechen zueinander, treten zueinander – sie bleiben inkommensurabel. Dadurch 
entsteht im Gedicht jene Bewegtheit und Spannung, an der wir es erkennen: noch 
immer tritt Zeit hinzu, partizipiert Zeit. In einem solchen Zeit h o f  stehen die 
Gedichte Ossip Mandelstamms. Daher noch in der substantivischen Reihung jenes 
Vibrato der Worte, das (auch) semantische Relevanz hat. Daher noch im Lapidaren – 
und nicht wenige dieser Gedichte haben den Charakter einer Inschrift – das Zittern 
der sterblichen Hand. In diese »Versteinerung« nimmt das Gedicht Mandelstamms 
seine Hoffnung mit, die Hoffnung auf das – nahe oder ferne – Auge.459 
 
In a memorandum referring to Mandelstam, Celan also directly refers to Husserl’s time con-
sciousness lectures: 
 
Zu Kamen: Er spricht — er schweigt  
EH Vorl Zb, S. 400 unterstr  
                                                                                                                                                        
ditions! — a poem of one who — as before — perceives, who faces that which appears. Who questions this 
appearing and addresses it. It becomes dialogue — it is often despairing dialogue. / Only in the realm of this 
dialogue does that which is addressed take form and gather around the I who is addressing and naming it. 
But the one who has been addressed and the one who, by virtue of having been named, has, as it were, be-
come a thou, also brings its otherness along into the present, into this present. — In the here and now of the 
poem it is still possible — the poem itself, after all, has only this one, unique, limited present — only in this 
immediacy and proximity does it allow the most idiosyncratic quality of the Other, its time, to participate in 
the dialogue.” (P. 182.) 




Wahrnehmung — {das bedeutet im Gedicht} nicht sprachliche Wiedergabe, sondern 
Vergegenwärtigung durch Sprache — 
{Erst} indem die Dinge Zeit, d.h. Jetzt Vorher Nachher zeitliche Extension haben, 
haben sie Individualität  
Erst im wahrnehmenden Auge konstituiert sich der Gegenstand 
Zum Zeitbewußtsein gehört Erinnerung und Erwartung: (im Zeitfeld dieser460 
 
But if we compare Husserl’s lectures with the context in which Celan refers to them atten-
tively enough, it soon becomes evident that here “an entirely different concept of perception 
is in question”: Husserl’s discourse, which restricts itself to the perception of such temporal 
objects as melodies, and which strictly distinguishes present perception from all forms of rep-
resentation (Vergegenwärtigung), is not really compatible with, or sufficient to account for, 
the kind of “verbal perception [sprachliche Wahrnehmung]” of which Celan speaks. Here is 
the passage referred to in Celan’s memorandum, underlined in his personal copy of Husserl’s 
book: 
 
Auch in bloßer Phantasie ist jedes Individuelle ein zeitlich irgendwie Extendiertes, hat 
sein Jetzt, sein Vorher und Nachher, aber das Jetzt, das Vorher und Nachher ist ein 
bloß Eingebildetes wie das ganze Objekt.461 
 
It is clear that Husserl reserves the term “perception [Wahrnehmung]” for original presenta-
tion (including primary memory, i.e. retention) and refuses to call the modes of 
“re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung, Re-Präsentation]”, recollection, secondary memory, 
                                                 
460 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 486; the parenthesis at the end of the fragment is not closed. The typography of the 
Tübingen edition has been only slightly modified; the completion of the reference to Husserl has been left 
out. Kamen, “The Stone”, is the title of Mandelstam’s collection of poems. Besides the word Zeithof, also 
Zeitfeld is part of Husserl’s vocabulary: “Das »ursprüngliche Zeitfeld« ist nicht etwa ein Stück objektiver 
Zeit, das erlebte Jetzt ist, in sich genommen, nicht ein Punkt der objektiven Zeit usw.” (Hua X, p. 6 [370]; 
cf. pp. 62 [418], 70 [425-426].) The word Zeithof appears in § 14, pp. 35-36 [395-396], underlined by Celan 
and marked also by a double stroke in the margin (La bi. phi., p. 422, No. 30); I cite here the English trans-
lation (pp. 37-38): “Let us consider a case of secondary memory: We recall, say, a melody that we recently 
heard at a concert. It is obvious in this case that the whole memory-phenomenon [Erinnerungsphänomen] 
has exactly the same constitution, mutatis mutandis, as the perception of the melody. Like the perception, it 
has a privileged point: to the now-point of the perception corresponds a now-point of the memory. We run 
through the melody in phantasy; we hear, ‘as it were’ [»gleichsam«], first the initial tone, then the second 
tone, and so on. At any particular time there is always a tone (or tone-phase) in the now-point. The preced-
ing tones, however, are not erased from consciousness. Primary memory of the tones that, as it were, I have 
just heard and expectation (protention) of the tones that are yet to come fuse with the apprehension [Auffas-
sung] of the tone that is now appearing and that, as it were, I am now hearing [des jetzt erscheinenden, 
gleichsam jetzt gehörten Tones]. The now-point once again has for consciousness a temporal fringe [hat für 
das Bewußtsein wieder einen Zeithof], which is produced in a continuity of memorial apprehensions; and 
the total memory of the melody consists in a continuum of such continua of temporal fringes [in einem Kon-
tinuum von solchen Zeithofkontinuen] and, correlatively, in a continuum of apprehension-continua of the 
kind described.” 
461 Hua X, p. 41; Celan cites the first edition of the 1905 lectures, edited by Heidegger in 1928, p. 400 
(this original pagination is henceforth given in square brackets); cf. Celan, TCA/Meridian, p. 239. 
Trans. John Barnett Brough: “Even in mere phantasy every individual is extended in time in some way, 
having its now, its before, and its after; but the now, before, and after are merely imagined, as is the
whole object.” (Husserl: Collected Works, Vol. 4: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of 




phantasy, and imagination by the name of “perception”.462 So has Celan just been careless in 
connecting perception with representation, Wahrnehmung with Vergegenwärtigung? 
 Husserl speaks in terms of objects and objectivation, and this requires that the process 
of temporal perception must be restricted into the limits of certain ideal borders of the object 
— and he is quite sensitive to the proximity of ideality and fiction (“idealisierenden Fik-
tionen”).463  But in any case, the place in which the now, the just-before and the soon-to-be 
form a continuum, in which a temporal object, such as a melody, becomes what it is, an indi-
                                                 
462 Let us quote the passage from the beginning of § 17 a little more extensively, in order to make this clear as 
economically as possible: “Der Wahrnehmung oder Selbstgebung der Gegenwart, [addition in the English 
translation: ‘and primary memory’,] die ihr Korrelat hat im gegebenen Vergangenen, tritt nun ein anderer 
Gegensatz gegenüber, der von Wahrnehmung und Wiedererinnerung, sekundärer Erinnerung. In der Wider-
erinnerung »erscheint« uns ein Jetzt, aber es »erscheint« in einem ganz anderen Sinne, als in dem das Jetzt 
in der Wahrnehmung erscheint. Dieses Jetzt ist nicht »wahrgenommen«, d h. selbst gegeben, sondern ver-
gegenwärtigt. Es stellt ein Jetzt vor, das nicht gegeben ist. Und ebenso stellt der Ablauf der Melodie in der  
W i e d e r e r i n n e r u n g  ein »soeben vergangen« vor, g i b t es aber nicht. Auch in bloßer Phantasie ist 
jedes Individuelle ein zeitlich irgendwie Extendiertes, hat sein Jetzt, sein Vorher und Nachher, aber das 
Jetzt, das Vorher und Nachher ist ein bloß Eingebildetes wie das ganze Objekt. Hier steht also e i n  g a n z  
a n d e r e r  W a h r n e h m u n g s b e g r i f f  in Frage. Wahrnehmung ist hier der Akt, der etwas als es 
selbst vor Augen stellt, der Akt, der das Objekt  u r s p r ü n g l i c h  k o n s t i t u i e r t. Das Gegenteil ist  
V e r g e g e n w ä r t i g u n g, Re-Präsentation, als der Akt, der ein Objekt nicht selbst vor Augen stellt, 
wenn auch nicht gerade in der Weise eines eigentlichen Bildbewußtseins. Hier ist von einer kontinuierlichen 
Vermittlung der Wahrnehmung mit ihrem Gegenteil gar keine Rede. Vorhin war das Vergangenheitsbe-
wußtsein, nämlich das primäre, keine Wahrnehmung, weil Wahrnehmung als der das Jetzt originär konsti-
tuierende Akt genommen war. Das Vergangenheitsbewußtsein konstituiert aber nicht ein Jetzt, vielmehr ein 
»soeben gewesen«, ein dem Jetzt intuitiv Vorangegangenes. Nennen wir aber Wahrnehmung den  A k t,  i n  
d e m  a l l e r  » U r s p r u n g «  liegt, der  o r i g i n ä r  k o n s t i t u i e r t , so ist die  p r i m ä r e  
E r i n n e r u n g  W a h r n e h m u n g. Denn nur in der primären Erinnerung  s e h e n  wir Vergangenes, 
nur in ihr konstituiert sich Vergangenheit, und zwar nicht repräsentativ, sondern präsentativ.” (Hua X, pp. 
40-41; emphases by letter-spacing in the original.) Trans. J. B. Brough (pp. 42-43.): “In addition to the con-
trast between perception, or the giving of the present itself, [and primary memory], which has its correlate 
in the given past, there is another opposition: between perception and recollection or secondary memory. In 
recollection a now ‘appears’ to us, but it ‘appears’ in an entirely different sense in which the now appears in 
perception. This now is not ‘perceived’ — that is, given itself — but represented. It represents a now that is 
not given. And so too the running-off of a melody in recollection represents a ‘just past’ but does not give it. 
Even in mere phantasy every individual is extended in time in some way, having its now, its before, and its 
after; but the now, before, and after are merely imagined, as is the whole object. Here, therefore, an entirely 
different concept of perception is in question. Perception in this case is the act that places something before 
our eyes as the thing itself, the act that originally constitutes the object. Its opposite is re-presentation [Ver-
gegenwärtigung, Re-Präsentation], understood as the act that does not place an object itself before our eyes 
but just re-presents it; that places it before our eyes in image, as it were, although not exactly in the manner 
of a genuine image-consciousness. Here we do not say anything at all about the continuous mediation of 
perception with its opposite. Up to this point, the consciousness of the past – the primary consciousness of 
the past, that is – was not <called> perception because perception was taken as the act that originally consti-
tutes the now. But the consciousness of the past does not constitute a now; it rather constitutes a ‘just past,’ 
something that has preceded the now intuitively. But if we call perception the act in which all ‘origin’ lies, 
the act that constitutes originally, then primary memory is perception. For only in primary memory do we 
see what is past, only in it does the past become constituted – and constituted presentatively, not re-
presentatively.” (Emphasis in the original translated text. Additions in brackets as in the translation by 
J.B. Brough; “Added according to the sense of the original manuscript.” [p. 42n25.]) 
463 “Erst als zeitlich gedehnter ist der Ton c ein konkretes Individuum.” (Hua X, p. 86 [439].) This — that it is 
the temporal extension that constitutes the concrete individual, here the note ‘c’ for instance — is of course 
quite close to the passage Celan has highlighed and commented on in his notes, cited above (TCA/Meridian, 
Ms. 486; Husserl, Hua X, pp. 40-41 [400]). However, a few lines later Husserl continues: “Im übrigen 





vidual object, this place is named by Husserl with the neologism Zeithof, and this word is 
adopted by Celan and used on many occasions, both in his poetry and in the drafts for the 
Meridian. 464
For example, Zeithof appears in a six-verse poem (written in October 1967) that has 
not a single verb in it and also therefore seems to deny the individualizing temporal contin-
uum, the now-before-after that belongs to all temporal objects, to the creature it names: 
SCHWIMMHÄUTE  zwischen den Worten, 





By the word Zeithof Husserl refers to the ‘halo’ of retentions and protentions that belong to 
each present punctual moment of a temporal object. A melody is an illuminating example. 
Also the memorized or phantasied temporal objects have the structure of “now before after”, 
which has caught very specific attention by Celan as a reader of the lectures.466
But here, in this poem, we seem to have some sort of a creature with shining feathers 
and interdigital webs, paddling on something like a pool of stagnant water. According to the 
Grimm dictionary, Tümpel has originally meant any deep pool of water (this corresponds to 
an obsolete acceptation of the word “pool”: “A deep and still place in a body of water”), even 
abysmally deep, and this is indeed how another poem, “Flimmerbaum”, speaks of “ein Tüm-
pel”: “Es war der unendliche Teich.”467 But here it is a question of a word-digited creature: it
has webs between words. Therefore we may be inclined to say: the strange creature, this syn-
dactyl, appears to be some kind of metaphor for some kind of verbal creature, word-digited
464 Cf. Hua X, p. 105 [457 in the 1928 ed.]: “Jede Wahrnehmung hat ihren retentionalen und protentionalen 
Hof. Auch die Modifikation der Wahrnehmung muß – in modifizierter Weise – diesen doppelten Hof 
enthalten, und was die ‘bloße Phantasie’ von der Erinnerung unterscheidet, ist, daß dieser ganze intentionale 
Komplex einmal den Charakter der Aktualität hat, das andere Mal den der Inaktualität.” En. trans., p. 111: 
“Every perception has its retentional and protentional halo. The modification of perception must also con-
tain — in modified fashion — this double halo; and what distinguishes ‘mere phantasy’ from memory is 
that in memory’s case this entire intentional complex has the character of actuality, while in the case of 
mere phantasy it is characterized by the absence of actuality.” By “memory”, Husserl refers here to “pri-
mary memory”, the retention immediately involved in the present perception of a temporal object (Zeitob-
jekt, Zeitgegenstand; cf. e.g. Hua X, p. 108 [459]) (such as a melody presently heard, with those phases that 
have already passed retained as belonging to the present perception of the melody as a whole). 
465 TCA/Lichtzwang, p. 125 (GW 2:297). “WEBS between the words, // their time-fringe —/ a pool, // grey-
spined behind / the luminous tuft / meaning.” (My translation.) 
466 Hua X, p. 30: “Kometenschweif von Retentionen” [391] (Celan has marked a passage that immediately pre-
cedes this expression, but not this one); on p. 61 “Hof von Intentionen” [418]; and on p. 105 [457] (the last 
of Celan’s highlightings is on p. 404 of the 1928 ed., which we have already cited. 
467 GW 1:233. CF. DWB: “TÜMPEL, m.[...] A.  tiefe wasserstelle. / 1)  tiefe stelle eines baches, flusses oder 
meeres. / a) meist mit der vorstellung des abgründigen [...] 2)  tiefes stehendes gewässer (s. auch u.
tümpelchen). / a)  kleiner see, teich: lacuna [...]” (Bd. 22, Sp. 1757f.) Cf. OED, “pool, n.1”: “2. a. A deep 
and still place in a body of water, esp. a river or stream; †a deep part of the sea (obs.). In early use (chiefly 
Sc.) also: † a river, a stream (obs.).” ( OED, 50183967.)  
212 Counter-figures
creature. There would be a resemblance between webbed feet and these words mentioned, 
words whose time-halo (is) a puddle and whose meaning, behind the glistening tuft of feath-
ers (Leuchtschopf) as it seems, (is) grey-spined — or then the meaning consists of this lumi-
nous tuft (inasmuch as Bedeutung is understood as an apposition to Leuchtschopf), behind 
which there is the grey-spined realm of the puddle, the time-court of the web-digited word-
creature — the ambiguous syntax allows for both of these options: “behind the luminous 
tuft[:] meaning”, or, “behind the luminous tuft [of] meaning.” Between the two last lines, the 
two last words of the poem, “Leuchtschopf / Bedeutung”, there is an inaudible, ‘diaphanous’ 
or invisible hymen (Schwimmhaut), a moment of indecision — a break and transition (Um-
bruch) — accounting for the ambiguity. In his detailed analysis of this poem, which does not 
really pay much attention to the Husserlian reference apart from mentioning it twice, Roland 
Reuß nevertheless grasps the peculiar sense of temporality that the poem manifests, with re-
gard to the thematics of “actualization” and the time-fringe (Zeithof: the retentional-
protentional aureole that surrounds every individual temporal object conceived as a punctual 
present) as evoked in the Meridian fragments: 
 
[...] das Gedicht nicht einfach von Syntax und Lexikon Gebrauch macht, um Etwas 
diesem Gebrauch mental Vorausliegendes nur noch auszusprechen. Es aktualisiert 
Sprache, und d.h. das Zu-Sagende ist nur in der Äußerung selbst, genauer: an den 
Umbrüchen des je und je Gesagtes zu gewahren.468 
 
To the individual, singular time-fringe of a poem and its “verbal perception [sprachliche 
Wahrnehmung]” belong also the hiatus, the line-breaks and the enjambment that may be bro-
ken apart, the breathers so to say (Zeithöfe are also Atemhöfe).469  And if we see in the poem 
primarily the use of a metaphorical technique of bringing together the abstract (Zeit) and the 
concrete (Hof), we should try to relate this apparent dialectic to the discourse against meta-
phor in which this word Zeithof occurs, to the phenomenology of “verbal perception 
[sprachliche Wahrnehmung]” drafted by Celan, a phenomenology of actualization as a phe-
nomenology of individuation. Reuß criticizes the commonplace strategy of interpreting the 
unfamiliar and the not-quite-understood as metaphor and this metaphor as a combination, of-
ten an unknown compound word, of the already familiar concepts, such as in the case of Kluft-
rose as if this flower of the mouth was just a surprising neologism composed of Kluft 
(chasm, cleft) and Rose, even though it is an established geological term, “joint rosette”. The 
word should not, according to Reuß, be interpreted only as a metaphor, but the lexical mean-
ing must be allowed to contribute, and the philologists as well as philosophers (Gadamer’s 
report of having originally read the cycle Atemkristall in the middle of Dutch dunes, without 
lexica or other auxiliaries, “until [he] believed to have understood them”, as he says in the 
                                                 
468 Roland Reuß, Im Zeithof: Celan-Provokationen (Frankfurt a.M.: Stroemfeld, 2001), pp. 105-106. Besides 
“Umbruch”, the word “diaphanous [diaphan]” in the preceding paragraph is also quoted from Reuß, and we 
owe also the earlier reference to “Flimmerbaum” to him (cf. pp. 107-108). 




revised edition of Wer bin ich und wer bist du? [1986] which is the published result of these 
readings on the beach, serves as a warning example for Reuß) should resist the temptation to 
reduce the unfamiliar into the familiar by the way of metaphorical interpretation (“Das Ethos 
nicht nur des Philologen, sondern auch des Philosophen sollte jedem Automatismus der 
Zurückführung von Unbekanntem auf Bekanntes von Anfang an widerstehen”). However, the 
concept of metaphor remains strongly and positively featured throughout Reuß’s reading of 
“Schwimmhäute”.470  Celan’s resistance to metaphorical interpretation is obviously more un-
conditional than that, although one of its motivations is indeed the tendency to use metaphor 
as a shortcut to knowledge, which is actually just insolent pseudo-knowledge.471 He does not 
only point out that many of the compound terms in his poems are also lexical, but precisely 
that the apparently metaphorical combinations, even when they are citations of technical 
terms from various specific discourses, are at the same time citations of the original possibili-
ties of concept formation, archaic possibilities as in the case of Meermühle, or naming power 
(Nennkraft) which is, strictly speaking, not metaphorical.  
 The absence of verbs would emphasize the stagnated motionlessness of the puddle, 
the timeless time of this word-creature. The fact that the webs are between words would im-
ply that we are dealing with metaphor here. The words (Worte) would be the ‘focus’ of the 
metaphor and the rest would be the ‘frame’, except for the word Bedeutung which doubles 
the ‘focus’. The frame — the images of the webs (Schwimmhäute), of the pool (Tümpel), of 
the glimmering tuft of feathers, as it seems (Leuchtschopf), and of the grey spines 
(Graugrätiges) — would be focused on words and meaning. But let us not make this the 
meaning of the poem yet. 
 This poem alludes to Husserl, at the very least through borrowing the word Zeithof, 
but perhaps also by an implicit reference to the constant fluvial ‘rhetoric’ used in the time-
consciousness lectures. Actually, whether it is appropriate to call it a ‘rhetoric’ is a question 
in its own right, since Husserl so vehemently resists the “seductions of language”,472  also by 
marking the unavoidable spatial analogies in his discourse on time and the ‘images’ for the 
                                                 
470 Im Zeithof, pp. 8-9: “Eine der am meisten verbreiteten Strategien, sich und anderen seine eigene Unzu-
länglichkeit an ›dunklen‹ Stellen zu verbergen, ist, das Unverstandene als Metapher zu deuten, und d. h. 
letztlich es aus Bekanntem kombinatorisch herzuleiten: »Kluftrose« = Kluft + Rose. Daran ist weniger zu 
kritisieren, daß der Ausdruck ›Metapher‹ überhaupt im Zusammenhang von Celan-Gedichten fällt; zu 
kritisieren ist vielmehr, daß das Nicht-Verstehen nicht zunächst dazu führt, der Unabgeschlossenheit seines 
eigenen Wortschatzes innezuwerden und in der Konsequenz den langen Weg über Wörterbücher, Lexika 
oder andere Bücher einzuschlagen.” The term “Metapher” and its derivates appear without any explicit res-
ervations at least on pp. 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 113. — Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du? Ein Kommentar zu Paul Celan’s Gedichtfolge ›Atemkristall‹; revidierte und 
ergänzte Ausgabe (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986), pp. 137-138. 
471 Cf. Mikrolithen, p. 46, No. 67.7 (loc. cit.) 
472 “[...] the originally intuitive life which creates its originally self-evident structures through activities on the 
basis of sense-experience very quickly and in increasing measure falls victim to the seduction of language. 
Greater and greater segments of this life lapse into a kind of talking and reading that is dominated purely by 
association [...]” (The Origin of Geometry / cit. Outi Pasanen, Writing as Spacing: Philosophy, Literature, 




time-constituting phenomena such as “stream [Fluß]” and all the related names for that which 
we have no names: “Für all das fehlen uns die Namen.”473  But necessity is the mother of in-
vention and the muses are not frightened by namelessness. For example ‘depth’ can be tem-
poral, as we see from Husserl’s use of the term Zeittiefe (Hua X, p. 109 [461]). 
 In his essay “Zeitgehöft et Anwesen. La dia-chronie du poème” (1986), Jean Greisch 
sees the poem “Schwimmhäute” as “something like a variation of the Husserlian image of the 
‘comet’s tail’ of protentions and retentions”, and continues:  
 
Pour s’orienter dans une temporalité aussi « flottante », peut-être faut-il effectivement 
des mots comparables à des palmes.474 
 
But could the poem bear some more precise reference? Roland Reuß points out that the word 
Schopf, here designating perhaps the bright and coloured plumage of a web-footed bird (in-
asmuch as we refer it back to the word Schwimmhäute), is sometimes also a synonym for a 
comet’s tail. This image (Kometenschweif) appears also in Husserl’s text, designating the re-
tentional aspect of every present perception of temporal objects (which is indeed character-
ized as a “temporal fringe”, Zeithof); Reuß himself only mentions this, without really trying 
to relate the poem to the phenomenology of temporality.475   
 Now we may also see the word hinter from a new perspective. Could it be that mean-
ing (Bedeutung) lags behind the comet’s tail (Leuchtschopf), namely the retentional-
protentional halo? Or that it is left behind, as a grey residue, grey and spikey? Or that this 
residue is actually left behind by Leuchtschopf Bedeutung — as that which is behind (or be-
yond) the glistening plumage of meaning? One thing that tends to be forgotten in interpreting 
such semantically and syntactically dense poems is to listen to the idiom, to pay attention to 
the sonority and pauses — Atemhöfe — or in other words: to how it arrives through the tro-
posphere and soon disappears. How Bedeutung refers itself back to Leuchtschopf and behind 
it, Graugrätiges — onomatopoesis of the voice itself in its idiomaticity, in its timbre, the 
phenomenal appearance and disappearance of untranslatable singularity. As Reuß observes, 
the etymology of grau refers paradoxically to beams of light and indeed, what is gray consists 
of different mixtures of black and white, light and darkness (in German, grau applies also to 
                                                 
473 Cf. Hua X, pp. 26, 75, passim. 
474 “[...] comme une variation sur l’image husserlienne de la « queue de comète » de protentions et de réten-
tions”. (In  Martine Broda, ed., Contre-jour : Études sur Paul Celan [Paris: Cerf, 1986], pp. 167-183, here 
p. 175.) For the image of the comet, see Hua X, p. 30 [391]: “[Die] Jetzt-Auffassung ist gleichsam der Kern 
zu einem Kometenschweif von Retentionen, auf die früheren Jetztpunkte bezogen.” And a few pages later: 
“Wir bezeichnen die primäre Erinnerung oder Retention als einen Kometenschweif, der sich an die 
jeweilige Wahrnehmung anschließt.”  (P. 35 [395].) 
475 Reuß, Im Zeithof, pp. 113, 116n12, 119n43. Cf. DWB, entry “Schopf, m.”: “1)  ursprünglich bezeichnet 
schopf vermutlich, wie das reimwort zopf, eine bestimmte haartracht, wobei die haare in ein büschel 
zusammengefaszt sind: cirrus [...] 2)  das haupthaar überhaupt: cesaries [...] 6)  weitere übertragungen. / 
a)  federbüschel auf dem kopfe mancher vögel [...] e)  vom schweife eines cometen: siht man ze stunden 
ainen newen stern, der ainen schopf hât oder ainen sterz. MEGENBERG 74, 21; der stern bedäut hungerjâr 




other mixtures, as the Grimm dictionary explains, and therefore generally to all the “grey 
zones” between determinate hues of colours); thus we might see in Graugrätiges the thin 
beams of (reflected) light gradually disappearing into the darkness;476  fringes of the time-
fringe sinking into the darkness of the deep pool. Perhaps this is a description of how the 
web-footed creature became a word-digited creature: how the imaginal glimmering of the 
moment became flickering sound and then receded into the darkness, in a motion that is both 
direct (the web-footed creature swims upon a pool) and retrograde (the word that means 
meaning, Bedeutung, is apposited equivocally and undecidably to both Leuchschopf and 
Graugrätiges hinter / dem Leuchtschopf), forward and backward towards the break between 
the strophes, “ein Tümpel, // Graugrätiges”.477  In the apparent metaphor which turns out to 
be ‘mixed’ (the zoological and the astronomical brought together, which is of course far from 
being extraordinary), we see the phenomenal image mixed with non-phenomenal darkness 
against the surface of the pool whose depth remains unfathomable. 
 There is a syndactyl — a web-footed animal — rapidly diving for fish by still ponds 
and pools and sluggish streams, the kingfisher, also called halcyon, after Alcyone whose 
metamorphosis the kingfisher is. This bird is associated with many legends and not only 
Ovid’s tale of Alcyone and Ceyx. More prosaically, the kingfisher is known to regurgitate 
pellets of indigestible fishbones. Taking this into account, we may have already dealt with 
two creatures in the poem “Schwimmhäute”: not only the beast of prey, the kingfisher per-
haps, but also the prey of this beast, the spiny, spikey catch, the spinous rest. The meaning — 
Bedeutung either apposited to Leuchtschopf or to what we are supposed to find under this 
shining surface — or the image is divided into an image and another, second image. 
 The kingfisher, the charmer of winds and waves during the winter’s halcyon days, ap-
pears elsewhere explicitly in Celan’s poetry, twice to my knowledge with its German name 
Eisvogel. I will only cite the opening poem of the cycle Stimmen, from Sprachgitter (1959) 
(GW 1:147): 
 
Stimmen, ins Grün 
der Wasserfläche geritzt. 
Wenn der Eisvogel taucht, 
sirrt die Sekunde: 
                                                 
476 “GRAU, adj. h e r k u n f t  u n d  f o r m . / ahd. grâo (pl. grâwe), as. grâ, grê, afries. gr?, ae. græg (engl. 
gray), anord. grár, mhd. grâ (pl. grâwe), mnl. gra, grau, nl. grauw. -- mit anderen farbbezeichnungen wie 
blau, gelb als wa-stamm, germ. *gr?wa-, wobei in ae. græg lt. SIEVERS in PBB 9, 204 und JELLINEK ebda 
14, 584 auch mit einem wja-stamm gerechnet werden musz. auszergerm. stellt sich lat. r?vus am nächsten, 
dessen ? freilich noch der erklärung bedarf. zur gleichen idg. wz. *gher-, *ghr?- 'strahlen, glänzen' gehören 
lit. z?eriù, z?eréti 'im glanze strahlen', aksl. zarja, zorja 'glanz, strahl', pl. 'morgenröte' u. a. [...] A.  als 
farbbezeichnung im eigentlichen sinne. grau bezeichnet verschiedengradige mischungen von schwarz und 
weisz, aber auch stark verblichene andere farbtöne [...]” (DWB, Bd. 8, Sp. 2072-2073.) Cf. Reuß, pp. 110, 
119n34, n35. 
477 “Retrograde” is both the movement characterizing certain comets (“1853 HERSCHEL Pop. Lect. Sci. iii. §13 
(1873) 106 Retrograde comets, or those whose motion is opposite to that of the planets, are as common as 
direct ones. “) and denied to the natural movement of fish (“1880 GÜNTHER Fishes 44 Retrograde motions 





Was zu dir stand 
an jedem der Ufer, 
es tritt 
gemäht in ein anderes Bild.  
 
There is a brilliant reading of this poem in Werner Hamacher’s duly famous essay, which ap-
peared for the first time as an English version (translated by William D. Jewett), entitled “The 
Second of Inversion: Movements of a Figure through Celan’s Poetry” (1985). The figure of 
inversion is not just rhetorical, it is one of the “master tropes” of philosophy, if not the master 
trope; Hamacher takes the “idea of a transcendental semantics”, the “ordo inversus engi-
neered by Kant’s critique — [...] the figure of totalized  subjectivity”, and especially Hegel’s 
talk of man “center[ing] himself on his head (sich auf den Kopf ... stellen), i.e. in thought, and 
to construct reality according to it”, and juxtaposes the philosophical inverted world “stood 
on its head” with Celan’s reference, in the Meridian, to Büchner’s Lenz who “walked through 
the mountains on the 20th of January [...] but now and then [...] experienced a sense of un-
easiness because he was not able to walk on his head.”478  In its own way, the figure of inver-
sion appears not only in the second poem of the Stimmen cycle (“Komm auf den Händen zu 
uns”) but also in the first, which we just cited;  I cite the third, revised English version of 
Hamacher’s essay, translated by Peter Fenves (1996): 
 
This transformation — a metamorphosis like the one Alcyone undergoes when she is 
turned into a “kingfisher” during her dive after her drowned husband [Ovid, Meta-
morphoses, XI, ll. 720-748] is occasioned by a cut [Schnitt]: what is trusted and famil-
iar is “mowed” into another image — mowed, that is, by the cut of the Sekunde un-
derstood now in its etymological sense, as the secare of time. Time transforms the 
voices into the writing of the water-mirror [Wasserspiegelschrift] and turns the trusted 
image of the objective world into the averted, inverted, and afflicted [abgewandten, 
verkehrten und verletzten] images of the literary text, which no longer offers them a 
ground beyond that of an unda in which they sink. But the same displacement under-
lies the language in which the poem articulates this transformation of a stable image 
into one that is overturned. Not only is the metaphor of reaping drawn from a meta-
phor lying dormant in a foreign word [aus der latent gewordenen Metapher im Wort 
                                                 
478 Cf. Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett (1985; cf. below), pp. 276ff. The translation from 
the Meridian containing the excerpt from Büchner’s “Lenz” is by Jerry Glenn (“Appendix” to Derrida’s 
Sovereignties in Question), p. 179. Cf. Der Meridian: “Meine Damen und Herren, ich habe vor einigen 
Jahren einen kleinen Vierzeiler geschrieben – diesen: »Stimmen vom Nesselweg her: / Komm auf den 
Händen zu uns. / Wer mit der Lampe allein ist, / hat nur die Hand, draus zu lesen.« / Und vor einem Jahr, in 
Erinnerung an eine versäumte Begegnung im Engadin, brachte ich eine kleine Geschichte zu Papier, in der 
ich einen Menschen »wie Lenz« durchs Gebirg gehen ließ. / Ich hatte mich, das eine wie das andere Mal, 
von einem »20. Jänner«, von meinem »20. Jänner«, hergeschrieben. / Ich bin ... mir selbst begegnet.” 
(TCA/Meridian, Endf. 45b-f.) — Inversion has of course its properly rhetorical meaning too — actually at 
least four distinct rhetorical, grammatical, logical and tropological significations among the rich polysemy 
of this word, briefly delineated here after the OED: “[2.]b. Rhet. The turning of an opponent's argument 
against himself; = ANTISTROPHE 3b. Obs. [...] c. Gram. Reversal of the order of words; = 
ANASTROPHE [...] e. Logic. A form of immediate inference in which a new proposition is formed whose 
subject is the negative of that of the original proposition. [...] 6. = METAPHOR Obs.” (OED, entry “inver-
sion”, accessed March 24th, 2006.) All these come to English from Latin, through the ancient works on 




einer fremden Sprache] (in the secare of Sekunde) — a procedure Celan abundantly 
employs — but this word, die Sekunde, is itself cut and read as diese Kunde, “this 
message,” “this conduit of communication.” The possibility of reading die Sekunde in 
this way is suggested by the phonetic combination of s and i in sirrt, which provokes 
a corresponding contamination of the ie and Se that follows, and is also suggested by 
the very colon after Sekunde, which allows the second quatrain to appear as the con-
tent of a message, indeed as a conduit. Die Sekunde — diese Kunde; the second — 
this conduit: it is time, the cutter, that conducts its message in the inversion of the 
world of images, but this message accomplishes the inversion only by subjecting the 
second itself — the temporal atom — to its own principle of fission, by splitting the 
unity of the message, cutting off the conduit. The very principle of separation by 
which “another image” is generated brings together whatever stands on separate 
banks — “on each of the banks” — and so dieSeKunde is not simply a metamorphosis 
but also a metaphor, the very moment of metaphorization: conducting across and car-
rying over [Übertritt und Übertragung]. All images and all turns of speech in Celan’s 
text follow the alteration dictated by its eccentric center — dieSeKunde, the second, 
this conduit: they are not metaphors for representations but metaphors for metaphori-
zation, not images of a world but images of the generation of images [Bilderzeugung], 
not the transcription of voices but the production of the etched voices of the poem it-
self [nicht die Niederschrift von Stimmen, sondern die Produktion der geritzten Stim-
men des Gedichts selbst]. They inscribe themselves as the script of alteration when 
they let themselves be exposed to this very alteration: they write, they are dieSe-
Kunde, this second, this conduit; the incisive word-exchange in which the phenome-
nal and linguistic world is opened onto a caesura that not a single shape of this world 
can exorcize, since each of these shapes results from it. The second — this conduit — 
of Celan’s poem is the self-interrupting, self-dismembering, distributing and redis-
tributing, communicating and imparting speaking of language. [...] Whatever steps 
into it, into this interval, this speaking, becomes other than it is. / This conduit — or-
dino inverso — is not one [ist keine]; it has no message to impart. It asserts nothing 
more than this: that it has nothing to assert but its own secession from itself and is, as 
self-revocation, the movement of turning about. In so turning, it does not turn toward 
an empirical or transcendent other [transzendenten Anderen] but rather steps, itself 
“mowed,” into another image, one that no longer stands in for a You and no longer 
belongs to anyone. Nothing cold be more foreign, for it is the etched image of a fun-
damental alteration, the alteration of every basis into an abyss [das geritzte Bild einer 
fundamentalen Alteration, der Alteration des Grundes zum Abgrund]. 479 
 
So there is no simple metaphor on the lines of the poem, but it rather consists of a meta-
metaphor. Not metaphors for thoughts or representations (Vorstellungen), or for the sake of 
representing something else, but rather metaphors for metaphorizing; not images of a world, 
but images of the production of images, and so on. In the first Yale French Studies version of 
                                                 
479 Werner Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion: Movements of a Figure through Celan’s Poetry”, trans. Peter 
Fenves, in Hamacher, Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan, trans. Peter Fen-
ves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P., 1996), pp. 358-361; I have corrected the erroneous term “transcenden-
tal” into “transcendent” here. Fenves’s translation is a revised version of his earlier translation of a new ver-
sion of the essay, in Aris Fioretos, ed., Word Traces (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1994). The first 
German version was written in 1984 and appeared four years later as “Die Sekunde der Inversion: 
Bewegungen einer Figur durch Celans Gedichte”, in Hamacher and Winfried Menninghaus, eds., Paul 
Celan  (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1988), here pp. 98-99. The first English translation, published before the 
German version, had the same title as Fenves’s rendering and was translated by William D. Jewett, in Yale 
French Studies 69 (1985), The Lesson of Paul de Man, pp. 276-311. I use alternately both of these transla-
tions. — Unfortunately, I have had no access to the new German version, in Entferntes Verstehen (Frankfurt 




the essay (1985), the translator William D. Jewett clarifies the use of the term ‘metaphor’ 
here with regard to its “strict sense”, namely its etymological origin (or latently metaphorical 
origin, as it seems): “DieSeKunde is not just a metamorphosis but also metaphor in its strict 
sense; it is the motion of metaphorizing itself: stepping across and carrying over.” (Trans. 
Jewett, p. 291.) But with respect to the production of images, the term “metaphorizing” may 
speak too strictly here. It may be too specific with respect to the more extensive term, Bilder-
zeugung. As the translation says: “This impartment, ordine inverso — has nothing to impart 
[Diese Kunde – ordine inverso  – ist keine].”480 This impartment has nothing to impart, no 
image, except the stepping-mowed-into-another-image of the unspecified “What stood to 
you”. In order to make a metaphor out of this, something seems to be missing: the message 
(“diese Kunde”) is nothing, no message, in this respect, no content is carried over except the 
stepping-into-another-image itself. It is precisely the content of this “What” that is “mowed”. 
 Hamacher takes up a poem by Rilke that has tremendous force also for understanding 
Celan’s poetics, perhaps Rilke’s most famous poem: 
 
ARCHAÏSCHER TORSO APOLLOS 
 
Wir kannten nicht sein unerhörtes Haupt, 
darin die Augenäpfel reiften. Aber 
sein Torso glüht noch wie ein Kandelaber, 
in dem sein Schauen, nur zurückgeschraubt, 
 
sich hält und glänzt. Sonst könnte nicht der Bug 
der Brust dich blenden, und im leisen Drehen 
der Lenden könnte nicht ein Lächeln gehen 
zu jener Mitte, die die Zeugung trug. 
 
Sonst stünde dieser Stein entstellt und kurz 
unter der Schultern durchsichtigem Sturz 
und flimmerte nicht so wie Raubtierfelle; 
 
und bräche nicht aus allen seinen Rändern 
aus wie ein Stern: denn da ist keine Stelle, 
die dich nicht sieht. Du mußt dein Leben ändern.481  
 
Hamacher notes that, according to the observation offered by this poem, “what still survives 
of Greek plastic art changes into precisely what time has taken away from it: into eyesight 
                                                 
480 “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett, p. 292; “Die Sekunde der Inversion” (1988), p. 99. 
481 “Archaïscher Torso Apollos”, in Der Neuen Gedichte anderer Teil (1908), in Die Gedichte (Frankfurt am 
Main: Insel Verlag, 1998), p. 503. This is one of the many extant English translations, by H. Landman, “Ar-
chaic Torso of Apollo”: “We never knew his fantastic head, / where eyes like apples ripened. Yet / his torso, 
like a lamp, still glows / with his gaze which, although turned down low, // lingers and shines. Else the prow 
of his breast / couldn’t dazzle you, nor in the slight twist / of his loins could a smile run free / through that 
center which held fertility. // Else this stone would stand defaced and squat / under the shoulders’ diapha-
nous dive / and not glisten like a predator’s coat; // and not from every edge explode / like starlight: for 




(Augenlicht).”482  It is the fragmentation that gives shape to the imperative: “You must change 
your life.” And we find something similar in Celan’s poematic fragments: “Du mußt hier 
hindurch, Leben” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 352). 
 Image, Bild, is not always metaphor, and the production of images — Bilderzeugung 
as Hamacher puts it, and also Einbildung or imagination in an etymological sense — is not 
always metaphorization, a production of metaphors. Yet, the second of transition, dieSe-
Kunde as Hamacher names it, between time and language could indeed be a moment of tran-
sition into language, the translation of images, external or interiorized, into names; the proc-
ess described by Hegel in his “philosophy of spirit”, namely the third part of the 
Enzyklopädie (1830). The inversion of which Hamacher speaks in this remarkable essay is 
indeed also the Hegelian world of philosophy as a world turned upon its head, an inverted 
world. This is a peculiar inversion, since its outcome is not second with regard to the world 
itself, it is not an outcome at all in the first place. It is an “originary secondariness”, as 
Hamacher puts it.483  He discusses the Hegelian movement of negativity and the Kantian for-
mal condition a priori of all phenomena: by one word, time. The understanding of time as 
negativity is the precondition for the oxymora, paradoxes and inversions we meet in Celan’s 
poetry. “Time,” says Hamacher, “as the formal unity of contradictory predicates, supplies the 
transcendental-esthetic ground  for the figure of inversion.” In using the term “esthetic” here, 
Hamacher refers indeed to Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and not just to an artistic principle 
of creation. Here are only a couple of Hamacher’s examples, perhaps the most telling ones: 
“rostgeborenen Messern” (“rust-born knives”), and “gesteinigte Stein” (“lapidated stone”).484  
Time is the formal unity of contradictory predicates, as Hamacher points out, and thus in-
deed, in the unique and punctual present of the poem, of which Celan speaks in the Meridian, 
one can always “stand on the carpet of withered hours [Ich steh im Flor der abgeblühten 
Stunde]”.485  The rhetoric of inversion is the rhetoric of temporality, says Hamacher.486  The 
co-presence of the contradictory predicates in the poem seems therefore often not so much 
due to metaphor (a notion which seems to bear reference to temporal differences, if at all, 
                                                 
482 “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett, p. 280; cf. Fenves’s trans., p. 342: “the remains of Greek plastic 
art [etc.]”. 
483 “»Die Sekunde« diktiert das Gesetz der ›ursprünglichen‹ Sekundärität, sie ist der Schnitt, der jedem Primus 
vorangeht, der Riß, der sich in jedem Prinzip – und zwar  auch in dem der universellen Sprachlichkeit – 
auftut, sie zerteilt jede Einheit und allen voran die mit sich selbst. DieSeKunde ist Sekunde zuerst im 
Verhältnis zu sich: »Sekunde« – sie »sirrt« – im musikterminologischen Sinn des Intervalls, Intervall 
zwischen verschiedenen Bedeutungen, Intervall zwischen verschiedenen Sprachen, Intervall in der Sprache 
selbst, das ihrem Sprechen erst Raum und Zeit gibt. Was es betritt, dies Intervall, dies Sprechen, wird an-
ders.” (“Die Sekunde...”, p. 99.) 
484 ”All diese Oxymora, Paradoxien und Inversionen haben – und auch darin nehmen sie radikalisierend die 
Probleme der Subjektivitätsphilosophie und der großen Literatur seit der Romantik auf – die Bewegung der 
Zeit zum Sujet. In der Zeit als der formalen Einheit kontradiktorischer Prädikate ist der transzendental-
ästhetische Grund der Inversionsfigur gegeben.” (“Die Sekunde” [1988], p. 91. Cf. En. trans. Jewett, p. 285; 
Fenves, p. 349.) 
485 “Ich bin allein”, in Mohn und Gedächtnis, GW 1:55. This, too, is one of Hamacher’s examples. 




then as their sublation into some sort of timeless or supratemporal unity — this is of course a 
caricature, a hypothesis based for instance on the mentioned readings of Proust, by de Man, 
primarily) than to the distance between times that can be traversed in language; traversed and 
not transcended, as we may say, following Celan’s own words.487   
 One of the most striking examples of inversion in Hamacher’s sense is this poem from 
1950: 
 
DER Tauben weißeste flog auf: ich darf dich lieben! 
Im leisen Fenster schwankt die leise Tür. 
Der stille Baum trat in die stille Stube. 
Du bist so nah, als weiltest du nicht hier. 
 
Aus meiner Hand nimmst du die große Blume: 
sie ist nicht weiß, nicht rot, nicht blau – doch nimmst du sie. 
Wo sie nie war, da wird sie immer bleiben. 
Wir waren nie, so bleiben wir bei ihr.488  
 
Hamacher writes on this, among other things, the following:  
 
In the language of this flower, which is certainly not metaphorical  in any traditional 
sense, but surely rather meta-metaphorical, which lays bare in its extremity the imag-
istic language’s mechanism of translation [die den Übertragungsmechanismus bild-
lichen Sprechens an seinem Extrem bloßlegt] — trope, turning and reversal par excel-
lence — in the language of this flower, what is divided has been reassembled and 
what never was has been reversed into subsisting being [in der Sprache dieser Blume 
ist das Getrennte zusammengetreten und das Niegewesene hat sich durch sie in 
bleibendes Dasein umgekehrt], because this language itself is brought from a nothing-
ness to the status of something that remains [weil diese Sprache selbst aus einem 
Nichts zu einem Bleibenden wurde]. 489   
 
The image of the flower in the second strophe could be related, inasmuch as its attributes are 
“negative throughout” (albeit the attribute “large” is an exception), to a process which would 
hardly be called metaphor or metaphorization by the tradition which has first defined and 
then declined metaphor, from Aristotle to Hegel and Kant. The process of ideation or, on the 
other hand, the originary schematization, corresponds to reducing the multiplicity of images 
or sensible qualities (here colours) into a name — here the name of the flower, to which the 
three colours of France are denied, as it seems, but which is also juxtaposed with the “whitest 
                                                 
487 “Denn das Gedicht ist nicht zeitlos. Gewiß, es erhebt einen Unendlichkeitsanspruch, es sucht, durch die Zeit 
hindurchzugreifen – durch sie hindurch, nicht über sie hinweg.” (GW 3:186.) Trans. Felstiner: “For a poem 
is not timeless. Certainly it lays claims to infinity, it seeks to reach through time — through it, not above 
and beyond it.” Cf. e.g. the documents 140-143 in Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre (2000), pp. 476-477 = 
TCA/Meridian, Ms. 301, 305, 325, 328. Et passim. 
488 Mohn und Gedächtnis, GW 1:61. Trans. Fenves, in Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion” (1996), p. 346: 
“The whitest dove flies off: I can love you! / In the soft window swings the soft door. / The still tree stepped 
into the still room. / You are so near as though you did not linger here. // From my hand you take the great 
flower: / it is not white, not red, not blue — yet you take it. / Where it never was, it will always remain. / 
We never were, so we remain with it.” 




of doves” ascending (which is not only a “late romantic metaphor of elevation”, but implies 
also the opposite of “we” who “remain”) — and to this outcome, idea or schema, or the name 
of “the large flower”, no particular image, no particular instantiation corresponds.490  While 
the second and third verse of the first stanza seem to speak of what is seen through the win-
dow (leise Fenster: soft, gentle, quiet window?) and reflected in it (die leise Tür), in the win-
dow that is (“Im leisen Fenster schwankt die leise Tür”), the irreality of the reflection seems 
to extend itself also to the more ‘abstract’ lines: “You are as close as if you were not lingering 
here. [...] Where it was not, there will it ever remain. / We never were, so we remain with it.” 
The poem speaks its own giving: the reaching of the present, “the large flower [...] not white, 
nor red, not blue”, is the gift of that which “was not” — was not, until this speech act of sorts 
— and “will [...] remain”, and it is the gift of inexistence (which means not only “non-
existence” but also: “The fact or condition of existing in something” [OED]): “We never 
were, so we remain with it.” In a later poem from Die Niemandsrose, “Flimmerbaum”, which 
also contains the word Tümpel,491  Celan writes: 
 
                                                 
490 Imagination, or force of imagination (Einbildungskraft) is, for Kant, the faculty which “has to bring the 
manifold into the form of an image [Bild]”; thus it is “a necessary ingredient of perception [Wahrnehmung] 
itself”, and “a fundamental faculty [Grundvermögen] of the human soul” (Kant, KrV A 120, A 124; the 
translation is cited by John Sallis, Force of Imagination: The Sense of the Elemental [Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000], p. 67). It is “a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we would 
have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious” (KrV A 78 / B 103; cit. Sallis, 
p. 66). This metaphor of blindness, if we can call it that, is reduced ad absurdum by John Sallis, in the fol-
lowing sentence from his remarkable book Force of Imagination (pp. 143-144): “As configuring the self-
showing of things, imagination is, as Kant says, blind; or rather, it is neither sighted nor blind, for only what 
can be sighted, what is capable of sight, can be blind.” The configuring itself can never present itself to vi-
sion, internal or external. The force of imagination is also “the faculty of representing in intuition an object 
that is not itself present” (KrV B 151; cit. Sallis, p. 73), and to the extent that it produces transcendental 
schemata it is indeed also the faculty which offers the necessary resistance to the multiplicity of images and 
figures — but as their very condition of possibility (cf. KrV A 141-142 / B 180-181). — As Sallis writes, “a 
certain move beyond the [visible, sensible] image, an exceeding of what is present to sense, comes into play 
from the moment one speaks, indeed from the moment one assumes the very opening to speech” (p. 102); it 
is indeed the schemas, figures without figure, imageless images, which correspond to general names. — On 
the other hand, Sallis also points to the fact that “each image remains not only of the thing but also one’s 
own, so that what it presents of the thing is always correlative to one’s perspective of the thing” (p. 109). 
And this is, furthermore, correlative to the inaccessibility to the other’s images, as we might add, to the sin-
gular vision of the other. — So while the schemas that correspond to words or names (of general concepts) 
are untranslatable into images, the other’s vision, the other’s sight, or interior, mental images, cannot be 
conveyed as such by words, and the visible in general resists being grasped by language (p. 122): “If speech 
always exceeds what one sees, the visible resists being carried over into something said, persisting in an un-
translatability that one would like to call — were it not itself untranslatable — the sense of the sensible.” 
491 Cf. later lines of the poem: “Der Flimmerbaum schwamm. // Schwamm er? Es war / ja ein Tümpel rings.  











How is the “gift of nothing transformed into substantial being”, then? Hamacher discovers in 
Celan’s early texts, such as the one from the cycle “Gegenlicht”, in Mohn und Gedächtnis 
(1952) we already cited (“Der Tauben weißeste”), and “Spät und Tief” which we also have 
already cited (“Es komme, was niemals noch war!” — but in the context, the irony of this line 
is unmistakable, I think), a danger: “that of rendering nothingness positive, of letting in ab-
sence merely as the negative of presence, of wanting to transform it to everlasting being by 
the power of language.” (Trans. Jewett, p. 283.) However, as Hamacher himself observes (p. 
284), “Were this taking-up to fail to come about, were the gift not to arrive at its destination, 
there would be no language, no transformation, no remaining.” In the early poems, as 
Hamacher sees them, and he certainly has a point inasmuch as we consider the “large 
flower”, the perception (Vernehmen), the taking-up of this verbal flower, “establishes the 
unity of the giver and receiver”; but there is also a “hole in the tropological system of Celan’s 
poem [‘Der Tauben weißeste’]”, marked by the graphic pause, the dash before the word doch 
(“still”), signalling “the mute hesitation of receiving and perceiving”. This small hole — I 
would see the unfathomable pool of the later poems opening up here — marks a possibility of 
impossibility (“Diese Möglichkeit der Unmöglichkeit ihrer eigenen Existenz”), which is an 
easily recognizable Heideggerean figure, of course: “This possibility of its denial in the face 
of nonbeing [...] opens in Celan’s poem only in the dash before ‘doch,’ in the interruption of 
the language of tropes, [...]. It opens a spacing that cannot be reversed into nearness, a differ-
ence that cannot be turned into unity, a deaf place that cannot be reversed into the topos of a 
corresponding signification [der nicht in den Topos eines sprechenden Bildes verwandelt 
werden kann].”492  The dash marks an imminence, an exposure of the words to themselves, 
their own dissociation from themselves. The word-things in the poem “stand [...] always in 
their last-thing-hood”, their last Zeithof  — this is what Celan writes in one of the notes for 
the Meridian: “im Gedicht stehen die Dinge – Zeithof! –  immer in ihrer letzten Dinglich-
keit.”493  The things perceived in the poem are those that could always be the last things. The 
                                                 
492 “The Second...”, trans. Jewett, p. 284; “Die Sekunde der Inversion” (1988), pp. 90-91; there is a significant 
difference between the wording of the German version and the earlier English translation here, as we can 
see; instead of, for instance, den Topos eines entsprechenden Bedeutung, which would correspond to “the 
topos of a corresponding signification”, the German text reads “den Topos eines sprechenden Bildes”. 
493 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 518. Cf. Ms. 517: “Die dingfestgemachten Worte, die Wortdinge im Gedicht – in einen 
einmaligen Prozeß gestellt, sie halten auf ihr Ende zu, eilen ihm entgegen: sie stehen im Licht einer 
»Letztdinglichkeit« – ich sage Licht, ich sage nicht, Dunkel, aber bedenken Sie: der Schatten, den das 
wirft!” The light surrounding these last things, their last-thingliness revealing them as the last things – while 
the light that surrounds and gives the thing its contours, the counter-light (Gegenlicht) shining from behind 
the thing, can always also grant the thing its own obscurity and opacity, and is indeed a time-halo. (Cf. also 
TCA/Meridian, Ms. 519, 524, passim.) Cf. Mikrolithen, p. 110, No. 186: “Jenes die Zeit-zu-Ende-Denken, 
das seinen dingfest gemachten Worten den Charakter der letzten Dinge gibt” (undated, probably 1959/60; 




unique Zeithof  could always be the last, at the limits of consciousness and experience and 
beyond, or one that survives itself, as in the poem “Mapesbury Road” which is related to the 





einen Steckschuß, daneben, hirnig. 
Die scharfgehimmelten höfigen 
Schlucke Mitluft.494  
 
As we already observed, Zeithöfe are, in the Meridian fragments, also Atemhöfe. And poems 
are Atemwende, not just turns of speech but turns of breath. They speak, they breath in extre-
mis; and what is left behind, as a contour (Gestalt — Umriß), is a singable residue 
(GW 2:36): 
 
SINGBARER REST – der Umriß 
dessen, der durch 
die Sichelschrift lautlos hindurchbrach,  
 
Is it writing, then (“sickle-script”) that mows “What stood to you / on each of the banks [...] 
into another image”? But what is writing, anyway? One thing that it is, is time: a relation of 
an absent one to someone who is even more absent; Freud has defined writing as “speech of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Zeit ist eine andere als die unsere; wir sind weit draußen, aber allenfalls doch nur am Rand unserer eigenen 
Zeit; mit uns sind auch die wahrgenommenen Dinge dort: sie stehen da, wo wir zuletzt stehen: die Dinge im 
Gedicht haben etwas von solchen »letzten« Dingen[, sie] könnten, man weiß es nie, die »letzten« Dinge 
sein.” (TCA/Meridian, p. 36.) — The allusion to Rilke, sometimes associated with the title of the cycle Zeit-
gehöft, seems also pertinent with regard to the fact that for Celan, the ‘semantic field’ of Zeithof (if we may 
say so: ‘semantic field’ is probably not the term Celan himself would have used, and it is used here as a 
more or less uncomfortable approximation) includes the last abode of the things, the last things as the verbal 
things, rather than being just the place of the continuity of temporal objects in perception. Rilke’s poem 
“Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens”, written on Sept. 20th, 1914 (Die Gedichte [1998], p. 880), reads 
as follows: 
  
Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens. Siehe, wie klein dort, 
siehe: die letzte Ortschaft der Worte, und höher, 
aber wie klein auch, noch ein letztes 
Gehöft von Gefühl. Erkennst du’s? — 
Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens. Steingrund 
unter den Händen. [...] 
 
494 In Schneepart (1971), GW 2:365. Trans. M. Hamburger: “The full / time-yard around / a lodged bullet, next 
to it, cerebrous.” (Paul Celan, Poems. A Bilingual Edition. Selected, trans. and introduced by Michael Ham-
burger [New York: Persea Books, cop. 1980], p. 285.) Cf. Sandro Zanetti, »zeitoffen« (2006), p. 146n94: 
“In allen drei Gedichten weitet Celan den Begriff des ›Zeithofs‹ allerdings aus, um mit ihm auch solche Er-
eignisse zu fassen oder anzusprechen, die in Husserls Fixierung auf ›Bewußtsein‹ nicht zur Sprache kom-
men können. So bezieht sich etwa »Mapesbury Road« auf das Attentat auf Rudi Dutschke und radikalisiert 
den »Zeithof« zum Moment der Zerstörung (nicht nur) von Bewußtsein (»Der volle / Zeithof um / einen 
Steckschuß, daneben, hirnig«). »Schwimmhäute« wiederum verwandelt den »Zeithof« in einen »Tümpel«, 




the absent”, a definition quoted and developed by Celan in one of his Meridian fragments. A 
silent figure, contour, a “form to be filled”?495   
 My words surprise myself, in the archaic sense of this verb: “mes paroles me sur-
prennent moi-même et m’enseignent mes pensées”, writes Maurice Merleau-Ponty. His essay 
“Sur la phénoménologie du langage” (1952)496  comes strikingly close to Celan’s drafts for a 
phenomenology of poetry as a phenomenology of perception and language, verbal perception 
— “sprachliche Wahrnehmung”. Let us return for a moment to the poem “Schwimmhäute” 
and its interdigital webs as interverbal webs, its words concerning words and meaning (Be-
deutung). We noticed that the last two words have a certain hymen between them, a mem-
brane that both connects and separates them: “Leuchtschopf / Bedeutung.” It is clear that the 
question concerning the retrograde reference of the word Bedeutung — namely whether it is 
apposited to the immediately preceding single compound word Leuchtschopf or rather the 
word Graugrätiges and the whole clause beginning with this word and ending with Leucht-
schopf  — could be decided by different means of articulation and rhythm that would stress 
and  distribute the sentence and its components differently. The duration of the pause be-
tween the two last words, two last lines, comparable to the rapidity of the diastolic and sys-
tolic movement of the interdigital membrane of the swimming creature, could already make 
the decision. Now Merleau-Ponty, in speaking of the “distance action” of language, makes a 
striking comparison between bodily conscience and the linguistic gesture, one whose texture 
is more complex than that of a simple comparison: 
 
À condition que je ne réfléchisse pas expressément sur lui, la conscience  que j’ai de 
mon corps est immédiatement significative d’un certain paysage autour de moi, celle 
que j’ai de mon doigts d’un certain style fibreux ou grenu de l’objet. C’est de la même 
manière que la parole, celle que je profère ou celle que j’entends, est prégnante d’une 
signification qui est lisible dans la texture même du geste linguistique, au point 
qu’une hésitation, une alteration de la voix, le choix d’une certaine syntaxe suffit à la 
modifier, et cependant jamais contenue en lui, toute expression m’apparaissant tou-
jours comme une trace, nulle idée ne m’étant donnée qu’en transparence, et tout effort 
pour fermer notre main sur la pensée qui habite la parole ne laissant entre nos doigts 
qu’un peu de matériel verbal. [Signes, p. 144; emphases added.] 
 
“What we have between our fingers”, in reading the residue that is neither simply material 
nor simply immaterial, is not only the “trace”, but the trace that carries over: carries over not 
a message or content or a bundle of information, but the verbal materiality, fibreux ou grenu, 
the grainy (“le grain de la voix”, as Roland Barthes so appropriately says) and fibrous quali-
                                                 
495 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 458 (loc. cit.). Cf. Freud, “Das Unbehagen in der Kultur”, in Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 
XIV: Werke aus den Jahren 1925-1931 (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1999), p. 450: “die Schrift ist ursprünglich 
die Sprache des Abwesenden”. On the “form to be filled”, cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 777=504 [”ab 19.8.60”] 
and below. 
496 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Sur la phénoménologie du langage”, in Signes (Paris: Gallimard, cop. 1960, repr. 
2001), pp. 136-158, here p. 144. (1st ed. in Problemes actuels de la phénoménologie, ed.Herman L. Van 
Breda [Actes du Colloque International de Phénoménologie. Bruxelles Avril 1951] [Paris: Desclée de 




ties that belong, and by no means only metaphorically belong,497  to the phenomenality of the 
poem, to the Zeithof and Atemhöfe inhabited by the words. The materiality which is, at the 
same time, immaterial, a “spiritual phenomenon”: the invisible in the visible, the darkness 
that lets the light appear,498  the non-phenomenality behind the phenomenal — behind, but in 
no way fathomable, since it is the other’s time whose trace the poem is, the other’s time that 
speaks with (mitsprechen) the poem, the other’s time that the poem lets participate in the 
conversation, in the “verbal perception”. 
 Whether ‘meaning’ resides in the glowing head or the fading tail of the poematic, 
comet-like or meteoric phenomenon (one that the poem “Schwimmhäute” not only describes, 
but, of course, is), is perhaps not actually a good question, since the poem describes precisely 
the movement of meaning from the head toward the tail and its recession behind it into the 
dark depth that we perceive as the pool, the backdrop for the thread-like, fibrous spines that 
the tail of the comet consists of (while Leuchtschopf seems ambiguously both the “comet’s 
tail” and still rather the “crest”, the “tuft” of the head — not only the visible form but the 
etymology of the word ‘comet’, coming from komh/thj, “wearing long hair” [OED], provides 
for the association with the ‘tuft’ [Schopf]499  — of which the actual tail consists of the “grey” 
mixture of light and darkness behind the “luminous tuft”); here “meaning [Bedeutung]” is 
both the phenomenal apparition and its recession into the non-phenomenal, unfathomable 
background. 
 As has already been observed, Celan’s reference to the Husserlian phenomenology of 
internal time consciousness is not unproblematic. While Husserl restricts his discussion, in 
the 1905 lectures, to the relatively simple situations of perceiving temporal objects, such as a 
melody, Celan’s sprachliche Wahrnehmung seems to reach far beyond the ideal borders of 
                                                 
497 The grain of the voice is no metaphor, or at least no ‘live’ metaphor. The most economical way to prove this 
is to look at the OED and the entry “grainy”: “Of a voice or sound: rough, gritty.” (OED, 50097586.) And 
no human voice is produced without the fibres of the body; therefore to call a voice fibrous is metonymic or 
quasi-metonymic and not metaphorical. And furthermore, the human body and its organs for producing a 
voice certainly have “grainy” aspects too. But what is perhaps even more important is that the “spatiality of 
my body” (cf. Merleau-Ponty, loc. cit.) and the spatiality of my language are inextricably linked with, con-
tiguous with, the world. The touch of my hand upon the grains of wood and the act of naming that corre-
sponds to ‘it’ is not primarily restricted to the piece of wood as something “present-at-hand” but rather re-
fers to my experience of the grains, and the  ‘transferral’ of this experience to other sorts of grains — such 
as the grain of the voice — is not intrinsically a transferral onto another realm of objects (or from the object 
onto the subject) but an iterated application of the basic experience that never belonged to the wood alone, 
as its “property” in the strict Aristotelian sense (i.e. property as idion). 
498 Hamacher cites several of Celan’s early Gegenlicht aphorisms (1949), and among them this one: “Täusche 
dich nicht: nicht diese letzte Lampe spendet mehr Licht – das Dunkel rings hat sich in sich selber vertieft.” 
(GW 3:165.) Both Jewett and Fenves translate this erroneously, I’m afraid; this is Fenves’s rendering (p. 
345): “Don’t confuse yourself: this lamp no longer gives off light — the enveloping darkness has absorbed 
itself into itself.” Jewett’s translation (p. 282): “Don’t fool yourself: not even this last lamp gives off light 
anymore — the darkness round about has been absorbed into itself.” I think the aphorism should rather be 
translated as follows: “Don’t fool yourself: this lamp does not give more light — it is the surrounding dark-
ness which has deepened itself.” It would be different if the syntax was the following: “nicht mehr spendet 
diese Lampe Licht”. But here, in “nicht diese letzte Lampe spendet mehr Licht”, “mehr” must be under-
stood as a comparative, as in Goethe’s reported last words: “Mehr Licht!” 




such Zeithöfe. These borders of ideality and objectivation must be overcome if the poematic 
‘perception’ consists of letting the time of the other speak, letting the time of the other par-
ticipate in the very punctuality of the poem’s “here and now”, as Celan says.500  But Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s observations on the phenomenology of language, in the concise article we 
have already cited, come astonishingly close to Celan’s drafts for a phenomenology of po-
etry, and the necessary move from the sphere of internal time consciousness toward the per-
ception of the other as an alter ego — later so many times insisted upon by Derrida, also with 
reference to Celan’s poetry and poetics501 — is displayed clearly in “Sur la phénoménologie 
de langage”. As far as I know, it is not known whether Celan knew the text or not and if he 
did, when he might have read it, although he did possess a copy of the 1967 edition of Signes 
in his library, containing this conference paper of 1951 which was first published in 1952; the 
personal volume bears no reading traces.502  Let us cite a couple of more passages from Mer-
leau-Ponty’s text: 
 
On dit qu’une pensée est exprimée lorsque les paroles convergentes qui la visent sont 
assez nombreuses et assez éloquentes pour la désigner sans équivoque à moi, auteur, 
ou aux autres, et pour que nous ayons tous l’expérience de sa présence charnelle dans 
la parole. Bien que seuls les Abschattungen de la signification soient thématiquement 
données, le fait est que, passé un certain point de discours, les Abschattungen, prises 
dans son mouvement, hors duquel elles ne sont rien, se contractent soudain en une 
seule signification, nous éprouvons que quelque chose a été dit, comme, au-dessus 
d’un minimum de messages sensoriels, nous percevons une chose, quoique 
l’explicitation de la chose aille par principe à l’infini, — ou comme, spectateurs d’un 
certain nombre de conduites, nous en venons à percevoir quelqu’un quoique, devant la 
réflexion, aucun autre que moi-même ne puisse être vraiment, et dans le même sens, 
ego... Les conséquences de la parole, comme celles de la perception (et de la percep-
tion d’autrui en particulier), passent toujours ses prémisses. [Signes, p. 148.] 
 
From these ‘comparisons’ (note the presence of the conjunction comme here) we may conjec-
ture something concerning the analogical appresentation of the alter ego: 1) in the “flesh and 
blood presence” of meaning, incorporated in the discourse as the “something said”, regardless 
of whether it is a question of my discourse or that of others, what is thematically given are 
only the Abschattungen, 2) as in sensorially perceiving a thing the explication of this thing 
could go on infinitely and the thematic presence is only that of the Abschattungen, 3) and 
similarly we also perceive an alter ego although only I can be an ego in the strictest phe-
nomenological sense, only I can be the origin of the world. If meaning gains presence, also 
for myself, only in being thematized by articulating it verbally, and if this thematization never 
                                                 
500 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 36 (loc. cit.). 
501 Cf. Béliers (2003); “Majesties”, in Sovereignties in Question (2005). 
502 Cf.Celan, La bi. phi., p. 509. I asked Bertrand Badiou whether he knows of another copy of this text in 
Celan’s possession (or working notes or anything that might suggest that he was familiar with it), and this is 
part of his kind reply, confirming what I thought might be the case: “En deux mots, Celan, à ma connais-
sance, ne possédait pas d’autre exemplaire de ce texte de Merleau-Ponty. Mais il pouvait bien sûr en avoir 




totalizes or fully explicates what it indicates, just as sensory perception gives its object with-
out exhaustively unfolding its every aspect and without having to do that, likewise we never 
fully grasp the presence of the other even when we perceive it. Inversely, just as the other ego 
remains radically other and only attainable through an analogical apperception, also the other 
in general, including even inanimate objects, is indeed given but never exhaustively, and 
likewise also my own speech, always the speech of the other, remains for me the speech of 
the other, something not totalizable: to express is to become conscious but expression is 
never total.503  My idea is the idea of an other than me, another I. And it is indeed already 
Husserl’s observation that language is the original manner of intending certain objects and 
rendering thought intersubjective, which is finally also to render the ideal existence to that 
which would otherwise remain a private phenomenon504  — inasmuch as such privacy of 
ideas is even thinkable. Merleau-Ponty continues: 
 
Je dis que je sais une idée lorsque s’est institué en moi le pouvoir  d’organiser autour 
d’elle des discours qui font sens cohérent, et ce pouvoir même ne tient pas à ce que je 
la posséderais par-devers moi et la contemplerais face à face, mais à ce que j’ai acquis 
un certain style de pensée. Je dis qu’une signification est acquise et désormais dispon-
ible lorsque j’ai réussi à la faire habiter dans un appareil de parole qui ne lui était pas 
d’abord destiné. [...] C’est précisément cette « déformation cohérente » (A. Malraux) 
des significations disponibles qui les ordonne à un sens nouveau et fait franchir aux 
auditeurs, mais aussi au sujet parlant, un pas décisif.505 
 
The expression “decisive step” makes me think of the figure of Lucile, counter-figure Lucile 
and her “counter-word”, her “step [Schritt]”: “»Es lebe der König!« [...] – welch ein Wort! Es 
ist das Gegenwort, [...] es ist ein Akt der Freiheit. Es ist ein Schritt.”506  Lucile’s “step” is 
                                                 
503 “Exprimer, pour le sujet parlant, c’est prendre conscience”; but: “l’expression n’est jamais totale.” (“Sur la 
phénomenologie du langage”, in Signes, pp. 146, 145.) 
504 Cf. Signes, p. 137; Merleau-Ponty refers to and quotes Husserl’s late works, Formale und transzendentale 
Logik and Ursprung der Geometrie (p. 137n1-2). Cf. the quote from Husserl on p. 157: “La subjectivité 
transcendentale est intersubjectivité.” 
505 “Sur la phénomenologie du langage”, in Signes, p. 149. Another text by Merleau-Ponty, first published in 
1952 just as “Sur la phénoménologie du langage”, and resonating with Celan’s drafts, is the essay inspired 
by André Malraux, “Le langage indirect et Les Voix du silence”, also in Signes (repr. 2001), pp. 63-135. 
(Originally in Les Temps modernes, 80 [juin 1952], pp. 2113-44; 81 [juillet 1952], pp. 70-94.) Just to take a 
few examples: “Beaucoup plus qu’un moyen, le langage est quelque chose comme un être et c’est pourquoi 
il peut si bien nous rendre présent quelqu’un : la parole d’un ami au téléphone nous le donne lui-même, 
comme s’il était tout dans cette manière d’interpeller et de prendre congé, de commencer et de finir ses 
phrases, de cheminer à travers les choses non dites.” (P. 69.) “La volonté de mort, elle n’est donc nulle part 
dans les mots : elle est entre eux, dans les creux d’espace, de temps, de significations qu’ils délimitent, 
comme le mouvement au cinéma est entre les images immobiles qui se suivent.” (P. 123.) “La parole n’est 
pas un moyen au service d’une fin extérieure, elle a en elle-même sa règle de l’emploi, sa morale, sa vue du 
monde, comme un geste quelquefois porte toute la vérité d’un homme.” (P. 124.) And, a reference to 
Claudel, reminiscent of what Celan writes in the Meridian about “the wholly other” and about obscurity: 
“Claudel va jusqu’à dire que Dieu n’est pas au-dessus, mais au-dessous de nous, — voulant dire que nous 
ne le trouvons pas comme une idée supra-sensible, mais comme un autre nous-même, qui habite et authenti-
fie notre obscurité.” (P. 114.) 
506 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 7. To understand what a “step” is here, we must understand also the relation between 
breath and “was auf den Taubenfüßen kommt” (this is Celan’s quote from Nietzsche in one or two of the 
Meridian fragments; from the context, it is clear that this “arriving at dove’s feet” is an arrival through the 




more than irony. It says something else than what it means, in a certain sense, but not the op-
posite: rather, it seems to me that the Majesty of the Absurd is for her — for Celan’s Lucile, 
of course, and in the situation in which we meet her for the last time in Dantons Tod — the 
only majesty worthy of that name. But perhaps it is also “une déformation [in]cohérente”? It 
gives “un sens nouveau”, perhaps, but neither metaphorically nor just as a conceptual modi-
fication with regard to the extant language system; rather, in giving herself death (it is a sui-
cidal ‘speech act’, anyway, resembling Antigone’s defiance), she also gives to the word 
‘King’ a new meaning — but ‘new’ only with respect to the current acceptation, since with 
respect to what majesty should be, Lucile’s is the most archaic, the most majestic ‘meaning’ 
(while ‘absurd’ is, of course, the very antonym [Gegenwort] of ‘meaning’!): “Gehuldigt wird 
hier der für die Gegenwart des Menschlichen zeugenden Majestät des Absurden.” 
(TCA/Meridian, Endf. 8.) 
 I will not go into all the intricacies of Celan’s adaptation of Büchner’s Lucile and 
Lenz in Der Meridian now.507  Let us instead follow Merleau-Ponty’s article a little further, 
in order to better understand Celan’s borrowing of the word Zeithof and his “step further”, as 
I see it, from the original Husserlian context of this coinage. The limit toward which this step 
is taken has been often evoked by Jacques Derrida, also with respect to Celan’s poetry and 
poetics (in “Majesties” and toward the end of Béliers): it is the encounter with the other as an 
other ego, or with irreducible otherness in general, and this experience can be considered as 
an internal limit of phenomenology, considered by Husserl himself in the fifth Cartesian 
Meditation. Here is a part of what Merleau-Ponty writes on the problem: 
 
La position d’autrui comme autre moi-même n’est en effet possible si c’est la con-
science qui doit l’effectuer : avoir conscience, c’est constituer, je ne puis donc avoir 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lenz’s step further, namely his wish to walk upon his head and his terrifying silence: “Ich habe bei Lucile 
der Dichtung zu begegnen geglaubt, und Lucile nimmt Sprache als Gestalt und Richtung und Atem wahr –: 
ich suche, auch hier, in dieser Dichtung Büchners, dasselbe, ich suche Lenz selbst, ich suche ihn – als Per-
son, ich suche seine Gestalt: um des Ortes der Dichtung, um der Freisetzung, um des Schritts willen. [...] 
Finden wir jetzt vielleicht den Ort, wo das Fremde war, den Ort, wo die Person sich freizusetzen vermochte, 
als ein – befremdetes – Ich ? Finden wir einen solchen Ort, einen solchen Schritt? / »... nur war es ihm 
manchmal unangenehm, daß er nicht auf dem Kopf gehn konnte.« – Das ist er, Lenz. Das ist, glaube ich, er 
und sein Schritt, er und sein »Es lebe der König«. [...] Lenz – das heißt Büchner – ist hier einen Schritt 
weiter gegangen als Lucile. Sein »Es lebe der König« ist kein Wort mehr, es ist ein furchtbares Verstum-
men, es verschlägt ihm – und auch uns – den Atem und das Wort.” (Endf. 23, 25, 29.) For a breathtaking 
discussion of these passages, one that also underlies our discussion here, cf. Derrida, “Majesties”, trans. 
Outi Pasanen, in Sovereignties in Question, pp. 108-134. — On silence, the silence that Celan both thema-
tized and personified in a certain sense (there are several anecdotes telling of his reticence and the awkward 
pauses that punctuated the conversations with him), as well as, more specificially, the pauses that give the 
Meridian speech its particular rhythm, Esther Cameron has very well remarked, in her fragmentary  “hyper-
text commentary” on the Meridian, that it is a question of something like “those halts in conversation which 
make one aware of the presence of a fellow-mortal, from which the words often tend to distract us” (The 
Impossible Way, http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/german/celan/cameron/comment html; last accessed January 
2007). We might say that Lucile observes these halts even when the air is swirling with words. 
507 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, in La poésie comme expérience (Paris: Bourgois, 1986), and Jacques Derrida, in 
“Majesties”, trans. Outi Pasanen, in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan (New York: 





conscience d’autrui, puisque ce serait le constituer comme constituant, et comme con-
stituant à l’égard de l’acte même par lequel je le constitue. Cette difficulté de principe, 
posée comme une borne au début de la cinquième Méditation cartésienne, elle n’est 
nulle part levée. Husserl passe outre : puisque j’ai l’idée d’autrui, c’est donc que, de 
quelque manière, la difficulté mentionnée a été, en fait, surmontée. Elle n’a pu l’être 
que si celui qui, en moi, perçoit autrui, est capable d’ignorer la contradicition radicale 
qui rend impossible la conception théorique d’autrui, ou plutôt (car, s’il ignorait, ce 
n’est plus à autrui qu’il aurait à faire), capable de vivre cette contradiction comme la 
définition même de la présence d’autrui. [Signes, pp. 152-153.] 
 
I interrupt the quote for a moment, in order to ask whether the ability to “live this contradic-
tion”, to endure the presence of the other as an irreducible other, wholly other, is not pre-
cisely what Celan aims at, in speaking of the tyranny of the poem, which some of us experi-
ence as unbearable (unerträglich) and try to mitigate by having recourse to the doctrine of 
metaphor: “aber unter Menschen Sein, das kann auch so verstanden werden: unter Königen 
sein.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 896, loc. cit.) The analogical appresentation of the alter ego (or 
even of otherness in general) is neither an inference by analogy508  nor a metaphorical anal-
ogy. Now let us proceed with Merleau-Ponty’s text, skipping a few lines: 
 
Il se trouve que, sur certains spectacles, — ce sont les autres corps humains et, par ex-
tension, animaux, — mon regard achoppe, est circonvenu. Je suis investi par eux alors 
que je croyais les investir, et je vois se dessiner dans l’espace une figure qui éveille et 
convoque les possibilités de mon propre corps comme s’il s’agissait de gestes et de 
comportements miens. Tout se passe comme si les fonctions de l’intentionnalité et de 
l’objet intentionnel se trouvaient paradoxalement permutées. Le spectacle m’invite à 
en devenir spectateur adéquat, comme si un autre esprit que le mien venait soudain 
habiter mon corps, ou plutôt comme si mon esprit était attiré là-bas et émigrait dans le 
spectacle qu’il était en train de se donner. Je suis happé par un second moi-même hors 
de moi, je perçois autrui... Or, la parole est évidemment un cas éminent de ces « con-
duites » [Gebaren] qui renversent mon rapport ordinaire avec les objets et donnent à 
certains d’entre eux valeurs de sujets. [Signes, p. 153.] 
 
The whole paradox of encountering the other as encountering oneself, evoked in the Merid-
ian, is prefigured, as it were, by this late Husserlian or post-Husserlian paradox. This para-
dox, this scandalon is both Husserlian and post-Husserlian at once; Merleau-Ponty’s article is 
an explication of a certain Husserlian paradox, as we have seen — the paradoxical relation 
between the experience of otherness, the irreducible otherness of the wholly other, and tran-
scendental subjectivity, and the discovery of transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity. 
This is one thing that Merleau-Ponty says on the scandalon of the theory of intersubjectivity 
and of time: 
 
Quand je parles ou quand je comprends, j’expérimente la présence d’autrui en moi ou 
de moi en autrui, qui est la pierre d’achoppement de la théorie d’intersubjectivité, la 
                                                 
508 Husserl himself points out that in the analogical apperception, it is not a question of inference by analogy, 
or of any other kind of inference or act of thought (“Denkakt”). Cf. Cartesianische  Meditationen  und Pa-





présence du représenté qui est la pierre d’achoppement de la théorie du temps, et je 
comprends enfin ce que veut dire l’énigmatique proposition de Husserl: « La subjec-
tivité transcendentale est intersubjectivité. » [Signes, p. 157.] 
 
The margins for the possibility of intersubjectivity — which is also, transcendental subjectiv-
ity, ideality and objectivity — are fringy. Clearly enough, perception does not, and does not 
have to, seize the object in all its aspects in order to fully perceive it, and when we consider 
perceiving the other person, the other ego, the impossibility of totalization becomes even 
clearer. And when I engage in conversation with another person, other ego and other origin of 
the world, an “intentional transgression” or, rather, a transgression of intentionality must take 
place. Expression is never total, as Merleau-Ponty calls us to observe, but when we are deal-
ing with the other’s expression, it is not even clear that we are dealing with one intentional 
act, a subject-object relation whose “signified exceeds its signifier”;509  what we have is in-
deed something “like a blank form to be filled” (“comme un formulaire en blanc que l’on n’a 
pas encore rempli, comme les gestes d’autrui qui visent et circonscrivent un objet du monde 
que je ne vois pas”) (Signes, p. 143), but perhaps that which remains out of my sight is not 
only an object in the world but the world itself, absolutely invisible to me with regard to the 
point where my visible-invisible interlocutor stands, so to say, the viewpoint of that other 
origin of the world?510  It would be not only so that the thematization of the other’s viewpoint 
remains an infinite task (while it remains that even for the speaking subject itself, as Merleau-
Ponty invites us to observe), but that it remains radically impossible. It is indeed this radical 
impossibility with which I must live, and which may be experienced as a demand: “You must 
change your life.” It is the fragments of radical otherness, with which I deal with every time I 
perceive the other, when I listen to someone else, when I read, but also when I speak and 
write. The deformation, transformation, alteration is always also mine. 
 
Si la parole veut incarner une intention significative qui n’est qu’un certain vide, ce 
n’est pas seulement pour recréer en autrui le même manque, la même privation, mais 
encore pour savoir de quoi il y a manque et privation. [Signes, pp. 146-147.] 
 
In the poem “Schwimmhäute”, which we were reading a moment ago, the absence incarnated 
is perhaps named by the word Bedeutung: the presence of meaning as the privation or with-
drawal of meaning, its luminous appearance and disappearance into the dark abyss of a back-
                                                 
509 “Il y a donc toujours du sous-entendu dans l’expression, — ou plutôt la notion de sous-entendu est à re-
jeter : elle n’a un sens que si nous prenons pour modèle et pour absolu de l’expression une langue 
(d’ordinaire la nôtre) qui, en fait, comme toutes les autres, ne peut jamais nous conduire « comme par la 
main » jusqu’à la signification, jusqu’au choses mêmes. Ne disons donc pas que toute expression est impar-
faite parce qu’elle sous-entend, disons que toute expression est parfaite dans la mesure où elle est comprise 
sans équivoque et admettons comme fait fondamental de l’expression un dépassement du signifiant par le 
signifié que c’est la vertu même du signifiant de rendre possible.” (“Sur la phénoménologie du langage”, p. 
146.) 
510 Cf. Derrida’s Béliers — un dialogue ininterrompu : entre deux infinis, le poème (Paris: Galilée, 2003) on 
this, and Celan’s line “which sounds throughout the [...] essay like a refrain” (as the text on the back cover 




ground. The comet-like, meteoric image, or the creature swimming on the stagnated water of 
the pool, whose depth is nevertheless unfathomable. 
 The crossing-through of the tropes resides, perhaps, precisely in this instant of chias-
matic exchange in which the “determined void [un vide determiné]” becomes inscribed in my 
flesh as the words of the other, learned by heart, without knowledge.511 This incision or in-
version in which my sight becomes transformed by the invisible images that appear out of 
nothingness, this cutting that is also a message without determined content (dieSeKunde), is 
also what invites me to “studying the other”,512  which means also to take the encyclopaedic 
detour, but not only that. Even when the words of a poem thus become interiorized into my 
proper body, both learned by heart (appris par cœur) and auswendig gelernt, both internal 
and external at once, they still bear the trace of the singular gesture, the contour of the hand’s 
tracing; the person, which is not just the person Paul Celan, but the person in general, or sin-
gularity in general. Any authentic poem is anti-biographic, as Celan writes, but the poet lives 
on in his poem, his only homeland as a poet, one that changes from poem to poem. This is 
why the poet must renounce his “complicity [Mitwisserschaft]”, while he remains “endowed 
[mitgegeben]” as the “mute consonant [stumme Mitlaut]” to these “vocal things”, but this is 
also why the reader has his chance to be an instantaneous “confidant [Mitwisser]” of the 
poem. 
 Perhaps the chiasmatic second of inversion could be further described by Celan’s 
comment on Marion’s words in Büchner’s play: “Danton, your lips have eyes.” For Celan, 
that is no ‘modern’ metaphor (I do not know whose characterization he quotes in the note) 
but age-old knowledge concerning the knowledge of a mouth.513 When speech meets the eye, 
when “your mouth / speaks its way to the eye”,514 a chiasmus of sorts takes place: in seeing 
you speak, I cannot see you seeing, I cannot get inside your head and inside your time, your 
“time-fringe” (in a large sense of Zeithof which covers not only the retentional-protentional 
halo of the present perception of an object, but the past and future of a unique and finite des-
tiny, the time-aureole that is always mortal, open at both ends and untransferable as such), 
and therefore I must renounce the spontaneous images, let the images, visible or mental im-
ages, destroy themselves and turn themselves into the words, tokens of the other’s invisibil-
ity; this invisibility is not only my impossibility to penetrate the phenomenal surface and see 
the other’s seeing, and so on, beyond the manifestation, but also the blindfoldedness of the 
other’s address, bottle-mail from one invisible stranger to another. Transformation, transplan-
                                                 
511 On learning by heart (apprendre par cœur, auswendig lernen), cf. Derrida, Poétique et politique du té-
moignage (Paris: L’Herne, 2005); En. trans. by Outi Pasanen in Sovereignties in Question, pp. 65-96; and 
“Che cos’è la poesia”, bilingual (French and English) in Points... Interviews 1974-1994, ed. Elizabeth We-
ber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). 
512 Cf. below. We shall return to all the themes that are evoked here for the first time in the present treatise. 
513 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 593 (loc. cit.), and above. 
514 “Zürich, zum Storchen”, trans. Hamburger, in Poems of Paul Celan, p. 135; the verb tense has been modi-




tation, metamorphosis without metaphor: this is what is required of me when, from this in-
stant of encounter onwards, I see with the other’s words.  
 The poetic image is “by no means visual”, as Celan maintains. The non-visual poetic 
image, turning into a word, wakes up to another reality as another dream, another’s dream; 
the transmission of an image must be “blind enough”, lose itself in order to ignite the other’s 
eye and sight as a candle and a wick, as in the poem “Zwiegestalt” (written “before 
5.4.1954”): 
 
Laß dein Aug in der Kammer sein eine Kerze, 
den Blick einen Docht, 
laß mich blind genug sein, 
ihn zu entzünden. 
 
Nein. 
Laß anderes sein. 
 
Tritt vor dein Haus, 
schirr deinen scheckigen Traum an, 
Laß seine Hufe reden 
zum Schnee, den du fortbliest 
vom First meiner Seele.515  
 
The figure (Gestalt) is double (Zwiegestalt) not only due to the (blind?) fumbling that opts for 
another image in the middle of the poem (a mixed metaphor, as some might say — not I, 
however), and not only because of the distinction between eye and sight, candle and wick, but 
also because the figure of you or “your house” and I or “my soul” are perhaps one figure, one 
double figure; “the roof ridge of my soul” seems to be the one of “your house”, your house of 
being perhaps,516  which is at the same time “my soul”, the occupiable, hospitable space of-
fered by the poem — and yet, an abode to be abandoned now, as it seems, inasmuch as it is 
still a question of “my soul” from whose “roof ridge” you have now blown away the snow. 
Blown away, that is: breathed. An abode, a confidence (Mitwisserschaft), a complicity to be 
inhabited and abandoned, first by “me” and then, after “your” having liberated the soul of its 
cover of snow, after having exorcized the haunted house, by “you”. Inhabited and abandoned, 
both at once — perhaps. So it would not be a question of carrying over a content, a message, 
but rather the form, the figure to be occupied and to be abandoned, both at once; a figure to 
be liberated by harnessing one’s dream and letting its hoofs speak to the snow. Harnessing 
one’s dream means, perhaps, to affirm that it is indeed my dream, the other’s address having 
                                                 
515 DGKG, p. 67; cf. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, p. 625. 
516 Celan was familiar with Heidegger’s quasi-metaphoric turn of speech “Haus des Seins” at the time of writ-
ing this poem (Cf. La bi. phi., p. 691, No. 627); such incidental information and speculation is of course not 
an argument yet. But on the other hand, the view of the poem presented here is not necessarily an interpreta-
tion of the poem, either; rather, the minimalistic reading at hand is to be taken as a description of the pre-
requisites for receiving the gift of the poem while suspending the position or imposition of any determined 




become blind in the darkness of my interiority — it is not the same or the similar, but another 
figure, and yet one that we share now, one through which we communicate across the irre-
ducible duplicity, in the exchange between I and you: Zwiegestalt. 
 The chiasmatic inversion amounts also to saying that it is not the poematic encounter 
which bears reference to a real-life encounter, but that every true, authentic encounter (wirk-
liche Begegnung) happens in remembrance of the poem’s secret — the irreducible blindfold 
or veil between us, through which we approach each other.517  Celan may well be designated 
as a “transcendentalist” inasmuch as his poems speak “of the conditions of their own possibil-
ity”.518  And, at the same time, they speak of how any true encounter bears witness to the 
immemorial, archaic imprint of what is called poetry.519 
                                                
 
 
TOUCHING WITHOUT TOUCHING: THE “CONTINGENT METEORITE” 
 
The third poem where the Husserlian term Zeithof appears is an untitled one belonging to the 
cycle called Zeitgehöft; the posthumously titled collection also bears the name of this opening 
cycle, Zeitgehöft (1976): 
 
Erst wenn ich dich 
als Schatten berühre, 
glaubst du mir meinen 
Mund, 







517 “Es [das Gedicht] kann, als das Gegenständliche, auch dessen Stummheit und Opazität haben; es erwacht 
erst in der wirklichen Begegnung, die es als sein Geheimnis hat. Darum ist jede wirkliche Begegnung auch 
Erinnerung an das Geheimnis des Gedichts.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 508, loc. cit.) 
518 “Celan’s poems speak — in a transcendental manner [transzendentalistisch] like only those of Hölderlin 
and, to a lesser degree, those of Rilke — of the conditions of their own possibility.” (Hamacher, “The Sec-
ond of Inversion”, trans. Fenves , p. 352; “Die Sekunde der Inversion” [1988], p. 94.) 
519   “Es gibt Wahrnehmungen, die sich uns unbewußt prägen[.]” (Mikrolithen, p. 100, No. 163.11.) The subse-
quent fragment (No. 163.12) repeats the often quoted words of Valéry: “Poésie: langage à l’état naissant. 
Sprache in statu nascendi also, freiwerdende Sprache. Das Flüchtige, Verschwebende des Vorgangs.” (Cf. 
also Wiedemann’s comments on pp. 508-510, as well as La bi. phi., p. 405, Nos. 984-986; these notes were 
written in September 1954, while reading Heidegger’s Was Heißt Denken?, and the note on the “uncon-
scious imprint” seems to indirectly reflect Heidegger’s following words, marked by Celan: “einen Denker 
aus ihm selbst zu verstehen […] ist unmöglich, weil kein Denker, so wenig wie ein Dichter, sich selbst ver-
steht.”) To speak of “perception” (Wahrnehmung) here  is one of the things that make Celan’s notion at 
least partly incompatible with Husserl’s, since for the latter, an unconscious perception is altogether un-
thinkable (“Es ist eben ein Unding, von einem ‘unbewußten’ Inhalt zu sprechen, der erst nachträglich be-
wußt wurde. [...] Retention eines unbewußten Inhalts ist unmöglich.” [Hua X, Beilage IX, p. 119]). And yet, 
cf. also the following correction made in one of the Meridian fragments, perhaps in response to Husserl’s 
objection: “Intuitives Denken: daß ich, in einem Gespräch im Gebirg gen<annten> Stück, aus dem Bewußt-
losen, nicht Unbewußten, den Lenz kommen sah; [...] Es gibt Geheimnisse. Gedicht und Geheimnis stehen, 
auch heute, […] im Bund.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 85.) It is a question here, no doubt, of what Celan else-




du stößt zur Heerschar 




sternt. 520  
 
The expression glaubst du mir meinem Mund may be translated, as Michael Hamburger has, 
as “you believe my mouth”, but there is a second possible significant option: the structure of 
that expression makes it plausible to claim that the verb glauben is here used in the rare, ob-
solete or dialectal sense ‘to give credit’, to ‘lend’, ‘to entrust something to someone’, ‘to 
commit something to a person’s keeping’.521  So we could translate: “Not until / as a shade I 
touch you / will you entrust me with my / mouth”.  
 We find this ‘structure’ of “lending one’s ears” — or rather, entrusting one’s hands, 
one’s mouth, to the other, as the hands and as the mouth of the other, of voicing the other’s 
writing, the other’s absence — in several other poems, too (for example in “Es ist alles an-
ders”, the poetic encounter with Mandelstam; we shall return to this poem later). “Selbdritt, 
selbviert” from Die Niemandsrose (1963) speaks of, or invites you to speak with “my” 
mouth, in your hour; the conversation seems to happen across something that could be 
named, after a later poem, Zeitenschrunde (“time crevasse”): 
 
Diese Stunde, deine Stunde, 
ihr Gespräch mit meinem Munde. 
 
Mit dem Mund, mit seinem Schweigen, 
mit den Worten, die sich weigern.522  
 
In another poem from the early sixties we meet the image of meteors or comets, or, in any 
case, a meteorological phenomenon making its way “through the air [durch die Luft]”, which 
is, at the same time, an image of Lucifers, in plural (“light-/bringers”), and one which trans-
forms itself into “slender / dog roses”, perhaps reminiscent of the flower, of the no-one’s rose 
given and received in the earlier poem “Der Tauben weißeste flog auf”, Heckenrose also 
known by several other names, such as Heidenröslein, and while this rose known for its 
thorns is named, and Lucifer and his angels are alluded to (perhaps those who preferred to 
remain silent and did not take the side of either God or his enemies — a poet’s ambiguous 
position, perhaps? — but remained between earth and sky: “Schweigewütiges / sternt”), these 
images will not sting, these stones “want to / not sink, not fall, / not collide”; rather than go 
                                                 
520 GW 3:76. “Not until / as a shade I touch you / will you believe / my mouth, // that clambers about / with 
late-minded things / up there / in time-courts, // you come to the host / of the second-utilizers among / the 
angels, / and a body that rages for silence / stars.” (Trans. M. Hamburger, Poems of Paul Celan, p. 295.) 
521  Cf.  DWB, entry “GLAUBEN, vb.”: “[II.]B.  einer person oder sache 'vertrauen', auch 'etwas anvertrauen'. 
[...] 3)  einem etwas glauben 'einem etwas anvertrauen', wohl erst durch den entsprechenden gebrauch von 
lat. credere veranlaszt “ (Bd. 7, Sp. 7831-7832.) 




down and tear the earth, they undergo their transformation and “rise / up, / like slender / dog 
roses they break open” and are to be plucked “with my / new, my / Everyman’s hands”: 
 
DIE HELLEN 
STEINE gehn durch die Luft, die hell- 




nicht niedergehen, nicht stürzen, 
nicht treffen. Sie gehen 
auf, 
wie die geringen 
Heckenrosen, so tun sie sich auf, 
sie schweben 
dir zu, du meine Leise, 
du meine Wahre –: 
 
ich seh dich, du pflückst sie mit meinen 
neuen, meinen 
Jedermannshänden, du tust sie 
ins Abermals-Helle, das niemand 
zu weinen braucht noch zu nennen.523  
 
This poem, as perhaps they all are, must be both occasional, a love poem dedicated to some-
one, as it seems, an erotic poem in the most profound acceptation of this term,524  and at the 
same time, so to say, “Poesie der Poesie”, poetry on the occasion of nothing but poetry it-
self.525  As they all are, perhaps, both at the same time. 
 The you whose eye is hit by the comets, “you, my gentle one, / you, my true one”, 
gives the other I, the I of the poem, her hands, gives her everyman’s-hands to him, to pluck 
the wild roses, the shooting stars that did not hit the ground but shot, blossomed as roses do, 
as roses rising up and breaking open before the eye who saw them plucked — then, with his 
new everyman’s-hands. Their “Once-Again-Brightness”, their fading instant of opening up 
once more and yet once again, is not to be named or to be wept over. 
 But this instant, the unrepeatable once repeated, always again only for once, the secret 
of the encounter, would have been, will have been meteoric, and what is meteoric must be 
                                                 
523 Die Niemandsrose, in DGKG, p. 147; cf. Wiedemann’s commentary on pp. 693-694. 
524 Wiedemann’s commentary names Gisèle Celan-Lestrange, and one might perhaps surmise that the name of 
Saint Frances provides the link between the story of Lucifer and the loved one who appears in Celan’s po-
ems sometimes also enciphered in the figure and name of Francesca, from Dante’s Divina Commedia (cf. 
e.g. Szondi, “Reading ‘Engführung’”, op. cit.). Cf. also letter No. 221 in Paul Celan – Gisèle Celan-
Lestrange, Correspondance. Vol. I: Lettres, ed. Bertrand Badiou (Paris: Seuil, 2001), pp. 233-234, indicated 
by Wiedemann. 
525 I would like to refer here to the paradoxical self-understanding of Goethe, who took his poems to be always 
occasional poetry, while for Friedrich Schlegel, Goethe represented something that would seem the exact 
opposite of occasional poetry, “Poesie der Poesie”.  I would read “Heidenröslein” as a perfect example of 
Goethe’s poetry being both at once: at least potentially occasional (with biographical reminders and re-




brief, rapid, passing. Derrida, on at least two occasions in his essay “La littérature au secret: 
Une filiation impossible”, the second occasion being right after briefly referring to his own 
reading of Celan’s “Todtnauberg”, seems to allude, more implicitly, to Celan’s meteors. “Me-
teor” must be here understood both as “Any atmospheric phenomenon” and as “A luminous 
body seen temporarily in the sky” (OED). If “any atmospheric phenomena” can be called a 
meteor, we must say that a poem must be a meteor too. It makes its way through the air, read-
able and recitable, visible and speakable in its verbal body that can touch mine without touch-
ing, when I read it, silently or aloud. 
 
Cette phrase [« Pardon de ne pas vouloir dire... »] paraît aussi phénoménale qu’un 
météorite ou une météorite (ce mot a deux sexes). Phénoménale, cette phrase paraît 
l’être, car d’abord elle paraît. Elle apparaît, cela est clair, c’est même l’hypothese ou 
la certitude de principe. Elle se manifeste, elle paraît, mais « en l’air », venue on ne 
sait d’où, de façon apparemment contingente. Contingente météorite au moment de 
toucher un sol (car une contingence dit aussi, selon l’étymologie, le toucher, le tact ou 
le contact) mais sans assurer de lecture pertinente (car la pertinence dit aussi, selon 
l’étymologie, le toucher, le tact ou le contact). Restant en l’air, elle appartient à l’air, à 
l’être-en-l’air. Elle a sa demeure dans l’atmosphère que nous respirons, elle demeure 
suspendue en l’air même quand elle touche. Là même où elle touche. C’est pourquoi 
je la dis météorique. Elle se dit encore suspendue, peut-être au-dessus d’une tête, par 
exemple celle d’Isaac au moment où Abraham lève son couteau au-dessus de lui, 
quand il ne sait plus que nous ce qui va se passer, pourquoi Dieu lui a demandé en se-
cret ce qu’il lui a demandé, et pourquoi il va peut-être le laisser faire ou l’empêcher de 
faire ce qu’il lui a demandé de faire sans lui en donner la moindre raison : secret ab-
solu, secret à garder en partage quant à un secret qu’on ne partage pas. Dissymmétrie 
absolue. [Donner la mort, pp. 177-178.] 
 
A few pages later, after discussing Kafka’s Brief an den Vater, and mentioning Celan’s 
“Todtnauberg” in passing, Derrida continues: 
 
La littérature aura été météorique. Comme le secret. On appelle météore un phé-
nomène, cela même qui apparaît dans la brillance ou le phainesthai d’une lumière, ce 
qui se produit dans l’atmosphère. Comme une sorte d’arc-en-ciel. [...] Le secret du 
météorite : il devient lumineux à entrer, comme on dit, dans l’atmosphère, venu on ne 
sait d’où — mais en tout cas d’un autre corps dont il se serait détaché. Puis ce qui est 
météorique doit être bref, rapide, passager. Furtif, c’est-à-dire, dans son passage 
éclair, peut-être aussi coupable et clandestin qu’un voleur. [Donner la mort, pp. 181, 
185-186.]  
 
Foreign bodies detached from a foreign body. The “vocal things” endowed with the “mute 
consonant” carry not only the secret of their origin — the heart, let us say, not only as the in-
nermost recess of the human body, its “middle-point” (Herzpunkt)526  but made manifest by, 
                                                 
526 Cf. these lines of the poem “Von der Orchis her” in Atemwende (GW 2:64):  
  
Ein kleines Verhängnis, so groß 
wie der Herzpunkt, den ich 
hinter dein meinen Namen 
stammelndes Aug setz, 




or as, Herzmund and Herzfingern,527  — not only this originary secret, but also the secret of 
their destination, which may always remain a secret also to the addresser of such a singular, 
open address, with at least some hope of reaching something or someone, of course. 
 In an interview with Évelyne Grossman, Derrida characterized his experience of read-
ing Celan as meteoric: “With regard to Celan, the image that comes to my mind is a meteor, 
an interrupted blaze of light, a sort of caesura, a very brief moment leaving behind a trail of 
sparks that I try to recover through his texts.”528 
 We shall return to comet-like figures, aerophones and air-stones, meteoric and mete-
orological phenomena, and projectiles later. Also a bottle thrown into the sea, bottle-mail, is a 
projectile of sorts, resembling a carrier pigeon to an extent. In a poem, a carrier pigeon is no 
metaphor, as Derrida maintains in a quasi-Magrittean fashion: “mais ce n’est pas une méta-
phore.” A poem described as a carrier pigeon is no metaphor either, as odd and unorthodox 
as this may seem. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 Wiedemann refers the word Herzpunkt back to one of the things the Grimm dictionary says on “Herz”: “das 
Innerste, der Mittelpunkt von etwas” (“Einzelkommentar”, in DGKG, p. 736). 
527 Cf. “In Eins”, Die Niemandsrose, GW 1:270 (“Im Herzmund / erwachtes Schibboleth.”);  “Schibboleth”, 
Von Schwelle zu Schwelle, GW 1:131 (“Herz: / gib dich auch hier zu erkennen, / hier, in der Mitte des 
Marktes. / Ruf’s, das Schibboleth, hinaus”); “Hüttenfenster”, Die Niemandsrose, GW 1:278 (“Das Aug, 
dunkel: / [...] magnetisch / ziehts, mit Herzfingern, an / dir, Erde:”). 
528 “Language is Never Owned. An Interview”, trans. Thomas Dutoit and Philippe Romanski, in Derrida, Sov-
ereignties in Question, p. 99. French original: “L’image qui me vient à propos de Celan c’est celle d’un 
météore, un éclat de lumière interrompue, une sorte de césure, un moment très bref et qui laisse un sillage 
que j’essaie de retrouver à travers ses textes.” (“La langue n’appartient pas. Entretien avec Jacques Der-
rida”, in Europe: Revue littéraire mensuelle. 79ème année, No. 861-862, Paul Celan [janvier-février 2001], 






T H E  F I G U R E  O F  N O  O N E  
... and the bottle-mail (Martine Broda) 
 
 
Das Gedicht kann, da es ja eine Erscheinungsform der Sprache und damit seinem 
Wesen nach dialogisch ist, eine Flaschenpost sein, aufgegeben in dem – gewiß nicht 
immer hoffnungsstarken – Glauben, sie könnte irgendwo und irgendwann an Land 
gespült werden, an Herzland vielleicht.529  
 
In her superb essay “« A personne adressé » : Paul Celan lecteur de L’Interlocuteur” (1985), 
Martine Broda has paid specific attention to a tension that is not only constituent to  meta-
phor, such as the metaphor of bottle-mail, but between the metaphors in this passage: bottle-
mail and dialogue, both being “metaphors” of poetry. Poetry is defined as dialogue and, at the 
same time, as bottle-mail. An absolutely dissymmetrical dialogue, an encounter across an 
immeasurable distance: “Mais  une rencontre qui suppose cette absolue dissymétrie des 
places est-elle bien encore une dialogue?”530 Furthermore, the “dialogue” is described as an 
address to “no one [Niemand, personne]”: another oxymoron. On the one hand, we have this 
address to Niemand (in the poem “Psalm”, most notably), in which the name without name, 
Niemand, takes the place of God’s name, the missing or absent name of God, which at once 
also names God’s absence; but this absence of God, denoted by the non-name Niemand, 
stands also for the “irreducible transcendence of the Thou”, the human other, the human per-
son. Into the non-name Niemand in Celan’s poetry is translated the whole ambiguity of the 
French personne and the quasi-homophonic proximity of the Russian words nikto / niekto (no 
one / someone) in Mandelstam’s essay “On the Addressee”;531  Celan also borrows from 
                                                 
529 ”Ansprache anläßlich der Entgegennahme des Literaturpreises der freien Hansestadt Bremen” (1958), in 
GW 3:186. Trans. John Felstiner: “A poem, as a manifestation of language and thus essentially dialogue, 
can be a message in a bottle, sent out in the — not always greatly hopeful — belief that somewhere and 
sometime it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps.” (Selected Poems and Prose, p. 396.) 
530 Martine Broda, “« A personne adressé ». Paul Celan lecteur de « l’Interlocuteur », in Po&sie, No. 35, 1985, 
pp. 13-20, here p. 17.  
531 ”[U]ne opposition travaille De l’Interlocuteur [par Mandelstam] dans sa langue d’origine, de part en part. 
Celan y a sans doute été sensible, qui lisait, lui, le russe à la lettre. C’est celle de nikto et de niekto. Nikto, 
indéterminé, est l’équivalent exact de « personne » ou de « niemand ». Niekto, indéterminé-déterminé, 
qu’on pourrait traduire par « une personne » ou « une certaine personne » est très proche du « quidam » 
latin (quelqu’un que je pourrais mais ne veux nommer). Mandelstam lie ces deux mots, presque homo-
phones, à sa réflexion sur l’interlocuteur. Je rappelle les principales articulations de son raisonnement : le 
poète a l’air de ne s’addresser à personne (nikto). C’est que, contrairement au littérateur, il ne s’adresse pas 
à une certaine personne (niekto), son contemporain, son voisin, l’ami-dans-la-génération, ou même le con-
temporain de l’avenir. Il fait un pari sur l’inconnu, en visant un indéterminé lointain : le lecteur dans la 
postérité. Cet interlocuteur existe cependant. C’est le poème qui l’élit, le crée, puisque celui qui ramasse la 
boutéille jetée à la mer sait qu’elle lui était personellement destinée. En retour, c’est l’existence de 
l’interlocuteur qui est le garant de la légitimité, du bon droit de la poème. [...] En effet, chez Mandelstam, 
c’est l’élection par le poème qui détermine cet interlocuteur d’abord hypothétique et indéterminé. Un « lec-
teur inconnu mais défini », ouvrant la bouteille ou rencontrant le poème, avec joie et épouvante, se sent 




Mandelstam the metaphor of bottle-mail to denote the poem. On the other hand, we have the 
description of poetry as “dialogue”, “conversation [Gespräch]”. How can these be conjoined 
— the message in a bottle and dialogue, dialogue and an address to no one, dissymmetry and 
dialogue? Perhaps these “metaphors” are just incompatible: 
 
Mais une rencontre qui suppose cette absolue dissymétrie des places est-elle bien en-
core un dialogue? On peut se le demander. / Pour dire ce qui, de la relation intersub-
jective, peut advenir dans la chance du poème, Mandelstam et Celan ont recours à la 
métaphore du dialogue. On pourrait dire, ils s’en contentent, car si on lit les textes de 
près, on s’apercevra qu’il s’agit d’une approximation. Le mot de « dialogue » me 
semble dangereux, en ce qu’il peut évoquer le schéma question/réponse, et une con-
ception trop simple du discours. Aussi le schéma linguistique banal de la communica-
tion, dans lequelle un locuteur transmet des contenus à un allocutaire, l’un et l’autre 
assignés à une place fixe. Dans cette conception, qui reste foncièrement instrumentali-
ste, le « Je » sait qui il est, où il est, et où est l’autre qu’il vise. Le code est supposé 
commun, et le message une fois transmis, une information, il n’y a pas de reste. Pour 
voir ce qu’il en est vraiment, il faut focaliser sur un détail : la lecture que fait Celan du 
motif de « la bouteille jetée à la mer ». [“A personne adressé”, p. 14.]532 
 
The incompatibility between the “metaphor of dialogue” and the message in a bottle is so ob-
vious it seems to cry out for reductio ad absurdum. But when the positions and the code are 
already securely fixed beforehand, and the communication is guaranteed, when there is no 
residue left after the message, and the information contained in it has been safely transmitted, 
sent and received without loss and without residue (a “cultivation of intimacy” indeed, even 
when we are surprised or stricken by a good joke or metaphor),533  are we really having a dia-
logue, a true dialogue? Perhaps a poem, speaking in its ownmost cause but also, at one and 
the same time, in the cause of the other, wholly other perhaps, even when it is a conversation 
between absent ones, or a desperate conversation,534  could teach us what a true dialogue is. 
 But perhaps there is no other dialogue, no other than the guaranteed, codified commu-
nication. Perhaps there is no other dialogue than the one in which everything is more or less 
anticipatable. In which the questions are, thus, more or less rhetorical, the other’s response 
responding to what I already expected him to respond, more or less, as if in a mere tautology. 
But perhaps, on the other hand, the insecurity and the “motif” of the message in a bottle 
(Flaschenpost:  this word does not actually name the ‘message’), the bottle-mail received by 
Celan from Mandelstam, rather reveal what a true dialogue is, or would be. Celan remarks 
that the dialogue, the conversation that has taken on the form of a bottle post, or the form of a 
poem (or perhaps even “writing as a form of prayer”), while remaining yet also a form of 
                                                 
532 Part of this passage has been repeated, word for word, in the beginning of another essay, “Bouteilles, cail-
loux, schibbolets : Un nom dans la main”,  by Broda in her book Dans la main de personne. Essai sur Paul 
Celan et autres essais. Nouvelle édition augmentée (Paris: Cerf, 2002), pp. 95-105; the first version of this 
essay was published with the title “Un nom dans la main” in Passé Présent No. 4, Nov. 1984. 
533 Cf. Ted Cohen, “Metaphor as Cultivation of Intimacy” (1978, op. cit.). “Stricken by Metaphor: Some The-
matic Consequences” is the title of the final chapter of Murray Krieger’s book A Reopening of Closure: Or-
ganicism Against Itself (op. cit.). 




conversation, is “not always greatly hopeful”. While remaining conversation (Gespräch), the 
poem can be “despairing conversation”, and often is, as the Meridian remarks.535  Without 
these extremes of conversation, or these borderline cases of dialogue, without such imminent 
proximity to non-dialogue, interruption and despair, without the poetic “pronouncement of 
the infinitude of mere mortality and futility” even,536  there would be no dialogue whatsoever. 
Only the “false dialogue”537  of a perfect — or false — consensus, at the most.  
 Every dialogue is haunted by an ongoing interior dialogue, each question takes place 
in anticipation of response and each statement anticipates further questions. Even the most 
unquestionable, apodeictic assertion must formally anticipate questions, responses, objec-
tions, in order to exclude them once and for all, and thus every conversation, indeed all lan-
guage, even before taking on the explicit form of dialogue, even the Cartesian proposition je 
pense, donc je suis, is haunted by the figure of prosopopoeia, giving the other its voice or its 
hearing, mouth and ears, even before the other speaks or listens.538  This other, this interlocu-
tor, can even take on the form of myself as an other, and of course it does, since it is a ques-
tion of an interior dialogue. But this necessary anticipation and interiority preceding every 
dialogue in the world (every ‘exterior’ dialogue, that is) does not reduce the conversation into 
being mere monologue. If language is “in essence dialogue” as Celan claims, even when it is 
“despairing conversation” and addressed to no one, the whole notion of monologue — and 
thereby Gottfried Benn’s notion of poetry as monologue addressed to no one, but as a non-
address rather than as Mandelstam’s and Celan’s ambiguous address to nikto/niekto, Nie-
mand, personne — becomes dubious. 
 A poem can be a message in a bottle while a message in a bottle can be a poem. Of 
course, a bottle abandoned to the waves could always contain a poem written on a piece of 
paper. The message in a bottle, the bottle-mail could be a poem, and a poem can be a mes-
sage in a bottle. It is not only so that the message in a bottle, the idea of bottle-mail, can teach 
us what a poem can be, but a poem can teach us what a message in a bottle can be. And these 
both together can perhaps teach us what dialogue is, and must be: not only expected and ex-
pectable lines, but a radical openness of the horizon, an openness to the unexpected and un-
known. The alleged “metaphors” of dialogue and bottle-mail, in their very incompatibility 
                                                 
535 ”Das Gedicht wird [...] Gespräch – oft ist es verzweifeltes Gespräch.” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 36a.) Trans. 
Felstiner, in Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, p. 410. 
536 ”Die Dichtung, meine Damen und Herren –: diese Unendlichsprechung von lauter Sterblichkeit und Um-
sonst!” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 44.) “The Meridian”, trans. Jerry Glenn, “Appendix” in Derrida, Sovereign-
ties in Question, p. 183. 
537 Cf. the “Exergue” of Derrida’s “La mythologie blanche” (in Marges, 1972), where Anatole France’s dia-
logue “Ariste et Polyphile” is considered a false dialogue. 
538 It is well known that the phrase cogito, sum, let alone cogito, ergo sum, is not found as such in Descartes’s 
Meditationes de prima philosophia, but the French equivalent  je pense, donc je suis appears in the “popu-
larized” account, entitled Discours de la méthode and written in French, and in Principia philosophiae I,10 
Descartes refers to the “proposition” ego cogito, ergo sum, but denies that it contains an inference (as the 
adverb ergo would suggest). — On the prosopopoeia, cf. Derrida, Mémoires — pour Paul de Man (Paris: 





and the further incompatibility, or rather paradoxicality, of their union with the poem, indi-
cate something not only of the poem, but of dialogue itself, of its conditions of possibility and 
impossibility. 
 Rachel Ertel has written: 
 
Mais ce « Rien », ce « Personne » est la figure ultime d’un interlocuteur absent dont il 
est impossible au poète de se déprendre, car ce serait se priver de la parole.539 
 
The figure of no one, the figure of the withdrawal or definite absence of a determined ad-
dressee (which has as its consequence, perhaps, that the address can always only be over-
heard and never appropriated in person — except, perhaps, in the rare case of its reaching its 
ownmost, singular, secret destination just like a message in a bottle would), or of the deter-
mined addressee, is the contour of absence which makes speech itself, dialogue itself, appear 
in the apostrophe. 
 The poem and the bottle-mail share, of course, some common characteristics, more or 
less essential, that make the metaphor possible. But this “metaphor” suggests perhaps some-
thing about the signifier, the signifying form, the vehicle, rather than about the signified (con-
tent, message, or tenor). There are many other such “metaphors of the poem in Celan’s 
texts”,540  as Martine Broda puts it. But these are perhaps not simply metaphors, or metaphors 
of metaphor. Let us read some more of Broda’s excellent essay: 
 
On peut se demander ce qu’il y a dans la bouteille. C’est déjà clair chez Mandelstam: 
« la description de sa destinée et son nom », ainsi que « la date de l’événement » — la 
fameuse « mémoire des dates » qui réapparaît dans Le Méridien. Le message n’est pas 
un sens informatif, une collection de signifiés dont le poète serait maître. Ce qu’il y a 
dans cette bouteille hermétique comme le poème, c’est le poète, son don de lui-même 
— le poème, son destin chiffré. [“À personne adressé”, p. 17.] 
 
In one of the manuscript fragments written for the Meridian speech, Celan cites Whitman: 
“Who touches this touches a man”.541  The poem is the poet. The gift of the poem is the gift 
of the poet, and the gift of the poet is no longer to be distinguished from the poet himself. To 
give is to give oneself, to expose oneself, as endowed to the poem (mitgegeben), as a dowry 
of sorts (Mitgift). Abandoned to the waves and currents, as it were. And we may see how in-
tricate the difference between metaphor and non-metaphor, or quasi-metaphor, between 
vague and littoral is here.542  If the bottle-mail is washed upon the heartland (“irgendwo und 
                                                 
539 Rachel Ertel, “La résonance des cendres”, in Arcadia: Zeitschrift für Allgemeine und Vergleichende Litera-
turwissenschaft, ed. J. Neubauer and J. Wertheimer, Bd. 32 / 1997, Heft 1, Celan und / in Europa, (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1997), p. 266. 
540 ”Métaphores du poème comme corps opaque, organique, du sens, totalité, et aussi du destin du sujet qu’il 
recèle, d’autres métaphores sont proches de celle de la bouteille jetée à la mer dans les textes de Celan.” 
(Broda, “À personne adressé”, p. 18.) But here one might evoke Celan’s own question: “was eine Metapher 
denn sei, wo sie im Text stehe” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582). 
541 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 422. Whitman’s line is from the poem “So long!” (1860). 
542 The pun on vague (“wave”, but also “vague”) and littoral (“shoreline”; cf. litéral), and furthermore, be-




irgendwann an Land gespült werden, an Herzland vielleicht”), it is no longer simply a 
question of a message in a bottle, and no longer metaphor either. 
 In Broda’s text, the designation “hermetic” seems a metaphor that might be associated 
with the semantic field of the bottle-mail rather than to be understood as properly characteris-
tic of Celan’s poetry and poetics. Celan himself denied that his poems are “hermetic” in any 
way: “Ganz und gar nicht hermetisch.”543  But as Broda herself emphasizes earlier in her 
text, the bottle message is not Celan’s own metaphor for the poem, rather he receives it from 
Mandelstam and thus implicitly cites Mandelstam in his Bremen speech. Mandelstam, with 
whom he more than shakes hands in an imaginary meeting: 
 
ES IST ALLES ANDERS, als du es dir denkst, als ich es mir denke, 
die Fahne weht noch, 
die kleinen Geheimnisse sind noch bei sich, 
sie werfen noch Schatten, davon 
lebst du, leb ich, leben wir. 
 
Die Silbermünze auf deiner Zunge schmilzt, 
sie schmeckt nach Morgen, nach Immer, ein Weg 
nach Rußland steigt dir ins Herz, 
die karelische Birke 
hat 
gewartet, 
der Name Ossip kommt auf dich zu, du erzählst ihm, 
was er schon weiß, er nimmt es, er nimmt es dir ab, mit Händen, 
du löst ihm den Arm von der Schulter, den rechten, den linken, 
du heftest die deinen an ihre Stelle, mit Händen, mit Fingern, mit Linien, 
– was abriß, wächst wieder zusammen – 
da hast du sie, da nimm sie dir, da hast du alle beide, 
den Namen, den Namen, die Hand, die Hand, 
da nimm sie dir zum Unterpfand, 
er nimmt auch das, und du hast 




stoßen dir Luft in die Lunge, [...]544  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
retrait de la métaphor” (in Psyché — inventions de l’autre). 
543 Reported by Michael Hamburger in the introduction to his volume of English translations (1980). 
544 In Die Niemandsrose (1963), GW 1:284. Trans. Felstiner: “It’s all different from what you think, from what 
I think, / the flag still waves, / the little secrets are still intact, / they still cast shadows — on this / you live, I 
live, we live. // The silver shekel melts on your tongue, / it tastes of Tomorrow, of Always, a path / to Rus-
sia rises into your heart, / the Karelian birch / is still / waiting, / the name Osip comes toward you, you tell 
him / what he already knows, he takes it, he takes it off you with hands, / you loose the arm from his shoul-
der, the right one, the left, / you fasten your own in their place, with hands, fingers, lines, // — what ripped 
apart, grows back together — / you’ve got them now, so take them now, so now you’ve got them both, / the 
name, the name, the hand, the hand, / so take them and this pledge will stand, / he takes that too and you’ve 
got back / what’s yours, what was his, // windmills // drive air into your lungs, […]” (Selected Poems and 




What, if we may say so, was actually exchanged in the “imaginary meeting”545  between 
Celan and Mandelstam — a poetic handshake indeed, and more546  — ‘was’ not a bottle but a 
pebble: Kieselstein, an enigmatic sumbolon as Broda says,547  which turns into a name at the 
end of the relatively long poem: “Alba”, which, as we have already noticed, enciphers the 
name Celano: 
 
Weiß ist er, weiß, ein Wasser- 
strahl findet hindurch, ein Herzstrahl, 
ein Fluß, 
du kennst seinen Namen, die Ufer 
hängen voll Tag, wie der Name, 
du tastet ihn ab, mit der Hand: 
Alba.548   
 
Here Broda finds a correspondence to a passage in the Book of Revelations: “and I will give 
him a white stone, with a new name written on the stone which no one knows except him 
who receives it.” (Apoc. 2:17; cf. “À personne adressé”, p. 18.)  
 
Mais il le faut, pour bien marquer l’importance, dans la poésie de Celan, de ce geste 
de passation d’une main d’homme à l’autre, où ce qui est transmis n’est pas au pre-
mier d’abord un communicable : une « pierre-cœur », plus semblable à un signifiant 
qu’à un signifié, dure, mais orientée et encore vibrant d’un souffle, l’énonciation, un 
nom propre opaque comme le signifiant, peut-être celui qui signe le dire. [“À per-
sonne adressé”, p. 18.] 
 
The gesture is the first thing that counts, perhaps. The gesture of giving a sign counts before 
the sign itself or its content, the gesture of handing over the gift of oneself (“le poète, son don 
de lui-même — le poème”) — the gift of oneself mitgegeben, endowed to the poem’s phe-
                                                 
545 ”Much consideration has also been given to the fact that personal encounters, letters, and conversations with 
such persons as Theodor Adorno, Martin Buber, Erich von Kahler, Nelly Sachs, and even his imaginary 
meeting with the Russian Jewish poet Osip Mandelstam played an essential part in the formation of Celan’s 
jewish identity.” (Christine Ivanovic, “‘All poets are Jews’ — Paul Celan’s Readings of Marina Tsve-
tayeva”, in Glossen 6 [1999]; http://www.dickinson.edu/departments/germn/glossen/heft6/celan html.) On 
this “imaginary meeting”, see Celan’s translations of Mandelstam (GW 5:48-161), his own poems in Die 
Niemandsrose, the book dedicated to Mandelstam, and the radio polylogue Die Dichtung Ossip Mandel-
stamms (written between Feb. 16th and March 8th and broadcast, in a slightly abbreviated form, March 
19th, 1960 by Norddeutsche Rundfunk; TCA/Meridian, pp. 215-221; also in Mikrolithen, pp. 196-206, No. 
300; cf. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, pp. 825ff). 
546 See “Brief an Hans Bender”: “Ich sehe keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied zwischen Händedruck und Ge-
dicht.” (GW 3:177.) 
547 GW 1:285: 
 
es wandert überallhin, wie die Sprache, 
wirf sie weg, wirf sie weg, 
dann hast du sie wieder, wie ihn, 
den Kieselstein aus 
der Mährischen Senke, 
  
 Cf. Broda, “À personne adressé”, p. 18. 
548 GW 1:286, ad finem. Cf. L. M. Olschner’s commentary to this poem in Lehmann et al., Kommentar zu Paul 




nomenal and thus opaque, vocal things — counts more than the countable, decipherable value 
of the item given (its signification or significance, its information value, etc.). What is enci-
phered in this gesture is indeed often the proper name of the “one who signs the saying [celui 
qui signe le dire]”; the various poetic encipherings of the name Antschel — Ancel — Celan, 
and of toponyms such as Bukovina, whose old German name is das Buchenland (the land of 
the beech trees; the homonymy meaning “book” must be taken into account) have been re-
markably traced by Thomas Schestag in his essay “buk”.549  The poet is metonymized by his 
corpus, his poetry, the gift of himself. But this gift is opaque, opaque like the proper name, as 
Broda suggests (“un nom propre opaque comme le signifiant”) (“À personne adressé”, p. 18).  
 The name, the opaque signifier, the hand or the sumbolon that transmits the warmth of 
the hand and thus of the heart, the destiny and destination of the name and the one bearing it 
are not absolutely something else than this person or this reality, even when this reality re-
mains beyond our reach as such. The detachment belonging to metaphor is radically different 
from the detachment belonging to metonymy, understood as a figure of contiguity — or sev-
ered contiguity, detached belonging to a singular reality waiting to be re-attached to another 
singular reality, radically dissimilar but joined through the sumbolon. 
 Broda still sees these as metaphors — which they of course are, too, even when they 
would denote the anti-metaphorical resistance of the poem: 
 
Métaphores du poème comme corps opaque, organique, du sens, totalité, et aussi du 
destin du sujet qu’il recèle, d’autres métaphores sont proches de celle de la bouteille 
jetée à la mer dans les textes de Celan. On lira le poème Tout est autrement [“Es ist 
alles anders”], qui parle de la rencontre avec Mandelstam (ils échangent leurs mains, 
marquées des lignes de destin). Vers la fin, un mystérieux symbolon, un « caillou 
blanc » se change en nom, mis dans la main. « Et je lui donnerai un caillou blanc, et 
sur ce caillou un « nom nouveau » est écrit, que nul ne connaît, hormis celui qui le 
reçoit. » C’est dans L’Apocalypse (II, 17). Je reviens ici, de façon très allusive, sur 
quelque chose que j’ai développé ailleurs. [“À personne adressé”, p. 18.] 
 
This “elsewhere” is in another excellent essay, whose first version dates from 1984 and ap-
peared in a revised form in the book Dans la main de personne (1986, new augmented edi-
tion 2002).550  There Broda comments again on the passage of the Bremen speech and the fig-
ure of the bottle-mail: 
 
Il n’est jamais question, chez Celan en tout cas, plus clair sur ce point que Mandel-
stam, de fracturer la bouteille et de déchiffer son message, ce qui compte est de le 
ramasser : « Le poème en tant qu’il est, oui, une forme d’apparition du langage, et par 
là d’essence dialogique, le poème peut être une bouteille jetée à la mer, abandonnée à 
l’espoir — certes, souvent fragile — qu’elle pourra un jour quelque part être recueillie 
sur une plage, sur la plage du cœur peut-être. Les poèmes en ce sens sont en chemin : 
                                                 
549 Thomas Schestag, “buk”, MLN 109 [April 1994], pp. 399-444. Cf. e.g. Mikrolithen, p. 116, No. 200.1: 
“Mein Name – Celan, Célañ, Zelan.” On corresponding encipherings in Kafka, cf. Hamacher, “The Gesture 
in the Name: On Benjamin and Kafka”, trans. Fenves, in Premises, pp. 294-336. 
550 “Bouteilles, cailloux, schibbolets : Un nom dans la main”,  in Dans la main de personne. Essai sur Paul 




ils font route vers quelque chose. Vers quoi ? Vers quelque lieu ouvert à invoquer, à 
occuper, vers un toi invocable, vers une réalité à invoquer. » / Rien qu’un contact avec 
la main. Et la main chez Celan résume tout l’homme, contigu, continu — voir la lettre 
à Hans Bender. Le poème est un « serrement de mains » : geste unissant qui fait que 
d’un homme à l’autre quelque chose passe, est transmis. C’est pour ce geste qu’un 
« Je » et un « Tu » sans places fixes, assignées, se cherchent et finissent peut-être par 
se trouver, à travers toute l’épaisseur de la langue, au bout d’une longue distance 
d’espace-temps. [“Bouteilles, cailloux, schibbolets”, p. 99.] 
 
The poem does not deny this distance or annul it in favour of something supratemporal, su-
pra-spatial and supra-personal, it seeks not to transcend but to traverse: “Denn das Gedicht ist 
nicht zeitlos. Gewiß, es erhebt einen Unendlichkeitsanspruch, es sucht, durch die Zeit 
hindurchzugreifen – durch sie hindurch, nicht über sie hinweg.”551  This is said in the Bremen 
speech just before the paragraph on the bottle-mail. And Broda connects the metaphor of the 
bottle-mail with the handshake of which Celan speaks, most notably and most famously, in 
his letter to Hans Bender (“Paris, den 18. Mai 1960”) on the occasion of the latter’s invitation 
to participate in the collective volume of essays and poetry entitled Mein Gedicht ist mein 
Messer. Instead of an essay or poems, this letter was published in the volume — perhaps its 
figure of poetry as a handshake was a comment on the title (“My poem is my dagger”), a 
counter-word to it? This is the exact formulation: “Ich sehe keinen prinzipiellen Unterschied 
zwischen Händedruck und Gedicht.” (GW 3:177.) There is no difference of principle between 
a poem and shaking hands. This is hardly a metaphor. But, in the other essay, Martine Broda 
writes:  
 
Cette métaphore du « serrement de mains » me semble plus adéquate que celle du dia-
logue pour dire le geste fondamental de la poésie de Celan: « je gagnai, je perdis (...) 
je jetai / tout dans la main de personne ». [“À personne adressé”, p. 17.] 
 
Broda uses in the passage cited a few moments ago, and also in the other essay (these two 
texts are  almost versions of each other), the terms “contiguous, continuous”, to denote the 
way the hand “resumes the whole man” in the hand-shake: “Et la main chez Celan résume 
tout l’homme, contigu, continu” — “Et la main est ce qui résume tout l’homme, contigu, con-
tinu.”552  Contiguity and continuity are terms accepted to characterize metonymy as a figure 
juxtaposed with — and sometimes also opposed to — metaphor, which is a figure of similar-
ity; metaphor, this figure based on resemblance, is of course also a figure of substitution, or if 
not substitution, then of impertinent predication, and so on and so forth. 
 Referring to Mandelstam’s “Interlocutor”, the source of Celan’s image of the bottle-
mail, Broda writes: 
 
                                                 
551 GW 3:186. Trans. Felstiner: “For a poem is not timeless. Certainly it lays claims to infinity, it seeks to reach 
through time — through it, not above and beyond it.” Cf. e.g. the documents 140-143 in Paul Celan – Die 
Goll-Affäre (2000), pp. 476-477 = TCA/Meridian, Ms. 301, 305, 325, 328. Et passim. 




Ce que le poète-navigateur, à l’heure ultime, confie aux flots roulants vers le futur 
n’est pas un ensemble de signifiés dont il serait maître. C’est son être même, inscrit 
dans son poème, souvent meilleur que lui. Le message, c’est lui tout entier, avec le 
chiffre, secret, de son propre destin, que le poème conserve, que lui ne connaît pas. 
[“Bouteilles, cailloux, schibboleths”, p. 100.] 
 
The white pebble exchanged by the hands — which themselves are exchanged in the poem 
“Es ist alles anders” — remains, for Broda, a metaphor: “métaphore de la langue perdue-
trouvée et du poème [...] le caillou transmis, métaphore du poème comme corps opaque [...] 
métaphore du destin du sujet qu’il recèle” (p. 101). But the pebble (Kieselstein) in this poem 
is not just any metaphorical pebble, it is “Kieselstein aus / der Mährischen Senke, / den dein 
Gedanke nach Prag trug” (GW 1:285),553  etc.; not just any old pebble, but a very specific 
pebble bearing reference to the unique and singular destiny that can be addressed by a proper 
name. A sumbolon, tessera or metonymy, not metaphor. 
 The pledge (Unterpfand) of “the name, the name, the hand, the hand”,554  is an incar-
nation and, yet, is also thrown “in the air”, this “in the air” meaning first of all a dis-
incarnation: “uncertain”, “unsubstantial”. But perhaps an inversion takes place here? 
 
ES IST ALLES ANDERS, als du es dir denkst, als ich es mir denke, 
die Fahne weht noch, 
die kleinen Geheimnisse sind noch bei sich, 
sie werfen noch Schatten, davon 
lebst du, leb ich, leben wir.555  
 
In spite of what you think and I think, the flag still waves, the little secrets are still intact (bei 
sich), they still cast shadows, and on this, you live, I live, we live. This is to say that you are, I 
am, we are still living on, living on all this, in spite of what you, what I, what we may think 
of these things and their reality, their presence or absence. 
 How does this happen? How did this happen, this ‘mistake’ in thinking otherwise, and 
how does the correction take place, how can this living-on take place, in spite of what “we” 
thought, as the strange logic of this first strophe of a poem claims? Perhaps it takes place 
through another sense of the expression “in the air” (in der Luft). This expression, used by 
Celan on many occasions,556  alludes to the opposite expression ‘aus der Luft’, ‘es ist aus der 
                                                 
553 Trans. Felstiner: “that pebble from / the Moravian Basin / your thought carried to Prague,” (p. 207). 
554 Cf. DWB: “UNTERPFAND, n. [...] [1] b)  von gliedern des leibes; vgl. fraispfand (MEIBOM 25): darmit du 
aber der bezahlung versichert seyest, so wil ich mir ein gliedt, es seye ein arm oder schenckel, abschneyden 
und dir zum underpfandt lassen volksb. v. dr. Faust 81 ndr. Br.; wie d. Faustus geld von einem juden 
entlehnet und ihme seinen fusz zum u. eingesetzet WIDMANN Fausts leben 262 K.” (Bd. 24, Sp. 1711ff.) 
555 GW 1:284. Trans. Felstiner: “IT’S ALL DIFFERENT from what you think, from what I think, / the flag still 
waves, / the little secrets are still intact, / they still cast shadows — on this / you live, I live, we live.”  
556 Cf. Der Meridian: “in der Luft, die wir zu atmen haben” (GW 3:192); in Die Niemandsrose: “IN DER LUFT, 
da bleibt deine Wurzel, da, / in der Luft.” (GW 1:290); in  Atemwende: “STEHEN, im Schatten / des 
Wundenmals in der Luft.” (GW 2:23); “Blume” in Sprachgitter: “Der Stein in der Luft, dem ich folgte.” 
(GW 1:164); and “Todesfuge” in Mohn und Gedächtnis: “ein Mann wohnt im Haus dein goldenes Haar 
Margarete / er hetzt seine Rüden auf uns er schenkt uns ein Grab in der Luft” (GW 1:42). Cf. also “Der 




Luft gegriffen’, meaning ‘it is fully invented’, ‘with no foundation whatsoever’, ‘pure inven-
tion’, ‘mere rumour’. ‘In the air’ is, in Celan’s use, no metaphor. It is quite literally “the air 
we have to breath”.557  It is no metaphor, according to Celan himself, not even when he 
speaks of a “grave in the air”: 
 
Zur »Todesfuge«: 
Das »Grab in der Luft« – lieber Walter Jens, das ist, in diesem Gedicht, weiß Gott 
weder Entlehnung noch Metapher.558 
 
This is said in a letter, in a direct address and appeal to someone, and as if in calling God to 
witness: believe me, as God is my witness, this “grave in the air” is no borrowing and no 
metaphor either, in spite of the appearances to the contrary. In this specific poem, in “Todes-
fuge”, it is not metaphorical. One must read it in the poem, and not detach it in order to find 
similar expressions elsewhere, concordances, or explain it away as a loan or as an “ambulant 
metaphor”: 
 
ein Mann wohnt im Haus dein goldenes Haar Margarete 
er hetzt seine Rüden auf uns er schenkt uns ein Grab in der Luft559 
 
But how on earth can a grave be ‘in the air’? How can it be granted, how can it be given? 
There is a ‘metonymical’ chain between the ‘speech act’ of the man in the house who not 
only “looses” the hounds (as Felstiner translates “hetzt”) but rushes them,560 verbally entices 
them to their hunt and thus enforces the killing, a chain between this man in the house and his 
gift of the grave in the air, not only setting the hounds free but enticing them to kill, a chain 
between this enticing and the smoke rising above the well-known bakeries of death. The 
grave in the air is not situated (only) in that smoke, nor (only) in the song sung by the prison-
ers while shovelling the graves in the earth, but (also) in the way the grave is granted: in the 
death-bringing speech (todbringende Rede) enticing the hounds or “hounds”.561 
                                                 
557 TCA/Meridian, Endf. 18b (loc. cit.); trans. Felstiner, Selected Poems and Prose, p. 405. 
558 “[Paul Celan an Walter Jens] Paris, am 19. Mai 1961”, in Paul Celan – Die Goll-Affäre (2000), p. 532 (doc. 
186). 
559 Mohn und Gedächtnis, GW 1:42. Trans. Felstiner: “a man lives in the house your goldenes Haar Margarete / 
he looses his hounds on us grants us a grave in the air” (p. 33). 
560 “[het]zen 1 <V. t.> hitzig verfolgen; mit Hetzhunden jagen, treiben; Füchse, Hirsche, Rehe, Sauen ~; den 
Hund auf od. gegen jmdn. ~zur Verfolgung antreiben [...] 2 <V. i.> sich sehr beeilen; aufreizend reden, 
Schmähreden führen; [...] gegen jmdn. ~ andere zum Haß gegen ihn aufstacheln; [...] zum Kriege ~. [...]  
[< ahd. hetzen ‘antreiben’ < germ. *hatjan ‘zum Verfolgen bringen’; zu germ. *hatan ‘verfolgen’: verwandt 
mit Haß]” (Wahrig). Cf. also DWB, Bd. 10, Sp. 1272ff. 
561 In the first strophe of “Todesfuge” (GW 1:63ff) are the following lines: 
  
wir schaufeln ein Grab in den Lüften da liegt man nicht eng 
Ein Mann wohnt im Haus der spielt mit den Schlangen der 
schreibt der schreibt wenn es dunkelt nach Deutschland dein goldenes Haar Margarete 
er schreibt es und tritt vor das Haus und es blitzen die Sterne er pfeift seine Rüden herbei 
er pfeift seine Juden hervor läßt schaufeln ein Grab in der Erde 





 A song is in the air. Even when it is written down (a “singable residue”) it is “in the 
air” in more than one way, not only up-in-the-air as something unreal; one of these ways is 
that it remains at least contiguous with being-in-the-air, namely being audible. The difference 
between knowing a poem by heart (while this ‘knowing’ does not actually have to ‘know’ the 
content, the meaning of what is ‘known’ by heart) and reciting it, airing it, is in any case 
“phenomenologically impure”.562  And sometimes things have their only reality in the air: the 
only grave for those who “went through the chimney” as the saying goes, their only monu-
ment is in the air, in the song. 
 In the two essays we have been discussing by Martine Broda almost everything is il-
luminating, except the connection between name and metaphor, which Celan himself would 
very probably have considered malapropos:  
 
Le nom opaque, mis dans la main, est métaphore du poème et du sujet qui s’y efface, 
lui-même devenu signe, ou plutôt signifiant. Il est métaphore du mot crypté de son 
destin, au destinataire inconnu destiné. Celan s’est choisi lui-même un nom, je veux 
dire son nom d’écrivain, pour se dédier, non pas à Dieu [n.: « En leur donnant un 
nom, les parents dédient à Dieu leurs enfants. » (Benjamin)], mais à personne, ce qui 
inclut Dieu, et l’autre homme. Ce nom, Celan, envers d’Ancel, contient la figure du 
retournement, de l’inversion [...]. Signature : nom jeté dans la main de personne. 
[“Bouteilles, cailloux, schibbolets”, pp. 104-105.] 
 
Perhaps a movement from the metaphor of what is no metaphor (the man, the poem) to the 
quasi-metonymical token of an irreducibly singular reality (hand, handwriting, signature, 
proper name, a pebble as a sumbolon, etc.) is one way to “carry metaphor ad absurdum”: to 
carry the token, or let oneself be carried by the poetic token, where it ceases to be metaphor 
and regains reality. Perhaps heartland: heartland is always somebody’s heart-land. A meton-
                                                                                                                                                        
 Nearer the end of the poem: 
  
er ruft streicht dunkler die Geigen dann steigt ihr als Rauch in die Luft 
dann habt ihr ein Grab in den Wolken da liegt man nicht eng 
 
 The reader must pay heed to the contrapuntal development of this ‘motif’ in this “Death fugue” as a whole, 
of course (the lines cited here are not the only lines that should be considered). — The expression “todbrin-
gende Rede” is from Celan’s Bremen Prize Speech: “Sie, die Sprache, blieb unverloren, ja, trotz allem. 
Aber sie mußte nun hindurchgehen durch ihre eigenen Antwortlosigkeiten, hindurchgehen durch 
furchtbares Verstummen, hindurchgehen durch die tausend Finsternisse todbringender Rede. Sie ging hin-
durch und gab keine Worte her für das, was geschah; aber sie ging durch dieses Geschehen. Ging hindurch 
und durfte wieder zutage treten, »angereichert« von all dem.” (GW 3:185-186.) Perhaps might we say that 
this hindurch is one possible translation of the prefix dia- of the Celanian “dia-logue” and “dia-chrony” too? 
Only a few lines later in the Bremen speech: “Denn das Gedicht ist nicht zeitlos. Gewiß, es erhebt einen 
Unendlichkeitsanspruch, es sucht, durch die Zeit hindurchzugreifen – durch sie hindurch, nicht über sie 
hinweg.” (GW 3:186. Cf. Zanetti, »zeitoffen«, p. 69 et passim.) 
562 Jean-Luc Chrétien points out that “the distinction between vocal and mental prayer” is “phenomenologically 
impure” (“The Wounded Word: The Phenomenology of Prayer”, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky, in Dominique 
Janicaud et al., Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”. The French Debate, trans. Bernard G. Pruzak 
et al. [Authors: Dominique Janicaud, Jean-François Courtine, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc 
Marion, Paul Ricœur.] [Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, No. 15, John D. Caputo, series editor.] 
[New York: Fordham University Press, 2000], pp. 147-175, here p.148.) I discuss this in more detail in the 




ymy of one’s heart, one’s abode, whether it be in the Rhine valley or only in the piece of 
earth, the pebble that one carries buried in one’s palm, or a piece of language learned by 
heart. Carried with, wherever you go. 
 This reduction of metaphor, as a reduction of its metaphoricity, can be established be-
cause the poem, bearing an implicit signature and counter-signature, as well as a counter-sign 
or counter-word, creates reality, seeks and attains reality (counter-sign and counter-word are 
synonyms for password, and even Lucile’s Gegenwort, “Es lebe der König” is a sort of pass-
word, even when it is also a counter-password, a shibboleth in reverse):563 
 
Le mot, ou le nom, mis dans la main, est bien un schibboleth, un mot de passe. C’est-
à-dire le mot sans référent, au signifié accessoire, qui permet de quelque chose se 
transmettre, passe. Le poème hermétique est lui-même le schibboleth, il est un mot de 
passe. Pur corps de lettres sans référent, mais référent de lui-même, car créateur de ré-
alité, ses signifiés ne sont pas l’essentiel. [“Bouteilles, cailloux, schibboleths”, pp. 
102-103.] 
 
But why on earth does Broda, again in the other essay (“À personne adressé”), claim that 
shibboleth is “the last metaphor”?  
 
La dernière métaphore est celle du mot de passe, du schibboleth, métaphore du poème 
hermétique lui-même. Qui produit ses effets quand il est reçu plutôt que compris. [“À 
personne adressé”, p. 18.] 
 
Perhaps this “last metaphor” is no more metaphor — or at least it denotes, if it is a metaphor 
of the poem and if we draw the consequences of Broda’s own suggestions, the effect that 
takes place before comprehension and certainly before any metaphorical undertaking. It is the 
compelling force of the poem which drives us to “cite and recite beyond knowledge” and to 
“learn by heart”, as Jacques Derrida has said about Celan’s poetry, a “compulsion to cite and 
re-cite, to repeat what we understand without completely understanding it”.564 
 Shibboleth — or rather Schibboleth — can be the last metaphor for the poem (“La 
dernière métaphore [...] du poème hermétique lui-même”), because it marks the limit of Über-
                                                 
563 “Wirklichkeit ist nicht, Wirklichkeit will gesucht und gewonnen werden.” (GW 3:167). Trans. Walter Bil-
leter and Jerry Glenn: “Reality doesn’t exist, it must be sought and attained.” (“Reply to an Inquiry held by 
the Librairie Flinker, Paris”, in Prose Writings and Selected Poems [Carlton, Victoria: Paper Castle, 1977], 
p. 24; cit. Ian Fairley, “When and Where? Paul Celan’s Fadensonnen”, in Celan, Fathomsuns and Be-
nighted, trans. Ian Fairley [Manchester: Carcanet, 2001], p. 7.) — According to James K. Lyon, Celan “took 
note” of the following sentence in Sein und Zeit: “Die Wahrheit (Entdecktheit) muß dem Seienden immer 
erst abgerungen werden.” (SuZ, p. 222 = GA 2:294; cit. James K. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger: 
An Unresolved Conversation 1951-1970, p. 17.) However, a marking of this particular sentence is not re-
ported in the catalogue La bibliothèque philosophique, although a sentence in the end of the same brief 
paragraph has been marked by Celan with a double stroke in the margin: “daß In-der-Unwahrheit-sein eine 
wesenhafte Bestimmung des In-der-Welt-seins ausmacht?” (p. 379, No. 613). This reading trace of course 
confirms that Celan did focus his attention on the paragraph, even though for some reason he did not mark 
either the sentence that begins it (cited above) or its sequel, for instance this phrase: “Das Seiende wird der 
Verborgenheit entrissen.”  
564 “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing”, trans. Outi Pasanen, in Sovereignties in Question (2005), p. 87; Poé-




tragbarkeit, transferability, translatability. And this is perhaps one reason for the fact that in 
the two poems in which the word Schibboleth occurs, several languages, several shibboleths 
are cited and mentioned and perhaps referred to: no pasarán, Peuple de Paris, Wien und Ma-
drid, Estremadura, Februar, Dreizehnter Feber, Hirten-Spanisch, and so on, all these 
counter-words and citations and dates and toponyms and idioms, and even the German 
catchword, in italics, from Büchner’s pamphlet, Friede den Hütten!  
 Shibboleth marks this borderline between idioms, the limit between languages, and 
finally, between the speakers of different idioms, referring to the very corporeal conditions of 
possibility for the correct pronunciation of an idiom. An infant is given a name but also a 
mother tongue, a native language which once and for all forms his or her speech organs and 
delimits, at least to a certain extent, his or her ability to pronounce certain phonemes. The 
body is literally marked, formed by language. We shall return to this. 
 But the shibboleth is also a password that brings these idioms together. What is abso-
lutely idiomatic, the corporeal singularity of each individual person, can also be named by 
this word. A word whose significance does not reside in its signification. It names the en-
trance into a community, a community of speakers, which each of us has once had to un-
dergo; and this is what brings it close to another main theme of Jacques Derrida’s first essay 
on Celan, Schibboleth — pour Paul Celan (1986), namely circumcision. 
 Martine Broda comes thematically quite close to Derrida’s Schibboleth, and she refers 
to this “bel essai” in her essay whose first version she had published in 1984 and whose re-
vised book version appeared two years later.565  But speaking of another carrier of messages, 
not bottle-mail this time but a carrier pigeon, which would perhaps be another metaphor for 
poetry in Broda’s view, Derrida says the very opposite. A carrier pigeon very much resem-
bles in certain respects bottle-mail and could thus be considered yet another metaphor for the 
poem. But for Derrida, such a vehicle, such a carrier is not a metaphor. This vehicle is alive 
— or supposed to be alive. It is a bird, a carrier pigeon: 
 
[U]ne date n’allant jamais sans lettre à déchiffrer, je pense à l’anneau du pigeon-
voyageur, au centre de La Contrescarpe. Le pigeon-voyageur transporte, transfère, 
traduit un message chiffré, mais ce n’est pas une métaphore. Il part à sa date, celle de 
l’envoi, il doit revenir de l’autre lieu au même, celui de sa provenance, aller-retour 
accompli. Or la question du chiffre, Celan ne la pose pas seulement au sujet du mes-
sage mais de l’anneau même, du signe d’appartenance, alliance et condition du retour. 
Le chiffre du sceau, l’empreinte de l’anneau compte peut-être plus que le contenu du 
message. Comme dans schibboleth, le sens du mot importe moins que, disons, sa 
forme signifiante quand elle devient mot de passe, marque d’appartenance, manifesta-
tion de l’alliance. 
 
                                                 
565 I do not know whether the footnote mentioning Derrida’s Schibboleth dates from the 1986 revision or 




Scherte die Brieftaube aus, war ihr Ring 
zu entziffern? (All das 
Gewölk um sie her – es war lesbar.) Litt es 
der Schwarm? Und verstand, 
und flog wie sie fortblieb? 
 
Une date s’emporte, elle se transporte, s’enlève – et donc s’efface dans sa lisibilité 
même. L’effacement ne lui survient pas comme un accident, il n’affecte pas son sens 
ou sa lisibilité, il se confond au contraire avec l’accès même de la lecture à ce qu’une 
date peut encore signifier.566 
 
The carrier pigeon in this poem, or as it is also called, homing pigeon, is no metaphor. This 
figure of the homing pigeon is no metaphor for metaphor, either. Derrida relates it to shibbo-
leth, the word whose “signifying form” counts more than the content of the message, as soon 
as it has become a password: the Hebrew word shibboleth which originally meant, depending 
on the context, “ear of corn” or “stream in flood”, was “used by Jephthah as a test word by 
which to distinguish the fleeing Ephraimites (who could not pronounce the sh) from his own 
men, the Gileadites (Judges xii. 4-6)”, as the Oxford English Dictionary tells us; by “transfer-
ence” it has come to mean, among several other things, “[a] word or sound which a person is 
unable to pronounce correctly; a word used as a test for detecting foreigners, or persons from 
another district, by their pronunciation” and “[a] peculiarity of pronunciation or accent in-
dicative of a person’s origin” (OED). It resembles the carrier pigeon, and perhaps also bottle-
mail and all these alleged “metaphors” for the poem — which are actually anti-metaphors, 
counter-figures to metaphor — by virtue of its emphasis on the signifying form instead of the 
content or message. 
                                                 
566 Derrida, Schibboleth — pour Paul Celan (Paris: Galilée, 1986), p. 39. Trans. Joshua Wilner, revised by 
Thomas Dutoit: “[S]ince a date is never without a letter to be deciphered, I think of the ring of the carrier 
pigeon at the center of ‘La Contrescarpe.’ The carrier pigeon transports, transfers, or transmits a ciphered 
message, but this is not a metaphor. It departs at its date, that of its sending, and it must return from the 
other place to the same one, that from which it came, completing a round trip. Now the question of the ci-
pher is posed by Celan not only with regard to the message but also with regard to the ring itself, sign of be-
longing, alliance, and condition of return. The cipher of the seal, the imprint of the ring, counts, perhaps 
more than the content of the message. As with shibboleth, the meaning of the word matters less than, let us 
say, its signifying form once it becomes a password, a mark of belonging, the manifestation of an alliance: 
 
Did the carrier pigeon sheer off, was its ring 
decipherable? (All that  
cloud around it — it was readable.) Did the 
flock endure it? And understand, 
and fly as the other stayed on? 
 
 “A date gets carried away, transported; it takes off, takes itself off — and thus effaces itself in its very read-
ability. Effacement is not something that befalls it like an accident; it affects neither its meaning nor its 
readability; it merges, on the contrary, with reading’s very access to that which a date may still signify.” 
(Derrida, “Shibboleth — For Paul Celan”, in Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. 
Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen [New York: Fordham University Press, 2005], pp. 19-20. A translation re-





 And yet, the cooing carrier of coordinates — since the information trusted to the hom-
ing pigeon can concern the location of the troops sending it off at a given time — carries also 
the date of its sending, and a date, says Derrida, is always a metonymy: “La métonymie de la 
date (une date est toujours aussi une métonymie) désigne la partie d’un événement ou d’une 
séquence d’événements pour en rappeler le tout.” (Schibboleth, p. 41.) And as Derrida says 
elsewhere, in the phrase we have already cited: “Une métonymie porte au moins le deuil d’un 
sens propre ou d’un nom propre” (Le toucher..., p. 29, loc. cit.). A date is, insofar as it is a 
date, immediately exposed to its other, another date which it already is, insofar as it is a date: 
it is its own self-effacement. “Elle doit s’effacer pour devenir lisible.” (Schibboleth, p. 32.) 
 
La première inscription d’une date signifie cette possibilité : ce qui ne peut pas revenir 
reviendra comme tel, non pas seulement dans la mémoire, comme tout souvenir, mais 
aussi à la même date, à une date en tout cas analogue, par exemple chaque 13 
février... Et chaque fois, à la même date sera commémorée la date de ce qui ne saurait 
revenir. Celle-ci aura signé ou scellé l’unique, le non-répétable ; mais pour le faire, 
elle aura dû se donner à lire dans une forme suffisamment codée, lisible, déchiffrable 
pour que dans l’analogie de l’anneau anniversaire (le 13 février 1962 est analogue au 
13 février 1963) l’indéchiffrable apparaisse, fût-ce comme indéchiffrable. [Schibbo-
leth, pp. 37-38.] 
 
The figure of the date carries along with it the same features of double-sidedness as perhaps 
any truly poetical figure or trope: its wish to be reduced ad absurdum qua similitudo, as a 
false identity, a wish to be deciphered as an undecipherable singularity, perhaps. 
 
 
AMBIGUITY WITHOUT A MASK 
 
Hugo Huppert, who had become acquainted with Celan already in Vienna in 1947, scrupulous- 
ly begins the account of his interview with the poet by reporting its time and place: December 
26, 1966, 78 Rue de Longchamp. The account is titled “»Spirituell«: Ein Gespräch mit Paul 
Celan”.567  Huppert describes how his interlocutor silently moved his lips as this rare Ger-
man-speaking visitor recited some poems from Atemkristall.568  Huppert comments on the 
poems to the poet by characterizing them as “unspeakably abstract, imponderably spiritual”, 
to which Celan responds that these characterizations delight him and indicate, perhaps, that 
the guest resembles him in being no supporter of “the socialization of the interior life”,569  and 
that he hopes the information that proceeds from his verse (“die Informationen, die von 
meinem Vers ausgehen”) is precisely that, spiritual.  
                                                 
567 In Hamacher and Menninghaus, eds., Paul Celan, pp. 319-324, already cited above. 
568  The first cycle of 21 poems from Atemwende (1967) was published already in 1965 as a limited edition, 
illustrated by Gisèle Celan-Lestrange, by the title Atemkristall (cf. e.g. GW 3:36). Huppert uses incorrectly 
the title Atemwende for this special edition. 
569 ”»Unsagbar abstrakt«, meinte ich, »unwägbar spirituell«” [...] »Es freut mich, daß Sie ›abstrakt‹ sagen, auch 
»spirituell« ist zutreffend. Vielleicht sind Sie, wie ich, kein Freund der Vergesellschaftung des Innenle-




 Celan tells Huppert that at an earlier time, in Vienna, he still used to “experiment with 
the mental media of communication”: somewhat paradoxically, “a play of hide-and-seek be-
hind metaphors” was for him such a medium, a medium he had since those days denied him-
self.570 
 
Heute, nach zwanzig Jahren Erfahrungen mit den Widerständen zwischen dem Innen 
und dem Außen, habe ich das Wörtchen »wie« aus meiner Werkstatt verbannt. 
[“Spirituell”, p. 319]571 
 
The particle — Wörtchen — wie indicates a comparison in general or a simile in particular 
and, by a metonymy of sorts, also metaphor as a condensed simile, a concise figure of resem-
blance. 
 
Es gibt ein Gedicht »Sprachgitter« von mir, nach welchem ich einen ganz Lyrikband 
benannt habe [1959]. Wissen Sie, was Gitter sein können? Dort hab’ ich, fast zum 
letztenmal, das ›wie‹ angewandt und diesen Vierzeiler hernach zwischen Klammern 
isoliert: »Wär ich wie du. Wärst du wie Ich. / Standen wir nicht unter einem Passat? / 
Wir sind Fremde.« Das war mein Abschied von dem trügerischen ›Wie‹. Ich stehe auf 
einer andern Raum- und Zeitebene als mein Leser; er kann mich nur ›entfernt‹ 
verstehen, er kann nicht in den Griff bekommen, immer greift er nur die Gitterstäbe 
zwischen uns: »Augenrund zwischen den Stäben. / Flimmertier Lid / rudert nach 
oben, / gibt einen Blick frei.« So lautet mein Text. [“Spirituell”, p. 319.]572 
 
We are always on separate levels of time and place, and not only as writers and readers. We 
never coincide. According to one traditional way of speaking, ‘spiritual’ would be something 
that transcends time and place. But (the) poem is not timeless: it does not transcend time, it 
aspires to traverse time (cf. GW 3:186). 
 But the poem is written, it is language, it aspires to conversation, and this conversa-
tion may take place through the bars — and these bars are conversation, they are Sprachgitter. 
 
Und dieser durchs Gitter »freigegebene Blick«, dieses »entfernte Verstehen« ist schon 
versöhnlich, ist schon Gewinn, Trost, vielleicht Hoffnung. Keiner ist »wie« der 
andere; und darum soll er vielleicht den andern studieren, sei’s auch durchs Gitter 
hindurch. Dieses Studium ist mein »spirituelles’ Dichten«, wenn Sie so wollen. 
[“Spirituell”, p. 320.]573 
                                                 
570 “Damals, in Wien, experimentierte ich noch mit den seelischen Medien der Mitteilung. Ich übte noch das 
Versteckenspiel hinter Metaphern.” (“Spirituell”, p. 319.) 
571 “Today, after twenty years of experiencing the resistance between the inside and the outside, I have ex-
pelled the tiny word ‘like’ from my workshop.” (My translation.) 
572 “There is a poem of mine, ‘Sprachgitter’ [‘Language Mesh’], […] There I have, for the last time almost, 
used the ‘like’, and afterwards isolated this four-lined stanza between brackets: ‘If I were like you. If you 
were like me. / Did we not stand / under one trade wind? / We are strangers.’ That was when I parted with 
the treacherous ‘like’. I am situated on a different level of place and time than my reader; he can only com-
prehend me in a ‘distanced’ fashion, he cannot come to grips with me, he always only grasps the bars of the 
grating between us: ‘Eye’s roundness between the bars. // Vibratile monad eyelid / propels itself upward, / 
releases a glance.’ That is how my text reads.” (My translation, except for the verse trans. by Michael Ham-
burger.) The emphasis on the word “einem”, belonging to the published version of the poem (GW 1:167), is 
missing in Huppert’s text and is hereby restored. 





“If you wish”: not completely without reservations, perhaps, or without differentiations. We 
already saw that what is ‘spiritual’ in the poem is both “embodied and disembodied” at one 
and the same time. ‘Spiritual’ seems to be situated between the interior life and its manifesta-
tion, between inhaling and exhaling, in the becoming manifest of the non-manifest. In any 
case, the study of the other is launched at this borderline, through the “language mesh (Sprach-
gitter)”. The spirituality is linked with corporeality in the sense that the body is the locus of 
invisibility and singularity: the spiritual is the secret of the invisible, but nothing other-
worldly, nothing removed from the terrestrial and corporeal ‘reality’; we also remember that, 
for Celan, the opposite of the ‘merely apparent’ (scheinbar) is not the ‘real’ but the ‘non-
apparent’ (unscheinbar), the invisible, the otherness that never comes to daylight in itself, in 
all its depth. 
 What about Huppert’s other characterization? It soon appears that Celan is less satis-
fied with “abstract” than he first seemed to be. He refers to poésie concrète and remarks: “It 
is neither concrete nor poetry [weder konkret noch Poesie]. A philistine abuse of language. A 
sin against the word. [Ein banausischer Sprachmißbrauch. Die Sünde am Wort.]” As long as 
the “slanderers” call themselves concrete poets, Celan will call himself “abstract”, although 
he knows that in the perspective of any “epistemology [Erkenntnistheorie]” he does not have 
the least to do with “abstract art, that is to say: art without objects [gegenstandsloser Kunst]”. 
Thus the departure from the “treacherous ‘like’” or from the “hide-and-seek behind meta-
phors” — “metaphor” understood here, at once, as a “medium of communication”, and as 
something that you can hide behind, which is by no means a contradiction — does not mean 
turning towards a non-figurative art form, something like ‘abstract art’. Actually Celan sees 
his own ‘abstract’ poetry as rather ‘concrete’, but the latter characterization has been made 
even less usable than the former, by the “concrete poets”, the anti-poets. “A language that no 
one speaks is anti-poetic. [Eine Sprache, die niemand spricht, ist anti-poetisch.]” As Celan 
presents his wife’s studio to the guest, the conversation turns more closely to the visual arts 
and also touches upon music. He tells his visitor that he doesn’t “work with a graving tool 
[Stichel], not even in a figurative sense [auch im übertragenen Sinn nicht]”, and that he 
nowadays, years since “Todesfuge” has become “thrashed ripe for a reading-book [schon le-
sebuchsreif gedroschen]”, separates rigorously poetry from music, while graphic art is nearer 
to what he does, although he “only uses more shade than Gisèle [nur schattiere ich mehr]” 
(“Spirituell”, pp. 320-321).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
ready an advantage, consolation, perhaps hope. No one is ‘like’ the other; and therefore he should perhaps 





Ich bin für Verständlichkeit, sogar Gemeinverständlichkeit; nur wollen auch diese 
präparierten Druckplatten, französich ›cliché‹ genannt, kein Klischee sein... [“Spiri-
tuell”, p. 320.]574 
 
Every phrase always already bears the mark of reproduction, but we should pay attention to 
the will of  the cliché, to the will of the figure itself, to be anti-cliché. 
 
Und was meine  angeblichen Verschlüßelungen angeht, ich würde eher sagen: 
Mehrdeutigkeit ohne Maske, so entspricht sie exakt meinem Gefühl für 
Begriffsüberschneidung, Überlappung der Bezüge. Sie kennen doch auch die 
Erscheinung der Interferenz, Einwirkung zusammentreffender kohärenter Welle 
aufeinander. Sie wissen Bescheid über das dialektische Übergehen und Umschlagen – 
die Wandlung ins Benachbarte, ins Nächstfolgende, ja oft ins Gegenteilige. Dem 
entspricht meine (nur an gewissen Wendepunkten, Dreh-Achsen, auftretende) 
Mehrdeutigkeit. Sie trägt auch dem Umstand Rechnung, daß wir an jedem Ding 
Schliffflächen beobachten, die das Ding aus mehreren Sichtwinkeln zeigen, in 
mehreren ›Brechungen‹ und ›Zerlegungen‹, die keineswegs nur ›Schein‹ sind. Ich 
trachte sprachlich wenigstens Ausschnitte aus der Spektral-Analyse der Dinge 
wiederzugeben, sie gleichzeitig in mehreren Aspekten und Durchdringungen mit 
anderen Dingen zu zeigen: mit nachbarlichen, nächstfolgenden, gegenteiligen. Weil 
ich leider außerstande bin, die Dinge allseitig zu zeigen. Ich bleibe in meinen Sachen 
sinnfällig; sie prätendieren niemals aufs ›Übersinnliche‹, das liegt mir nicht, das wäre 
Pose. Ich lehne es ab, den Poeten als Propheten hinzustellen, als ›vates‹, als Seher und 
Weissager. Ich versuche, Ihnen zu erklären, weshalb ich meine angebliche 
Abstraktheit und wirkliche Mehrdeutigkeit für Momente des Realismus halte... 
[“Spirituell”, p. 321.]575 
 
Celan considers his ambiguity as fidelity to his Seelenrealismus, and his shades as responding 
to the truth of Nuance: they respond to how we observe in each thing its ground surfaces, the 
way it is cut, ground (Schliffflächen), or, as we could say, the way each thing is constituted 
through this multiangular observation of ‘refractions’ and ‘cuttings’ that are nevertheless no 
mere appearances (“Schein”). Still, it is not painting, drawing, graving, sculpting, and not ab-
solutely versatile (“allseitig”) either: “Yet,” admits Celan, “I am unfortunately not in a posi-
tion to show the things in all of their aspects.” He does not mean only the aspects of particu-
lar things, but also how the things ‘penetrate’ and ‘overlap’ each other. These terms 
themselves, the “phenomenon of interference” and the “spectral analysis” that describe the 
ambiguity or equivocality (“Mehrdeutigkeit”) without a mask and multi-facetedness, may be 
called metaphors, to be sure. They are borrowed from other domains, as it seems. By interfer-
ence, Celan refers to the theory in physics of the “mutual action of two waves or systems of 
waves, in reinforcing or neutralizing each other, when their paths meet or cross” (OED), and 
                                                 
574 “I am all for comprehensibility, even for common comprehensibility; but even these prepared printing 
plates, called ‘cliché’ in French, want to be no cliché…” (My translation.)  
575 “And as it comes to my alleged encipherings [Verschlüßelungen is an expression Huppert used a moment 
before], I would rather say: ambiguity without a mask, thus it corresponds exactly to my sense of conceptual 
intersection, overlapping of relations.  […] I remain sensibly plain  in my things; they never pretend to the 
‘suprasensual’, it wouldn’t suit me, it would be a pose. […] I see my alleged abstractness and my actual 
ambiguity as moments of realism …” (My translation; for the rest of this passage, cf. the interpretative 




by spectral analysis he refers to the “analysis of light or another oscillating system into a 
spectrum” (OED). But the verbalization, namely the concept formation in these source do-
mains themselves, is not exempt of borrowing  resources from — as it were — another do-
main, the existing vocabulary and syntactic possibilities in the language system, either. The 
spectres of polysemy and the originary violence of catachresis, namely abuse of metaphor, 
haunt the spectral analysis, and the technical term of interference cannot avoid being inter-
fered with by these ghosts, either. And this need not be a hindrance to the exactness and pre-
cision of the concept formation. To the contrary: it is rather the inevitable procedure in coin-
ing new terms. But these terms and models and theories themselves, in the sciences, can 
always be shown as inadequate, only analogical or sometimes even metaphorical, and super-
seded by new models, theories and analogies. This is not the case with the phenomenon of 
language itself, the appearance or manifestation of language in the poem (“Erscheinungsform 
der Sprache”), to which Celan applies these terms — catachrestically, no doubt, and in re-
turn, so to say, in a return to the ‘source domain’ of these terms which is actually language 
itself — the “poetizing”576  of the things in their several overlapping and sometimes contra-
dicting or paradoxical aspects, is not something refutable or supersedable by new, more accu-
rate visions and theories. The phenomena (Erscheinungen) constituted in this poetizing, and 
the poetizing itself, are not mere “appearances”, mere “sham [Schein]”, and the apparent 
“metaphors” of interference and spectral analysis must be read in their anti-metaphorical con-
text, as indications toward the original ‘source domain’ of these terms, toward the linguistic 
prerequisites of naming that some call, confusingly and metaphorically, the “metaphoric” re-
sources of language. 
 Almost fifteen years before his conversation with Huppert Celan wrote this note: 
 
Das Miteinander der Worte im Gedicht: nicht nur ein Miteinander, auch ein 
Gegeneinander. Auch ein Zueinander und Voneinander. Begegnung, Widerstreit und 
Abschied in einem.577 
 
 
                                                 
576 This “poetizing” must be read as a translation of Heidegger’s Dichtung in the sense that even the objects of 
science, such as the sun and the wind of meteorology, are no less “poetized [gedichtet]”, even though poet-
ized “more clumsily and unpoetically”, than the sun and the wind in Hölderlin’s hymns; this is said as part 
of one of Heidegger’s anti-metaphorical arguments (GA 52:40). 
577 Mikrolithen, p. 98, No. 162.5. Wiedemann considers it probable that the series of notes to which this one 




                                                 
 
 
S Q U A L L S  
A reading of the poem “Ein Dröhnen” 
 
 
EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist 
die Wahrheit selbst 





Me-ta-phern-ge-stö-ber: First, two light pats of the first two crystals from above, the first two 
syllables, one lighter than the other (Me-ta-), then a whirlwind, a violent twist of air pressing 
itself forth through a spiral, hurling about the light particles that it carries afar in a quick rush 
(-phern-), then a sudden stop, a suspension in mid-air, as the wind halts and leaves the light 
little things hovering about on their own (-ge-), before they are grabbed and pressed forth 
again in a horizontal thrust (-stö-), then a heavier fall that ends thick and mute in the white 
mass below (-ber). Me-ta-phern-ge-stö-ber. 
 But who said anything of snow? Gestöber does not have to be Schneegestöber, and 
when it consists of something other than snowflakes or hail or dust, it still does not have to be 
a metaphor. In another poem, Partikelgestöber is not only the Democritean movement of at-
oms, but also the dispersion of linguistic particles on the page, Par- / tikelgestöber (cf. “Eng-
führung”, GW 1:195ff). The white below the line, the silence after Metapherngestöber, does 
not have to be the silence of snow, or metaphor. 
 This poem, “Ein Dröhnen”, appears to be one of the most accessible in Paul Celan’s 
book Atemwende (1967). In this respect, taken that this poem could be classified as relatively 
accessible, it is understandable that the volume caused an allergic reaction in a contemporary 
critic who exclaimed: “Such a gifted, experienced poet, so much praised by the critique as 
 
578 GW 2:89. Trans. Michael Hamburger: 
  
A RUMBLING: truth 
itself has appeared 
among humankind 
in the very thick of their 
flurrying metaphors. 
 
 Cf. John Felstiner’s translation:  
  
A RUMBLING: it is 
Truth itself  
walked among  
men,  






Paul Celan is, seems to be not the least interested in commonly comprehensible poems any
longer.”579  The poem “Ein Dröhnen” serves as the critic’s proof of how the poet’s deliberate 
incomprehensibility fits together with his “theoretical stand”: with the conviction that “the 
truth of the things” is irreconcilable with the “idle talk [Gerede]” of the people. In the critic’s 
view, the truth is for Celan beyond idle talk, beyond “fallenness [Verfallenheit]”, and indeed, 
this critic appeals to Heidegger and the fact which, as it seems to him, has been overlooked 
by the poet, the equiprimordiality of truth and untruth — authenticity and inauthenticity — 
that determines Dasein: “Das Dasein ist gleichursprünglich in der Wahrheit und Unwahr-
heit.” The human being-there lives as originally in truth as in untruth, and even the poet must 
live his life in both “authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and “inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]”. It 
even seems that the critic would recommend silence as a solution to the poet’s problem, as 
“the simplest consequence” of the poet’s tendency towards “the uninhabited” or “unrelated-
ness” (“Paul Celan ist ein Dichter der Unbezogenheit”), the tendency of the poet who already 
moves “in the no-man’s-land between speaking and remaining silent”.580 
 The poem is comprehensible enough for the critic to infer a “theoretical stand”, a po-
etic programme of incomprehensibility out of it: the juxtaposition of truth and metaphor in 
the poem is enough evidence for him. By referring to “Ein Dröhnen” the critic seems to ac-
knowledge metaphor as a normal, standard procedure towards common comprehensibility 
and, on the other hand, that this detour belongs for the most part to the “idle talk”, to the side 
of “fallenness” and “inauthenticity”. He also recognizes Celan’s critical stance toward poetic 
metaphor, or toward the poetic concept of metaphor.581  So this critic, Arthur Häny, sees the 
                                                 
579 Arthur Häny, “Paul Celans »Atemwende«” [1968], in: Dietlind Meinecke, ed., Über Paul Celan (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), pp. 207-209, here p. 207. The translation is mine. 
580 Cf. Häny, p. 207. 
581  Some readers of “Ein Dröhnen” have seen this in a different light. Ulrike Poch, in her brief analysis of 
the poem, remarks upon the “tellingly ambiguous [vielsagend mehrdeutig]” character of Celan’s stance to-
ward metaphor: “Der Ort, das ›Metapherngestöber‹, an dem die Wahrheit erscheint, wirkt ungünstig. Das 
Wort ›Metapherngestöber‹ signalisiert einen ungeordneten Schwall von verwirrenden, womöglich 
täuschenden Worten. Und doch werden die Metaphern als der menschliche Ort gewürdigt, an dem die 
Wahrheit sich dröhnend, unüberhörbar bemerkbar macht. Die Anspielung auf das Neue Testament, 
Johannes 1,14 (»Und das Wort ward Fleisch und wohnte unter uns«) wirkt mit am feierlichen Charakter der 
Allegorie. Sprachskepsis, die Metaphernskepsis einschließt, und Hochschätzung dichterischer Metaphorik 
prallen in Celans Gedicht aufeinander.” (Ulrike Poch, Metaphernvertrauen und Metaphernskepsis: 
Untersuchungen metaphorischer Strukturen in neuerer Lyrik [Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1989], pp. 287-
288.) Celan’s objection to metaphor (as a hobbyhorse of criticism), it seems to me, is rather based on the 
failure of the word to become flesh and to abide amongst us — or rather, the detachment from what is 
“earthly, terrestrial”, and human. The (possibility of a) Biblical allusion in the poem “Ein Dröhnen” is evi-
dent; its ‘function’ is not evident at all. One of the ironies of irony remains the fact that one can never be 
quite sure whether it is irony. — For another interpretation of the poem, cf. the chapter “Paul Celan: ‘EIN 
DRÖHNEN’” in Franz Schneider, Plötzlichkeit und Kombinatorik. Botho Strauß, Paul Celan, Thomas 
Bernhard, Brigitte Kronauer (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 121-129. Schneider writes, with regard 
to the poem in question and the title of the book Atemwende (p. 127): “Grundsituation ist hierbei das Ver-
stummen der Sprache vor der Wirklichkeit.” This would require much differentiation: Celan’s own 
statements on poetry, reality, language, and their interrelation, seem to anticipate objections to such a 
simplification. — Yet another interpretation of this poem is to be found in Ulrich Fülleborn’s article “Rilke 
und Celan”: “Das ‘Dröhnen’ [...] bildet hier den stärksten Kontrast zur Belanglosigkeit menschlicher 




poet offending both common comprehensibility and the poetic tradition by his unwillingness 
to use metaphor, an instrument of both ordinary spontaneous communication and poetry. 
 Indeed, as Blanchot writes, “there comes a moment when art realizes the dishonesty 
of everyday speech and departs from it”.582  This dishonesty may be a moment of ‘art’ in eve-
ryday speech, an eloquence by which so-called common sense betrays itself; this may also be 
a naïve lack of honesty, a failure to see this betrayal, which is not due to an intended, con-
scious dishonesty of a speaking subject. The moment of its realization, in art or by art, may of 
course be seen as a moment in history, or as thematized at a certain historical moment, and 
perhaps this should have bothered the Germanist critic Arthur Häny more than it seems to 
have done, in all his nostalgia for the comprehensible metaphor as an elevation of “idle talk”. 
The rapport between the vernacular, so-called natural language and artful eloquence is indeed 
recognized by him. But of course, Häny’s charges against the heinous poetic rebellion seem 
absolutely anachronistic with regard to the historical situation, the genocide and the verbicide 
that could not leave the language of art and poetry untouched.583 
 Regarding other matters, such as Celan’s motivation for the anti-metaphoric stance — 
or the anti-metaphoric movement of his poems in the Atemwende book— the critic is even more 
at a loss. He fails to recognize that the truth still arrives, in Celan’s poem, “amongst men 
[unter die Menschen]” and that the poet still writes — or that the poem still “speaks” as Celan 
reminds his audience in the Meridian speech — and has not chosen silence after all, and that 
the title of the book, Atemwende, recalls the word that was first used in the Meridian speech 
(1960) where this speaking of the poem was first addressed, and precisely against the fantasy 
of an “absolute poem”; in spite of this, Häny attributes to Celan a “non-commitment of the 
absolute [die Unverbindlichkeit des Absoluten]” and “absolute non-commitment [absolute 
Unverbindlichkeit]”. The sheer rage of Häny’s reaction, measured against the general enthu-
siasm mentioned but not shared by this critic, is an indication that something extraordinary 
may have happened in the history of poetry. The critical resistance may be a reaction to the 
poem’s unwillingness to respond to some traditional methods and horizons of interpretation, 
such as the tropological models; and for some reason, these poems that defy comprehension 
are not laughed at in such an easy and simple manner as they perhaps would have been in ear-
lier days: “In früheren Zeiten hätte man über ein solches Gedicht [“Keine Sandkunst mehr”] 
schlicht und einfach gelacht.” Poor Arthur Häny. His golden days would never return. 
                                                                                                                                                        
bleibt es doch seinem Wesen nach jenseits ihrer Maße und Fassungskraft [...]” (In Ingeborg H. Solbrig & 
Joachim W. Storck, eds., Rilke heute. Beziehungen und Wirkungen  [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975], 
pp. 49-70, here p. 58.) 
582  “La Littérature et le droit à la mort”, in Part du feu (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 334. English translation: 
“Literature and the Right to Death”, trans. Lydia Davis, in The Work of Fire (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford U. P., 
1995), p. 332. Translation modified. 
583 Cf. e.g. Mikrolithen, p. 122, No. 214: “Kein Gedicht nach Auschwitz (Adorno): / Was wird hier als 
Vorstellung vom »Gedicht« unterstellt? Der Dünkel dessen, der sich untersteht hypothetisch-





 If we decide, instead of the complacent but perhaps also embarrassed, feigned easi-
ness and simplicity of such laughter, to face the difficulty of the poems of Atemwende as 
such, as a new kind of difficulty that does not meet the expectations of the olden days any-
more, such as the continuity between rhetoric and poetry, established by the tropological ap-
proach to art, how should we proceed? 
 We might consult the dictionary first. “Metapherngestöber”: we are told that Gestöber 
is also a synonym for Niederschlag, which means, not only the corresponding meteorological 
phenomenon or phenomena of raining and snowing and condensation of humidity, but also 
written expression, a condensation of thought in writing. It seems obvious that Gestöber is 
neither Niederschlag in that sense in this poem, nor the contrary of condensation, a rapid 
flurry of metaphors. Here there is no abundance of metaphors in a restless motion condensed 
into a concise figure that only waits, in turn, to explode into a flurry of metaphors again. If 
we take the lead of the semantic possibilities of the poem’s vocabulary, it soon turns out that 
these are almost limitless, even with such a concise poem in question: we might begin an 
endless drift with ein Dröhnen through the series of die Drohne / Drohnendasein / 
Drohnenschlacht and perhaps finally, the ephemeral pleasure of all the good guesses notwith-
standing, suffocate below a pile of dictionaries, as if buried in snow. Or in metaphor. 
 The noun Gestöber is not primarily attached to some particular type of material parti-
cles (snow, dust, etc.) but rather names the force of their flurrying movement, the whirlwind 
and the particles hurled about by it; the first quasi-synonyms of Gestöber in the Grimm dic-
tionary are “aufwirbeln, aufscheuchen, durcheinanderstieben”.584  The accustomed interpreta-
tion would be that this noun and the verb stöbern apply themselves to sensible phenomena 
and are then extended to more abstract, figurative or transferred acceptations, and this would 
also be the case with Metapherngestöber.  
 But there is also a more ‘literal’ sense that we might choose and ascribe to the com-
posite noun Metapherngestöber: the verb stöbern means, besides the flurrying movement of 
air and the particles tossed about in it, approximately the same as “to rummage, ransack, 
overhaul”.585  We could imagine that something like a whirlwind has messed up a writer’s 
                                                 
584  DWB: “GESTÖBER, n., verbalsubst. zu stöbern (s. d.), aufwirbeln, aufscheuchen, durcheinanderstieben, 
älter md. gestubere, gestüber, gestobere, gestober, noch bei FRISCH 2, 213a schneegestüber. vgl. gestäube, 
gestiebe, gestübe. // 1)  aufscheuchung, aufruhr, auflauf, getümmel: [...] ein gestobere sich erhûb / under 
den gotes cristen. / pass. [=Passional : eine Legenden-Sammlung des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts] 169, 10 
Köpke; [...] 2)  aufwirbelnde staubmasse: [...] do aufferhub sich der sudwind .. / und trieb daher ein grosz 
gestöber. / als mir nun das gestöber nehet, / es sich umb mich ringweisz umbdrehet / H. SACHS 1, 285c; // 
gestöber, gestäub, polverio, polverina KRÄMER 553a; gestöber, pulveratio, pulvis STEINBACH 2, 709; 
mühlen-gestöber, mill-dust LUDWIG 764; aschengestöber PYRKER werke 35; davonwirbelnde spreu: // 
doch wie der wind hinträget die spreu durch heilige tennen, / unter der worfeler schwung, .. / fern dann 
häuft das weisze gestöber sich: also umzog nun / weisz von oben der staub die Danaer. / VOSS Ilias 5, 502; 
// wasserstaub: durch diesen fall und oftmalige brüche des wassers wird ein groszer theil derselben in staub 
und nebel verwandelt. man siehet von diesem gestöber um die (teufels-)brücke herum ganze wolken. FÄSI 
[...] 3)  durch einander wirbelnder regen, hagel, besonders aber schnee: ein regen-gestöber [...]” 
(Bd. 5, Sp. 4241ff.) 




desk: perhaps someone has been searching for metaphors, or searching the way through 
metaphors? 
 It is clear that the verb stöbern cannot be translated into a single English word even if 
we agree on the means of translation here, the semantic fields overlapping in this usage: the 
movement of the whirlwind is transferred to the movement of a plunderer searching after 
some item — or of an enthusiastic “dilettante philologist” or “cultural attaché” searching for 
metaphors in a corpus of poetry in order to write their “tractatii and tractatuli [Traktaten und 
Traktätchen]” (cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582). Or then it could be the other way around, the 
search could be first and the flurrying movement could be its result. The Grimm dictionary 
ascribes the first, transitive sense of stöbern to hunters’ jargon, referring to the way the 
hounds search for game and chase it out into the open, but also, in an extended sense, to the 
way the wind whirls the snowflakes as if they were feathered prey, and this association be-
tween snowflakes and feathers and feathered fowl serves as a bridge toward the intransitive 
sense, which is “perhaps” derived from the “technical term” in the waterfowl hunters’ jargon, 
referring to the sudden flight of startled birds, upset by the hounds as one may imagine. And 
so on and so forth: the possibilities of metonymico-metaphorical displacement between the 
fowl and its feathers and the hounds chasing the game like the wind driving the snowflakes, 
and the startled flight of the birds themselves, like a bed of feathers risen and dispersed by the 
wind, seem almost limitless. But this means also that it becomes very hard to reduce the 
polysemy or dissemination of these multilateral displacements to some presumed primary, 
authentic, literal or even ordinary meaning of the noun Gestöber or the verb stöbern, transi-
tive or intransitive.586  Let alone to translate the whole ambiguity into one noun or verb. 
                                                                                                                                                        
durcheinanderbringen, um etwas zu finden; (in Fremden Sachen) herumsuchen, schnüffeln; es stöbert es 
herrscht Schneegestöber; in jmds. Schreibtisch [stöbern]” (Wahrig); i.e. “to search after something, […] to 
meddle (in other people’s affairs), to nose about; […] to [tamper] on someone’s desk [etc.]” or, in one word, 
to ransack, i.e. to “shake down, beat the bushes, leave no stone unturned, look high and low”; cf. entry 
“ransack” in Roget’s II: The New Thesaurus, Third Edition. Copyright 1995 by Houghton Mifflin Company 
(http://www.bartleby.com/62/74/R1227400 html). 
586  Cf. entries “STÖBER” and “STÖBERN” (tr. and itr.), in the Grimm dictionary (DWB): “STÖBER, m., wie 
oben stäuber 3 (th. 10, 2 sp. 1104) eine art kleiner jagdhunde [...]”. “STÖBERN [I.], verb. zu oben stöber, 
m.: // 1)  im eigentlichen sinne von den das wild aufsuchenden hunden gebraucht: sie (die isländischen 
wasserhunde) stöbern aus dem rohr, gleich einem jagdhunde die füchse, ottern und wilden katzen mit 
besonderem fleisz, dasz man ihnen desto besser im schieszen beykommen kann FLEMING teutscher jäger 
182b [...] 2)  in erweiterter bedeutung von jedem 'aufsuchen, aufscheuchen, auftreiben', zunächst (und noch 
der ursprünglichen sphäre nahe) von den jägern, welche mit den stöbern (s. oben) jagen: [...] // doch liegt 
den folgenden gebrauchsweisen vielmehr der vergleich zu grunde (wie ein stöber eines aufsuchen und 
scheuchen). // a)  als nächstes reiht sich hier an aus einem gewandstück die flöhe stöbern u. s. w.: [...] b)  
feinde auseinandersprengen und aus dem lande jagen: [...] c)  e i n e n  a u s  d e m  b e t t e  s t ö b e r n , 
ihn zwingen aufzustehen [...] d)  besonders n a c h  b ü c h e r n  s t ö b e r n , unter alten beständen und in 
heimlichen ecken nach büchern, documenten oder sonst erinnerungen der vergangenheit suchen. [...] 3)  in 
einer begrifflichen vermischung mit dem folgenden intrans. stöbern, doch noch völlig angeschlossen an 
unser jägerisches bild: der wind stöbert die schneeflocken wie wenn es federwild wäre, [...] 4)  bildlich: 
stöbernder argwohn, verdacht, welcher der wahrheit auf die spur zu kommen sucht: [...]”. “STÖBERN [II.], 
verb., iterativbildung zu ndd. stöwen, stöben, stieben, ausschlieszlich intransitiven gebrauches, vielleicht als 
technisches wort der niederdeutschen wasservogeljagd, vom hastigen unruhigen auffliegen des federwildes 
gebraucht, [...] doch gewöhnlich von federn oder schneeflocken, welche vor dem winde wirbelnd umher-




 The word Metapherngestöber need not be metaphorical, but its meaning cannot be, at 
first or in principle, delimited as a ‘proper’ meaning either. Not even if its worldly referent 
could be recognized as a certain biographical series of incidents. Barbara Wiedemann, the 
editor of the vast documentation of the “infamy” known as the “Goll affair”, the stupid accu-
sations waged against Celan that turned into an aggressive press campaign, comments on the 
poem, dated “6.5.1965”, in the light of the fact that metaphor is opposed to truth and equated 
with lies already in the drafts for the Meridian speech (1960), while Claire Goll and her ad-
vocates used to “ransack” Celan’s “metaphors” in order to find proof of plagiarism, and on 
the other hand, with regard to the fact that, for anyone familiar with Celan’s use of the word 
Mensch, it is “no coincidence that ‘truth’ is here seen in connection with ‘human beings’”.587  
The false accusations were anything but humane and it is well known that they affected Celan 
gravely. But the import of the tension between ‘metaphor’ and ‘truth’ or ‘humanity’ is cer-
tainly not solely personal or biographical, while it is also that: it is situated precisely on the 
border between “the inside and the outside”, internal and external, between speaking and 
muteness.  
 Whatever the objections may be, a reader sensitive to metaphor — even if he is sensi-
tive to other things too and not only metaphor588 — may always detect one metaphor after 
the other, and we do not absolutely refuse to address the question of the so-called “basic” or 
“conceptual” or “absolute metaphor” at this point, either: 
 
[...] es ist 
die Wahrheit selbst 




                                                                                                                                                        
umher CAMPE; entsprechend: wenn die flocken still vom himmel fielen oder tanzten und stöberten 
FONTANE I 1, 89; [...] ein gedräng der worte wie stöbernde winterflocken REHFUES briefe aus Italien 
(1805) 1, 91. -- als allgemeine wetterangabe: es stöbert es schneit fein, der schnee wird vom winde umget-
rieben ADELUNG [...]” (Bd. 19, Sp. 3ff.) Et cetera: this citation quasi in extenso should indicate that the 
choice between the ‘literal’ or ‘original’, and the ‘extended’ and the ‘transferred’ or ‘figurative’, between 
the ‘sensible’ and the ‘intelligible’ or ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ sense is not always that simple, but involves 
speculation and arbitrariness. On the other hand, these ambiguities — while ambiguity is irreducible in po-
etry, insofar as it is not just a stylistic component but altogether essential (Szondi) — should also indicate 
that the extensibility, a form of general iterability or, on the other hand, of dissemination, of concepts or 
terms is in a certain sense congenital to these terms themselves, and therefore the etymon or the literal, 
original meaning may be very hard to determine. — As has already been argued in our discussion on Hei-
degger and Aristotle, there is a certain “phenomenology” of the co-intended meanings, which also amounts 
to a deconstruction of the traditional concept of metaphor. 
587  “Schon in den Entwürfen zur Büchnerrede [i.e. Der Meridian] ist die Gegenüberstellung von Metapher, die 
der Lüge gleichgesetzt wird [...] und Wahrheit zentral; die Metapher steht dabei als aus dem Kontext 
gelöstes und als solches sinnentleertes Element im Zusammenhang mit den Argumentationsmethoden von 
C[laire ]G[oll] und ihren Helfern, die, wenn man so will, in Metaphern ‘stöbern’, um Vergleichsmaterial zu 
finden. Nicht zufällig wird ‘die Wahrheit’ hier mit den ‘Menschen’ zusammen gesehen.” (Barbara Wiede-
mann, “Kommentar”, in Paul Celan Die Goll-Affäre [2000], p. 784). 




How can the truth itself arrive? Or, better: how can it arrive by foot, taken that the basic or 
original meaning, the oldest and the most concrete we can retrace, of the verb treten is to 
“tread” or to “trample”, “tramp”? Truth, something abstract as we may presume, arriving by 
foot, perhaps even by heavy foot?589  Or do we just take the trope the wrong end up? Should 
we see Truth personified as something or someone who can walk amongst men? Or rather, 
should we first see a person entering and then recognize him or her as “truth”? Should we see 
“die Wahrheit selbst” as a person “unter die Menschen” and not as an abstraction at all? Is 
truth here a metonymy for someone who speaks the truth in contrast to the 
Metapherngestöber? If there is metonymy, it might suggest that truth resides — appears — 
amongst humans, in their midst, between humans. In the air between them: “in der Luft, die 
wir zu atmen haben.”590 
 Rumbling, droning (“ein Dröhnen”) is hardly speaking — this roar could of course be 
an effect of speaking, caused by speaking the truth, but a truth which has arrived “mitten ins / 
Metapherngestöber”, within or between two unarticulated noises, one being “ein Dröhnen” 
and the other being — perhaps something like the white noise of — “Metapherngestöber”.  
 





Is it not so that truth, considered as something abstract, can only arrive amongst people, even 
in the very thick of their flurrying metaphors? Between the rumbling and the flurrying the 
truth has arrived, despite the odds against anybody recognizing what happened? The ambigu-
ity is not alleviated by the fact that in the structure 
 
EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist 
die Wahrheit selbst 




the es could in principle function in two ways. According to the usage and perhaps a first in-
tuition, the colon marks the way of speaking so that we should read “ein Dröhnen” as an ef-
                                                 
589 Not “on dove’s feet”, here, as it seems; cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 265: “Einiges kommt vielleicht, auch jetzt, 
auch heute noch, auf Taubenfüßen.” Celan obviously alludes to Nietzsche’s phrase of “thoughts that come 
on dove’s feet [and] direct the world [Gedanken, die mit Taubenfßën kommen, lenken die Welt]”; from Hei-
degger’s Was heißt Denken, Celan has extracted (on his first reading of the book in 1954) this quote from 
Nietzsche’s Also sprach Zarathustra (GA 8:77; cf. James K. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger. An 
Unresolved Conversation, 1951-1970 [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 2006], p. 114; La bi. phi., p. 404, 
No. 168; Celan reread the book, given to him by Heidegger in thanks for the reading in Freiburg July 24th, 
1967, with very intensive attention as it seems, in December 1969; cf. La bi. phi., pp. 392ff). But of course, 
what comes on dove’s feet, arrives through the air, and it is indeed the movement of the air, and through the 
air, that we are talking about here. 





fect of the arrival of truth amongst men; first we hear “ein Dröhnen” and then we are told that 
this reverberation is caused by that arrival, more or less directly. In this case (1) the es would 
be an impersonal pronoun functioning as an indefinite subject and thus with an indirect refer-
ence to Wahrheit, or rather to the state of affairs in some rather indefinite connection to the 
subject die Wahrheit selbst, and as such it could function even if we would have only a frag-
ment of the poem beginning with es ist die Wahrheit selbst..., without Ein Dröhnen; or so that 
first 
 
[...] es ist 
die Wahrheit selbst 




and only then there is a “rumbling; (2) but the es could also be a relative pronoun, with refer-
ence to the neuter-gendered noun ein Dröhnen:  
 
EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist 
die Wahrheit selbst 
[...] 
 
So we have two possible and incompatible readings of this structure, corresponding to: “Ein 
Dröhnen ... ist die Wahrheit selbst, or Ein Dröhnen: ... die Wahrheit selbst [ist] unter die 
Menschen getreten.”591  We cannot be quite sure which is the cause and which is the effect 
here: is the truth identified with the noise, or even caused by the noise, or has the apparition 
of truth caused the noise? It seems intuitively clear that the relatively simple, almost prosaic 
sentence of which this poem consists, a complex sentence divided by the colon into two more 
or less elliptical clauses, attributes the role of effect or consequence to the “drone” or “rum-
bling”, an effect caused by the “arrival” of “the truth itself”; the hypothesis of identification 
between “ein Dröhnen” and “die Wahrheit selbst” seems immediately false. But on the other 
hand, nothing in this complex sentence confirms the priority of truth with regard to the dron-
ing noise, at least not temporal priority: they may arrive together, at once, they may coincide, 
and we may perhaps recognize the arrival of truth by the noise that signals it; but it is always 
also possible that the signal remains indistinct from the signalled “itself”.592 
                                                 
591 This indeterminacy is one of the reasons why I prefer Felstiner’s translation to Hamburger’s: “A RUMBLING: 
it is / Truth itself / walked among / men / amidst / the metaphor squall.” 
592 These quasi-metonymic possibilities relating ‘the truth’ to ‘a rumbling’, as if they were a ‘cause’ and an 
‘effect’, in a flurry where we no longer are able to tell the one from the other or the order of their arrival, re-
semble Martin Heidegger’s talk of “unconcealment”, Unverborgenheit or aletheia in terms of “truth”, die 
Wahrheit, a way of speaking he later abandoned and declared misleading; he had, by a quasi-metonymical 
turn of phrase, as I would call it, used the word “‘truth’ to name the conditions of the possibility of truth”, as 
Mark A. Wrathall has pointed out (“Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence”, International Journal of Phi-




 It seems that both the metaphoric and the metonymic poles are flurried about by the 
tropic movement of this poem. The truth itself takes place between a roaring noise (“ein 
Dröhnen”) and a metaphor-drift (either a flurry of metaphors or a search for metaphors, 
which sometimes may be the same thing: the metaphors searched for and found may not be 
there in the poem, but rather the outcome of the activity of the “dilettante philologist”). The 
poem that names Metapherngestöber reduces the attempt to operate by overhauling meta-
phors to an awkward state of sterility — drone-likeliness (Drohnendasein). Such a strictly 
intrinsic approach leads almost immediately too far. The flurrying and buzzing of the ‘dead 
metaphors’ about the poem makes it impossible to focus on its few words as if they were 
metaphorical. We cannot rely on a lexical system of commonplaces or calculate on collusions 
and collisions of conventional meanings or ‘dead metaphors’ to solve the riddle — as if we 
were solving a riddle, as if there was a riddle to be solved — of what would seem to be more 
lively metaphorical. We will only be stupefied, transferred and then re-excited to drone in — 
or invited to blow apart, stöbern — a whirlwind of metaphors instead of revealing the truth of 
this enigma, as if there was a truth to be revealed, or an enigma, within this poem. The truth 
itself, die Wahrheit selbst, is only mentioned and not revealed, nor relieved by some dialecti-
cal accord uniting the discordant twain of metaphor and truth. 
 What is this truth? That is not easy to say. But perhaps the truth is precisely that it is 
not easy to say, or that it is impossible to make a statement of the truth of this poem parting 
from the ‘metaphors’ that one might detect in it: the truth is not in the metaphors, it arrives in 
their midst but unnoticed insofar as there is a Metapherngestöber, out of which the droning 
noise, perhaps caused by it, may be impossible to distinguish, and insofar as we take its 
metaphors for granted and not ‘for real’, insofar as we do not even ask “what a m[etaphor] is, 
anyway, when it has its place in a text [was eine M. denn sei, wo sie im Text stehe]” 
(TCA/Meridian, Ms. 60/582). In the manuscript drafts for the Meridian, Celan objects vehe-
mently to the metaphor-oriented interpreters’ severing individual expressions from their con-
text and treating them as “ambulant” metaphors. It is in the text, the poem as a text, that 
tropes and metaphors manifest their will to be reduced ad absurdum. 
 The almost prosaic sentence of this poem is nevertheless articulated into verse, and as 
such it seems to manifest a certain vertical movement or structure, a descending movement as 
if between two meteorological phenomena (Ein Dröhnen: this could be something like thun-
der in the clouds, followed by -gestöber, a squall in the lower atmosphere; like thunder and 
hail these would be, without a lightning bolt in between, without the mediation between the 





EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist 
die Wahrheit selbst 





The Biblical or Judeo-Christian associations seem evident. But perhaps it is not quite a ques-
tion of the Word here, of the Logos come to abide amongst men (in spite of the obvious pos-
sibility of sarcastic or blasphemous tone), let alone of Zeus’ thunder — or perhaps it is a 
question of these also, but not only these, since we never know the exact origin or motivation 
and, on the other hand, the final destination of these words, let alone the associations evoked 
by them.  
 The manuscript of the poem “Ein Dröhnen” bears the date 6.5.1965. In her commen-
tary, Barbara Wiedemann tells us that on the same day, the newspaper Die Welt announced 
the closure of the hearing of evidence in the Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt; the next day the 
Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung published a corresponding article and Celan sent another 
copy of the poem to his wife. According to Wiedemann, Celan was possibly reminded of an 
earlier article concerning the trial in FAZ, dated 14.11.1964, which contained the statement 
by the witness Princz, a prisoner of Auschwitz who drove a horse wagon sometimes loaded 
with containers of Cyclone B: “[Wilhelm] Boger called an SS-man and was given a gas 
mask. Cartons were unloaded and Boger took out the containers that looked like tinned provi-
sions. He opened them and passed them on. Other SS men threw them in through the open 
window, out of which a droning noise could be heard, as if there were several people under-
ground [warfen sie in die geöffneten Fenster, aus denen man ein Dröhnen hörte, als ob sich 
viele Menschen unter der Erde befänden]. The openings — the little windows — were  then 
closed again [Die Öffnungen — die Fensterchen — wurden wieder geschlossen], and I had to 
return immediately.”593  A droning noise, as if many people were underground — “...ein 
Dröhnen ... als ob ...” — while of course, there were many human beings in the room, as if 
underground. Cyclone B, hydrogen cyanide (HCN), was a fumigant originally meant for kill-
ing vermin — rats, mice, lice. But the droning noise heard through the “little windows” con-
sisted of human voices, in spite of the “as if [als ob]” pronounced as if in doubt of its origin. 
 In the FAZ article in question, there is no obvious referent for the expression 
Metapherngestöber. However, there are examples, for instance one specimen out of the ordi-
nary “raid of the bestiary”594  in the vocabulary of the murderers: “Erschießt die Hunde.” This 
is what the camp adjutant Mulka is reported to have yelled, ordering his subordinates to shoot 
                                                 
593  “Ein Beinbruch des Kommandanten Höß? Die Verteidigung bezweifelt die Glaubwürdigkeit eines Zeugen / 
Der Auschwitz-Prozeß”, Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 14th, 1964, pp. 17-18, here p. 17. Partly 
cited by Barbara Wiedemann in her commentary  in Celan, DGKG, pp. 743-744. 
594  This expression “raid of the bestiary” is borrowed from Jonathan Culler’s “Commentary”, in New Literary 
History, Vol. VI, No 1 (Autumn 1974), p. 222. Culler’s expression corresponds roughly to the “system of 




two prisoners, who they had already beaten for having “organized” something; this “some-
thing” that was shown to Mulka as he came across the two SS men, who were making a body 
search of the prisoners after beating them into a blood-soaked state, was not seen by the wit-
ness. And as the subtitle of this newspaper article already announces (“The defence casts 
doubt on the credibility of a witness”), the witnesses are subjected to doubts about their see-
ing things with their own eyes: “Der Zeugen Princz wird hart angefaßt, manchmal scheint er 
sich in einen Angeklagten zu verwandeln. Etwa, wenn der Vorsitzende vorwurfsvoll vorhält: 
›Sie sagten doch, die Häftlinge seine roh hineingetrieben worden (in die Gaskammer). Also 
müßen Sie es doch gesehen haben.‹” The anonymous writer of the article ridicules this in an 
eloquent fashion: “Nein, der Zeuge muß es nicht gesehen haben, denn er gibt in dieser Sache 
nur wieder, was über viele Kanäle von den Krematorien ins Lager gesickert war: daß 
nämlich die Selektierten nicht mit höflichen Verbeugungen und sanften Gebärden gebeten 
wurden, die Gaskammern zu betreten.” But it is neither in the ironical figures of the journal-
ist, nor in the witness’s statements that metaphors flurry, not even in the couple of metaphori-
cal expressions quoted by them, even though we may find another example of a metaphor of 
sorts taken from the mouth of the Gestapo officer Wilhelm Boger: “So haben wir in War-
schau alle Juden fertiggemacht, gefällt dir das?” This is what he is reported to have said, af-
ter he and a fellow officer had just murdered a child in an especially show-off manner.595 
 In one of the two later newspaper articles mentioned by Wiedemann, namely the FAZ 
article from the day the poem “Ein Dröhnen” was originally written (May 6th, 1965), we ac-
tually encounter the verb dröhnen again — the verb this time and not the noun, an adjectival 
present participle to be precise — a fact which seems to have escaped Wiedemann’s atten-
tion. The “mammoth process of a trial [der Mammutprozess]” is being described, with the 
audience asked to leave the courtroom and then called back, with the ongoing commuting 
between Frankfurt and Auschwitz and Krakow during the process, with the attorneys having 
to remove their cloaks in order to appear as witnesses from time to time, and with the dis-
putes between the Nuremberg defence attorney Laternser and the counsel for the plaintiff, the 
East Berliner Professor Kaul; and then the writer of the article (Walter Pfuhl) imagines for us 
“an internal dispute in the breast of the Gentleman from East Berlin” (i.e. F. K. Kaul): “Aber 
auch in der Brust des Herrn aus Ost-Berlin herrscht Widerstreit. Eben noch hat er durch 
Scharfsinn, Redekunst und Gedächtnis imponiert, als er mit einem Male in dröhnende 
Fensterreden ausbricht, als kenne das Regime, dem er dient, weder Mauer noch 
Stacheldraht.”596  The wall and barbed wire are no metaphor, of course, but a part and 
metonymy of the East Berlin reality as we know it. The journalist’s choice is nevertheless not 
any more exempt from rhetorico-political strategies than the speech droning out of Professor 
Kaul’s internally agitated breast. However, the drone of the human voice is the same (i.e. it 
                                                 
595 Cf. FAZ, Nov. 14th, 1964. Here we recognize the common “basic” and objectifying metaphor of fertig-
machen whose variants we have already encountered in dealing with Heidegger and Aristotle.  




can be named with the same noun or verb: ein Dröhnen, dröhnende), whether it comes 
through the Fensterchen of the gas chamber or in the Fensterrede (soap-box oratory, propa-
ganda) from beyond the Iron Curtain. The tone of accusation, “as if there were several people 
underground”. A droning, like one from an underground wasps’ nest, perhaps — but this 
time, this drone is composed of human voices. 
 Friedrich Karl Kaul is known for his outstanding career as a lawyer who had the ex-
ceptional opportunity to work in West Germany in spite of being a GDR citizen, as a defence 
counsel for persecuted communists and, of course, as a counsel in the Frankfurt trials for the 
survivors of Auschwitz who had thereafter become East German citizens; he was also present 
at the Eichmann trial, of which he  authored one of his several books, Der Fall Eichmann 
(1964). He was the son of a Jewish mother and spent two years in Dachau after being arrested 
in 1935. He was released, however, and exiled to the Americas, first to Columbia and finally 
to the USA, where he was actually interned as an enemy alien in a prison camp in 1941; after 
the war he returned to the city that became East Berlin. He has of course been controversial, 
especially after the collapse of the “wall and the barbed wire” mentioned by the journalist, 
with his connections to the East German regime and to the Stasi.597  It is probable — and of 
course, nothing more than probable to us — that in May 1965 Celan felt a specific sympathy 
towards this man, and perhaps he might have even identified his own situation, with regard to 
the recent accusations by the ransackers of the ambulant metaphor led by Claire Goll, with 
the politically characterized accusations against the “dröhnende Fensterreden” of F. K. Kaul. 
Perhaps. We do not know, and such conjectures about what happened in the poet’s mind and 
heart — or about the nature of the Widerstreit that perhaps reigned in the attorney’s breast — 
must not count as evidence.598 
 But in light of the ‘extrinsic’ but always still textual ‘evidence’ we do possess, we 
may of course make a few connections between the newspaper articles and the poem, as well 
as connections ‘within’ the poem, within its phenomenal, textual structure. It is perhaps not 
quite unimportant that the noun Dröhnen and the present participle dröhnend appear in both 
articles we have cited; and in the earlier article there are, in the quotations of Alexander 
Princz’s testimony, the words Fenster and Fensterchen in close proximity to this noun Dröh-
nen, while in the later article by Pfuhl the pejorative term Fensterreden is used with the pre-
sent participle dröhnende as its attribute: “dröhnende Fensterreden”. 
                                                 
597 I have gathered this information over the internet, especially from a review of Annette Rosskopf’s disserta-
tion on Kaul (2002): Johannes Beleites, “Review of Annette Rosskopf, Friedrich Karl Kaul. Anwalt im 
geteilten Deutschland (1906-1981), H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews, August, 2002; http://www h-
net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi? path= 298571032202498), and the former’s earlier brief article on the 
subject of her dissertation, “Strafverteidigung als ideologische Offensive. Das Leben des Rechtsanwalts 
Friedrich Karl Kaul (1906-1981)”, in forum historiae iuris, Aug. 8th, 1998; http://www rewi hu-
berlin.de/FHI/98_08/roskpf.htm. 
598 Cf. Derrida, Schibboleth, p. 38: “le 13 février 1962 est analogue au 13 février 1936”. There is no identifica-
tion, no assimilation between the singularities metonymized by the date (cf. p. 41: “une date est toujours 




Within the poem’s verbal ‘surface’ structure we can recognize parallel connec-
tions, internal connections — whether or not we can speak of strictly internal connections of 
a text (in the traditional, empirical sense of ‘text’). There is the noun “ein Dröhnen” that can 
be symmetrically juxtaposed with another noun, another word in this poem which can be 
largely associated with noise — let us say — ‘white noise’, namely the last word in this 
poem, Metapherngestöber, the “metaphor squall” as Felstiner translates it. The rumbling or 
drone, ein Dröhnen, is a noise associated with die Wahrheit selbst, which takes place — ar-
rives, walks in or “is [...] walked [in] among men” (which is Felstiner’s translation) —  unter 
die Menschen, and this latter expression is, on the other hand, juxtaposed with mitten ins / 
Metapherngestöber. It is easy to arrange these terms as a pair of structural oppositions: [I] 
EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist / die Wahrheit selbst [versus] Metapherngestöber; [II] die Wahrheit 
selbst / unter die Menschen [versus] mitten ins / Metapherngestöber. 
 What is the truth of this poem, then? What is the ‘truth’ mentioned in the poem, die 
Wahrheit selbst? It is not a proposition, it is not a statement, it is not a message or content. It 
is not a ‘meaning’ or ‘opinion’. Rather, it seems to be something like the voice of an individ-
ual life, or one voice composed of many voices, many lives: the human voice as such. 
A naked voice, stripped of signification but all truth: die Wahrheit selbst.599   
                                                 
599 But the human voice as such may be more than human... “alles ist weniger, als / es ist, / alles ist mehr.” 
(“Cello-Einsatz”, in Atemwende, TCA, p. 125; trans. Michael Hamburger: “all things are less than / they are, 
/ all are more.” In Poems of Paul Celan. Revised and Expanded [ed. of 2002], p. 237.) — A conversation 
with Esa Kirkkopelto inspired further suggestions and questions and especially this reference to the more-
than-human — the more-than-human in the human voice. (I take full responsibility for what I have drawn 
from that conversation, of course.) One of Esa’s suggestions was that perhaps ein Dröhnen, the noise heard 
is no longer human, it has turned into a non-human voice: the voice of the Furies, the Erinyes. A noise 
composed of many shrieks, squalls that defy the “metaphor-squall”. — Esa’s remark on the Erinyes brought 
to my mind an essay by another Finnish scholar and friend, Susanna Lindberg, concerning the figure of the 
Furies, these “Daughters of the Night” in Blanchot, most notably in L’espace littéraire (1955). This image 
is primarily no metaphor, but bears a precise literary-historical reference, even though the feminine figures 
that could be named with the general name “daughters of the night” are “omnipresent” in Blanchot’s work, 
including for instance Eurydice and the Sirens. “Mais quand Blanchot nomme les « Filles de la Nuit » ex-
pressément et avec majuscule, il ne fait pas une métaphore mais une référence historique précise.” (Susanna 
Lindberg, “Les filles de la nuit”, in Éric Hoppenot, ed, L'OEuvre du féminin dans l'écriture de Maurice 
Blanchot [coll. Compagnie de Maurice Blanchot] [Grignan: Éditions Complicités, 2004], pp. 81-94, here p. 
82.) Primarily, the Daughters of the Night name the Furies of Aeschylus’ Eumenides, part of the Oresteia 
trilogy, the Furies who are also the Daughters of the Earth. The Furies are those who are buried, with their 
terrifying voices, beneath the city, hopefully appeased by the “epuhemistic” name Eumenides and by build-
ing them a shrine by the side of the abodes of the more diurnal divinities: “[L]a cité offrira comme répara-
tion aux Filles de la Nuit un temple souterrain en plein milieu de la cité, à côté des temples brillants des di-
vinités du Jour. Celles qu’on nommera désormais les Euménides continueront leur vie obscure dans ce 
temple, cet abri, cette tombe souterraine. De manière analogue Antigone sera enterrée vivante, et ainsi on 
montrera que sa mort n’est pas visible. Les Filles de la Nuit habitent cette cachette visible, dans laquelle 
elles cesseront de vivre sans pour autant être déjà mortes [...]. Dans un premier temps nous pourrions donc 
penser que le chant des Sirènes, qu’il soit un bruit naturel ou l’imitation de la voix humaine dépourvue de 
signification, est pure voix : phone sans logos, et ceci serait son manque essentiel. De même, le chant des 
Erinnyes n’est qu’à moitié articulé, toujours en proie à une cassure apte à le transformer en de simples cris 
et jappements, ou prêt à s’élever comme un merveilleux chant sans paroles. Elles viennent en bandes qui 
crient, et même dans la pièce de théâtre, leur chant maudit et envoûte grâce à la répétition, à la rime et à 
l’écho plus que par la force de l’argument. / Mais la séparation en phone et logos ne suffit nullement pour 






A E R O P H O N E S ,  A I R - S T O N E S  
 
One of the sources for the poem “Ein Dröhnen” can be found in the middle of an ode by 
Mandelstam, one of Celan’s own translations (GW 5:133): 
 
Wo beginnen? 
Alles kracht in den Fugen und schwankt. 
Die Luft erzittert vor Vergleichen. 
Kein Wort ist besser als das andre, 
die Erde dröhnt von Metaphern,  
 
The fact that the line “die Erde dröhnt von Metaphern” finds its way, transformed, from 
Mandelstam or rather from Celan’s translation of Mandelstam into the poem “Ein Dröhnen” 
does by no means efface any other possible connections to other texts — such as the newspa-
per articles. But each such connection of the unique verbal body that the poem is to other 
poems and other texts presents only one aspect of the breath-crystal — yet another name for 
the poem, perhaps. The newspaper articles to which the poem seems to refer, the recogniz-
able Biblical associations, a possible response to a line by Stefan George (“Ich bin ein dröh-
nen nur der heiligen stimme”, in a poem which also has the line “Ich fühle luft von anderen 
planeten”),600  all this information that can be gathered with some effort and with some luck, 
with the help from other readers and scholars, can only work as guidance and introduction. 
 Mandelstam’s poem, translated by Celan, is indeed an ode of earth and air (yes, ‘of’ 
and not only ‘to’).  
 We shall try to retain this ‘reference’ to earth and air: the poem retains it, even when it 
hovers suspended in the air. It hovers suspended, its truth remains equivocal — no decision 
can be guaranteed, the poem remains underway and open, occupiable, even when the droning 
of the voice retains its singularity, and this infinite iterability is just the reverse side of the 
infinite singularity of the poem’s voice, the verbal body, which makes the “always again only 
for once” possible. The aspects that cannot be grasped all at once and their shades are irre-
ducible, for instance the possibility that the Wahrheit of this poem is (also) an ironical re-
mark, even in its very sincerity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
que même le non-sens recèle toujours un renvoi à un sens retiré ou perdu : même si le chant des esprits 
naturels n’appartient pas au logos, il est déjà articulé d’une manière ou d’une autre. Deuxièmement, nous 
savons que le cri des esprits naturels n’est pas du simple son comme l’est le bruit du vent ou de la mer, ni 
même comme peut l’être la parole des humains fondue en un simple bruit de fond. Le cri des esprits 
naturels n’est pas un pur phone au sens d’un tranquille bruit de fond, mais toujours déjà une voix qui 
s’adresse à quelqu’un, le touche, le transforme parfois.” (Pp. 83, 87.)  
600 Stefan George’s poem “Entrückung” is made famous through the fourth movement of Schönberg’s Second 




 The first two lines of the poem we have just been reading, “EIN DRÖHNEN: es ist / die 
Wahrheit selbst”, reverberate in a remarkable manner in the first two lines of another poem 
from Atemwende (GW 2:67): 
 
SCHWIRRHÖLZER fahren ins Licht, die Wahrheit 
gibt Nachricht. 
 
There are striking resemblances between these beginnings. The two words before the colon in 
the poem “Ein Dröhnen”, seem to correspond to the sentence before the comma in this other 
poem: “SCHWIRRHÖLZER fahren ins Licht”. And what follows the comma here in this poem, 
“die Wahrheit / gibt Nachricht”, echoes and is echoed by the words following the colon in 
the first poem, “es ist / die Wahrheit selbst”. In both cases, it is as if the second co-ordinate 
sentence, following the colon in one poem and the comma in the other, explained the first co-
ordinate sentence. And in both cases truth is at issue: it is as if truth’s arrival amongst men 
and truth’s bringing tidings were to explain the noise, the noise called “ein Dröhnen” in one 
case and in the other, the noise made by the bullroarers’ movement in the light. 
 Schwirrholz is a bullroarer, an aerophone known from all over the world, but best 
known as an instrument of the Australian aboriginals, as well as the Maori, and the natives of 
New Guinea and North America; among the variants of this instrument is also the traditional 
toy used in Europe. What should especially interest us here, is maybe its status as an 
aerophone and as the representative of a divine voice or voice of the ancestors, its role in a 
“drama of death and resurrection” and in initiation rites, especially its relation to circumcision 
— and finally, the connection between air as “Luftstrom”601  and the rite of circumcision as 
initiation. 
Frazer’s The Golden Bough tells us of tribes in New Guinea whose “tribal initiation, 
of which circumcision is the central feature, is conceived by them, as by some Australian 
tribes, as a process of being swallowed and disgorged by a mythical monster, whose voice is 
heard in the humming sound of the bull-roarer.”602  The initiation happens in these tribes in a 
mighty spectacle, in which, “after a tearful parting from their mothers and women[-]folk, who 
believe or pretend to believe in the monster that swallows their dear ones, the awe-struck 
novices are brought face to face [with a monstrous structure, a hut built for this special occa-
sion, a betel palm as its backbone and] adorned by a native artist with a pair of goggle eyes 
and a gaping mouth”; then “this imposing structure, the huge creature emits a sullen growl, 
which is in fact no other than the humming note of bull-roarers swung by men concealed in 
the monster’s belly”; later, after being released from the monster’s belly, each young man 
must “undergo the more painful and dangerous operation of circumcision. It follows immedi-
ately, and the cut made by the knife of the operator is explained to be a bite or scratch which 
                                                 
601 Cf. Celan’s poem “OFFENE GLOTTIS, Luftstrom, / der / Vokal, wirksam, / [etc.]” (GW 2:388). 





the monster inflicted on the novice in spewing him out of his capacious maw.  While the op-
eration is proceeding, a prodigious noise is made by the swinging of bull-roarers to represent 
the roar of the dreadful being who is in the act of swallowing the young man.” The bullroarer, 
the “harmless wooden instrument” that makes the air speak and that is not supposed to be 
seen by women or children or anyone uninitiated on pain of death, is a metonymy for the rite 
of circumcision itself and also for the “grandfather”, or the dead ancestors, who have of 
course had to undergo the same horror of being swallowed up by the “bull-roarer” — the 
bullroarer who at last bites off and swallows up the foreskin, as the women will be told.603  
This “drama of death and resurrection”, in its several variations characterized by secrecy, in-
timidation and even threat of death, involving wild mythical stories told to the uninitiated and 
to those about to undergo initiation, the myths that culminate in a theatrical spectacle, in 
which the yet uninitiated believe that they will be eaten by a monster, with all the physical 
pain and seclusion that the young man has to suffer, this terrifying event turns out to be a 
drama after all, a rite whose secrets (including the knowledge of its being only a myth, a ficti-
tious spectacle after all, a “counterfeit”) are not to be revealed to the women and children and 
other uninitiated. Of course we will never know whether Frazer and his colleagues were 
themselves fooled by the “solemnity” of the “drama”, uninitiated as they were, and as we are. 
 
In certain districts of Viti Levu, the largest of the Fijian Islands, the drama of death 
and resurrection used to be acted with much solemnity before the eyes of young men 
at initiation. In a sacred enclosure they were shown a row of dead or seemingly dead 
men lying on the ground, their bodies cut open and covered with blood, their entrails 
protruding. But at a yell from the high priest the counterfeit dead men started to their 
feet and ran down to the river to cleanse themselves from the blood and guts of pigs 
with which they were beslobbered. Soon they marched back to the sacred enclosure as 
if come to life, clean, fresh, and garlanded, swaying their bodies in time to the music 
of a solemn hymn, and took their places in front of the novices. Such was the drama 
of death and resurrection. [The Golden Bough, p. 695.] 
 
Let us return to the poem beginning with the humming, the droning of the bullroarer making 
its way in the light, mid-air, the space in which truth itself dwells and “brings tidings”, the 
space of the priest’s yell and of singing and shouting and reverberating: 
 
SCHWIRRHÖLZER fahren ins Licht, die Wahrheit 
gibt Nachricht. 
 
                                                 
603  “It is highly significant that all these tribes of New Guinea apply the same word to the bull-roarer and to the 
monster, who is supposed to swallow the novices at circumcision, and whose fearful roar is represented by 
the hum of the harmless wooden instruments. Further, it deserves to be noted that in three languages out of 
the four the same word which is applied to the bull-roarer and to the monster means also a ghost or spirit of 
the dead, while in the fourth language (the Kai) it signifies ‘grandfather.’ From this it seems to follow that 
the being who swallows and disgorges the novices at initiation is believed to be a powerful ghost or ances-
tral spirit, and that the bull-roarer, which bears his name, is his material representative.” (Frazer, The 
Golden Bough, pp. 692-695. Also available as an electronic copy at Bartleby.com [cop. 2000]: 




Drüben die Ufer- 
böschung schwillt uns entgegen, 
ein dunkler 
Tausendglanz — die 
auferstandenen Häuser! — 
singt. 
 
Ein Eisdorn — auch wir 
hatten gerufen — 
versammelt die Klänge.604  
 
When the resurrection of houses is spoken of, the houses can be a metonymy for families, just 
as names can be. Another poem, entitled “Chymisch”, speaks elliptically of “alle die mit- / 
verbrannten / Namen”, “all the names burnt / together / with” (GW 1:227-228). Burnt to-
gether with what? With the houses? But the houses can be a metonymy for families, just as 
the names can be. Burnt together with those who were burned, perhaps. Both “houses” and 
“names” can be metonymies for whole families, generations, lines of tradition not only sev-
ered but annihilated. And, in the vision of the poem, resurrected in a singing “dark / thou-
sand-glare [dunkler / Tausendglanz]”.605 
 The source of the word Schwirrholz, Schwirrhölzer, has been identified, in Celan’s 
personal library, in an ethnological study published in 1933, Kulturgeschichte Afrikas by Leo 
Frobenius (1873-1938), with words underlined by the poet: “Im Busch erklingen die Schwir-
ren als Stimmen der Ahnherren”, “die Schwirrhölzer und andere Lärminstrumente”, etc.606 
The discovery of such  “reading traces [Lesespuren]”, as the editors call them, are often in-
dispensable; but here these materials do not facilitate our understanding of the “thousand-
brightness” and the “ice-thorn”, let alone that they would reveal the identity of the “we too”. 
The questions concerning these are left open. 
                                                 
604 GW 2:67. Trans. Pierre Joris: 
  
BULLROARERS whiz into the light, truth 
sends word. 
 
 Yonder, the shore’s 
slope swells toward us, 
a dark 
thousand-brightness — the 
resurrected houses! — 
sings. 
 
 An icethorn — we too 
had called — 
gathers the tones.  
 
Breathturn (Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, cop. 1995), p. 167; reproduced at the website of Chris-
topher Brakel, http: //christopherbrakel.com/audio/IceThorns-English.pdf. 
605 Cf. “Es ist alles anders” (GW 1:286): “die Ufer / hängen voll Tag, wie der Name”. 
606 Leo Frobenius, Kulturgeschichte Afrikas. Prolegomena zu einer historischen Gestaltlehre (Zürich: Faidon, 




 Eisdorn is nevertheless no new coinage. The word can be found in the Grimm dic-
tionary: “EISDORN, m. asterias glacialis.” Eisdorn is a starfish, asterias glacialis, also 
known as marthasterias glacialis (Linnaeus 1758).607  If we look at the taxonomic tree, the 
significant choice for classifying this poetic Eisdorn might be the class of asteroidea. This is 
because we may recognize a significant constellation of poems, a concordance in a very spe-
cific sense, in which this asteroid gathers several tones together, and indeed a “thousand-
brightness”, Tausendglanz. Before proceeding towards these parallels, it must be emphasized 
that these concordances and constellations, the access to some of the possible literary and lit-
eral referents of the poem’s vocabulary, do not have to furnish the key to the poem’s secret 
any better than the typical metaphorical inventions, based on the associations of ideas would, 
while such discoveries of reference material are indispensable in their own right, and espe-
cially with regard to Celan’s objections to metaphor-oriented interpretations. We can see that 
the use of rare but lexical vocabulary is, at the least, a means of prevention against metaphor, 
but this avoidance of coinage is also motivated by other poetical concerns: the botanical, zoo-
logical, geological, meteorological, ethnological and phenomenological (such as Husserl’s 
Zeithof); all these special terminologies and many more belong to the sedimentation of what 
Celan calls, in his 1948 Jené essay, “ashes of extinguished sense-giving [Asche ausgebran-
nter Sinngebung]” (GW 3:157). No pretensions shall be made at deciphering the poem here; it 
can only be mentioned that the African cultural history or any other single source is not 
enough: for instance, Eisdorn is not asterias africana but its northern cousin. 
 In any case, when we have a “grave in the air”, in the song, even the “thousand-
brightness” turns “dark”, milk turns black, and death turns “day-break” — the dawn of “the 
others”, as Celan comments on “Todesfuge” in a later note.608  Here the drama of death and 
resurrection is perhaps the drama of their coincidence in the song that survives. 
 When we first read the incipit of the poem we have just been trying to decipher, we 
might have been surprised by the fact that it says “SCWIRRHÖLZER fahren ins Licht” and not 
“in der Luft”, as we might have expected when aerophones are at issue. Aerophones and 
boomerangs are at issue also in one of the poems in the book whose title poem marked the 
poet’s “farewell to the deceiving ‘like’”, Sprachgitter (1959), in a poem named by another 





fragst ja, ich 
sags dir:) 
 
                                                 
607 DWB, Bd. 3, Sp. 364. The taxonomic tree of this species can be found in Costello, M.J.; Bouchet, P.; Box-
shall, G.; Emblow, C.; Vanden Berghe, E. (2004). European Register of Marine Species. Available online at 
http://www marbef.org/data/erms.php. Accessed Feb. 14th, 2006.  




Strahlengang, immer, die 
Spiegel, nachtweit, stehn 
gegeneinander, ich bin, 
hingestoßen zu dir, eines 
Sinnes mit diesem 
Vorbei. 
 
Aber: mein Herz 
ging durch die Pause, es wünscht dir 
das Aug, bildnah und zeitstark, 
das mich verformt – : 
die Schwäne, 
in Genf, ich sah’s nicht, flogen, es war, 
als schwirrte, vom Nichts her, ein Wurfholz 
ins Ziel einer Seele: soviel 
Zeit 
denk mir, als Auge, jetzt zu: 
daß ichs 
schwirren hör, näher – nicht 
neben mir, nicht, 
wo du nicht sein kannst.609  
 
The swans would be, of course, a famous poetic topos or “emblem”.610  But these swans are, 
besides the allusion to all the poetic swans and their topoi, the swans of Geneva. The address 
or dedication, the occasionality of the poem, becomes manifest through mentioning Geneva, 
even while no other proper name is explicitly given. Until the mention of Geneva,  suggesting 
biographical details and a ‘real-life encounter’ underlying the poem’s address, the poem 
could have concerned the reader directly, any reader and her reading, even when we do not 
know what is meant by, for instance, Strahlengang and the mirrors standing against each 
other. Strahlengang is, once again, a special term referring to the stream of rays through a 
lense or an optical instrument,611  such as an instrument called a cœlostat (Zölostat): “An in-
strument consisting of a mirror turned by clockwork on an axis parallel to itself and to the 
axis of the earth, by means of which the celestial bodies may be observed and photographed 
as in a stationary position.” (OED.)612  This “as in a stationary position”, the fixed image of 
the sun and the stars permitted by the instrument invented by Gabriel Lippmann who won the 
Nobel Prize in physics in 1908, this image of an image must be seen constellated with the 
                                                 
609 My ad hoc approximation: “BUT [or YET, or AGAIN] // (You / ask and I / tell you:) // Stream of rays, ever, 
the / mirrors, night-wide, stand / across each other, I am, / projected towards you, of one / mind with this / 
going-by. // But: my heart / went through the pause, wishing you / the eye, image-near and time-strong, / 
that disfigures me – : / the swans, / in Geneva, I didn’t see it, flew, it was / as if, from nothingness, a boo-
merang / into the target of a soul: think for me [zudenken: grant me, in your thoughts, as if in echange for 
‘the eye’ that my heart ‘wished (for) you’] / so much / time, as an eye: / that I / hear it buzz, nearer – not / 
by my side, not / where you cannot be.” These untranslatable ‘displacements’ (“mein Herz [...] wünscht dir / 
das Aug, [...] denk mir, als Auge, jetzt zu”) would deserve specific attention. 
610 Cf. Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett, p. 303: “a topic”, “a classical poetic emblem” (or 
Fenves’s translation [1996], p. 376). 
611 This is part of Wikipedia’s definition: “Der Lauf von Lichtstrahlen durch optische Geräte (Mikroskope, 
Fernrohre usw.) hindurch wird Strahlengang genannt” (http: // de.wikipedia.org / wiki / Strahlengang). 




nominalized adverb Vorbei, “past” in the sense of gone by and bygone,613 and the movement 
of being thrusted toward you, hingestoßen zu dir. So inasmuch as there is an image or meta-
phor here, it is immediately reflected by its counter-figure, this Vorbei and what follows it in 
the third strophe, beginning with the adverb Aber: 
 
Aber: mein Herz 
ging durch die Pause, es wünscht dir 
das Aug, bildnah und zeitstark, 
das mich verformt – : 
 
The heart that went through the pause — perhaps the instant of taking the stationary snapshot 
permitted by Lippmann’s instrument which is, after all, an appliance of photography — de-
sires ‘your’ eye, or wishes you an eye that deforms ‘me’, an eye that is image-close and time-
strong: an eye that sees the stereoscopy involved in every poetic image, metonymized by the 
date of which Derrida speaks in Schibboleth, the date that is both singular and plural, both 
unique and, yet, always already a commemoration of what is unique. Such an eye observes 
time, the time-crevasse (Zeitenschrunde) that belongs to every breath-crystal (Atemkristall) 
and prohibits metaphorical undertaking, as Celan understands it, the shortcut or short-circuit 
between the irreducibly different times and places, belonging to the irreducibly different sin-
gularities that are situated in time and space, and are thus nothing supratemporal or omni-
present. 
 So this poem seems indeed to speak of the poetic image, of itself as a poetic image, 
which is rather the metonymical heart than the metaphor whose reductio ad absurdum the 
heart desires. It carries this wish just like the tropes and metaphors are said to carry in the 
Meridian. The cœlostat is indeed associated with the meridian, the meridian which is an im-
age that would traverse the tropes, cross them through as tropes and metaphors, perhaps in 
order to display, through this palimpsest of crossing through, the phenomenal character of the 
poetic image. Phenomenal, meteoric — “eines / Sinnes mit diesem / Vorbei”. 
 Already the title and first verse (between brackets, just like the strophe between 
brackets in “Sprachgitter”) of this poem seem to associate the Thou of this poem with other 
Thous, since this Du is both singular and, as it were, doubled into being Aber-Du, “Yet-
Thou”. This “Yet-Thou” is John Felstiner’s very fortunate translation for “Aber-Du” in an-
other poem, “Zürich, zum Storchen”, because “Yet-Thou” combines the two ambiguously 
interrelated significations of the adverb aber (‘but’ and ‘again’). “Zürich, zum Storchen” is a 
poem bearing an explicit dedication below the title: “Für Nelly Sachs” (GW 1:214). The title 
itself names another city in Switzerland and a hotel by the name of Stork, and shibboleths 
                                                 
613 For this “gone by” that is not just the same as “bygone”, cf. OED, entry “by, prep., adv.”: “16. a. On along-
side of, into the vicinity of and on beyond, past. Originally the nearness in passing was emphasized; in later 
use ‘by’ is more frequently distinguished from ‘through’ or other word [sic?], and expresses passing without 
stopping or contact, and thus avoidance, aloofness; but often the notion is merely that of getting beyond, or 




like this “Stork” (as well as the dedication itself) seem to be there to mark the rapport to real-
ity, to real-life encounters between real people and thus to something that cannot be repeated 
in itself, not even as an ideal meaning bestowed after the event, rather than to function as 
conveyors of a given content. This “Yet-Thou” appears in yet another poem as well, “Radix 
Matrix”: “du in der Aber-Nacht Be-/gegnete, du / Aber-Du – ” (GW 1:239).614   
 
 
AN EXCURSION: “YOU / YET-YOU” 
 
The sense of this Aber-Du could perhaps be clarified by an anecdote that we can read out of 
the published correspondence between Celan and Nelly Sachs. She gave a manuscript copy of 
this poem to her “dear brother [Lieber, lieber Paul – Bruder]” on the last day of their meeting 
in Zurich, on May 25th, 1960, and this is another poem beginning with a line consisting of 
the sole word “Du”: 
 
Du  
in der Nacht  
mit dem Verlernen der Welt Beschäftigte  
von weit weit her  
dein Finger die Eisgrotte bemalte  
mit der singenden Landkarte  
eines verborgenen Meeres  
das sammelte in der Muschel deines Ohres die Noten 
Brücken-Bausteine  
von Hier nach Dort  
diese haargenaue Aufgabe  
deren Lösung  
den Sterbenden mitgegeben wird.615  
 
The anecdote concerns Celan’s reception of this poem. There is a note attached to the manu-
script leaf of the poem, in Celan’s handwriting, that is to commemorate something of the in-
stance of its giving and Nelly Sachs’s words from the following day: “Von Nelly Sachs, / 
<nach dem Du?>, am 25. Mai  1960, in Zürich / am 26.5. : »Dieses Gedicht ist Dein 
Gedicht; Du bist gemeint.«”616  Among the manuscript notes he made during their meeting in 
Zurich can be found the following, dated on May 25th: “Das Gedicht: »Du ... mit dem 
Verlernen der Welt Beschäftigter«” (Paul Celan / Nelly Sachs: Briefwechsel, p. 41). But later, 
in a note from June 17th, the last day of Sachs’s five-day visit in Paris which was the second 
time they met after the years of correspondence, we find a few more words concerning the 
referent of the poem:  
 
                                                 
614 Trans. Felstiner: “you in Yet-Night en- / countered, you / Yet-You — “ (p. 167). 
615 Fahrt ins Staublose. Die Gedichte der Nelly Sachs (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1961), p. 333. 
616 Facsimile of the poem manuscript and of the note are on p. 44 of Paul Celan / Nelly Sachs — Briefwechsel, 




17 juin: 2 h 50 Nelly Sachs Abreise  
Vormittag Nelly S. bei uns. Das Gedicht »Du mit dem Verlernen Beschäftigte (?)« 
u.a. ihre Mutter. Die Mutter: zehn Jahre hindurch jede Nacht Gespräch mit den Toten, 
dann am Morgen, Beruhigung. [Paul Celan / Nelly Sachs: Briefwechsel, p. 47.]  
 
This is to say that the “Thou” addressed by this poem is Margarete Sachs, the mother who  
used to speak to the dead for ten years each night before she herself passed away (“dann am 
Morgen, Beruhigung” — then one morning, the morning of all these nights, brought peace). 
That is, she spoke in her sleep just like the old man in Jean Paul’s Titan who spoke to the 
dead through the speech-grille of sleep (“der alte Mann sprach hinter dem Sprachgitter des 
Schlafs mit Todten”).617  Celan’s notes reveal that he first mistook the gender of “Du” in the 
poem to be masculine (already before Sachs told him that “Dieses Gedicht ist Dein Gedicht; 
Du bist gemeint”), as he slightly misquoted it: “Du ... mit dem Verlernen der Welt Beschäftig-
ter”; later he wrote the gender correctly, though with a question mark attached to this abbre-
viated citation — abbreviated and by heart — this time: “Du mit dem Verlernen 
Beschäftigte (?)”. But Celan’s mistake was of course not actually a mistake, nor Sachs’s 
dedication by any means inappropriate, quite to the contrary. What is especially remarkable 
in Celan’s later elliptical note is the siglum “u.a.”: the addressee is identified as “u.a. ihre 
Mutter”, namely, a Thou among others. The Thou of the poem, in the irreducible singularity 
of its address, is among others the late mother of the poet. The question mark points to the 
openness of the address, the openness of “diese haargenaue Aufgabe” given to “der Muschel 
deines Ohres”. The poem speaks in the absence or rather to the absence of its final addressee 
who is not only the dead mother but also the mortal Thou in his or her irreplaceability — the 
only one who can receive “this task of a hair’s width / whose solution will be / endowed to 
the dying”: 
 
diese haargenaue Aufgabe  
deren Lösung  
den Sterbenden mitgegeben wird. 
 
“Du bist gemeint”: the Meinung (intentio, denotatio) of the poem is Du — and Aber-Du. No 
one is the final and only addressee of the poem, but the address is always more or less a piece 
of an overheard conversation: the one who finds him- or herself addressed, as by a personal 
letter, may still recognize the poem’s remaining open (and “underway”) toward others.  
 And yet, this Aber-Du can also be a “Not-You” (as it has also been translated), albeit 
only in the sense that the address finds its addressee alone (and thus, addressed by no one, no 
one there with her), alone in the world, or after the world has withdrawn (“Die Welt ist fort”), 
in the “Aber-Nacht” of solitude in which the word “wished to shine”, as in “Engführung”, but 
only as the tiniest particle of Asche — its shining, its glory or halo is an ashen one, Asche that 
                                                 




wishes to shine, even in “Nacht. / Nacht-und-Nacht” — even as an invisible, tiny particle 





The sender’s absence in the poematic address brings to light, even if this light is a cinereous 
afterglow, glow after glow, what is involved in every real encounter, every daylight encoun-
ter: the incommensurability, the comparable incomparability — analogy, between metony-
mies, the figures of the other, always only parts or aspects or indications, gestures619  — be-
tween the times of the one and the other, meeting each other across the language-mesh, which 
separates one from the other, not only in space but also in time. In the now, in your now 
which is always the time of the ego, “my” now that is, you can see the light of an already ex-
tinguished star — an afterglow, already present in the present of your perception. Yet, the 
time of the other is allowed to participate in the now, mitsprechen; in the poem “Aber”, this 
structure of participation or conversation of times seems to be applicable to the conversation 
between the “I” and the “you” of the poem, between your eye or you as an eye, indeed you as 
an I, and my ear, as yours, now: 
 
[...] ich sah’s nicht, flogen, es war, 
als schwirrte, vom Nichts her, ein Wurfholz 
ins Ziel einer Seele: soviel 
Zeit 
denk mir, als Auge, jetzt zu: 
daß ichs 
schwirren hör, näher – nicht 
neben mir, nicht, 
wo du nicht sein kannst. 
 
This eye, your eye, you as an eye and you as I, is beseeched to think, for a time, for a passing 
moment, as much time as it takes to hear the aerophone boom, schwirren in the air: the image 
of the boomerang, Schwirrholz, present in many of Celan’s poems, is not just the weapon that 
you have sent and that comes back to hunt you down, in the worst case scenario, as it has of-
ten been interpreted with reference to the so-called Goll Affair and the role of detached tropes 
in it (“ambulant metaphors”), but something more ambivalent. It is not simply an object pre-
sent-at-hand or a weapon ready-to-hand, nor just a metaphorical image for the detached 
metaphors for instance, not just a wooden projectile and not an immaterial figure of this in-
strument either, one that would have no real link, no true connexion with the breath-paths 
(Atemwegen) named by another poem speaking of a boomerang (“EIN WURFHOLZ, auf 
Atemwegen”) — these “paths of breath” are also “respiratory ducts” as Werner Hamacher 
                                                 
618 “Engführung”, “The Straitening”, trans. M. Hamburger, Poems of Paul Celan, p. 119. 
619 I refer here to Husserl’s fifth Cartesian Meditation (Hua I), and the theme of the “analogical appresentation 




invites us to observe in his great essay “The Second of Inversion”, and there are no 
aerophones and boomerangs without the movement of air and in the air — we see this boo-
merang travelling “breathways”, breathwise from soul to soul; this is indeed a twin poem of 
“Aber”, as it seems: 
 
EIN WURFHOLZ, auf Atemwegen, 





geküßt, von Zeitkörnern 




verbracht und verworfen, 
sich selber der Reim, – 
so kommt es 
geflogen, so kommts 
wieder und heim, 
einen Herzschlag, ein Tausendjahr lang 
innezuhalten als 
einziger Zeiger im Rund, 






beziffert. 620  
 
The figure of the returning trope locates the noise of the boomerang, as the voice of the 
poem, perhaps something to be learned by heart as Derrida says, nearer but not quite close 
by, not by ‘my’ side where ‘you’ cannot be, separated as ‘we’ are by the time taken by the 
poem, so to say. Taken by the poem to reach the eye that thinks, thinks the time of the other 
as a given time, without imagining too much.621  This hitting the eye — and the heart, con-
                                                 
620 Die Niemandsrose (GW 1:258); En. trans. William D. Jewett, in Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion”: “A 
BOOMERANG, on paths of breath, / so it wanders, the wing- / powered , the / true. On / astral / orbits, by 
world- / shards kissed, by time- / kernals pitted, by dust of time, co- / abandoning with you,/ Lapilli,/ 
dwarfed, diminished, an- / nihilated, / deported and abject, / of itself the rhyme,—/ thus it comes / back and 
comes home,/ for a heartbeat, for a millennium / to stall as / the solitary hand on the dial,/ a soul / described, 
its soul / which one / soul / figured.” Cf. Fenves’s translation (1996), pp. 377-378: “[...] on breath-ways [...] 
by world- / splinters kissed, by time- / kernels grained, by time-dust, co- / orphaned with you [...] deported 
and thrown away, / itself the rhyme,—/ thus it comes / flown, thus it comes / back and home, [...] to pause as 
/ a lone hand on the dial, / by one soul, / by its soul / inscribed, / by one / soul / ciphered.” 
621 “Das Gedicht [...] muß unentwegt auf jenes Fremdeste zuhalten, das es — immer noch — als ansprechbar, 
besetzbar, zumindest nennbar denkt (nicht: imaginiert).” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 30.) In writing that the ‘eye ... 
thinks the time’ without ‘of’ (i.e. not just ‘thinks of the time of the other’) I would like to approximate 
Celan’s way of using the verb denken here. Such a transitive use is akin to the one instantiated in the OED 




tiguous with the true eye — may be a millennium, the flight may have taken a thousand 
years. How can it come home, then, in this twin of the poem “Aber”? How can it be one soul, 
coming home after wandering for perhaps a thousand years? 
 “Language is not posited”, writes Werner Hamacher, “but projected [nicht gesetzt, 
sondern entworfen]”.622  Projections of existence, as Celan designates them in the Meridian 
and the manuscript notes: “Gedichte sind Engpässe / ‘Du mußt hier hindurch, Leben’: 
Daseinsentwürfe.”623  Hamacher continues on the poem “Ein Wurfholz”, on the word “boo-
merang”:  
 
Thrown, a boomerang — this word — is already on its way with the first word of the 
poem, thus not at home but grasped in the flight of its displacements and transforma-
tions [Enstellungen und Verwandlungen], “on breath-paths.” [...] The return and the 
homecoming of the word to itself, traditionally regarded as the awakening of the po-
tencies exhausted by conventional usage or as the “metapoetic” reflection of its con-
tent and thus, once again, as the inversion that sets things in order, takes a strange turn 
in Celan’s poem, for it does not return in restituted form to its authentic and proper 
site but returns, instead, in a scarred, dismembered, and finally an-nihilated form at a 
site that is not its own, at site  where it is not itself. [“The Second of Inversion”, trans. 
Fenves, pp. 378-380.] 
 
But this alteration is not something altogether negative. Actually it might be the poem’s only 
hope, its risk and its chance, the very will of the words and images in the poem. In this home-
coming —  
 
It is always the other that comes. This two-turned coming — the implicit inversion of 
writing and the unwritten [while the unwritten is, as Hamacher notes, also the yet un-
written, namely that which is to come], of reading and the unreadable [and here too, 
we must think of the yet unreadable, the unknown destiny of the poem in its being un-
derway], in every poem, every speaking and reading — is itself the movement of al-
teration in which even the most hardened and petrified self opens itself toward an 
other. The “ores” (Erze) of the beginning are then “transformed into a heart” 
(Herzgewordenes). [“The Second of Inversion”, trans. Fenves, p. 386.] 
 
Hamacher refers here to the poem “À la pointe acérée” (written in 1961) whose title refers to 
both Baudelaire and Hugo von Hoffmansthal: 
 
À LA POINTE ACÉRÉE 
 
Es liegen die Erze bloß, die Kristalle, 
die Drusen. 
Ungeschriebenes, zu 
Sprache verhärtet, legt 
einen Himmel frei. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
now.” (Entry “think, v2”, OED, 50251158, last accessed March 16th, 2007.) 
622 “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett, p. 303; cf. Fenves’s translation, p. 376. 




(Nach oben verworfen, zutage, 
überquer, so 
liegen auch wir. 
 
Tür du davor einst, Tafel 
mit dem getöteten 
Kreidestern drauf: 
ihn 



















Blubbernde Wege dorthin. 
 




Only a couple of remarks on this poem now. The apparently ‘metaphorical’ link between the 
first and second strophe (“so / liegen auch wir”) is actually bridged rather by the fact that the 
term Verwerfung not only means being “thrown out”, or being rejected, dismissed, and so on, 
but is also a geological term, corresponding to “fault” (OED: “A dislocation or break in con-
tinuity of the strata or vein”). Celan often makes such expeditions into the no-man’s-land be-
tween the general, ‘natural’ language and specific terminologies, as we have already seen, 
and the transfer, from the first strophe with its geological terms and into the bracketed second 
strophe, serves the catachrestic precision rather than metaphorical approximation. Irony, too: 
this lying “upward, revealed, / crossways” is the way not only the ores and crystals and geodes 
                                                 
624 Die Niemandsrose (1963); GW 1:251- 252; DGKG, p. 146. For a commentary, see Georg-Michael Schulz, 
“À la pointe acérée”, in Lehmann, ed., Kommentar zu Paul Celans »Die Niemandsrose«, pp. 208-213. 
Trans. Michael Hamburger: “The ores are laid bare, the crystals, / the geodes. / Unwritten things, hardened / 
into language, lay bare / a sky. // (Thrown out, upward, revealed,/ crossways, so / we too are lying. // Door 
in front of it once, tablet / with the killed / chalk star on it: that / a – reading? – eye has now.) // Ways to that 
place. / Forest hour alongside / the spluttering wheeltrack. / Col- / lected / small, gaping / beechnuts: black-
ish / openness, questioned / by finger thoughts / about – –/ about what? // About the unrepeatable, about / it, 
about / everything. // Spluttering tracks to that place. // Something mobile, ungreeting / as all that’s turned 




are things that have been “unwritten” but also, then, “hardened / into language”, exposed. 
Exposed not only to the surveyor trying to pay attention to the time of the other (even geol-
ogy is that, isn’t it?), but also to the shortcuts of metaphorical interpretation. Not to mention 
the preciseness of the third strophe, in which, as Georg-Michael Schulz well observes, the 
door and the David’s shield, two things of protection, have become things of exposure and 
give-away: the board (“tablet”) and the yellow star crayoned on it, killed by this act of signal-
ling that would lead to the other killings: “todbringender Rede”, this too.625  Fingergedanken 
should be clear enough in its relation to hand-clasping and handwork: as it is said in Heideg-
ger’s Was heißt Denken? — a very important text for Celan — thinking is a handicraft, 
Hand-Werk. And also questioning and remembrance. Herzwerk, too: poetry and thinking 
could not be true hand-works without a continuity, contiguity with a heart; and an eye too, 
inasmuch as it really reads, can establish this connexion in one way or another.626 
 Enquiring after the unrepeatable (“Nach / dem Unwiederholbaren, nach / ihm”) 
means, here, enquiring after everything (“nach / allem”). Everything that is less than it is, 
every thing that is more: 
 
alles ist weniger, als 
es ist, 
alles ist mehr.627  
 
The reading eye, the thinking finger enquires after all this, unrepeatable, unwritten too. 
Hamacher writes: “The metaphor of petrifying the unwritten into language, being itself writ-
ten, brings to light the fact that that it misses the unwritten.”628 But isn’t the second of inver-
sion the un-writing of metaphor? The gift of the heartbeat that may literally take a thousand 
years, going through the pause (syncope?), and yet, not missing the mark but hitting the eye, 
perhaps (which is an event not totally without violence, since it requires a transformation, 
transplantation of sorts), this movement of a figure, not only through Celan’s poetry, but 
through the “pause” (“mein Herz / ging durch die Pause”) and the troposphere like a meteor 
(an atmospheric phenomenon it is, literally), through “paths of breath” and through being 
“dwarfed, diminished, an- / nihilated, / deported and abject”, through being deformed by the 
eye of the other but also through becoming a heart, isn’t all this also a profound inversion of 
                                                 
625 Cf. Schulz’s commentary, p. 210. 
626 Cf. Celan’s “reading traces” and notes in La bibilothèque philosophique, p. 351, Nos. 155, p. 387, Nos. 726, 
731-733, pp. 392-410, esp. Nos. 823-824, 829, 831, concerning both the short version of “Was heißt Den-
ken?” and the book containing the lectures (2nd ed.: Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1961); as has already been noted, 
this volume was given to Celan by Heidegger after their first face-to-face encounter in Freiburg, July 24th, 
1967, and Celan was reading it at least in December 1969; he had read the first edition already fifteen years 
earlier and written many notes as well as a few lines of dedication (pp. 409-410, No. 1041) meant to be at-
tached to a book of his own that he would send to Heidegger; echoes of this inspiring reading experience 
can of course be found in the Bremen speech, as has often been observed. 
627 “Cello-Einsatz”, in TCA/Atemwende, p. 125 (loc. cit.). 




metaphor? An inversion of “conventional usage”, an expropriation underway towards reap-
propriation? 
 The poetic boomerang carries no message, no content, it imposes nothing but exposes 
itself (“La poésie ne s’impose plus, elle s’expose”)629  — “sets out for an other”, precisely as 
Hamacher says. It exposes itself as a projection of existence and preparation for an encounter 
that is always a self-encounter and homecoming, even at another time, at another’s time; a 
meridian. 
 The poet must pass through the narrow passage of the poem with his life, says Celan 
(“Gedichte sind Engpässe / ‘Du mußt hier hindurch, Leben’”). No doubt, this narrow pas-
sage is (also) the path of breath, Atemweg, respiratory duct. Poems are porous formations, as 
he also writes, and the form of the poem is a poet’s heart waiting for an encounter.630  The 
transformation required can be that of the reader’s too, of course, besides being required of 
the writer of the poem and besides being requested of the reader’s eye, transforming the other 
“I”, the one whose voice we may give back to the “silent consonant” through our own voice. 
But perhaps the first lesson in this school of humanity is to learn to respect the secret inherent 
to the poem, its not-quite-comprehensible character, the irreducible not-knowing and un-
bridgeable distance, the meteoric character of the poetic trace. And in spite of all appearances 
to the contrary, it is this asteroidal or meteoric character that resists the metaphorical under-
takings to the utmost. The meteor, the asteroid is the trope that would be carried ad absurdum 
— or rather, one of them all. It is a photoacoustic phenomenon, a voice without voice asking 
for us to give an eye that, while figuring or disfiguring or transforming him, still remains 
“picture-near and timestrong [bildnah und zeitstark]”, asking for us to trust him with his 
mouth and give him his new everyman’s hands: 
 
Erst wenn ich dich 
als Schatten berühre, 
glaubst du mir meinen 
Mund, 
 





du stößt zur Heerschar 
der Zweitverwerter unter 
den Engeln, 
 
                                                 
629 Mikrolithen, p. 58, No. 105 (GW 3:181); this “French maxim” is also cited by Hamacher, “The Second of 
Inversion”, trans. Jewett, p. 305. 
630 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 305: “Mit dem Gedicht, dem zeitoffenen, dem zeitdurchlässigen, dem porösen 
Gedicht steht sie [die Person] in die Zeit hinein. Zeit kann hier hinzutreten...” Cf. Mikrolithen, p. 108, No. 
180: “Gedichte sind poröse Gebilde: Das Leben strömt und sickert hier aus und ein, unberechenbar 







The meteoric, comet-like, asteroidal poems, even satellite- or spaceship-like poems that are 
still lehmgelb, clay-yellow by the colour of the light they emit, scarred eyes (Seh-/narben), 











ins Raumschiff gekerbt, 
betteln um Erden- 
münder.633 
 
Even in the apparent metaphors that have been launched into the air or beyond it, above the 
earth’s atmosphere, even there, notched into being carried by the spaceship with its calculated 
portion of oxygen, the poems need the earth’s air; they beg to be voiced by earth’s mouths, 
mortal voices. Even when the poetic images have been thrust about as unearthed metaphors, 
they carry the detached remnants of contiguity. Contiguity with earth and with mortality. 
Even a poem written by computer, Celan reportedly said, is a poem, and that is, an anti-
computer. 
 Without being able to answer the questions concerning “dunkler Tausendglanz” and 
“ein Eisdorn” and “auch wir”, in the poem “Schwirrhölzer”, in spite of these attempts at de-
ciphering the poem through materials and concordances, the ‘motif’ of resurrection, associ-
ated with the bullroarer and the truth that “brings tidings” through the roaring of the 
aerophone, can be bookmarked and followed elsewhere. And these connexions suggest cer-
tain connexions between certain corporealities, namely between the acoustic phenomena on 
the one hand, of which the human voice is one very specific type, and circumcision on the 
other. 
                                                 
631 Zeitgehöft (posthumous, 1976), GW 3:76. Cf. e.g. “Psalm”: “Niemand knetet uns wieder aus Erde und 
Lehm, / niemand bespricht unseren Staub.” (GW 1:225.) Cf. also above. 
632 The first strophe of the last poem of Die Niemandsrose (GW 1:290): 
 
 IN DER LUFT, da bleibt deine Wurzel, da, 
in der Luft. 
Wo sich das Irdische ballt, erdig, 
Atem-und-Lehm. 
 
633 Atemwende, GW 2:71. Note the difference between “umhergestoßene” here and “hingestoßen zu dir” in 





“ T H E  T R O P I C  O F  C I R C U M C I S I O N ”  
 Following on from Derrida’s Shibboleth: For Paul Celan 634 
 
 
Tzippora took a flint and cut off her son’s foreskin, she touched it to his legs and said: 
Indeed, a bridegroom of blood are you to me!635   
 
By giving the present chapter the title “The Tropic of Circumcision”, I do not want to be too 
abusive. It is not so much “the distasteful and embarrassing subjects of circumcision, blood, 
and foreskins”636  that I wish to touch upon. But perhaps it would actually be even more abu-
sive and more distasteful to treat the topic of circumcision and the term itself only as a trope, 
as wordplay, regardless of its reference to the literal mutilation of the human body. I do not 
want to be abusive in either way: so I should find a third way besides the literal and the figu-
rative, a tropic beyond this dichotomy. For a ‘tropic’ it is after all, a deviation from the ordi-
nary usage of the word ‘circumcision’, inasmuch as we shall be speaking of a circumcision of 
the word. But the question we shall have to ask, following Derrida, is: “What is literality in 
this case?”637 
 The words between quotation marks in my title, “The Tropic of Circumcision”, are 
actually borrowed from Jacques Derrida’s first essay on Paul Celan’s poetry, Schibboleth — 
pour Paul Celan (1986). More specifically, the expression appears in the seventh and con-
                                                 
634 I presented an earlier version of the present chapter at the annual conference of The International Associa-
tion for Philosophy and Literature, in Nicosia, Cyprus, June 6th, 2007. The overall topic of the IAPL 2007 
conference was Layering: Textual, Visual, Spatial, Temporal, and the “Invited Symposium” where I pre-
sented was titled “Palimpsests of Poetry: Philosophy and / as / in Poetry”. The discussions during and after 
the panel proved very fruitful. I am especially grateful to Chris Bremmers, Carrol Clarkson, Volker Kaiser, 
Artemy Magun, Martin Jörg Schäfer, Jarkko Toikkanen, and last but not least, Merle Williams. 
635 Exodus 4:25, trans. Everett Fox, The Five Books of Moses: Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteron-
omy (The Schocken Bible, Vol. 1), a new translation with introductions, commentary, and notes by Everett 
Fox (New York: Schocken Books, 2000). For a brief theological (and in the last analysis, typological) inter-
pretation of the passage, cf. Ronald B. Allen, “The ‘Bloody Bridegroom’ in Exodus 4:24-26”, Bibliotheca 
Sacra 153 (July-September 1996): 259-69. Tzippora (Zipporah) appears to “dislike” the rite of circumcision 
but, caught in a double bind, decides to perform it on her son in order to save her husband’s life when God 
is about to kill Moses, apparently because “Moses was guilty of not carrying out circumcision in his own 
family, yet he was the one who was to lead the circumcised nation of Israel from Egypt to the promised 
land” (Allen, p. 266). Some interpreters have taken “his legs” or “his feet” to refer to Moses’, some to the 
baby boy’s legs or feet, some to Yahweh’s “legs” or “feet”, which could be “a euphemism for the male 
genitalia” (Allen, p. 268n32); on these ‘extremities’, cf. my discussion below concerning the word Gottes-
gemächt (“god-like loins”, Felstiner translates; I would prefer, in need of a better term, “god’s-loins”) in a 
poem by Celan. 
636 Cf. Allen, “The ‘Bloody Bridegroom’”, p. 260. By the term ‘abusive’, I would like to refer to the polysemy 
of  this adjective, ranging from “1. Wrongly used, perverted, misapplied, improper: in Rhetoric, catachres-
tic” to “5. Employing or containing bad language or insult; scurrilous, reproachful” (OED, 50000977, last 
accessed Sept. 14th, 2007). 
637 Derrida, “Shibboleth: For Paul Celan”, trans. Joshua Wilner revised by Thomas Dutoit, in Derrida, Sover-
eignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham 




cluding chapter of the essay, where the topic announced already at the outset returns more 
emphatically and occupies the thematic foreground: “Only one time: circumcision takes place 
only once” (Sovereignties in Question, p. 1).638   
 Shibboleth, the essay for Paul Celan, is not only an essay about shibboleth (or shibbo-
leths) and “what one sometimes [parfois] calls a date” (p. 2), but also about the “only once” 
and the circumcision which obviously “takes place only once”, as Derrida affirms. But right 
away he continues, faithfully to his idiom, introducing an element of doubt concerning this 
evidence: “Such at least is the appearance given to us” (p. 1; cf. p. 53). And yet, several pages 
later, he seems to concede that “a birth or a circumcision takes place only once, nothing could 
be more self-evident”. But he also affirms that it is indeed a “revenance of impossible return” 
(p. 18) that his essay is concerned with.639  It is precisely a question of the “resistance that 
once [une fois] may offer to thought” (p. 1).  
 How could there be a “one time” that would escape the mentioned revenance or repe-
tition (or perhaps Nachträglichkeit), how could “one time” escape being offered to the other 
time, the other’s time? “Only once”, “one time”: this uniquity is perhaps unthinkable, the un-
thinkable itself. But on the other hand, every repetition, everything “repeatable” — and that 
is, everything, everything thinkable and the thinkable everything, and also the tropes and im-
ages that demand to be “verified” or “perceived” (Wahrgenommen) and, at once, “carried ad 
absurdum” as tropes and metaphors, “always again only for once [immer wieder einmal]” — 
take place “After / the unrepeatable, after / it, after / everything [Nach / dem Unwiederhol-
baren, nach / ihm, nach / allem]”. Another poem, also quoted by Derrida, states: “alles ist 
weniger, als / es ist, / alles ist mehr”; “everything is less than / it is, / everything is more”.640 
 Let us try to uncover or analyse some of the connections in this configuration or com-
plex that joins (or perhaps ‘layers’) together, as into a palimpsest, the date, circumcision, 
shibboleth, and the unrepeatable “only once”. 
 
 
“TO STAND, IN THE SHADOW...” 
 
The unique, the unrepeatable may be unthinkable, just as it is impossible to speak of singular-
ity or solitude without at once betraying it.641  It is perhaps the unthinkable itself, I just said; it 
                                                 
638  “Une seule fois : la circoncision n’a lieu qu’une fois.” (Schibboleth, p. 11; cf. pp. 97 ff.) The expression 
“tropic of circumcision” appears as such at least twice in Derrida’s text, on pages 98 and 100 of the French 
original (i.e. on pp. 54, 55 in Sovereignties in Question). 
639 Sovereignties in Question, p. 18. Emphasis added to the word revenance; this is a French word introduced, 
without italics, into the English terminology by the translators of “Shibboleth”, as it seems; however, cf. 
OED, entry “revenant, n.2 (and a.)” (50205293; last accessed Sept. 14th, 2007). 
640 Celan, GW 1:251-2, GW 2:225; trans. Michal Hamburger, modified by Wilner and Dutoit; cf. Sovereignties 
in Question, pp. 3, 190; 38, 198. 
641 The word “alone” is, as Blanchot once wrote, “as common as the word bread”: “Un écrivain qui écrit : « Je 
suis seul » ou comme Rimbaud : « Je suis réellement d’outre-tombe » peut se juger assez comique. Il est 
comique de prendre consience de sa solitude en s’adressant à un lecteur et par des moyens qui empêchent 




is unthinkable as such. But on the other hand, the unrepeatable may, at the same time, be that 
which calls for thinking in the form of commemoration, for thinking in the form of thanking 
(these are Heideggerian themes famously adopted by Celan in his Bremen speech of 1958, 
but also continued in the 1960 Meridian speech), inasmuch as we are dealing with something 
analogous to the aporetics of the gift. In order that there be a gift, it must not be recognized as 
a gift, as Derrida has argued; a gift must not present itself as such, and Celan’s words of 
thanks are loaded, “enriched” with an ambivalence that is not simple irony. A commemora-
tion of the immemorial, bearing witness to that which no one bears witness to.642  Thinking 
does not always happen in the realm of knowledge and memory is not always representation. 
“The date,” Derrida writes, “must conceal within itself some stigma of singularity if it is to 
last longer than that which it commemorates — and this lasting is the poem.” (Sovereignties, 
p. 20.) 
 In the seventh and final chapter of Shibboleth, Derrida returns more closely to the 
theme of circumcision, announced at the very outset of the essay. He points out that “in the 
literality of its word (Beschneidung), circumcision appears rarely in Celan’s text” (p. 54). To 
my knowledge, the verb is used only once in Celan’s corpus, in a poem we shall soon return 
to. But the “tropic” of this topic “disposes cuts, caesuras, ciphered alliances, and wounded 
rings throughout the text” (ibid.). One of Derrida’s examples is the occurrence of the word 
Wundgelesenes (“wound-read”) in one of the Atemwende poems; instead of that, I will try to 
say a few words about the poem that precedes it in the  book (GW 2:23):643 
 
STEHEN, im Schatten 







                                                                                                                                                        
9.) No doubt, the Hegelian “dialectic of sense-certainty” imposes itself even here: as soon as I utter “I am 
alone”, my solitude is put into question. (As he often does, Derrida alludes to Hegel’s discussion of 
sinnliche Gewissheit also in “Shibboleth”; Sovereignties in Question, p. 40.) On the solitude of the poem, 
with reference to Celan’s Meridian speech, cf. Schibboleth, pp. 23, 25 (Sovereignties, pp. 9, 10). 
642 For the patently Heideggerian themes of commemoration and thinking as thanking, cf. Celan’s Bremen 
speech (GW 3:185-186: »eingedenk sein«, »Andenken«, etc.; this gratitude must be related to the word also 
in quotation marks, »angereichert«, towards the end of the speech, meaning “enriched”; not all these quota-
tion marks are necessarily ironical, however), “Der Meridian” (GW 3:196: “eingedenk bleiben”); Derrida, 
Sovereignties..., p. 40: “a commemoration without whose enunciation [sic?] no event would ever take place 
[sans l’annonce de laquelle aucun événement jamais n’aurait lieu]” (Schibboleth, p. 73). Commemoration 
or its “announcement” (l’annonce should here be translated as “announcement” rather than “enunciation”, I 
think) indeed arrives before the event, as its condition of possibility — and, at once, impossibility. For the 
verses on bearing witness, see Celan’s poem “Aschenglorie” (GW 2:72) and Derrida, Sovereignties..., pp. 
65-96. On the gift, cf. esp. Derrida, Donner le temps 1 : La fausse monnaie (Paris: Galilée, 1991). 
643 Trans. John Felstiner: “TO STAND, in the shadow / of a scar in the air. // Stand-for-no-one-and-nothing. / 
Unrecognized, / for you / alone. // With all that has room within it, / even without / language.” (Selected Po-









Wundenmal instead of Denkmal: instead of a memorial or monument, [das] Wundenmal in 
der Luft: a stigma, a scar in the air — or the stigma, the scar, with a definite article. The noun 
Mal, the second constituent of the compound word Wundenmal, does not only mean a visible 
token or sign, a visible mark (such as a boundary stone or a tombstone), a stain or patch or 
blemish, a scar or stigma, but Mal means also a point in time (Zeitpunkt);644  also time in the 
sense of ‘one time’, ‘once’, ‘twice’, and so on: einmal, zweimal, dreimal. 
 But how on earth could a scar, let us say the scar of circumcision, hover in the air, if 
not by some strange trope? And would it be just a wordplay if we take the Mal out of Wun-
denmal and recall, not only Denkmal and so on, but also Muttermal, namely mole or birth-
mark, the mother’s mark, as the word suggests? 
 One’s voice is carried through the air, borne by the air.645  Voice, articulation, and 
pronunciation are, roughly speaking, produced by the movement of air passing through the 
organs of speech — and these organs of speech are precisely what is formed, ‘cut into shape’, 
so to say, trained like any muscle to learn a certain coordination, by learning the mother 
tongue in early childhood, in order to pronounce the native language in the right way. This 
learning and practise and formation makes the correct pronunciation of the domestic pho-
nemes possible, but it also more or less excludes an indefinite wealth of foreign phonemes 
and their combinations, and the original state of the infant, for whom there were, at least in 
principle, unlimited possibilities of learning to speak any human language without foreign 
accent and to cope with its phonetic codes, becomes soon practically impossible to regain. 
 Shibboleth is originally “The Hebrew word used by Jephthah as a test-word with 
which to distinguish the fleeing Ephraimites [...] from his own men the Gileadites” (OED).646  
The semantic dimension of the word, meaning originally an “ear of corn” or a “stream in 
flood”, plays practically no role with regard to its function: the Ephraimites could not pro-
nounce ‘shibboleth’ but rather said ‘sibboleth’. The vocable became a matter of life and death 
                                                 
644 Let us remember that in the Meridian and the manuscript notes Celan writes that the poem has only this one 
and unique point in time: “das Gedicht selbst hat ja immer nur diese eine, einmalige, punktuelle Gegenwart” 
(TCA/Meridian, Endf. 36; GA 3, 198-199). 
645 When we encounter the word Luft (“air”) or the expression “in der Luft” (“in the air”) in Celan, as in the 
Meridian speech for example, it seems often very relevant to say we are dealing with breath, speech, lan-
guage, and sometimes with uprooted language (“In der Luft, da bleibt deine Wurzel, da, / in der Luft.” 
GW 1:290; cf. “Radix, Matrix,” GW 1:239). Let us also remember that Celan said that the only tomb or 
monument for his mother is in the poem “Todesfuge” — in the poem, in the song, in the air — in which a 
grave is  being dug into the air, in the song (GW 3:63-4). 
646 This original meaning — or rather function — of the word has been transferred, as the OED tells us, into 
any “word or sound which a person is unable to pronounce correctly; a word used as a test for detecting for-
eigners, or persons from another district, by their pronunciation”; and further, it has come to mean “A pecu-




for those who “could not frame to pronounce it right”, as it is said in the King James version 
of the passage in the Book of Judges.647   
 As Derrida notes, words meaning circumcision appear seldom in Paul Celan’s poetry, 
at least in the explicit form of the noun and verb Beschneidung, beschneiden. The poem 
“Einem, der vor der Tür Stand”, Celan’s only poem, as far as I know, where this verb literally 
appears, speaks of circumcising the word. The verb literally appears in this expression which 
seems all but literal: “beschneide das Wort”, “circumcise the word”. 
 To speak of circumcising the word appears to be metaphorical; the term referring to 
the mutilation of an infant’s genitals seems to be transferred to mean something more harm-
less than this painful operation on the flesh. But circumcision, also the mutilation of the body 
that is done as a “token of the covenant”, “seal of the covenant” (the Hebrew term translated 
also as “rite of circumcision” or “covenant of circumcision”, is transliterated as brit milah or 
berit milah), is always, among other things, a circumcision of the word. 
 Circumcision is always already “of the word”. The Latinic word tends to obfuscate 
this, just as the Greek peritomia, these unfaithful translations acting as if the consecrated op-
eration could be reduced to the “carnal”648  meaning of  “cutting round”. Here is how Derrida 
circumscribes the “minimal semantic network” as he says, the “at least three significations” 
associated with circumcision in the Jewish traditions: 
 
    1. La coupure, qui entaille le sexe mâle, l’entame et tourne autour de lui, formant 
un anneau circonvenant.  
    2. Un nom donné au moment de l’alliance et de l’entrée légitime dans la commun-
auté : schibboleth qui coupe et partage, puis distingue par exemple, en vertu du lan-
gage et du nom donné, une circoncision d’une autre, l’opération égyptienne dont on 
dit qu’elle dérive, voire l’opération musulmane qui lui ressemble, ou tant d’autres en-
core.  
    3. L’expérience de la bénédiction et de la purification. [Schibboleth, pp. 99-100.]649 
 
The fact that Derrida associates with circumcision the shibboleth, namely the password 
whose signification is insignificant while its signifying form, its correct pronunciation makes 
                                                 
647 “And the Gileadites took the passages of Jordan before the Ephraimites: and it was so, that when those Eph-
raimites which were escaped said, Let me go over; that the men of Gilead said unto him, Art thou an Eph-
raimite? If he said, Nay; / Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could 
not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him at the passages of Jordan: and there fell 
at that time of the Ephraimites forty and two thousand.” (Judges 12:5-6; King James Bible.) 
648 Only at the very last stage of the final revision of the present chapter and the whole dissertation, I discov-
ered a truly marvellous article by Daniel Boyarin, “‘This We Know to Be the Carnal Israel’: Circumcision 
and the Erotic Life of God and Israel” (Critical Inquiry, Vol. 18, No. 3 [Spring, 1992], pp. 474-505), a most 
powerful articulation of the traditional dualism of “carnal” and “spiritual” which has entrenched the border-
line between Judaism and Christianism ever since Saint Paul and Saint Augustine. 
649 Trans. Wilner and Dutoit (p. 55): “1. The cut, which incises the male sexual member, cuts into it, then turns 
around it to form a circumvenient ring; / 2. A name given to the moment of covenant or alliance and of le-
gitimate entry into the community: a shibboleth that cuts and partitions, then distinguishes, for example, by 
virtue of the language and the name given to each of them, one circumcision from another, the Jewish op-
eration from the Egyptian from which it is said to derive, or, indeed, the Muslim operation that resembles it, 




all the difference, and also the linguistic distinction involved in naming the operation, already 
suggests that the circumcision has something to do with language. And indeed, in the seventh 
and final chapter of Schibboleth, it is a question of a “tropic of circumcision”, and the tropic 
extension of Marina Tsvetayeva’s phrase “All poets are Jews”, cited by Celan, in Russian, as 
an epigraph to one of his poems in the book Die Niemandsrose (“Und mit dem Buch aus Ta-
russa”, GW 1:287), the tropic extension that eventually comes down to “locating the Jew not 
only as a poet but also in every man circumcised by language or led to circumcise a language 
[tout homme circoncis par la langue ou porté à circoncire une langue]” (Sovereignties, p. 
54).650  Every man, and by the same tropic movement, every woman too, is circumcised, says 
Derrida. It is a question of names, the circumcision of names: “But does one ever circumcise 
without circumcising a word? a name? And how can one circumcise a name without touching 
upon the body?” It is a question, here, of being carnally marked and, “at once endowed with 
and deprived of singularity”, since the inscription of a “proper name” marking the locus of 
singularity, the “proper body”, also inscribes the named “in a network of other marks” (pp. 
54-55).651 
 A (human) community is always a speaking community, a linguistic community. The 
entry into a community is an entry into a network of marks, across a line of demarcation 
marked by a shibboleth. Circumcision is, I repeat, always already “of the word”: it is a sign of 
the covenant and marks the entry into the speaking community. Circumcision is always al-
ready of the lips, of the tongue, of the heart too. The entry into the community circumcises 
the body, quite corporeally (but this is said neither metaphorically nor literally, at least if we 
understand by ‘metaphor’ the spiritual translatio and by ‘literal’ the common parlance): the 
speech organs are formed, by this entry, from the moment that one becomes a member in a 
linguistic group (not only as receiving a name but also as being determined to speak a given 
language) and eventually, as the child learns his or her mother tongue, the pronunciation of 
certain phonemes is facilitated and others, the foreign ones, are excluded by something that 
would seem like a law of nature, but which rather overwrites the distinction between nature 
and culture. Thus the circumcision that pertains to one nation and linguistic group, naming 
the operation in their own way or not naming it at all, since the circumcision of the tongue or 
                                                 
650 Cf. Sovereignties, p. 50; Schibboleth, p.  99. Cf. p. 100: “Juif peut être quiquonque, ou personne. Juif, nom 
de personne, le seul. La circoncision de personne.” 
651 On being “marked”, cf. Boyarin, “This We Know to Be the Carnal Israel”, p. 494: “The word Zion [Hebrew 
Tsiyyon] is taken as a noun derived from the root ts / y / n [to be marked], and accordingly the Daughters of 
Tsiyyon are read as the circumcised men of Israel.” Reading Boyarin’s article, Freud’s remarks on circum-
cision as a “surrogate” of castration certainly impose themselves (cf. below). — A reader’s unpleasant sur-
prise, comparable to the discovery of, say, Baudelaire’s violent antisemitism, must be mentioned here, also 
with reference to Freud’s problematic notions of homosexuality that are displayed also in his texts concern-
ing the castration complex. Judging by a few of the recently published “theoretical and critical fragments” 
and memoranda, Celan seems to have entertained a peculiar paranoid homophobia; cf. Mikrolithen, No. 
200.5: “Das Tot- und Zuschandeschwätzen meines Namens: die Rache der Homosexuellen an dem in an-
dern Lager Stehenden, der ein Dichter ist, anders als sie. Daher mein wahnsinniggesprochener Meridian, in 





lips is always there, regardless of whether the ritualistic circumcision is present in the soci-
ety’s cultural practices or not, or whether the circumcision happens only in the name, so to 
say, merely tropically but as a trope that always concerns the body in one way or the other, 
this particular circumcision, as the distinctive mark of the members of a community, always 
already names the shibboleth against the clumsy sibboleth of the “uncircumcised” for-
eigner.652  The word meant death to the ones with uncircumcised lips or tongue. 
 “What is literality in this case?” we asked with Derrida. The literal or original mean-
ing of circumcision, or brit milah, cannot be restricted to the “consecrated operation that con-
sists [of] excising the foreskin”; rather, there is a plurality of significations already in the 
Jewish bible, as Derrida points out. 
 
Je ne suis pas ici en mesure d’aborder la question de la charge sémantique de la cir-
concision ; je ne dénombrerai pas tous les usages que le riche lexique de la circonci-
sion peut autoriser dans la langue des Écritures, bien au-delà de l’opération consacrée 
qui consiste à exciser le prépuce. La « spiritualisation », comme on dit souvent, 
l’intériorisation qui consiste à étendre le sens du mot bien au-delà de l’entaille char-
nelle ne date pas de Saint Paul, elle ne se limite pas à la circoncision de l’âme ou du 
cœur. [Schibboleth, p. 99.]653 
 
The “carnal” circumcision is indeed pregnant with the “spiritual”, the visible with the invisi-
ble.654  Or, on the other hand, the cut in the vulnerable flesh of the infant is always already 
verbal. But we must also, chiasmatically, turn the trope the other way around: “in all of what 
we are calling its tropic dimensions,” Derrida writes, “circumcision remains a matter of the 
senses and of the body.” (Sovereignties, p. 59.) Before Saint Paul, the Bible already speaks of 
                                                 
652 For me, if I am allowed to speak from personal experience for a moment, the word circumcision is itself a 
shibboleth. As a non-native speaker of English, as an uncircumcised foreigner in most respects, whose 
mother tongue is Finnish, the English word ‘circumcision’ is relatively difficult to pronounce; the French 
circoncision is for me, personally, much easier for some reason. 
653 Trans. Wilner and Dutoit: “I am not in a position here to take up the question of the semantic charge of cir-
cumcision; I will not enumerate all the usages that the rich lexicon of circumcision may authorize in the 
language of the Scriptures, well beyond the consecrated operation that consists in excising the foreskin. The 
‘spiritualization,’ as one often says, the interiorization that consists in extending the meaning of the word 
well beyond the sense of the cut into the flesh does not date from Saint Paul; it is not limited to the circum-
cision of the soul or the heart.” (Sovereignties in Question, p. 55.) The philological questions concerning the 
Hebrew expression traditionally translated as “uncircumcised lips” (the Hebrew is sometimes transliterated 
as aral sefatayim) are all but simple, as it seems: some have claimed that the translation implies a false ety-
mology and that aral only means “obstructed”, or in this case, “impeded speech”. But of course, the ‘error’ 
is at least as old as the texts of the New Testament where Paul introduces the “inwardly circumcised Jew” 
(these are Marx’s words adopted by Slavoj Žižek; in his Epistle to the Romans [2:29] Paul states: “He is a 
Jew, that is one inwardly: and the circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter”). And on 
the other hand, it seems that the foreskin itself has been considered an ‘obstruction’ in the cultures where 
male circumcision is or has been performed. 
654 The word ‘pregnant’ is often used in this sense by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and as we have already seen, in 
one of his working notes he uses it in affirming Heidegger’s anti-metaphoric argument; cf. Le Visible et 
l’Invisible (repr. 2006), pp. 265-266. En. trans. The Visible and the Invisible, Followed by Working Notes, 




circumcised or uncircumcised tongues, lips, ears and hearts; it is certainly not only the Chris-
tian who is “inwardly circumcised”.655 
 The circumcision of a word is always “an event of the body”, as Derrida writes, and 
he continues: “There is an essential analogy between this event, on the one hand, and the dia-
critical difference between shibboleth and sibboleth, on the other.” (Sovereignties, p. 59.) The 
‘essentiality’ in this analogy resides in the fact that it is not a question of a mere resemblance 
or proportional relation of relations, but a more ‘substantial’ connection, if we may say so, 
between these phenomena. It is the “already cultivated body”, as Derrida writes, the proper 
body which has been cultivated in a certain way, more or less once-and-for-all, that con-
demns the Ephraimites; their word is not properly circumcised; they say sibboleth and thus 
reveal their uncircumcised organs of speech. A fatal impotence in the hands of an enemy.656 
 
 
“YOUR EYES SAW MY UNFORMED BODY” 657 
 
Here is finally the poem in which the term of circumcision appears explicitly and around 
which the final chapter of Derrida’s Schibboleth revolves: 
 
                                                 
655 “J’ai cité cette « alliance » [the Covenant of Jehovah] de Blake pour souligner que, dans toutes ses dimen-
sions dites tropiques, la circoncision reste une chose des sens et du corps. Elle se donne à écrire et à lire sur 
le corps. Plutôt : le sens des sens, le corps se donne à penser, signifier, interpréter ainsi, depuis cette réponse 
à la question « qu’est-ce que le corps propre, dit propre? » : un lieu de circoncision. / Avant saint Paul 
[Rom. 2:25-29], la Bible donnait à lire la circoncision ou l’incirconcision des lèvres, c’est-à-dire, dans cette 
langue, de la langue (Exode, 6 : 12, 30), des oreilles (Jérémie, 6 : 10) et du cœur (Levitique, 26 : 41)” 
(Schibboleth, pp. 105-106).  
656 “La circoncision d’une parole doit ainsi s’entendre comme un événement du corps. Analogie essentielle 
entre cet événement, d’une part, la différence diacritique entre schibboleth et sibboleth, d’autre part. C’est 
dans le corps, en raison d’une certaine impuissance advenue de leur organe vocal, mais d’une impuissance 
du corps propre, du corps déjà cultivé, limité par une barrière non organique, non naturelle, que les 
Éphramites ressentaient leur inaptitude à prononcer ce qu’ils savaient pourtant devoir être prononcé schib-
boleth — et non sibboleth.” (Schibboleth, p. 106.) Saint Paul’s emphasis on the circumcision of the heart is 
not such a distinctive mark as the Christian tradition would have sometimes had it: it just spiritualizes, and 
thus metaphorizes, the characteristic that always already belonged to the “semantic charge of circumcision”, 
to the apparently ‘carnal’ and ‘outward’ operation. But at the same time, the always corporeal aspect of the 
entry into covenant and community becomes obfuscated. Circumcision in the flesh and the allegedly pri-
mary, spiritual circumcision are contemporaneous, ‘equiprimordial’ indeed — they happen ‘at once’, at one 
and the same time. The circumcision of the heart (the heart does not only metaphorically name the inner-
most recess of man’s body, its literality is not only that of a muscle pumping blood), the circumcision of the 
lips and ears (it is well known that people cannot always distinguish the diacritical differences of pronuncia-
tion in a foreign language; therefore the impotence of the Ephraimites need not have been only a defect of 
the speech organs in the strict sense, but may have been a defect of the ‘ear’, the ‘inner ear’ as indistin-
guishable from the ‘outer’ in this respect), coincide perfectly — and most painfully — with each other and 
with their ‘spiritual’ counterpart in the ritual mutilation of a child’s body that happens in the name of God 
and his covenant. 
657 Psalm 139:16 (New International Version). Cf. Daniel Boyarin’s quotation of this verse from Midrash Rab-




EINEM, DER VOR DER TÜR STAND, eines 
Abends: 
ihm 
tat ich mein Wort auf –: zum 
Kielkropf sah ich ihn trotten, zum 
halb- 
schürigen, dem 
im kotigen Stiefel des Kriegsknechts 
geborenen Bruder, dem 









beschneide das Wort, 
diesem 
schreib das lebendige 
Nichts ins Gemüt, 
diesem 
spreize die zwei 




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Wirf auch die Abendtür zu, Rabbi. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
Reiß die Morgentür auf, Ra- –658 
                                                 
658 Die Niemandsrose, GW 1:242-243. Trans. John Felstiner (Selected..., p. 171):  
  
TO ONE WHO STOOD BEFORE THE DOOR, one 
evening: 
 
to him I opened my word —: toward the 
clod I saw him trot, toward 
the half- 
baked  
brother born in a  
doughboy’s dung-caked boot, 
him with his god- 
like loins all 
bloody, the  
chittering manikin.  
 








We have several personae here; their number is not immediately clear. Rabbi Loew is named: 
he is the one who created the Golem of Prague, according to the well-known legend from the 
sixteenth or seventeenth century. So we may indeed suppose that the Golem is also somehow 
present in the poem. But is the “one who stood before the door” the Golem or the Rabbi or 
perhaps the prophet Elijah who is expected to be present at the rite of circumcision? Is the 
“changeling [Kielkropf]” to be identified with the figure of the golem, or are there perhaps 
two or three malformed creatures here, the “clod” or “changeling”, namely the “chittering 
manikin”, on the one hand, the “one who stood before the door” and trotted toward the 
“brother”, on the other, and the rabbi with his “two cripplefingers”? And perhaps even the 
speaker has a speech impediment, “gnashing” his words out to the Rabbi? Perhaps even he 
has, at least momentarily, “uncircumcised lips”, resembling Moses in this respect? 659 
 The “clod”,660 a changeling, here a baby boy as it seems, “half- / baked / brother born 
in a / doughboy’s dung-caked boot”, as Felstiner puns, borne in a boot instead of a womb, as 
it seems, a soldier’s, a mercenary’s dung-caked boot. The word Kielkropf may suggest that 
this “child of clay” is craw-throated, malformed by struma, and there is a common supersti-
tion according to which a changeling is unable to speak and produces only inarticulate noises. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 For this one — 
circumcise his word, 
for this one 
scribe the living  
Nothing on his soul, 
for this one 
spread your two  
cripplefingers in the hale- 
making blessing. 
For this one. 
 
 ............... 
 Slam the evening door shut, Rabbi. 
 ................. 
 Fling the morning door open, Ra- — 
 
In the several drafts of the poem (cf. BCA 6.2:157-162) the most notable differences compared to the final 
published version are the title, in French and apparently suggesting a circumstantial, biographical motiva-
tion, of the first known draft, “Que sont mes amis devenus?”, and the fact that in several draft versions Celan 
wrote “heil- / bringenden Fluch” (“hale- / making curse”, or “malediction” or “blasphemy”) instead of 
“Spruch”. Cf. also Wiedemann’s commentary in DGKG, pp. 688-689. 
659 Cf. Ex. 6:12. On Moses’ “uncircumcised lips”, see the brilliant essay by Marc Shell, “Moses’ Tongue”, 
Common Knowledge 12:1 (2006), pp. 150-176. — I capitalize the word Golem now and then, since it is 
primarily, through the association with Rabbi Loew who is explicitly named, a question of the Golem of 
Prague and, in a certain sense, a character in the ‘scenario’ of the poem, and the name is not always generic 
here; in Hebrew, in the Torah, the word golem has its generic application, as we have already seen. Some-
times the Golem of Prague (associated with Rabbi Loew) has a first name too: he is called Joseph Golem; 
cf. Chayim Bloch, Golem: Legends of the Ghetto of Prague, trans. Harry Schneiderman (Whitefish: 
Kessinger, 1997), p. 69 et passim; this is a translation of Der Prager Golem, 1919. 
660 Cf. OED, entry “clod, n.”: “4. fig. Applied depreciatively to the human body as being a mass of ‘clay’; also 




According to some popular variants of the golem legend, the man-made monster could not 
speak; its soul had vitality but not rationality, or it lacked “the true soul, neshama”, that could 
only be given by God.661 
 A circumcision of the word is beseeched for this infant brother, this changeling — left 
in exchange in the boot, in exchange for the soldier’s real son, perhaps — this “clod” whose 
throat is malformed and who can only “chitter”, “twitter [schilpen]”. And who is of inferior 
wool, only half-woollen in a very specific sense which is not linsey-woolsey: the adjective 
halbschürig designates, normally, the wool that has been sheared after only a half-year’s 
growth. But here this bucolic term must be related — 
 




— namely, with the loins not necessarily “god-like”, as Felstiner translates, but bloody and 
belonging to God in another sense, “consecrated to God” as Otto Pöggeler observes;662  it 
seems that the “loins”, Gemächte, have already been cut in order to mark the entry into cove-
nant and community, the order of God as the order of the community, bleeding but still only 
half-sheared, perhaps because lacking the operation on the word which the Rabbi is be-
seeched to perform, the inscription of the living Nothing in the infant’s heart. The blood-
stained god’s-loins (“Gottes-/gemächt”), namely the exterior mark of the covenant, does not 
suffice: the scene is painfully comical, with an emphasis on the word ‘painful’ — almost like 
                                                 
661 For a scholarly historical exposition of the evolution of the Golem legend, see Gershom Scholem, Zur Kab-
bala und ihrer Symbolik (Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1960), pp. 209-259, here p. 251 (i.e. “Fünftes Kapitel: Die 
Vorstellung vom Golem in ihren tellurischen und magischen Beziehungen”; the sentence quoted is my 
translation); for a popular account, cf. Chayim Bloch, Golem (here esp. p. 200). The word Kielkropf is more 
or less untranslatable and its ancient etymology seems unclear. The Grimm dictionary refers to the specula-
tions which associate Kiel with Kehle (throat) rather than with the usual meanings of this word, as either 
quill or keel, or with Quelle (fountain), and thus this word Kiel together with the word usually meaning 
struma or goitre, Kropf, would add up to designate the malformed child as craw-throated, malformed by 
struma, but these surmises are denounced by the editors in favour of the meaning of Kropf in the Bavarian 
and Suabian dialects, in which it means a midget. Cf. DWB: “KIELKROPF, m. misgeburt, als teufelskind 
(zwergkind), 'wechselbalg' gedacht, [...] 5)  den ursprung von kielkropf vermutete FRISCH 1, 513c in ahd. 
chelckropf struma (sp. 504). ADELUNG gibt sogar als erste bed. 'kropf an der kehle, bes. sofern er von 
kindern mit auf die welt gebracht wird', er denkt an kehle; das sieht aber aus wie der erklärung zu liebe 
hineingelegt, von kielkropf als kropf find ich sonst nichts, allerdings von kröpfen als zeichen der 
wechselbälge; bair. und schwäb. bezeichnet aber kropf allein einen verwachsenen menschen, zwerg” (Bd. 
11 Sp. 680ff). Cf. Peter Horst Neumann’s commentary on the poem: “Im Volksaberglauben ist der 
Kielkropf ohne Sprache, er kann nur Laute ausstoßen” (“Einem, der vor der Tür stand”, in Jürgen Lehmann, 
ed., Kommentar zu Paul Celans »Die Niemandsrose« [Heidelberg: Winter, 1997], 173-177, here p. 176). 
Celan probably read the entry on Kielkropf  in Grimm, and also knew this popular superstition, which might 
actually be considered as an objection to Grimm’s etymological reasoning. Kielkropf may well designate a 
malformation of the throat, namely one of the parts of the body needed to produce speech. Actually this is 
more or less confirmed by some of the Meridian fragments: “Das Krummnasige. Krummsprachige. 
Kielkröpfige” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 130; cit. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, DGKG, p. 689). 
662 “Der Ausdruck ‘Gottesgemächt’ meint nicht das Gemächt Gottes, sondern das Gemächt, das Gott geweiht 
ist” (Der Stein hinterm Aug: Studien zu Celans Gedichten [München: Fink, 2000], 111). This is part of Pög-
geler’s counter-critique to Jean Bollack, who has interpreted the poem partly in terms of the myth  of 




the accidental circumcision of Tristram Shandy by the falling sash window — with all the 
openings and shuttings of the door (perhaps associated with the values of entry and exclusion 
inherent also in the distinction between the circumcised and the uncircumcised, between the 
shibboleth and the Ephraimites’ sibboleth?), with everything apparently only half-done, as if 
in a hurry. 
 The compound word divided by a line break, Gottes-/gemächt, does not, of course, 
refer only to Gemächte, the “loins” or genitalia, but also to anything God-created, “man, the 
world and everything”, as the Grimm dictionary explains.663  We may now see that this essen-
tial ambiguity joining the “loins” and Creation actually supports Felstiner’s decision to render 
the compound as “god- / like loins”: the allusion to man’s being made in God’s image is not 
so far-fetched after all, and it opens a whole new dimension, a new complex of relations to-
ward which a reading of the poem could be opened.664 The ambiguity is essential, just as it 
might be in “possibly the most perplexing passage in all the Torah”,665 already cited as our 
epigraph, where we are not actually told whose feet Zipporah touches with her baby boy’s 
bloody, circumcised foreskin, the boy’s own, Moses’, or Yahweh’s. But when we deal with 
this ‘likeness’, we are perhaps not dealing with metaphors (not even the “originary metaphor” 
sometimes referred to by the ‘early’ Derrida), but rather with another kind of Übertragung 
(“transference”), with condensations and displacements; the discourse on the castration com-
plex is not far when we deal with circumcision (which is of course, in Freud’s view, a “surro-
gate” for castration). But let us return closer to the ‘interior’ of the poem — as if we could 
ever rigorously distinguish between what is ‘intrinsic’ and what is ‘extrinsic’ here, while 
there is good reason to suggest that the poem’s scene of circumcision alludes even, among 
other things, to Freud’s “History of an Infantile Neurosis”, and especially the chapter on cas-
tration complex.666 
 The cutting of the exterior foreskin has been performed, judging by the blood on the 
“god’s-loins”, but the circumcision of the “heart’s foreskin” (cf. Deut. 10:16) seems to be 
missing, as if these operations could be separated as two distinct moments, whereas they 
should arrive at once, at one and the same time. 
 The malformed and twittering baby boy, whose origin is at least doubly obscure, this 
“clod” is borne in a soldier’s boot; but who put the changeling there? Here we must perhaps 
remember that it was Moses himself who was, according to the legend, found floating in a 
reed basket. But how on earth did the “brother” end up in this scene between Rabbi Loew and 
                                                 
663 Entry Gemächt, Gemächte: “5) ursprünglich auch von gott und der natur, schöpfung, geschöpf, eigentlich 
im bilde des menschlichen künstlers . // a) gottes gemächte, der mensch, die welt und alles” (DWB,  Bd. 5, 
Sp. 3147). 
664 I am grateful to Jarkko Toikkanen who suggested the allusion during the discussion that followed my pres-
entation at the IAPL conference session “Palimpsests of Poetry: Philosophy and/as/in Poetry”, June 6th, 
2007 in Nicosia. 
665 Allen, “The ‘Bloody Bridegroom’”, p. 259. It is a question of Exodus 4:24-26. 





the one who gnashes out his request at the Rabbi? Perhaps a fourth one is involved too: 
maybe Elijah, as Derrida suggests? Or maybe the Golem, as Otto Pöggeler sees fit to inter-
pret, another ‘monster’ in addition to the changeling, the twittering manikin? According to a 
Talmudic legend, whose profane variant is the legend of Rabbi Loew and the Golem of Pra-
gue, the golem bore the inscription of a word on its forehead. It was the word emeth, meaning 
‘truth’ — a sign of life and God’s creation. But when the golem would not stop working in 
the evening, or when it began acting like a monster, it had to be stopped. According to some 
variants of the story, it was either Elijah or Rabbi Loew who erased the aleph from the begin-
ning of the word and only meth, meaning ‘death’, was left. It seems more than relevant to 
think of Elijah here, not only because the prophet is supposed to be present at each brit milah 
and expected to heal the wound (the role of the rabbi, from whom the “hale-making bless-
ing”, healing and consecration is beseeched, may be associated with the role of Elijah here), 
but also because during the Passover feast, a door is at some point opened for him;667  it 
seems obvious that “the one who stood before the door” and for whom a word is being 
opened, a word of welcome no doubt, must be Elijah. But the one who “trotted” toward the 
“clod” could also be the golem, no doubt. 
 Perhaps the anonymity of “the one who stood before the door” is not just for the sake 
of riddling. The fact that we do not quite know whether to imagine Elijah or the Golem or 
some other unnamed guest just might be important and not just an obstacle to be torn down 
by an interpretative decision. “Right here,” Derrida writes, “the monster, or Elijah, the guest 
or the other, is standing before the door.” (Sovereignties, p. 57.) The one for whom the word 
or the door (the word ‘door’, the word-door, the door-word)668  is opened in the poem is not 
just someone, some specific person who stood “one evening” before the poet’s door — not 
just that, not only that person, even if the secret of such a circumstantial referent can never be 
simply excluded — but it could be anyone: Elijah, the golem, a stranger or the reader. The 
singular situation remains indefinitely reiterable. 
 Elijah arrives incognito. He is not only the prophet announcing the coming of the 
Messiah but also himself the other-to-come, the expected, unexpected guest who usually, in 
                                                 
667 For some reason, Derrida writes that “The prophet Elijah is not named by Celan, and perhaps he was not 
thinking of him”, even though he seems indeed familiar with the tradition of opening the door for Elijah, as 
he shows in the very next sentence: “I take the risk of recalling as well that Elijah is not only the guest, the 
one to whom, as relationship [rapport] itself, the door [porte] of the word [parole] must be opened”; Der-
rida continues to recall that Elijah is also supposed to be present in each brit milah and that the baby to be 
circumcised sits in “Elijah’s chair (Kise Eliyahu)” (Sovereignties in Question, p. 57). Otto Pöggeler’s read-
ings of “Einem, der vor der Tür stand” can be found in at least two books: Spur des Worts: Zur Lyrik Paul 
Celans (Freiburg: Alber, 1986), pp. 342-350, and Der Stein hinterm Aug, pp. 91-93, 110-113. Pöggeler tells 
of one of the variants of the legend, in which Rabbi Loew once forgot to erase the aleph for the Sabbath and 
the soulless monster ranted at the door behind which there was a service going on, but since the Sabbath had 
not yet begun, the Rabbi had still time to erase the aleph from the monster’s forehead. But this scene of the 
Golem ranting at the door does not seem to fit the poem, although the threat of violence seems to be there. 
668 Pöggeler suggests that the possible identity of the word and the door can be referred back to the “dwelling 





the popular stories, also leaves the scene unrecognized. According to countless testimonies, 
in the Talmudic tradition, Hasidic tales as well as modern folklore, the prophet has appeared 
to people in various guises, for instance as a poor wanderer who arrives at the door of a rabbi 
during the Sabbath afternoon to test his hospitality. “Sometimes he looks like an ordinary 
man, sometimes he takes the appearance of an Arab, sometimes of a horseman, now he is a 
Roman court-official, now he is a harlot”.669  He is a stranger, the stranger whose identity is 
revealed only afterwards, if at all. So is it strictly unthinkable that we imagine him in a mon-
strous form, ‘malformed’, like a golem?  
 Perhaps the circumcision in the poem, the consecrated operation remains half-done 
because the sign of nothingness, namely the inscription of mortality is not inscribed in the 
living tissue of the malformed infant (maybe this “brother”, this “homunculus” is the little 
brother of the golem; but on the other hand, he might also be the “brother” to be protected 
from the one who “trotted” toward him; the circumcision of the word might be asked for his 
sake, “for this one [Diesem]” — the scenario leaves open many possibilities for dramatiza-
tion); the entry into the human race, marked by finitude, is not fulfilled without this circumci-
sion of the heart. The circumcision which first bestows to human beings their truth. The liv-
ing nothingness in man’s heart, perhaps a sign of his time and essence, his time as his 
essence. The imminence of the internal limit of life, also in the form of a word opened to the 
other, for the other: it is the offering of a figure (Gestalt), a verbal body that lives on even in 
‘my’ absence. An affirmation of mortality as an invitation for the other. 
 The inscription of “Nothing” can be seen as the inscription of finitude, mortality that 
constitutes the essence of being-there (Dasein). Derrida also acknowledges this possibility.670 
But this essence of being-there is, at once, a non-essence, an absence of what is most proper, 
an essential non-essence. And at least at this fundamental level, the Heideggerian analysis of 
confronting “Nothing [das Nichts]” by passing through “anguish [die Angst]” resembles the 
experience of affirming Judaism. “I am Jewish in saying: the Jew is the other who has no es-
sence, who has nothing of his own or whose own essence is to have none”, says Derrida 
(Sovereignties, p. 50). The more or less arbitrary “token of the covenant”, the absence of 
foreskin as an exterior sign, is a strange substitute for the non-inscription of essence or the 
inscription of non-essence, the incision of absence.671 
                                                 
669 Louis Ginzberg, “Elijah”, in The Legends of the Jews, Volume IV: From Joshua to Esther, trans. Henrietta 
Szold and Paul Radin (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 195-235, here p. 203. See 
also e.g.  Martin Buber, “Probe”, in Die Erzählungen der Chassidim (Zürich: Manesse, 1990), pp. 111-112. 
670 Derrida mentions “the necessity of an immense parenthesis: for the question of Nothing and the meaning of 
being in Celan, of a truth of being that passes through the experience of Nothing [la question du rien et du 
sens de l’être chez Celan, d’une vérité de l’être qui passe par l’expérience du rien]” (Sovereignties in Ques-
tion, p. 62; Schibboleth, p. 110). An obvious point of reference is Heidegger’s discussion of das Nichts and 
the experience of Angst, most notably in “Was ist Metaphysik” and Sein und Zeit. 
671 When we label circumcision as ‘arbitrary’, this is not to say that the Paulian “replace[ment of physical cir-
cumcision] by its spiritual signified” or canceling of “the significance of the physical practice of circumci-
sion [...] by its spiritual meaning” (Boyarin, “This we know to be the Carnal Israel”, p. 487, 488), this spiri-




 “Circumcision is also a determination,” Derrida writes, continuing that “it defines and 
it decides. But to ask for circumcision is not to ask for something determinate, a meaning or 
an object.”672  He associates the circumcision of a word with readability, but this readability 
“start[s] from nothing”; an essence is promised, an ‘appropriation’ or an identity — Jewish 
identity, for instance — is promised only through dis-identification, expropriation in the noth-
ingness of non-essence, as he points out (Sovereignties, p. 62). When Daniel Boyarin remarks 
that circumcision is “the most complete sign of the connection of the Torah to the concrete 
body of Israel”, we might think of Paul Celan’s words of a “glowing / text-void [glühenden / 
Leertext]” — but we shall return to these words later. 673 
 The circumcision of the word, the “hale-making blessing” is beseeched for, prayed 
“for this one [Diesem]”. It is not absolutely clear, judging by the syntax, whether “this one” is 
the “chittering manikin” or the anonymous “one who stood before the door”, even though it 
seems intuitively more plausible to think of the “homunculus” rather than the “one” trotting 
towards it. At the same time it is clear that the “clod” — and even if we would not accept 
Felstiner’s interpretative translation of Kielkropf — is itself, himself a golem. 
 “For this one”, the dative case pronoun Diesem, is repeated four times, in a pattern 
where one line separates the first two single lines containing only the pronoun, then two lines 
separate the next pair, then there are three lines before the last Diesem which constitutes not 
only a single line but also a single sentence. One might expect that after this laconic sort of 
                                                                                                                                                        
deliverance from arbitrariness. Philo at least acknowledged that the physical practice has a purpose: “the 
excision of pleasures which bewitch the mind” (On the Special Laws, trans. Colson; cit. Boyarin, p. 486). 
Philo sees in circumcision “the figure of the excision of excessive and superfluous pleasure, not only of one 
pleasure but of all the other pleasures signified by one, and that the most imperious” (ibid.). The Jewish Pla-
tonist at least acknowledged the necessity of physical excision against physical excitement. This still sug-
gests, paradoxically enough, what Daniel Boyarin describes as “an entirely different hermeneutic structure 
from Platonic allegorizing”, saying that “even when it spiritualizes, the Rabbinic tradition does so entirely 
through the body. Spirit here is an aspect of body, almost, I would say, the same spirit that experiences the 
pleasure of sex through the body, and not something apart from, beyond, or above the body” (p. 492). 
“Where Philo argued that circumcision both symbolizes and effects the excision of the passions — that is, it 
symbolizes the reduction of all passion by effecting in the flesh of the penis a reduction of sexual passion — 
Paul ‘ties the removal of the fleshly desires exclusively to the believer’s crucifixion with Christ’” (p. 487; 
Boyarin quotes Peder Borgen, Borgen, “Observations on the Theme ‘Paul and Philo’”; we return in a note 
below to the theme of “believer’s crucifixion” in Augustine). Boyarin opposes midrash to the Platonic al-
legoresis by pointing out that in the Jewish hermeneutic tradition, the “letter” is not opposed to the “spirit”, 
but “quickeneth” indeed (Boyarin cites  2 Cor. 3:6 as an epigraph: “For the letter kills but the spirit gives 
life”; or as the Douay-Rheims Bible has it: “For the letter killeth: but the spirit quickeneth”) and is the very 
constitution of spirit: “although a spiritual meaning is assigned to the corporeal act, the corporeal act is not 
the signifier of that meaning but its very constitution” (loc. cit.). 
672 Sovereignties, p. 62. It must be mentioned that the German verb beschneiden is currently, as to its common 
acceptations, far more polysemic than for instance the English ‘to circumcise’, and the (ritual) circumcision 
of the foreskin is only one of its acceptations. Therefore also the transferred extensions of the verb are more 
neutral in German; for instance Peter Szondi may quite appropriately use the verb as follows: “zwischen 
falsch und richtig, sinnfremd und sinnbezogen zu unterscheiden, ohne das manchmal objektiv mehrdeutige 
Wort und das kaum je eindeutige Motive um der prätendierten Eindeutigkeit willen zu beschneiden.” (“Zur 
Erkenntnisproblematik in der Literaturwissenschaft” [a k.a. “Über philologische Erkenntnis”], in Die Neue 
Rundschau, vol. 73 [1962], pp.146-165, here p. 164.) 





sentence the pattern would continue with four lines, but rather there are the ellipses marked 
by two lines of dots.674  Whether it is a question of some (parody of) number mysticism and 
incantation or rather just “[t]he ellipsis and the caesura of discretion” is not an either-or ques-
tion: in any case, the series or pattern appears to be interrupted just like the word “Rabbi” is, 
in the last line of the poem, and the themes of “ellipsis, discontinuity, caesura, or discretion” 
(Derrida, Sovereignties, pp. 27, 40) retain themselves in their own right, as thematic ‘content’ 
that remains inseparable from the ‘form’ of the poem even through any deciphering process 
of allegoresis. 
 Whether the request to the rabbi becomes complete when the single-word single-
sentence line (“Diesem.”) is reached or whether we see it as an interrupted formula, anticipat-
ing the final interruption of the poem in the syllable Ra-, we may always ask whether “this 
one” remains the same during the repetition or whether “this one” also suggests some other 
body besides that of the “clod [Kielkropf]” — perhaps the verbal body of the poem itself, 
too? Does not “this one”, after all, thematize the poem itself? Does the request “for this one” 
not reflectively fold itself back to the words of the poem themselves, words of welcome 
opened to the other and words to be circumcised, healed and blessed — including the word 
‘heil’ itself (implying healing and salvation, blessing and greeting), one of the most blatantly 
injured victims of the Nazi verbicide? The soldier’s “dung-caked boot” might be the “excre-
mentitious / Husk” to be removed in a rite of purification (in Felstiner’s interpretation, “a lib-
erating counter-step”, a counter-circumcision of sorts after all the violence done to the Ger-
man language) — the possibilities for a historical allegoresis seem obvious. But such healing 
takes place only at the cost of violence: purification by circumcision implies mutilation, inci-
sion, excision, decision concerning what is to be included in the horizon against which the 
figure of the poem is circumscribed and what is to be excluded from it. And on the other 
hand, each word remains exposed to the danger of becoming “circumprostituted”, “whored 
about / by the flayer’s-ears [umhurt von den Schinderohren]”:675  there is no guarantee against 
violations of the ‘purified’ word. 
                                                 
674 I am grateful to Volker Kaiser who pointed out to me this pattern of 1-2-3-(4) and its interruption. The mo-
tivation for the pattern is not clear and it is not featured in the first known draft of the poem (cf. BCA 
6.2:157f). 
675 GW 1:138-139. The translation of the line “umhurt von den Schinderohren” is mine; cf. Hamburger: 
“whored about / by the bloodsucker ears”, and Felstiner: “enticed / by swindlers’ ears.” The word Schinder-
hannes names the figure of an antisemite. — Derrida cites a few lines from William Blake’s “Jerusalem” 
which speak of the senses “Circumscribing & Circumcising the excrementitious / Husk & Covering into 
Vacuum evaporating revealing the lineaments of Man” (ch. 4, plate 98, i.e. The Complete Poetry & Prose of 
William Blake, Newly Revised Edition, ed. David V. Erdman [New York: Doubleday, 1988], 257; cit. Der-
rida, Sovereignties in Question, p. 59). In his book Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew, Felstiner writes on this 
poem: “Celan gets a pun out of the Hebrew Brit Mila, the covenant of circumcision, since mila means 
‘word’ as well as ‘circumcision’ [this seems to be a case of homophony rather than homonymy or 
polysemy, since the words are distinguished by being spelled differently] — a pun audible only in Hebrew 
overtones and thus not for Aryan ears. After Nazism construed circumcision as a fatal sign, to ‘circumcise 
the word’ is to take a liberating counterstep, bringing German words within the Covenant.” (Paul Celan: 




 There is the ‘malformed’ infant and perhaps also the silent monster, both unable to 
speak for themselves. And there seems to be no escape from violence. The golem was meant 
to serve and, according to some variants of the legend, to protect the Jewish community 
against so-called blood accusations (“the accusation that the Jews used the blood of Chris-
tians for ritualistic purposes”),676  but it turned against its own; circumcision, the mutilation of 
babies was meant to distinguish the community from the others, like the shibboleth that 
should protect the frontiers against intruders. The circumcision of the word happens to every-
one, it arrives with the name and through becoming a member of a linguistic community — 
that is, humanity. There are worse forms of violence, of course, than giving a name and 
teaching a child to speak — these are, generally speaking, the very least of all violences, to be 
sure, the most non-violent and anti-violent of all violences — these forms that at once both 
bestow and deprive singularity.677  But the marginality and essential universality of this form 
of violence does not mean that we should not try to think of this general form, the verbal or 
linguistic form, as a form of violence, a violence which indeed borders on non-violence. 
 In the end of the poem, “Rabbi” is cut in half, as it were, the word Rabbi is cut in half 
and what remains is, indeed, Ra- — which could be read as the name of the Egyptian sun-
god, the god of the people who held Israel in bondage. The circumcision shows itself to be 
the ritual the Egyptians used to distinguish themselves from foreigners, the older ritual from 
which the Israelites have been claimed to inherit theirs. The distinction between different cir-
cumcisions, while the ritual itself is more or less universal, happens in the name, as Derrida 
points out (Sovereignties, p. 55). But the word and the name can be as vulnerable, as delicate 
as a baby boy’s skin. 
 The syllable Ra- may also allude, at least, to the Hebrew word meaning ‘evil’ (trans-
literated ra‘), which connotes “dungy”,678 and so perhaps we may think that this connection 
                                                 
676 S. Zeitlin, ”The Blood Accusation [review of Maurice Samuel, Blood Accusation: The Strange History of 
the Beiless Case], The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Ser., Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jul., 1968), pp. 76-80, here p. 
76 (JSTOR). Cf. also Bloch, Golem, pp. 35, 51ff, 53ff, 69, 75ff, et passim. 
677 Cf. Derrida, Sovereignties in Question, p. 54; Schibboleth, p. 98. On language as violence and non-violence, 
cf. Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas’s early work in “Violence et métaphysique” (in L’écriture et la dif-
ference [Paris: Seuil, 1967; repr. 1997], pp. 117-228, esp. pp. 217ff). Circumcision, which is “also a deter-
mination” as Derrida points out, “a determination [which] defines and decides”, is something that there 
must be — but we are not dealing here with the “appearance”, little more than a “simulacrum”, namely the 
mutilation of an infant’s genitals, but the necessity marked by this act of violence — this is what Derrida 
says: “There must be circumcision, circumcision of the word, writing, and it must take place once, pre-
cisely, each time one time, the unique time” (Sovereignties, p. 63). What cannot be avoided must be. Need-
less to say, I hope, that Derrida is strongly against so-called ‘literal’ circumcision and for “the annulment of 
all literal circumcision” (ibid.); but on the other hand, he also affirms the inevitable necessity of the circum-
cision of the word. So perhaps I might explain now, après coup, that it is this quasi ‘double bind’ that must 
have imposed the figure of Zipporah on me, as an exergue or legend for the present chapter. But perhaps 
there is not really a comparison for her situation. 
678 Cf. Paul Haupt, “Heb. ro‘, Evil=Arab. ‘urr”, Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 39, No. 3/4 (1920), pp. 
152-155, 170-171, e.g.: “Heb. ra‘, evil, originally means excrementitious, fecal, ordurous, filthy, dirty, 
nasty, foul, vile, offensive, fetid, noisome, disgusting, loathsome” (p. 154). I am grateful to Merle Williams 
who pointed out to me that “Ra” also suggests the Hebrew word for ‘evil’, and therefore it is another shib-




links the abrupt ending with the “dung-caked boot” of the “dough-boy” (“kotigen Stiefel des 
Kriegsknechts”). Moreover, the abrupt stifling in the middle of the word Rabbi at the end of 
the poem might also be taken as an allusion to a certain variant of the golem legend, or two 
almost identical versions cited by Gershom Scholem, in which the master of the overgrown 
golem asks this “servant [Knecht]” to pull off his boot in order to be able to erase the aleph 
from its forehead, but when the monster turns back into a bulk of lifeless clay, this heap col-
lapses and buries him alive.679  And then we also have the Freudian connection between cir-
cumcision and all the other “prototype[s] of castration”, the complex consisting of interre-
lated displacements, such as the metonymically motivated alliteration Gott–Kot (“God–shit”), 
the “cruel God” demanding “a readiness to give up one’s masculinity”, or the father as “the 
terrifying figure that threaten[s] [...] with castration” and the same father as “the one who had 
been castrated and calling, therefore, for [his son’s, Freud’s patient’s] sympathy”, as well as 
cripples, beggars, “an old day-labourer” who “could not speak, ostensibly because his tongue 
had been cut out”, and another cripple (Krüppel is Freud’s word) who was “a Jew and a con-
sumptive and had been an object of [the boy’s] compassion”, and the hallucination of the 
young patient who thought he had cut his finger “so that it was only hanging on by its 
skin”680  — all the vocabulary of the poem seems to suggest allusions to these “paths of asso-
ciation”, from the “dung-caked boot” to the “two / cripplefingers [zwei / Krüppelfinger]” of 
the rabbi. 
 None of these possible directions for exegesis are to be excluded at the outset, not be-
cause they all belong to the semantic network of the poem, not because they are all meant by 
the poem, but because these possible references that might be listed in a commentary may 
build up into a ‘horizon’ out of which the poem can be encountered again — a ‘horizon’ only 
in quotation marks, because it never becomes a complete and familiar circle of intimacy and a 
guarantee of comprehension, only an opening for a conversation-to-come. “Vacant”, “occu-
piable” are Celan’s terms for this hospitality; but it is also a question of a “reciprocal occupi-
ability” which, as Sandro Zanetti has remarked, implies a request for transformation on both 
sides (the poem and its reader) and yet also, at the same time, an insistence on singularity on 
                                                 
679 Cf. Scholem, Zur Kabbala und ihrer Symbolik, pp. 209-259. 
680 Cf. esp. the chapter “Anal Erotism and the Castration Complex”, from which I quote, in Freud’s “From the 
History of an Infantile Neurosis”, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. 17 (1917-1919): An infantile neurosis and other works, ed. and trans. James Strachey  (London: 
The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1981), pp. 7-122, here pp. 72-88; original German 
text: “Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose”, in Gesammelte Werke XII: Werke aus den Jahren 
1917-1920, ed. Anna Freud et al. (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1999), pp. 27-159, esp. pp. 103-121. — Volker 
Kaiser has very suggestively associated the “medusa’s head” in Celan (cf. TCA/Meridian, Endf. 15) with 
the way Freud deals with this image in his brief essay “Das Medusenhaupt” (vol. XVII, pp. 47-48); accord-
ing to Kaiser it is only when they remember their exposure to the “cut”, to “(the fear of) castration” that the 
“I” and the poetry are able to speak: “einzig als solchermaßen ausgesetzte, d.h. dem Schnitt, der Kastra-
tion(-sangst) eingedenk bleibende Größen vermögen sie [i.e. das Ich und mit ihm die Dichtung] überhaupt 
zu sprechen.” (Das Echo jeder Verschattung. Figur und Reflexion bei Rilke, Benn und Celan [Wien: 




both sides:681  the word-door or the door-word is open for the other, but an openness is also 
required of the one at the threshold of the poem, an openness for an incision, an intrusion of 
sorts. On the reader’s side, it is a question of a transformation of the “horizon of expectation”, 
but also an exposure to an alterity which exceeds all anticipations and horizons. And on the 
other hand, a complementary exposure takes place on the side of the poem (or let us say the 
‘text’ of the poem in the usual sense, while the poem is actually this reciprocity itself), a re-
quest for the circumcision of a word and for a blessing — and such a request can never be a 
matter of certainty.682 
 
 
ALLEGORIES OF ALLEGORY 
 
Allegoresis, said I. The poem seems to call for an allegorical interpretation of some sort. Der-
rida writes: “Let us call this — by way of allegory — an allegory”, conscious of his cata-
chrestic application of the term. By this catachresis, Derrida refers to the opening of one’s 
word at the beginning of the poem, “the bearing [portée] of a word for the other, to the other 
or from the other” (Sovereignties, p. 58). 
Otto Pöggeler finds in the poems of Die Niemandsrose an “allegorical trait” and 
claims that it is this characteristic that made this particular book so inaccessible to Heidegger, 
who complained to him about its “difficulty” (Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 162). One of Pögge-
ler’s discussions of “Einem, der vor der Tür stand” takes place under the heading “Symbol 
und Allegorie”, in Der Stein hinterm Aug (2000), and Pöggeler reinterprets there the tradi-
tional (Goethean) distinction, if not opposition, of symbol and allegory in a rather unusual 
manner. Rather than the traditional formal characteristics of allegory (a narrative consisting 
of a literal “text” or “type” and another, non-literal “pretext” or “antitype” indirectly alluded 
to, etc.), Pöggeler takes a detour through some of its just as traditionally negative qualifica-
tions, namely by Goethe (according to whom allegory is characterized by the merely exem-
plary function of what is particular, while in the truly poetic symbol the particular never even 
alludes to the universal and yet makes us grasp it even without notice), and applies the notion 
of allegorical “void of meaning [Sinnleere]” to an “allegorical” image in one of Goethe’s own 
poems of West-östlicher Divan: the cross, or a crucifix on the bosom of a Christian woman, a 
                                                 
681 Celan, TCA/Meridian, Ms. 448, 449; Sandro Zanetti, »zeitoffen«: Zur Chronographie Paul Celans 
(München: Fink, 2006), p. 94n75: “Diese Besetzbarkeit impliziert auf beiden Seiten die Zulassung von 
Veränderung, gleichzeitig ein Beharren auf Singularität.” On the “conversation-to-come”, cf. p. 87: “[...] 
von einer »Gegenwart und Präsenz« des Gedichts (als eines werdenden Gesprächs) nur dann gesprochen 
werden kann, wenn diese Gegenwart nicht allein und von vornherein als Gegenwart eines 
Sprechens/Sprechers aufgefaßt wird, sondern als Gegenwart, die Gelegenheit zur Mitsprache gibt.” Cf. also 
Werner Hamacher, “Premises”: “Understanding is [...] a procedure of reciprocal affection and alteration” 
(trans. Peter Fenves, in Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan [Cambridge: 
Harvard U.P., 1996], p. 2). 
682 On ‘complementarity’, cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 452: “Der Dichtende und Verstehende bleiben komplementär 
zugeordnet.” On the uncertainty of a blessing, cf. Derrida, Schibboleth, p. 76; Sovereignties, p. 42: “What 




token whose specific signification or significance is not recognized, or rather is not acknowl-
edged by her Muslim lover who sees, or pretends to see, just a piece of wood across another 
piece of wood (“Hölzchen quer auf Hölzchen”), a dismal figure indeed (“Solch ein Jammer-
bild am Holze!”). While “sunrise”, for instance, is a more or less universal symbol for birth, a 
symbol whose motivation is immediately understood regardless of cultural differences, the 
signification of the cross would not be clear to someone without knowledge concerning — 
and more importantly, without the experience of — Christian faith. An allegorical sign is 
characterized, according to Pöggeler, by a “vacuity and distance of meaning”, a meaning 
which can only develop itself discursively through time (“historically” or “in a narrative [in 
einer Geschichte]”),683  and therefore the relation between the cross and its theological or re-
ligious signification and significance (redemption, etc.) may be called “allegorical”. Some-
thing similar happens to “snow” in Celan’s poetry, Pöggeler argues. The snow in his poems is 
neither a universal symbol of death nor “the snow we all know”, but a very specific snow: the 
snow of Ukraine in the winter of the poet’s parents’ death at the camps of Transnistria. Snow 
becomes an “allegory of death [Todesallegorie]” only with regard to the singularity of each 
death, and yet, its uniquity is also “allegorically” applied more than once: “All these experi-
ences of death” — the death of the poet’s newborn son and those of Hiroshima — “are now 
co-intended in the word ‘snow’ [Alle diese Todeserfahrungen sind nun im Wort ›Schnee‹ mit-
gemeint]”, says Pöggeler.684  This sort of “allegory”, the snow as an “allegorical sign”, does 
not represent or carry over some universal content, nor does it only register some specific in-
                                                 
683 Cf. Der Stein hinterm Aug, pp. 89-118, here p. 90: “Eine Anschauung soll dann symbolisch heißen, wenn 
sie uns unmittelbar aus sich heraus ihre Bedeutung entgegenträgt und eine übertragene Bedeutung fest an 
den Grundsinn anschließt. In dieser Weise kann z.B. die Morgenröte für das neu beginnende Leben stehen. 
Allegorisch ist ein Zeichen, das in einer Sinnleere und -ferne doch wieder Sinn und Bedeutung gewinnt, 
wobei die Bedeutung sich langsam in einer Geschichte aufbaut. In dieser Weise konnte das Kreuz zu einem 
Heilszeichen werden.” A couple of paragraphs later Pöggeler remarks that often the relations of significa-
tion in Celan’s poems can be grasped and fixed only up to a certain point (p. 91): “Oft lassen sich die 
Sinnbezüge eines Celanschen Gedichts nur an einem bestimmten Zipfel fassen und festmachen.” But he 
also notes that “allegory” in Celan of course differs from the Renaissance and Baroque allegories, even 
though these are closer to his poetry than the symbols of young Goethe (p. 90), and that his later poetry dif-
fers also from the “concrete and clearly expressed allusions to the Jewish and mystical traditions that gave 
the volume Die Niemandsrose its new character” (p. 89). Actually the “allegorical trait” itself (cf. p. 162) 
has changed considerably in the later poetry of, for instance, the Atemkristall cycle: “Die kleinen Gedichte 
sind fremd und und verschlossen; sie öffnen sich erst, wenn wir vielen versteckten Bezügen nachgegangen 
sind. Dann kann freilich plötzlich der Funken springen und ein schönes, überzeugendes Gebilde vor uns 
stehen. Lesen wir das Gedicht, das uns in dieser Weise anspricht, nach einigen Wochen neu, dann ist es 
zuerst wieder fremd [...]” (p. 89). This description of Celan’s late ‘allegories’ corresponds very well to the 
“always again only for once” of “carrying tropes and metaphors ad absurdum” in the Meridian speech. 
684 “So muß diese Kunst ›allegorisch‹ sein, nämlich aus der Sinnleere heraus doch wieder Sinn aufbauen, 
diesen Sinn als das Nichtselbstverständliche und niemals unmittelbar Verständliche durch ein neues und 
anderes Leben bewähren. Deshalb ist der Schnee bei Celan gerade nicht der Schnee, den jedermann kennt, 
sondern diese bestimmte Schnee der Ukraine, in dem die Eltern des Dichters zum Tode gebracht wurden. 
[...] Doch ›Schnee‹ [cf. Celan, GW 2:11] meint ›allegorisch‹ auch mehr als dieses bestimmte einzelne. Mit 
dem Tod des ersten Kindes François fiel dem Dichter ›Schnee‹ auf ein sonnendurchschwommenes Meer; 
der Band Vom Schwelle hat in dieser Erfahrung (wie Celan selbst sagte) seine Mitte [cf. GW 1:109]. Der 
Zyklus Atemkristall setzt dazu auch die Todeserfahrung von Hiroshima voraus — am ehesten die 
Bedrohung der Zukunft! Alle diese Todeserfahrungen sind nun im Wort ›Schnee‹ mitgemeint.” (Pöggeler, 




cident, and it is not a question of a “symbolical” shortcut between snow and death either, ac-
cording to which snow would resemble death in various imaginable ways that can be ar-
ranged as a four-term proportion (snow is like death because it covers up vegetal life just like 
death covers up animal life, etc. etc.), but it “concentrates”, as we might say, on borrowing 
terms from the Meridian speech, and “commemorates” the singularity of each “date” and its 
loss. Always again only for once.685   
Pöggeler points out that Celan had nothing against a reader who would approach his 
poems from another historical-biographical horizon of experience and saw the deadly snow 
of Ukraine from the perspective of another snow, the one that was falling still on May 1st, 
1945, on the last roads of retreat and upon the bodies of those German soldiers who had been 
hanged by the SS as deserters (Der Stein hinterm Aug, p. 8). In the conversation with the 
poem — “this one”, as if the ostension was a sufficient guarantee of the exposed singularity 
(and this ‘as if’ is one of the elements in the tragicomedy of ‘this’ poem: there is no guarantee 
of the integrity of “this one”) — whatever question you pose, whatever you address to the 
poem, it repeats the same thing, the same words. It insists, twitters, lallates: “lallen und 
lallen” (cf. “Tübingen, Jänner”, GW 1:226). Like a baby without a father, as Socrates would 
say. The ‘allegory’ fumbles along like a golem, without the assistance of its father, uncircum-
cised.686  And at the same time, the word opens itself to an indefinite repetition also in the 
form of readings, ‘perceptions’ from different angles or positions, different horizons.  
Allegory is of course “a notoriously slippery category”, as for instance Daniel Boyarin 
has remarked,687  and so is the category of symbol. The title of Boyarin’s superb article “‘This 
We Know to Be the Carnal Israel’: Circumcision and the Erotic Life of God and Israel” 
(1992) quotes Augustine, who adopts “Paul’s usage of ‘in the flesh’ and ‘in the spirit’ respec-
tively to mean literal and figurative” and keeps referring this distinction not only to the her-
meneutical but also to the anthropological characteristics of Judaism and Christianity, Jews 
and Christians or the “fleshly Israel” and the “spiritual Israel”. Allegory is, according to 
Boyarin, “in [Augustine’s] theory, a mode of relating to the body” (pp. 474, 475);688 the au-
thor would probably agree that this relating is actually a disrelating. “Midrash and Platonic 
allegory are alternate techniques of the body” (p. 477). Allegory or allegoresis in Boyarin’s 
sense is a method of disembodiment and the Rabbinic “refusal of allegorization” was a scan-
dal to the “Fathers and Augustine in particular” (p. 493). The anthropological dimension of 
this hermeneutical trenching extends so far that Boyarin sees in the “Dialogue of Justin, Phi-
                                                 
685 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Endf. 35, 39. 
686 This monstrosity of the un-living or the automaton is perhaps the motivation for Derrida’s wish to write, in 
his Circonfession, “un écrit soi-disant idiomatique, inentamable, illisible, non circoncis, tenu non plus à 
l’assistance du père” (Derrida, “Circonfession”, in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Der-
rida [Paris: Seuil, 1991], p. 181). 
687 Cf. Boyarin, “This We Know...”, p. 497n71; cf. also below. 





losopher and Martyr, with Trypho, a Jew, perhaps the last occasion in late antiquity when 
something like a true dialogue between the two communities would be produced, that is, a 
dialogue in which the Jew is not merely a trope but a speaking subject” (p. 488); a dialogue 
still without the particularism (concerning the “bodily filiation” inherent to Judaism; cf. p. 
489) “that threatens ideologically and in practice to allegorize the Jews out of existence” (pp. 
490-491). 
The slippery tradition of the notion of allegory does not discourage Boyarin from ap-
plying the term to the hermeneutical practice of the early Christians and Hellenistic Jews, 
Paul and Philo for instance, as well as Augustine, a reading practice “founded on a binary op-
position in which the meaning as a disembodied substance exists prior to its incarnation in 
language, that is, in a dualistic system in which spirit precedes and is primary over body” (pp. 
476-477); this dualism and all the Platonic “inner-outer, visible-invisible, body-soul di-
chotomies of allegorical reading” seem to be refused by the “hermeneutic system” of Midrash 
(p. 477). In this Rabbinic tradition, there seems to be “no translation of the text onto another 
abstract meaning plane, no opposition of the letter, the carnal form of language, to its spirit, 
its inner, invisible meaning” (p. 479). If we should be unhappy with the association of this 
scheme of “translation of the text onto another abstract meaning plane” with allegory (since it 
is incompatible with Pöggeler’s revision of the Goethean notion, for instance), we might still 
retain the Latin equivalent translatio as used by Augustine (often in the form verba translata) 
and usually translated back to the term ‘metaphor’.689  Boyarin does indeed admit to the slip-
periness of the term and delimits it with reference to a very specific tradition of allegoresis 
and to the counter-tradition of the “explicit resistance to being allegorized”, the Rabbinic tra-
dition or Midrash from which “allegory, in the strict sense, is absent or nearly so” (pp. 493, 
498n71): 
 
In Rabbinic religion there is no invisible God manifested in an Incarnation. God him-
self is visible (and therefore corporeal). Language also is not divided into a carnal and 
a spiritual being. Accordingly, there can be no allegory. [Boyarin adds a footnote 
here:] I would like to clarify [...] that allegory, both as a genre of text production and 
as a reading practice, is a notoriously slippery category. Therefore it should be clear 
that when I say “allegoresis” I mean allegorical reading of the Philonic-Origenic type, 
which has a fairly clear structure as well as explicit theoretical underpinnings. It is a 
hermeneutic structure in which narrative on the physical or worldly level is taken as a 
sign of invisible and spiritual structures on the level of ideas. [“This we know...”, pp. 
497, 497n71.] 
 
                                                 
689 Cf. De Doctrina Christiana, 3.40-41; trans. R. P. H. Green, p. 151: “‘Those who belong to Jesus Christ have 
crucified their flesh along with its passions and desires.’ Even here, admittedly, some words are used meta-
phorically, such as [...] ‘crucified’, but they are not so many, or so unclear in expression, as to hide the sense 
and create allegory or obscurity, which is what I mean by figurative expression in the strict sense. [qui au-
tem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus et concupiscentiis. Nisi quia et hic quae-
dam verba translata tractantur, sicuti est ‘ira dei’ et ‘crucifixerunt’; sed non tam multa sunt vel ita posita ut 




Here it should be noted, however, that one of the traditional distinguishing features of alle-
gory with respect to metaphor has been that while allegory “says one thing and means an-
other” (which is certainly not a sufficient definition yet), it does not cease to mean the one 
thing when the other has been grasped or at least anticipated. Allegory, according to this tra-
dition that may well be incompatible with the tradition that Boyarin refers to, says and means 
both one thing and another. It insists on the letter even when it insinuates (suggests, implies) 
the spirit. This feature has been denied to metaphor, which establishes a “dissolution of 
meanings [Bedeutungsverschmelzung]” instead of keeping them apart, and this effacement of 
the ‘carnal’ or ‘literal’ dimension is crucial with respect to the disembodiment (“disembodi-
ment of history in allegoresis”) that Boyarin so effectively describes.690  But history has in-




“AND THE LORD WILL PASS OVER THE DOOR” 691 
 
To repeat what Derrida said, there is an essential analogy between the event of circumcision 
and shibboleth, between circumcision and the diacritical difference that constitutes the sig-
nificance of the “insignificant, arbitrary mark”, “the discriminative, decisive and divisive” 
phonemic difference, more significant than the actual signification of the word shibboleth.692 
We might extend this analogy — essential and not just formal, just as Derrida suggests of the 
analogy between the “affirmation of Judaism” and “the date” (Sovereignties, p. 49) — to 
cover also the “void and distance” as characteristics of the “allegorical sign” in Pöggeler’s 
reformulation of this term. We find ourselves addressed by a demand (Anspruch) for recip-
                                                 
690 The distinction hereby summarized has been emphasized by Gerhard Kurz, who argues that this double 
meaning (ambiguity in a certain sense: Kurz uses the adjective zweideutig; allegory has an “initial” meaning 
and, besides, another “implicit” meaning, but these two separate meanings are not “dissolved into one”) is 
the feature that disqualifies the common identification between metaphor and allegory, or the view of alle-
gory as “extended metaphor”; cf. Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1988), pp. 5, 31-34. For “disembodiment of history”, see Boyarin’s article, p. 499. 
691 Exodus 12:23; cited by Boyarin (p. 495) from Elliot R. Wolfson, “Circumcision, vision of God, and Textual 
Interpretation: From Midrashic Trope to Mystical Symbol”, History of Religions 27 (Nov. 1987): 189-215, 
here pp. 198f: “Rabbi Yose said, Why is it written, ‘And the Lord will pass over the door [literally open-
ing]’ (Exod. 12:23)? [...] ‘Over the opening,’ read it literally as ‘opening!’ That is, the opening of the body. 
And what is the opening of the body? That is the circumcision.” The whole problematic of “the tropic of 
circumcision” is here summarized. To “read literally” seems not quite ‘literal’ here, but it is rather a ques-
tion of referring the word (“door”) back to its most general signification (“opening”) and then applying this 
“opening” — it is also an opening, disseminal opening of signification — onto the body. And further, the 
body, the ‘visible’ body is “pregnant with the invisible”! 
692 Cf. Sovereignties in Question, pp. 26, 59. In her “Counter-Obituary for Jacques Derrida”, with specific ref-
erence to Circonfession and Ulysse Gramophone, Inge-Birgitte Siegumfeldt suggests that we pay attention 
to the way Derrida sought “to bind words to their wounds, to write by the escarre. This is one of the legacies 
of Jacques Derrida: the translation of the Jewish ritual of circumcision into a figure for différance. It came 
to signify, in a manner beyond all doctrinal affiliation, the universal wound (or cut) by which all discourses 
and alliances are contracted” (“Milah: A Counter-Obituary for Jacques Derrida”, SubStance #106, Vol. 34 




rocity that insists on singularity (to repeat Zanetti’s insight) and retains the distance in the 
heart of the encounter, the essential non-essential void. 
One of the Fadensonnen (1968) poems names “The trace of a bite in Nowhere” to be 
struggled against, engaged in combat against (once again, the trace, with a determined article 
just like in the case of the scar in the air): 
 
DIE SPUR EINES BISSES im Nirgends. 
 
Auch sie 
mußt du bekämpfen, 
von hier aus. 693  
 
The poem “Chymisch” addresses “You with the pale, / bitten-open bud [Du mit der fahlen, / 
aufgebissenen Knospe]” and “the light, so light / souls- / rings [den leichten, so leichten / 
Seelen- / ringen]”.694  A trace of being bitten nowhere: this nowhere is essentially ambiguous, 
the place of the trace as a non-place. An unnameable place. Perhaps it is there: but it is no-
where to be seen. As if a child complained of being bitten (by a ‘monster’) but there was no 
visible mark on the body. It is nothing, nothing at all, you’ve been bitten nowhere, dear child, 
you’ve imagined the whole thing, now would you please stop crying. Hush little baby... We 
remember the monster eating the novices, or at least biting off their foreskins (pars pro toto), 
in the ritual of the bullroarers. A scar of nothing, nowhere, or in the air. 
Language, the gift of a poem, may offer a porous space for silence and solitude, words 
may circumscribe that which is “without language”, but only in the shadow of the scar in the 
air. As Derrida writes, a “poem unveils a secret only to confirm that there is something secret 
there, withdrawn, forever beyond the reach of hermeneutic exhaustion”. This does not, of 
course, exempt us from doing all the hermeneutic toil we can.695 
The interrupted word Ra- suggests several directions to be taken in the exegesis or al-
legoresis of the poem: the palimpsestic presence of Hebrew and the word for ‘evil’ on the one 
hand, and its coincidence with the name of the Egyptian sun-god on the other, to mention 
only two contrasting and interlaced, even contiguous elements in a certain sense and from a 
certain perspective. The suggestion of the Hebrew word is a shibboleth of inclusion-
exclusion, marking the limit of a language and community. But on the other hand, the word is 
                                                 
693 TCA/Fadensonnen, p. 13. Trans. Felstiner: “THE TRACE OF A BITE in Nowhere. // It too / you must combat, / 
from here out.”  
694 GW 1:227. Trans. Robert Clarke (http://german.berkeley.edu/poetry/chymisch.php). On the “bitten- / open 
bud” and the “souls- / rings” with “so much land” upon them (cf. below), it must be noted that in certain 
Jewish traditions, as well as in some other cultures observing the rite of circumcision, the excised foreskins 
are buried in the ground. 
695 The quote is from Sovereignties in Question, p. 26. On the limit and dialogue between a “hermeneutical 
response to the Anspruch of the poem” and, as Derrida says, “the experience that I call disseminal” which 
“undergoes and takes on, in and through the hermeneutic moment itself, the test of an interruption, of a cae-
sura or of an ellipsis, of an inaugural cut or opening”, cf. Derrida’s homage to Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
“Rams: Uninterrupted Dialogue — Between Two Infinities, the Poem” (Sovereignties in Question, pp. 135-




not only ‘evil’ but also homonymous with the name of another people’s god, Ra. There is a 
hazard at the threshold: risk and chance. The quasi-allegoricity of the poem resides in this 
primordial equivocality. 
At the same time, the interrupted word ending the poem also signals the limit of inter-
pretation: the undecidable equivocality at the limit of hermeneutics, the disseminal, pre-
semantic, pre-thematic thrust, a manifestation of a secret that invites us to “study the other”: 
this study of the other means, perhaps, both the interpretative effort (hermeneutics) and a kind 
of phenomenology drafted by Celan himself, a phenomenology paying attention to the non-
phenomenal or ‘invisible’ (in Celan’s sense which is indeed not far from Merleau-Ponty’s), to 
that which is indeed “beyond the reach of hermeneutic exhaustion”, an enigma that is not just 
a riddle to be solved. With regard to hermeneutical response and responsibility, the thrust (or 
the “interruption”, “caesura”, “ellipsis”, “inaugural cut or opening”; cf. Derrida, Sovereign-
ties, p. 152) indeed takes place in anticipation of meaning, but, with regard to what we just 
called phenomenology of the non-phenomenal, it also draws our attention to that which is in 
excess of meaning — in excess or, at the same time, devoid of meaning.  
Who was the one who stood before the door? Some specific person who stood at the 
poet’s door “one evening”? Prophet Elijah? The golem? Rabbi Loew? Anyone who ap-
proaches the poem, the reader at the threshold? The horizon of these possibilities must be 
folded back upon “the one” and “this one”, whether these are one and the same or one and 
another: literally, in the poem it is a question of none but “the one”, “this one”. The insistent 
ostensive singularization of ‘someone’ (“the one”, “this one” must be someone specific), or 
perhaps two specific personae, is at the same time an opening for ‘anyone’, the most general 
vacancy that may remind us of Hegel’s famous discussion of “sense-certainty”, as well as for 
‘no one’. The poem’s request “for this one” concerns not only the figure of the “chittering 
manikin” in the poem’s scenario, and not only the poem itself in its self-reflexive dimension 
either. The request may always concern also anyone who “stood” at the threshold, as if in a 
prophetic dream, in a past that remains to come, a past announcing a future — or rather à-
venir — that is also revenance. As Derrida says in an important paragraph that concerns not 
only all words but also all of us and our experience of language as an experience of mortality, 
the experience of death as an experience of mourning: “All words, from their first emergence, 
partake of revenance” (Sovereignties, p. 53).696 
                                                 
696 Emphasis added to the word revenance; cf. Schibboleth, p. 96: “La revenance est le partage de tous le mots, 
dès leur premier surgissement. Ils auront toujours été des fantômes, et cette loi régit en eux le rapport de 
l’âme et du corps. On ne peut pas dire que nous le sachions parce que nous avons l’expérience de la mort et 
du deuil. Cette expérience nous vient de notre rapport à cette revenance de la marque, puis du langage, puis 
du mot, puis du nom. Ce qu’on appelle poésie ou littérature, l’art même (ne distinguons pas pour l’instant), 
autrement dit une certaine expérience de la langue, de la marque ou du trait comme tels, ce n’est peut-être 
qu’une intense familiarité avec l’inéluctable originarité du spectre. On peut naturellement la traduire en 




The “Nothing” of the poem becomes “living” only when inscribed, incised into the 
invisible depths of another body, another heart (“das lebendige / Nichts ins Gemüt”).697 
There must be a chiasmatic wounding as a “token of a covenant”, a “double vacancy”, “recip-
rocal occupiability”. The heart as a place of inscription is a very traditional topos, of 
course.698  But here, as the inscription beseeched for is an inscription of “Nothing”, there is 
no metaphor. Rather something less than metaphor, as Rudolf Carnap argued in his polemic 
against Heidegger’s “metaphysical” language.699 The wound of nothing inscribed into the 
heart is neither literal nor metaphorical, neither purely carnal nor purely spiritual. It is a cor-
poreal wound even when it is invisible, in the heart or soul (Gemüt) or “in the air”.  
                                                
And this “Nothing” is nothing but nothing: this void, this vacancy ‘is’ less than any 
determined negation. It ‘is’ not a lack, a longing for something determinate. It ‘is’ a radical 
hospitality for that which — for “the one who” — arrives “always again only once”, before 
we know it, before identification, “beyond knowledge”.  
Like Elijah, perhaps. Like a stranger, like an Other, “‘wholly Other’ and an ‘other’ 
which” — or an other who — “is not far removed, which [or who] is very near”.700   
 
697 Cf. DWB, entry “Gemüt, n.”: “das gemüt ist ursprünglich, wie der mut, u n s e r  i n n e r e s überhaupt im 
unterschied vom körper oder leib, daher leib und gemüt u. ä., wie leib und seele” (Bd. 5, Sp. 3294). It is not 
only the ‘soul’ or the ‘mind’, in opposition to ‘body’, but the ‘heart’, and that is not only the organ that can 
be operated on but ‘heart’ also names the innermost recess of the human body or body-and-soul in general, 
singularity in general, the non-phenomenal nucleus (Herzpunkt) of the phenomenal ‘person’. And perhaps 
here all we have to say is that Gemüt names nothing but the invisible ‘stationery’ on which “the living / 
Nothing” is to be “scribed”. 
698 To mention only one example out of a myriad: “You are our letter, written not with ink but with the spirit of 
the living God, not on tablets of stone but on the fleshy tablets of the heart [in tabulis cordis carnalibus].” 
2 Cor 3:2-3; cit. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, trans. Green, p. 183 (3.112). For a contrast, cf. 
Boyarin, p. 491: “In contrast to Paul and his followers, for whom the interpretation of circumcision was a 
rejection of the body, for the Rabbis of the midrash it is a sign of the sanctification of that very physical 
body; the cut in the penis completes the inscription of God’s name on the body.” According to Midrash 
Tanhuma 14, cited by Boyarin, “the Holy Blessed One placed His name on Israel” in circumcision, and the 
name is ShaDaY: “The Shi’’n [the first letter of the root], he placed in the nose, the Dale’’t, He placed in 
the hand, and the Yo’’d in the circumcision.” (Cit. ibid.) 
699 Cf. above the brief discussion of a passage in Carnap’s “The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical 
Analysis of Language”, which we hereby repeat: “We pointed out before that the meaningless words of 
metaphysics usually owe their origin to the fact that a meaningful word is deprived of its meaning through 
its metaphorical use in metaphysics. But here [in the case of the verb nichten, derived from the noun das 
Nichts] we confront one of those rare cases where a new word is introduced which never had a meaning to 
begin with” (pp. 24-25). 
700 “Vielleicht, so muß ich mir jetzt sagen, – vielleicht ist sogar ein Zusammentreffen dieses »ganz Anderen« – 
ich gebrauche hier ein bekanntes Hilfswort – mit einem nicht allzu fernen, einem ganz nahen »anderen« 
denkbar – immer und wieder denkbar.” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 31c; trans. Glenn, in the “Appendix” to Der-
rida’s Sovereignties in Question, p. 180.) — With regard to the poem “Einem, der vor der Tür stand”, much 
is left undiscussed here, of course. I have not found satisfactory answers to the questions concerning the 
“morning door” and “evening door” and their relation to the “one who stood before the door, one / eve-
ning”, for instance (I find P. H. Neumann’s reference to Psalm 92 a little bit vague; cf. his commentary on 
the poem in Jürgen Lehmann, ed., Kommentar zu Paul Celans »Die Niemandsrose«,  pp. 173-177, here pp. 
175, 176-177). The words “eines / Abends” do not only signal that there may be a specific reference to some 
biographical incident, nor do they only manifest that there is, as there always is, some such singular experi-
ence, that there is a secret, let alone that it would be just a casual remark (as ‘one evening’ would often be, 
in other contexts), but it should obviously be related also to the last two verses, separated from each other 
and the rest of the poem by the enigmatic ellipses. However, inasmuch as we can only ‘explain’ the morn-








In one of the poems in the book Lichtzwang, we seem to be invited to grasp something like a 
solitary hand in prayer — not only to grasp it, but to cut it, with eye-scissors (GW 2:273): 
 
SCHNEID DIE GEBETSHAND 
aus 
der Luft 
mit der Augen- 
schere, 
kapp ihre Finger 
mit deinem Kuß: 
 
Gefaltetes geht jetzt 
atemberaubend vor sich.701  
 
Here, as always, the word Finger might point us toward a complex configuration in Celan’s 
work — Handwerk702  — of poetry. But Finger — in this case fingers, in plural — is not just 
another figure among others. Fingers, hands, eyes, lips, lungs, in Celan’s poems, are not 
metaphors even though they may be understood as metonymies; they are no mere figures of 
speech but speech seeking a figure (Gestalt). They are pars pro toto, on their way through the 
atmosphere like meteors, and heading toward an “occupiable” reality: besetzbar is a word 
often used by Celan in the material for the Meridian speech.703   
                                                                                                                                                        
would rather leave them their universally ‘allegorical’ openness, their chance and risk of repetition. 
701 My translation: 
 
 CUT THE PRAYER-HAND  
off  
the air  
with the eye- 
scissors,  
cap its fingers  
with your kiss:  
 
the folded goes now  
breath-robbing before itself. 
 
 The Tübingen edition of Lichtzwang tells that the word Gebetshand is Celan’s citation from Rudolf Bilz, 
Die unbewältigte Vergangenheit des Menschengeschlechts. Beiträge zu einer Paläoanthropologie 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), p. 109: “Ich gehe nicht auf die Gebetshand ein, im besonderen den 
physiognomischen Wechsel, der sich vollzogen hat.” (TCA/Lichtzwang, p. 80n.) 
702 “Brief an Hans Bender” (GW 3:177): “Handwerk – das ist Sache der Hände. Und diese Hände wiederum 
gehören nur einem Menschen, d.h. einem einmaligen und sterblichen Seelenwesen, das mit seiner Stimme 
und seiner Stummheit einen Weg sucht. / Nur wahre Hände schreiben wahre Gedichte. Ich sehe keinen 
prinzipiellen Unterschied zwischen Händedruck und Gedicht.” 
703 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 490, passim. For instance, one of the many fragments in which this besetzbar oc-
curs, says that we should not imagine the “strangest” but to think it: “Das Gedicht [...] muß unentwegt auf 
jenes Fremdeste zuhalten, das es – immer noch – als ansprechbar, besetzbar, zumindest nennbar denkt 




 The poem heads towards an other, wants to move toward an Other, “it needs this 
Other, it needs an Over-against”; each thing, each human being is, for the poem, a figure of 
this Other, as it is said in the Meridian.704  And the word seeks to become flesh again, it wants 
to be voiced, perhaps even to be incorporated into your flesh, both embodied and disembod-
ied at the same time, but it will remain foreign, a foreign body within yours: “harzt, will 
nicht / vernarben.” (“resins, will not / scar over.”) (GW 1:149; trans. Felstiner.)  
 The imperative “kapp ihre Finger / mit deinem Kuß”, which I would translate “cap its 
fingers / with your kiss”, the verb “cap” meaning first and foremost, according to the OED, 
“To put a cap on ([for instance, on] the nipple of a gun)”, but also “To take away the cap 
from (a person)”; the German verb kappen would usually mean the same as schneiden, “to 
cut”, or even “to capon” (that is “to castrate a cock”), but it also means “to toe-cap, to tip”, 
which is to say in the shoemakers’ idiom, “[to cover the toe of a boot or shoe with] a cap of 
leather”, and the imperative “kapp ihre Finger / mit deinem Kuß”, “cap its fingers / with your 
kiss”, certainly combines these two opposite moves: to cut away the tip, tips, yes, but only to 
remove them from sight, to cover from sight and even to furnish, with your lips, new cover, 
new caps of leather.705  I say “certainly” because this inevitably happens to the words read 
aloud, learned by heart, and recited. 
 The theme of circumcision imposes itself here, of course. And is it perhaps a question 
of circumcising a word, again? “SCHNEID DIE GEBETSHAND”: could it be that this imperative 
concerns the word, the word die Gebetshand, the thing that is inseparable from this word as it 
arrives through the atmosphere, or the poem as a word, the handshake as a whole — “kapp 
ihre Finger / mit deinem Kuß”? Could it be that to cut the fingers — or the word Finger, the 
word-thing that arrives through the air or on the paper, like an airmail letter whose envelope 
you must cut open with the eye-scissors, but always an open letter — could it be that to cap 
the fingers, to cut them out of sight and thus to give them their new leather tips, is to give the 
                                                 
704 “Das Gedicht will zu einem Anderen, es braucht dieses Andere, es braucht ein Gegenüber. Es sucht es auf, 
es spricht sich ihm zu. / Jedes Ding, jeder Mensch ist dem Gedicht, das auf das Andere zuhält, eine Gestalt 
dieses Anderen.” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 35a-b; GW 3:198.) Trans. Felstiner, p. 409: “The poem wants to 
reach an Other, it needs this Other, it needs an Over-against. It seeks it out, speaks toward it. / For the poem 
making toward an other, each thing, each human being is a form of this Other.” 
705 Another poem, “Sibirisch”, in the earlier book Die Niemandsrose (1963), begins with the word “Bogenge-
bete”, “bow-prayers”, and ends “mit abgehäutetem / Finger.” With a flayed finger, with which “I speak to 
you [ich … rede zu dir]”. To say that I speak to you “with [mit]” a finger whose skin is peeled off, does not 
of course have to mean that I speak “through” my finger or write “with it”, as I write with a pen or com-
puter, but that I speak to you while my finger is skinned. But does one not speak in person, with all the parts 
of one’s body joined in? The poem begins: “Bogengebete — du / sprachst sie nicht mit, es waren, / du 
denkst es, die deinen.” (“Bow-prayers — you / did not speak with them [mitsprechen: you did not (just) 
‘join in’; also: you didn’t speak ‘with’ the words, didn’t just use them as an instrument of expression, let 
alone only mention them], those that were, / you think so, of your own.”) Bogengebete are related to the ti-
tle’s Siberia, they are prayers spoken over the hunter’s bow, as a spell. (GW 1:248. My translation.) Cf. 
Hans-Michael Speier’s commentary on the poem in Lehmann, ed., Kommentar zu Paul Celans »Die Nie-
mandsrose,, p. 196. Cf. also Werner Hamacher, “Bogengebete”, in Norbert Haas,  Rainer Nägele, Hans-Jörg 





hand what is missing, the missing part; to put the cap on would be to give it the voice it lacks, 
to “entrust [him] with [his] mouth”, too? To voice this letter in the bottle, and to drink its con-
tents: to voice it, and to incorporate its secret. 
 Watch your mouth! Pronounce before a mirror, read your lips, eye them. The typical 
German pronunciation of the word Finger, slightly unlike the Oxford English ‘finger’, 
somewhat widening the orifice of the mouth more toward the end, lets them all in, or out, at 
one mouthful, four or five of them: die Finger in plural (singular of this masculine noun 
would be der Finger). But Kuß — read your lips, eye them, feel them, think them — unlike 
the English ‘kiss’, lets in, or out, only one. One at a time. One by one. For the kiss, no, by der 
Kuß the fingers are separated, as if to receive a ring: the ring that is the kiss, a ring of flesh.  
 Insofar as the prayer-hand remains suspended, so to say, in the air, “en l’air”, “in der 
Luft”, that is: insofar as it remains a figure of speech only, you have not grasped the hand yet. 
The paronomasia or false etymology that suggests itself between finger and figure or fiction 
(fingere) should not lead us astray from what Celan believed: “Fingierte Dichtung: das gibt 
es nicht.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 641.) The poem need not be a mere figment of the imagina-
tion, a feigned poem. But, on the other hand, the grasping  itself has to happen in the air, lit-
erally, in the atmosphere: it becomes — the word becomes flesh only when “materialized”, 
when spoken or when written, written in a way that it compels one to cite and recite, to 
learn by heart, which is something that transcends or traverses the limit between the outside 
and the inside. In German the equivalent of “learning by heart” or apprendre par cœur is 
auswendig lernen: so it seems that in order to speak of the phenomenon of “learning by 
heart”, one language is not enough. What is “by heart” is still auswendig, by rote. “Like a 
prayer”, as Derrida claims in “Che cos’è la poesia”.706  A piece of poetry learned by heart re-
mains other — neither out nor in, or both within and without. But it need be nothing out of 
this world, its element is the “atmospheric air” that, according to the OED, “envelopes the 
earth”, the air we have for breathing (“in der Luft, die wir zu atmen haben”).707 
 To cut the prayer-hand out of the air with the eye-scissors may be a violent manner of 
grasping the hand, but it could also be a manner of putting the fingers out of sight or, also, out 
of hearing range, and even, protecting them. To take them from the air is to take them from 
the air we breath, the air moved when we speak, the air that carries our words; to cut it out 
with the eye-scissors might be, perhaps, to read silently, to see the word-digits as written or 
with the mind’s eye; but perhaps they must be put into the air before they can be taken out of 
                                                 
706 Derrida, “Che cos’è la poesia (1995), pp. 294/295 (bilingual, French/English, En. trans. Peggy Kamuf). 
707 Celan, Der Meridian (GW 3:192; TCA/Meridian, Endf. 18c; trans. Felstiner, p. 405: “the air we have to 
breath”). OED: “air, n. / A. I. Atmospheric air. / 1. a. The transparent, invisible, inodorous, and tasteless 
gaseous substance which envelopes the earth, and is breathed by all land animals.” Furthermore, corre-
sponding to the French expression en l’air and also to the German in der Luft (cf. Celan, Die Niemandsrose, 
GW 1:290: “IN DER LUFT, da bleibt deine Wurzel, [...]): “[3.] c. in the air. fig. 1. [...] b. in an unfixed or un-
certain state, in doubt; colloq. phr. (up) in the air, of persons: in doubt, uncertain; of ideas or theories: 




the air, so they are written to be spoken, to be given their voice, to be voiced, cited and re-
cited but also to be learned by heart. To cite Derrida’s words, or at least their translation, the 
poem compels one to cite and recite, to learn by heart, without knowing, beyond knowl-
edge.708  The apostrophe of the poem interrupts breath and claims our breath as its own: “The 
gift of the poem”, as Derrida writes in “Che cos’è la poesia”, “comes along without your ex-
pecting it, cutting short the breath”.709  It is breathtaking, to the letter.  
 Gefaltetes: “folded”, or “crossed”: this participle alludes, of course, to the hands 
folded in praying. But it is also incompatible with the word “die Gebetshand”, since this is a 
feminine word while Gefaltetes is neuter. This neuter form refers to an undetermined gram-
matical and logical subject, something unnamed, unnamed in the poem except by this very 
participle Gefaltetes: this word itself is gefaltet, folded, into itself. It is as if it were to be ap-
posited, not to a preceding word within the poem but to the gap between the verses that actu-
ally precedes it on the page and separates the parts of the poem, indeed folds them together 
and apart, forming a strange envoi of the second ‘stanza’, as is so often the case with Celan’s 
poems: they end with an envoi of sorts that seizes you more or less immediately, something 
like an aphorism, but an aphorism that never ceases to bother you by its foreign air, an apho-
rism that can never be detached from itself, from its own verbal body as detached from a 
body, pars pro toto. Not just a figure of speech, though, carrying a theme or a message, but 
speech seeking a figure. Before we know whether it is a question of a folded hand, reaching 
toward us, or folded scissors, eye-scissors, it has already robbed our breath. Before knowing, 
we offer our body to it.710 
 To cut the prayer-hand out of the air is an operation of the eye, an operation that takes 
the word out of sight, or perhaps out of its own sight. It is to pronounce it, to cite it, and per-
haps to learn it by heart. To learn by heart, to cite and recite — I am citing Derrida again — 
like a prayer. By heart, nearby, but with a distance, not quite inwendig: auswendig remains 
the German equivalent for apprendre par cœur, to learn by heart. To pick up (aufnehmen) 
and to carry by heart, as if incised into the flesh, but as a precarious surface that is folded 
back from and still toward the outside. The heart’s recesses must recede, must draw back 
from within and wander toward sense, make themselves ‘sensed’, ‘sensible’. Even when they 
bring to light only their own movement, the movement of giving signs, even if only a “sign of 
nothing”711  — perhaps nothing but “the living Nothing” incised into the innermost of body 
and soul (Gemüt)? The transplanted surface remains a foreign body within your system, it 
                                                 
708 Cf. Derrida, “Che cos’è la poesia?”, Donner la mort (1999) and Poétique et politique du témoignage (2005; 
En. trans. “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing”, in Sovereignties in Question, 2005). 
709 Derrida “Che cos’è la poesia?”, pp. 296/297. (“Le don du poème […] survient sans que tu t’y attendes, cou-
pant le souffle, […]”.) 
710 Thomas Schestag gives a very remarkable reading of this poem in his book Mantisrelikte (Basel: Engeler, 
1998), pp. 130-144. I had already written my reading of the poem (late 2003) when I read Schestag’s, and I 
have not taken his analysis into account in mine. 
711 Emmanuel Levinas, “Paul Celan: From Being to the Other”, in Proper Names (Stanford: Stanford Univer-




doesn’t quite heal even as the grafted organ — or a voice, or a noise — or words, carried 
through the air we have to breath, grow back into flesh (the word Finger, for instance, per-
haps in your everyman’s hands that pick something up), it will not quite scar over.712   
 The word Augenschere is not a metaphoric coinage, a neologism. Augenschere, a 
word that may be hard to find in the average dictionary, is quite lexical, however, and it 
means “eye-scissors”: an instrument used in eye surgery, nowadays for example in the retina 
transplantations that are “routinely performed on experimental animals”, as we may read 
from ophthalmological abstracts.713  Celan uses ophthalmological vocabulary from time to 
time.714  Such concreteness, and references to specific vocabularies, is very characteristic of 
Celan, and the reader should perhaps always remember this poet’s vehement opposition to 
searching for metaphors or coinages, more or less arbitrary neologisms, in his poems, which 
is imperative at least as an opening, an invitation to be on the alert, to the possibility of find-
ing something else, for instance Augenschere, eye-scissors; the finger-holes, the eye-holes in 
the handles of this instrument strangely resembling spectacles, the model preferred by Sig-
mund Freud for example. Aren’t the Augenschere, the eye-scissors an instrument with two 
loops for fingers, fingerholds, like rings furnished with blades?  
 In one of Celan’s earlier poems we find eyes borne like rings around fingers (GW 
1:29). And in Lichtzwang an Irish palmister reads “your” hand; the name “Die Irin” seems to 
allude to the iris (while there undoubtedly is or was some Irishwoman, a real chiromancer or 
chiromantic — which is an old synonym for chiromancer — to whom this poem refers, and 
of whom we, or at least I, know nothing: the singular, often anonymous dedication carried by 
every poem is also encrypted within the folded appeal, while the anonymous appeal is itself 
folded between singularities, face to face in the darkness), and indeed, the blue of her gaze 
grows through the hand, through your hand, “du, / augenfingrige / Ferne.” The distant “you” 
addressed in the poem is someone who, perhaps, becomes “eye-fingered” in the poem, 
through the poem, whose fate, divined by the Irishwoman, is to carry the blue of her gaze in 
her fingers, forever. This iris transplantation means both losing and winning, at once:  
 
DIE IRIN, die abschiedsgefleckte, 




                                                 
712 Cf. “Keine / Stimme” (GW 1:149); “Es ist alles anders” (GW 1:284); “Die hellen / Steine” (GW 1:255); “Erst 
wenn” (GW 3:76); cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 57/485. Cf. Derrida, Béliers (2003), esp. pp. 71ff. 
713 “Retina transplantations were regarded as impossible up until about 15 years ago, but today, they are rou-
tinely performed on experimental animals in several different experimental laboratories.” Berndt Ehinger, 
“Transplantation of photoreceptors and of full thickness retina”, an abstract in the Abstracts Book of the 
10th Retina International World Conference in Lugano (http: // www retina-international.org/ conference/ 
1998/ abstract.htm). 




Ihrer Blicke Bläue durchwächst sie, 





The reading of the hand tells the destiny, but not as something that already was there, it 
rather produces the destiny: you are never quite the same after such an event.  
 The word learned by heart has become “the invisible word” and a word for the 
wholly other, “a witness that others can’t see, and who is therefore at the same time other 
than me and more intimate with me than myself”; a secret that can remain a secret even 
for myself, as for instance a formula learned by heart “beyond any semantic 
comprehension”. Derrida’s example of such a formula is the one repeated over and over 
again in Donner la mort: “Tout autre est tout autre.” Another one would be: “Die Welt ist 
fort, ich muß dich tragen.”716
715 GW 2:288; the poem was written in Paris, 27.9.1967. This is yet another poem discussed in Thomas 
Schestag’s Mantisrelikte (1998); what I said earlier about not having taken advantage of Schestag’s 
readings applies also here. 
716 Cf. Derrida, Donner la mort, pp. 133, 147, passim; En. trans. (1995), pp. 97, 108-109. God’s 
commandment to Abraham to slay his own son is of course the most horrible instance of such a secret, 
a secret that the man must carry in his heart without knowing why, and without being able to reveal it 
to anyone. — The line “Die Welt ist fort, ich muß dich tragen” is the concluding line of the poem 
“Grosse, glühende Wölbung” (TCA/Atemwende, 167), discussed at length by Derrida in Béliers 







I N  L I F E ,  L I K E  A  S E C R E T  




DU LIEGST im großen Gelausche, 
umbuscht, umflockt. 
 
Geh du zur Spree, geh zur Havel, 
geh zu den Fleischerhaken, 
zu den roten Äppelstaken  5 
aus Schweden – 
 
Es kommt der Tisch mit den Gaben, 
er biegt um ein Eden – 
 
Der Mann ward zum Sieb, die Frau 
mußte schwimmen, die Sau,  10 
für sich, für keinen, für jeden – 
 
Der Landwehrkanal wird nicht rauschen. 
Nichts  
           stockt.717 
                                                 
717  GW 2:334. Translated by John Felstiner (Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, p. 329): 
 
 YOU LIE amid a great listening, 
enbushed, enflaked. 
 
 Go to the Spree, to the Havel, 
go to the meathooks, 
to the red apple stakes 
from Sweden — 
 
 Here comes the gift table, 
it turns around an Eden — 
 
 The man became a sieve, the Frau 
had to swim, the sow, 
 
for herself, for no one, for everyone — 
 The Landwehr Canal won’t make a murmur. 
Nothing 
             stops.  
 
 The title of this chapter translates a few improvised words by Jacques Derrida in a colloquy on Peter 
Szondi’s work, held in Paris in June 1979. The words were presented in a discussion following a paper de-
livered by Thomas Fries on Szondi’s “Celan-studies”, a paper and discussion concentrating especially on 
the famous essay fragment “Eden” (cf. below). This is part of Derrida’s contribution to the discussion: “[...] 
où et comment va fonctionner cette opposition entre le dehors et le dedans ? est-ce qu’on va se contenter de 
dire que, au fond, il y a le dedans du poème qui est cette chose écrite là, et puis que tout ce qui sera dans la 
vie comme un secret par exemple entre Celan et Szondi, etc., c’est le dehors du poème ? [...] Quand un 
poète inscrit la date ou le lieu d’une poème, et même sa propre signature, le topos de cette inscription est 






Peter Szondi’s epoch-making, posthumously published essay fragment entitled “Eden” 
(1971),718 which consists of an analysis of this single poem by his friend Paul Celan, “DU 
LIEGST im großen Gelausche”, appears to challenge the traditional frontiers between so-called 
intrinsic and extrinsic criticism, between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, and it has not failed 
to leave its distinctive marks on the disciplines and counter-disciplines of reading poetry. For 
instance, the question of the relation between the extrinsic and intrinsic date of the poem, a 
central theme in Jacques Derrida’s book Schibboleth — pour Paul Celan (1986), is in a cer-
tain manner inherited by Derrida from his friend and colleague Szondi. Derrida’s reference to 
“Eden” actually concerns, first and foremost, a relatively public fact: whereas the first publi-
cation of the poem “DU LIEGST im großen Gelausche” bears the date of its composition (“Ber-
lin, 22./23.12.1967”),719 this inscription was omitted thereafter by the poet himself, together 
with the early title “Wintergedicht”.720 This omission of the date — which can be called an 
omission only because it was there, since Celan practically always dated his manuscripts, and 
this time the date of composition was featured also in the first published version of the poem 
— was customary to him, as Szondi points out. But this effacement of the “external date” 
never annuls what Derrida calls “la datation interne”.721 
 Szondi’s work on Celan also solicits the issues of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”, reading 
and interpretation, immanence and transcendence in the longer essay “Lecture de Strette” 
(1971),722 but apparently from the other side of the frontier: in that spectacular reading of the 
poem “Engführung”, he tries to remain as ‘immanent’ and as close to the letter as possible, 
                                                                                                                                                        
le biographique, une théorie de la datation, de la signature etc., de la localisation de ce topos très difficile à 
situer, une telle théorie devra naturellement considérer ce qu’on appelle vulgairement le biographique 
comme faisant partie (à sa manière, de manière hétérogène évidemment, de manière spécifique) du texte. 
Dès lors le secret que Szondi pouvait prétendre connaître de tel poème de Celan et à partir duquel, lui, en-
gage une lecture ne doit pas scandaliser. Il y a toujours dans tout poème une addresse, un poème est dédi-
cacé d’une manière ou d’une autre. Et cette addresse-là est à la fois secrète, elle est toujours secrète de toute 
manière, et son secret donne à lire, il se détourne de lui-même, c’est ça la langue. Dès lors que ce secret est 
inscrit dans la langue, il reste secret et il donne à lire.” (Jacques Derrida, with Thomas Fries, Jean Bollack, 
Michel Deguy, Martine Broda, Henri Meschonnic, Bernhard Böschenstein, Wolfgang Fietkau, Hans Hagen 
Hildebrandt, “Discussion”, in Mayotte Bollack, ed., L’acte critique. Un colloque sur l’oeuvre de Peter 
Szondi, Paris, 21-23 juin 1979; Cahiers de philologie, Vol. 5 [Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1985], 
here pp. 239-240.) The article by Fries (“Critical Relation: Peter Szondi’s Studies on Celan”) as well as the 
“Discussion on Fries” have been translated into English by James G. Hughes, in boundary 2, Vol. 11, No. 3 
(Spring 1983), The Criticism of Peter Szondi, pp. 139-154, 155-167. 
718 Schriften 2, ed. Wolgang Fietkau (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1978), pp. 390-398; “Celan-Studien” therein 
(pp. 319-398, 423-442) are edited by Jean Bollack, Henriette Beese, Wolfgang Fietkau, Hans-Hagen 
Hildebrandt, Gert Mattenklott, Senta Metz, Helen Stierlin. English trans. Susan Bernofsky, in Szondi, Celan 
Studies, trans. Bernofsky with Harvey Mendelsohn (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 83-95. 
719 In Otto F. Best, ed., Hommage für Peter Huchel, zum 3. April 1968, München 1968, p. 16; cit. Szondi, 
Schriften 2, p. 390. 
720  That is, in Celan’s final typescript copy for Schneepart, which was posthumously published in 1971, but 
already prepared for publication by the poet himself. 
721 Cf. Szondi, “Eden”, in Schriften 2, pp. 390-391; Jacques Derrida, Schibboleth — pour Paul Celan (Paris: 
Galilée, 1986), pp. 34-36, here p. 36. 





while most of the unfinished essay fragment “Eden” seems to consist of a certain promulga-
tion of private knowledge, evidently ‘external’ to the poem’s text, as it seems. But even if it 
remains a fragment, an unfinished essay, Szondi makes it quite clear that it is altogether ques-
tionable whether the biographical information shared by the friend and the events reported in 
the essay could, in the end, “serve to support any reading at all”. Let us cite the central ‘theo-
retical’ question of the essay in extenso, in Susan Bernofsky’s translation: 
 
This biographical report (others could no doubt make similar remarks apropos of 
other Celan poems), is not intended as the justification for a reading of the poem “Du 
liegst im großen Gelausche.” Rather, we might ask whether such information can 
serve to support any reading at all. To what extent does understanding the poem de-
pend on a knowledge of the biographical/historical framework? Or, in more general 
terms, to what extent is the poem determined by things external to it, and this deter-
mination from without invalidated by the poem’s own internal logic? Obviously 
Celan’s poem would never have been written — at least not in this form — had it not 
been for the experiences of his stay in Berlin, which were determined more by his 
friends and by chance than by the poet himself. Without the drive to the Havel, to the 
Landwehr Canal, past the Eden, without the visit to the Christmas market, the execu-
tion chamber at Plötzensee, without Celan’s having read the Luxemburg/Liebknecht 
documentation, the poem would have been impossible. [We shall shortly return to 
these ‘external’ conditions of possibility, as reported by Szondi.] Yet Celan also saw, 
read, and experienced many other things during the same few days that left no traces 
in the poem. But the poem’s determination by everyday coincidence is already limited 
— indeed precluded — by the process of selection, which, no less than these more or 
less chance occurrences themselves, was a necessary precondition for the poem, part 
of its genesis. We might ask whether the determination from without, the real-life ref-
erent, is not balanced out by the poem’s self-determination: the interdependence of its 
various elements, by means of which even the real events referred to are transformed. 
[Celan Studies, pp. 88-89.] 
 
”Eden” testifies to the rare fact that a privileged reader has been able to closely witness the 
incidents in the poet’s life which, in a very specific way, led to the poem. The few pages of 
the essay reveal how practically each line and each word of the poem may be traced back to 
some incident of Celan’s stay in Berlin just before Christmas 1967, while the poem can never 
be reduced to these details, however, as Szondi himself emphasizes (cf. Celan Studies, p. 85). 
Let us summarize briefly what Szondi can tell us of Celan’s experiences in Berlin. Celan was 
staying at the Academy of Fine Arts, in a room whose large panorama window looks out on 
the Tiergarten Park, and there he wrote the poem late at night, between the 22nd and 23rd of 
December, 1967. The opening lines refer to the bushes and the snowflakes seen through that 
window. The next four lines (3-6) refer to places Celan visited and objects he saw during the 
preceding day or two, including the Plötzensee Prison meat hooks from which Hitler’s 
would-be assassins and their suspected associates were hanged after the assassination attempt 
of the 20th of July 1944 and, as a scandalous rhyme-word for these Fleischerhaken, the 
Christmas decoration (the Swedish wreaths, Äppelstaken) that were on display at the Europa-




luxury apartment house named Eden that was built, as if to attest to sheer outrageous indiffer-
ence, right on the site of the former Hotel Eden, where Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht 
were held and beaten before they were lynched, on January 15th, 1919. During Celan’s visit 
to Berlin, he asked his friend for something to read, and Szondi gave him a new book about 
this political assassination.723 Lines 9-10 only slightly transform the words that are docu-
mented in the book as the murderers’ description of their deed.724 The bodies, turned into a 
“sieve” and a “sow”, as the assassins would have it, were thrown into the Landwehr Canal 
which, afterwards, “will make no noise” (line 12).  
 Szondi is not the privileged reader of this poem only because he happened to witness 
these events more or less personally, but, more importantly, because his Celan Studies and 
other readings of literature are exceptional in their force and insight.725 The importance of 
“Eden” does not lie only in the ‘anecdotal’ details, nor is it essentially devalued by the fact 
that he never finished it and thus never had the chance to “reconstruct the logic of the 
                                                 
723 E. Hannover-Drück, H. Hannover, eds., Der Mord an Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Liebknecht. 
Dokumentation eines politischen Verbrechens (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1968 [1st ed.1967]). 
724  “Der Mann ward zum Sieb, die Frau / mußte schwimmen, die Sau, / [...]”. An excerpt from a court testi-
mony by “Walter Alker, 28 Jahre alt, katholisch”: “Nach ungefähr einer Stunde kam Runge zurück und 
machte Anstalten, sich schlafen zu legen. In dem Moment kam auch eine Abteilung zurück, die wahr-
scheinlich Dr. Liebknecht weggebracht haben mochte. Die unterhielten sich angeregt und hatten auch zwei 
Flaschen Wein und mehrere hundert Zigarretten, die sie untereinander verteilt haben. Ich ging nun an den 
Tisch heran und fragte, ob Dr. Liebknecht schon wirklich tot sei, worauf mir von einem der Kameraden zur 
Antwort gegeben wurde, daß Liebknecht durchlöchert wäre, wie ein Sieb. Ich fragte auch, von wem sie die 
Zigarretten und den Wein hätten. Da wurde mir ebenfalls gesagt: Das ist von Offizieren gestiftet worden.” 
(Der Mord an R.L. und K.L., p. , 99). And another excerpt, from the written confession by the non-
commissioned officer Runge, who reportedly hit Luxemburg heavily with his rifle-butt two or three times as 
she was being taken from the Hotel Eden to a car, and who reports having been told after the murders were 
committed — and after he, as it is told in the testimony just quoted, returned to the hotel one hour after kill-
ing or trying to kill her (she was shot with a pistol in the car after the blows and then thrown into the canal), 
in order to get some sleep — the following: “Über Luxemburg hießt es: »Die alte Sau schwimmt schon.«” 
(Der Mord an R.L. und K.L., p. 129.) There are actually several places in the book by Hannover-Drück and 
Hannover where you can find the reference, almost word for word, of Celan’s citation, most notably the ci-
tation from a newspaper article: “Es konnte nicht allein die Parole sein, die den beiden revolutionären 
Führern den Tod brachte, jene Worte, die an dem verhängnisvollen Abend durch die Halle des Luxushotels 
geschmettert wurden: »Die Sau muß schwimmen!«, an einem Fluch stirbt niemand, [...]” (Berliner 
Tageblatt, April 29th, 1929, “Die rote Robe”; cit. Der Mord...., p. 166.) “Z[euge:] Ich [Röpke] meldete 
Herrn Hauptmann Weller: »Eben ist die Rosa Luxemburg ins Wasser geworfen worden, man kann sie noch 
schwimmen sehen.« Der Kanal trug nämlich die Leiche an der Oberfläche, unter der Brücke durch, so daß 
man sie bequem beobachten konnte, und verschwand. [...] / E [=Kriegsgerichtsrat Ehrhardt:] Was sagten Sie 
nun zu dem Angeklagten Weller? / Z  »Herr Hauptmann, eben ist die Rosa Luxemburg ins Wasser 
geworfen worden, man kann sie noch schwimmen sehen.«” (Der Mord..., p. 104.) “»Die ist erledigt, die 
schwimmt schon.« [...] »die ist erledigt, die schwimmt schon längst! Wir sind nicht weit gefahren damit!«” 
(An expression reportedly overheard by the hotel porter from a sentry only fifteen minutes after Rosa Lux-
emburg’s transport; Der Mord..., p. 146.) 
725 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe asserts that Szondi’s “Eden” “is, along with two essays by Blanchot and by Levi-
nas published in 1972 [...], among the very few illuminating commentaries on Celan”. Blanchot’s and Levi-
nas’s essays are of course very different from what Lacoue-Labarthe himself calls Szondi’s “complete deci-
phering of the poem”, and the “gnomic” character of their essays is recognized, with reference to Adorno’s 
critique of Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin, by Lacoue-Labarthe himself (in Poetry as Experience, 
trans. Andrea Tarnowski [Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1999], p. 14; La poésie comme expérience [Paris: Chris-





poem”726 as effectively as could have been expected. “Eden” is far from being a triumph of 
naïve biographical interpretation. Szondi emphasizes that it is impossible, impossible for him 
at least, for the very reader — Szondi speaks of himself variably in the first person and in the 
third person singular as “this reader, who was fortunate enough to spend these days in 
Celan’s company” and as “a friend” — to reduce the poem to these “dates and facts”. Reveal-
ing the facts opens the view not only into “the history of the poem’s genesis” but also “to the 
path that led from the actual experiences to their transformation in the poem”, to their “con-
stellation” and “crystallization” (Celan Studies, pp. 85, 86). Szondi himself warns against 
having recourse to what he calls empirical premisses without posing the question about their 
(poetic) motivation, and against reducing this motivation or this specific Wirklichkeit to sub-
jective contingencies. The motivation or “secret basis [geheimen Grund]” (Celan Studies, p. 
90; Schriften 2, p. 396) for the connection of the murders with the feast of the nativity (i.e. 
Christmas) in Celan’s poem is neither an arbitrary combination of indifferent coincidences 
nor a result of the poet’s indifference. A non-indifference towards indifference would perhaps 
be considered as a more accurate motivation for this poem. But the poem doesn’t state this 
non-indifference, it is not a statement, nor is its mode of speaking essentially that of a consta-
tation.  
 The rhyme juxtaposes, sets across Fleischerhaken and Äppelstaken, and this figure of 
indifference, this Skandalon (Indifferenz or In-Differenz is Szondi’s key word in Eden, and 
the connection of the “double motif” of the assassinations and executions with the tokens of 
Christmas Eve is of course a scandal) may be seen to extend itself and touch almost every-
thing, every word within the poem, within its texture, at least as long as we more or less know 
how to distinguish this ‘within’ from what lies outside the poem. The figure of indifference 
and ambivalence, the scandalon, extends from the meat hooks, rhymed together with the 
Christmas decoration, to the rhyme between “im großen Gelausche” on the first line and 
“wird nicht rauschen” near the end of the poem (as if the great harkening, the great atten-
dance in the still of the night meant anticipation of a Christmastide miracle that never hap-
pens) and through, not only the rhyme “umflockt ... nichts stockt”, but also the etymological 
connotation of Äppelstaken against this “nichts stockt”, all the way to the indifference that 
allows for the erection of the luxury apartment building of the name Eden, the same name as 
of the former hotel on the same site which served as the headquarters for the paramilitary 
Freikorps troops division called the Garde-Kavallerie-Schützen-Division.  
 In the scandalon, the collision of Fleischerhaken with Äppelstaken, Szondi recognizes 
“metaphor” in the Jakobsonian sense (Schriften 2, p. 398; Celan Studies, p. 92). This techni-
cal term is of course something quite different from the traditional concept of metaphor, 
which has been so vehemently denounced by Celan as an instrument of interpreting poetry, 
                                                 
726 Cf. Gadamer, Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?, p. 125; cf. Szondi, “[...] to what extent is the poem determined 
by the things external to it, and this determination from without invalidated by the poem’s own internal 




and actually the the term ‘metaphor’ is in Roman Jakobson’s use a sort of bricolage, a trans-
formed or ‘metaphorical’ use of the term ‘metaphor’.727 However, in the double exposure of 
Fleischerhaken and Äppelstaken neither of these two terms is in itself metaphorical. These 
nouns refer to altogether concrete objects in the world, as Szondi himself tells us, the meat-
hooks of Plötzensee and the Christmas decorations at the Europa-Center very near to the for-
mer Hotel Eden in Berlin. This syntactic operation over vocabulary, this juxtaposition by 
rhyme happens, of course, according to the linguistic procedure that Jakobson characterizes 
as “metaphor”, and we may understand Fleischerhaken and Äppelstaken as two metonymies 
that collide. They collide just like the crucifix and the dagger in a certain piece of “meta-
phorical montage” in Eisenstein’s Potemkin,728 and just like the scorpions’ tails hilariously 
juxtaposed with bishop’s crooks in the incipit of Buñuel’s and Dali’s L’age d’Or. But these 
two “objects”, Fleischerhaken & Äppelstaken, are “metaphorical” here only as according to 
the syntactical double exposure, or indeed as constituents of the ‘montage’ of the poem, and 
not as according to the more traditional, Aristotelian or post-Aristotelian understanding of 
metaphor. Moreover, Szondi adds a note that was not originally published as part of the 
fragmentary essay: “Rhyme for Celan is not, as for Karl Kraus, das Ufer, wo sie landen / sind 
zwei Gedanken einverstanden [the shore, where two thoughts land, / we take them together 
and as one understand].”729  
 The only phrases of the poem where we unmistakably, easily and obviously can locate 
metaphor in the traditional sense are the two quotations of the murderers’ words, namely, as 
Felstiner translates, where “The man became a sieve, the Frau / had to swim, the sow”: these 
two metaphors are only a slightly transformed version — precisely in order that they would 
compose a rhyme — transformed from the words that the assassins used to describe their 
deed. The man, Karl Liebknecht, was shot full of bullet holes, that is, according to his mur-
derers, he turned into a sieve, and the other “Bolshevik”, the Jewish woman, the female 
corpse of Rosa Luxemburg, die Frau, was thrown into the canal and “had to swim”, the sow 
as the assassins would have it. 
                                                 
727 Cf. Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances”. Szondi 
writes: “Das Gedicht als Sprachgewebe [...] konkretisiert die Gedankensassoziation nicht so sehr 
diskursiv, im Nacheinander der Satzaussage, als vielmehr in dem vom Sprachmaterial bereitgestellten 
Ineinander, in Roman Jakobsons Terminologie: nicht metonymisch, sondern metaphorisch.” (Schriften 2, p. 
398.) Jakobson associates metonymy with prose and metaphor with poetry. But we can see that the words 
Fleischerhaken and Äppelstaken, even as they are the constituents of the rhyme and the “metaphorical mon-
tage” juxtaposing them, are by no means metaphorical by themselves: they are quite ‘concrete’ and they 
metonymically refer to the concrete reality of Berlin; they are not poetic ‘transformations’ of that reality but 
belong to it, whereas to call a man a sieve and a Frau a sow rather indicate a dissimulation of reality in or-
der to annihilate it. 
728 Precisely the same ‘metaphorical’ collision-collusion of two metonymies takes place in a photograph of a 
crucifix-shaped dagger in Breton’s and Éluard’s Dictionnaire abrégé du surréalisme (Paris: José Corti, 
1991). 
729 Szondi, Schriften 2, p. 430; my translation. Cf. Celan Studies, p. 95: “the shore where they land / are two 





 These two metaphors appear in the poem as instruments of violence, the most repug-
nant verbal violence, as banal metaphors turning human beings into what the speakers repre-
sent to themselves as animals and inanimate things. Is it perhaps precisely through such 
metaphorical ‘filters’ that human beings, such as the young soldiers who used such words 
during the trial, are able to lose their conscience, so to say, or to keep it separate and commit 
murder? 
 Jean Bollack hears in the imperative geh, “go”, and in the triplet “ein Eden, aus 
Schweden, für jeden” a parody of commercial advertising. Following him, we might also rec-
ognize a double emblem of Eve and Adam in the composite Äppelstaken: the apple and the 
stake. This emblem would then “basically mean”, as Bollack puts it, “the pair of persecuted 
Jews who are driven away from Paradise and bloodily offered”.730 But I think the poem itself 
precludes such typological identification. It certainly offers this emblem like an apple on a 
stake, and certainly it also suggests the sense of offering, but at the same time it problema-
tizes such emblematic representation. An association between the meat-hooks and the Chris-
tian emblem of a cross is not far-fetched, I think. The cross too was originally a gibbet, and 
the original skandalon indeed.731 If we consider this association further in relation to the line 
“für sich, für einen, für jeden”, and these in relation to the advertisement-like character of the 
chain “ein Eden, aus Schweden, für jeden”, the banal aspect of this “für jeden” may be 
brought into relief. Through the context we might think that this “für jeden” is associated 
with martyrdom and sacrifice: the martyr was offered for everyone’s sake. This association 
might suggest that also the typological figura that identifies Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht with Adam and Eve through the emblem or the composite Äppelstaken, in which 
the apple is penetrated by the rod (cf. Bollack, “»Eden« nach Szondi”, pp. 86ff), is both ma-
cabre and banal: that emblem is macabre ‘like’ the meat hooks and banal ‘like’ the metaphors 
that identify the two victims with a sieve and a sow, or vice versa. All these tokens are pene-
trated by their failure to penetrate.  
 The couplet “Es kommt der Tisch mit den Gaben, / er biegt um ein Eden” remains 
strange, enigmatic and undeciphered in regard of its, so to say, grammatical motivation. But 
we could take it as a sort of rebus or pun, so that “the table [der Tisch]” is transformed into 
something like a snake that “bends round an Eden”, the serpent who tempts someone by of-
fering “the gifts”; and we can, of course, think of an abundance the weight of which bends 
the table. But it is not clear who is tempted by the table with the gifts, as it seems that it cer-
tainly cannot be the alleged Eve of this Eden, if there is an Eve to this Eden at all: the tempt-
ing apple stake is a grotesque motive for such typological identification suggested by Bol-
lack. On the one hand, insofar as we have happened to come across the book that was given 
to Celan by Szondi, and this could indeed happen, with Szondi’s assistance (one may always 
                                                 
730 Jean Bollack, “‘Eden’ nach Szondi”, trans. by Beatrice Schulz, in Hans-Michael Speier, ed., Celan-
Jahrbuch 2 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1988), p. 84. 




speculate whether the hints given by the poem could have pointed the reader to that specific 
book without Szondi’s assistance; I do not see why it couldn’t have), we might associate the 
table with the gifts with the wine and cigarettes that seemed like part of the reward for the 
Freikorps men after “the old sow was swimming”. We also learn from Szondi about the table 
of gifts in the new Eden of the 1967 Christmastide, and are thus able to make this uncanny 
association between the presents, between the dates of  January 15th, 1919 and December 
22nd, 1967, while the association between these wintery scenes accentuates the indifference 
so strongly thematized by him. On the other hand, these possible associations only accentuate 
the absurdity of the imposing, tempting association of the victims with Eve and Adam. There 
are no Eves and Adams in this Eden. 
 In the poem, there is the crystallization of lived experience into a constellation, to use 
Szondi’s vocabulary (cf. Celan Studies, p. 85). There are the objects hanging from the ceil-
ing, first of the Plötzensee and then of the Europa-Center, and their double exposure mediated 
by rhyme (the “metaphorical montage”, so to say, of the two non-metaphorical tokens of real-
ity); there are the bushes of the Tiergarten and the flakes of snow and the silence of the Ad-
vent. On the other hand, there is the experience of reading about what happened in January 
1919 and what was said then, according to the documentation contained in the book read by 
the poet. Both of these types of experience are types of reading, they are already typed by 
reading in a peculiar way, they are on their way to be read as soon as the poet experiences 
and perceives these things as a poet: his perceptions of the bushes and the snowflakes, the 
meat hooks and the Christmas decorations, are “offered for a reading”, they are perceived by 
the poet as a poet and perceived (wahrgenommen) “always again only for once” by the poem, 
or in the poem — let us say, by the Thou (Du) endowed to the poem; the Thou is, Thou art, 
the “you” in the poem is endowed to the poem as much as its “I” is.732  It is “you” who is, 
you who are “em-bushed, en-flaked” in the poem’s winter night. The guest room of the Ber-
lin Academy of Fine Arts, in which the poem was once written on a night just before Christ-
mas (“Berlin, 22./23.12.1967”), has transformed itself into a strange residence in the poem: 
the snowflakes outside the window have crystallized themselves into the single word um-
flockt, and the poem appears as a constellation surrounding the strange presence-absence of 
the unnamed “you”, unnamed yet summoned to appear as (if) “you” were already there, ad-
dressed with an uncanny precision. Uncanny, for instance because we can hear an uncanny 
echo in the participle umbuscht, of the word ‘ambushed’ (embûché, embusqué, embuscade, 
                                                 
732 In the Meridian: “Das Gedicht ist einsam. Es ist einsam und unterwegs. Wer es schreibt, bleibt ihm mit-
gegeben.” (TCA/Meridian, Endf. 34a. “The poem is lonely. It is lonely and underway. Whoever writes one 
stays mated with it.” Trans. John Felstiner, Selected..., p. 409.) In the manuscript: “Das Gedicht ist nie 
aktuell, sondern aktualisierbar. Das ist, auch zeitlich, die ‘Besetzbarkeit’ des Gedichts: das Du, an das es 
gerichtet ist, ist ihm mitgegeben auf dem Weg zu diesem Du. Das Du ist, noch ehe es gekommen ist, da.” 
(TCA/Meridian, Ms. 489, 490. “The poem is never up-to-date, but it is actualizable. That is, also tempo-
rally, the ‘occupiability’ of the poem: the thou, towards whom it is orientated, is endowed to it on its way to 
this thou. The thou is, even before it has come, there.” My translation.) The clause “offered for a reading” is 





imboscata). Thus the prefix um-, in umbuscht, umflockt, is perhaps not only a sign of security 
or protection (Schutz) here, as Hans-Georg Gadamer would have it, seeking to legitimize a 
hermeneutic interpretation that remains independent of the “information”, “biographical de-
tails” and “special knowledge” shared by Szondi.733 
 The shifts between past, present and future tense, between the second person singular 
and the third person, between indicative and imperative, should merit our attention in reading 
the poem. The first two lines address themselves to a “thou” who “is”, to you who are already 
there, vocative and locative at once:  
 
DU LIEGST im großen Gelausche,  
umbuscht, umflockt. 
 
This incipit in the form of a constatation locates you, in the present, which makes it hard to 
decide whether it is actually a constatation or a strange sort of performative, even more un-
conditional than the imperative that follows on the next four lines, composing the second 
strophe, an imperative to go, still in the second person singular:  
 
Geh du zur Spree, geh zur Havel,  
geh zu den Fleischerhaken,  
zu den roten Äppelstaken  
aus Schweden – 
 
Here, if we think of the silent and solitary hour of writing the poem or the one preceding its 
composition, the moment iterated by the poem — crystallized and constellated in or into the 
poem — these lines rather recollect the day, invite ‘you’ to repeat or memorize the day’s 
walk in Berlin in ‘your’ mind. The next couplet, with the return of the indicative mood and 
beginning with the impersonal neuter pronoun “Es”, seems to tell what arrives next into such 
recollection, the next ‘images’ that come to mind on this sleepless and apparently immobile, 
interiorized walk, returning visions transformed into their nocturnal counterparts:  
 
Es kommt der Tisch mit den Gaben,  
er biegt um ein Eden –  
 
Then, there is the three-verse strophe, first recollecting and transforming into a poetic form 
the statements of the accused in the trial, documented in the book given by the friend: 
 
Der Mann ward zum Sieb, die Frau  
mußte schwimmen, die Sau, 
 
                                                 
733 “Was erfährt man noch aus dem Gedicht selbst? ›Umbuscht‹ und ›umflockt‹ wird man wohl auf das winter-
liche Berlin beziehen, aber gewiß nicht auf den Blick aus dem fenster, den Celan bei seinem Besuch von 
Bett aus hatte. Eher wird man in Busch und Flocke Schutz (um-buscht, um-flockt) und nach innen 





These two lines are followed by the verse rhyming with the preceding strophes,  perhaps al-
luding to martyrdom, to bearing witness and to the impossibility of bearing witness for the 
witness,734 as was already suggested —  
 
für sich, für keinen, für jeden – 
 
— or perhaps not, and on the other hand, to the sarcastic echoes of advertising jargon sug-
gested by Jean Bollack (the rhyme forms the sequence “aus Schweden  — ein Eden — für 
jeden”). The conclusion responds — negatively, as it seems — to the “great listening” of the 
first line and the silent movement of the snowflakes on the second, crystallized into the word 
umflockt:  
 




To the ending Szondi attached the following comment that was however not included in the 
final copy and subsequent publication: “The poem stops short because nothing is stopping./ 
The fact that nothing stops makes the poem stop short. [Darüber, daß nichts stockt, stockt das 
Gedicht. / Daß nichts stockt, macht das Gedicht stocken.]” (Schriften 2, p. 429; Celan Stud-
ies, p. 94.)  
 The standard reading, shared for instance by Bollack and Fries but not by Gadamer 
and Derrida,735 which not only identifies and locates the poet Celan himself in the room of 
the Berlin Academy of the Arts next to the Tiergarten, watching in midwinter midnight si-
lence the bushes and snowflakes outside his window, but also identifies the addressee of the 
poem as the selfsame person, as if he was only talking to himself and using the singular 
“you”, “thou” only as a detour to denote “me”, is perplexing. I do not see why this imperative 
should be seen as merely a rhetorical device of Celan’s to address himself in a monologue 
that only recapitulates the events during the past few days. Why should he tell himself to 
“go” if he already went? A rhetorical question, perhaps. But perhaps this imperative is far 
from being a question of rhetoric. 
 This is not to say that the poem is addressed to some other determined individual 
alone, to only some single privileged addressee of a determined message, such a friend and 
reader alone as Peter Szondi for example, sharing a secret and “cultivating intimacy” upon 
this very specific horizon. In the colloquy of 1979 Derrida suddenly contributed to the dis-
cussion in a manner that, as we may imagine from the absence of response to this assertion, 
may have stopped the dialogue for a perplexed instant: “There is no dialogue with a deter-
                                                 
734 Cf. Celan, “Aschenglorie” (GW 2:72): “Niemand / zeugt für den / Zeugen.” Cf. Jacques Derrida, Poétique et 
politique du témoignage (Paris: L’Herne, 2005); En. trans. Outi Pasanen, “Poetics and Politics of Witness-
ing”, in Derrida, Sovereignties in Question, pp. 65-96. 





minable individual, with an empirically determinable addressee or correspondent, which does 
not mean that there is no dialogue.”736 This is an odd and abrupt sentence, to be sure. There is 
dialogue, as Derrida affirms. But nothing guarantees that this encounter called dialogue (Be-
gegnung, Gespräch are the words from the Meridian) stays between the twain: “se 
détourne[r] de lui-même, c’est ça la langue.”737 To deviate, that’s it, that’s language. 
 There is a certain piece of dialogue, among many others, in the record of the court 
martial, contained in the book given by Szondi for Celan to read,738 a piece of dialogue re-
ported as part of the testimony by a certain Captain Pabst who tells the court of the following 
conversation after the arrest: “I asked: Are you Mrs. Rosa Luxemburg? To that she replied: 
Decide for yourself please. Then I said: Judging by the picture you must be her. She an-
swered to that: When you say so.”739 A counter-word, her answer, both like and unlike 
Lucile’s Gegenwort. I would not put words into her mouth, these are mine — it is as if she 
said: You will have to decide who I am. You will have to decide whether I am who you think 
I am. Whether you will address me by that name — whether you will address a name and for 
what — for what cause, too, that is something you will have to decide for yourself, if you 
will.740  
 If the addressee is the poet, even if this Thou is not the only Thou of the poem but a 
Thou among others, as the poet certainly may be identified as the “privileged, or ‘exem-
plary’” addressee of the poem741 — with this reservation just made,  among others, — where 
does the address come from? Perhaps from the ‘ambush’. We are not invited simply to pay 
heed to what befell Celan in Berlin but what befalls him as a poet. Perhaps the imperative 
comes to the poet from the surrounding silence, comes to the poet as a poet, from the silence 
of the Tiergarten and Landwehrkanal and from the non-stop Berlin life — and death. From the
non-stop living and dying. Perhaps his speaking, the speaking of this poem, is a conse-
quence of listening.742 Perhaps the poet is addressed as a poet, as someone who should say 
his word, by this silence and non-stop rumour of the city. We must not be content with the 
verisimilitude according to which the address, the imperative (“go”) is connected to the facts 
                                                 
736 “Discussion on Fries”, trans. Hughes, p. 161; L’acte critique, p. 245. 
737 Derrida in “Discussion”, L’acte critique, p. 240; trans. Hughes: “There is always an address in each poem, a 
poem is dedicated in one way or another. And this address is at one and the same time secret, it is always 
secret in every way, and its secret offers something to read, it turns away from itself, that’s what langue is.” 
(“Discussion on Fries”, p. 157.) I think the word langue could just as well be translated, simply, as “lan-
guage”; I do not see any real reason for retaining langue. 
738 Yes, court martial (Kriegsgericht) but not military justice (Militärgericht), a distinction of which the Judge 
Advocate Ehrhardt wanted to remind the press, namely the Freiheit newspaper, in the name of the imparti-
ality of the Court of Justice: “Vor Gericht gibt es keine Politik.” (In Der Mord an R.L. und K.L., p. 79). 
739  “Ich fragte: Sind Sie Frau Rosa Luxemburg? Darauf sagte sie: Entscheiden Sie bitte selber. Da sagte ich: 
Nach dem Bilde müßten Sie es sein. Darauf entgegnete sie: Wenn Sie es sagen.” (In Der Mord an R.L. und 
K.L., p. 67.) 
740 On names — “What’s in a name?” — cf. Jacques Derrida, “L’aphorisme à contretemps”, in Psyché [edition 
of 1987], pp. 519-533 (En. trans. in Acts of Literature, pp. 416-433). 
741 Cf. Bollack, in Derrida et al., “Discussion” (L’acte critique, 1985), p. 272. 
742 “Speaking: a consequence of giving ear, a naming and making-visible [Das Sprechen: ein Ergebnis des 




and experiences that are brought into a monological rhetoric, but ask for the motivation of 
such “monologue” — perhaps not a monologue anymore, since the surrounding silence 
speaks in it. Speaks and does not speak. This poem is not the short Odyssey of a selfsame 
subject who is both the addresser and the addressee. The silence addresses itself, gives itself a 
voice through the imperative, through the address to the poet, while remaining what it is, si-
lence. A silence full of voices. And there is nothing miraculous or fantastic about this haunt-
ing; the miracle rather fails to happen, the Landwehrkanal will not roar and nothing stops — 
therefore the poem has to stop. Therefore the haunting, the non-stop sleepless walk in the pre-
Christmas city of Berlin. 
 We noticed that there were only two obvious metaphors in the poem: the transforma-
tion of the man into a sieve and of the Frau into a sow who “had to swim”. But if we under-
stand the poem as a transformation of what the poet saw, heard and read, thought and felt on 
a certain day and night in Berlin, a transformation of something that is “in life, like a secret”, 
the lived experience in person, presumably “external” with respect to the poem itself — as if 
the poem itself had an interior severed from the world, as if it were a hermetically sealed con-
tainer with no mouth in it, a misconception of poetry which Celan famously objected to — 
we see that the crystallization and constellation has happened in a very artistic, aesthetically 
excellent manner indeed, with the “metaphorical montage” juxtaposing the two metonymies 
of indifference, Fleischerhaken — Äppelstaken, with the rhyme that structures the whole 
poem, and so forth. Poetry, “which still has to take the path of art”.743 This surviving residue 
in the perfect form of a poem is indeed self-reflective. And it is a non-stop self-reflection, “it-
self its own rhyme [sich selber der Reim]”: the rhyme of in-difference, namely the rhythm 
that juxtaposes seemingly incompatible motives and undermines their incompatibility, show-
ing thus the scandal of indifference. The rhyme and the metaphorical montage, bringing to-
gether the Christmas decorations and the instruments of torturous murder, and the metaphors 
themselves, the sieve and the sow, all belong to this counter-figurative figure. The poem ad-





T E X T - V O I D  
 
I would consider the case of the poem “Die Posaunenstelle” almost another instance of some-
thing that Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe calls, in regard of Szondi’s “Eden”, a “complete deci-
phering of the poem” (La poésie comme expérience, p. 14). In the case of “Die Posaunen-
stelle” the deciphering is not due to some personal attestation but rather to observations by 
                                                 
743 “Und Dichtung? Dichtung, die doch den Weg der Kunst zu gehen hat?” TCA/Meridian, Endf. 21; 





several scholars, and John Felstiner seems to cap these by paying very special attention to the 
imperative in the poem. The most important fact or datum here seems to be the wonderful 
archeological find, made just before Celan’s visit to Jerusalem in 1969, of a fragment of writ-
ing incised on a fragment of stone, a piece of a parapet from the Second Temple that was 
crushed by the Romans during the Jewish revolt in 70 A.D., the Hebrew words (transcribed 
as L’veit haTekiah) that Felstiner translates in his semi-biographical book on Celan as “place 
of the shofar blast”.744 I will not go through all the details of his analysis here but rather con-
centrate on the imperative that ends the poem: 
 
DIE POSAUNENSTELLE 





hör dich ein 
mit dem Mund.745 
 
The unusual verb einhören is not lexical. But it is not a completely new coinage either, al-
though its sense can easily be understood and translated as something like “hear yourself in / 
with the mouth”, “hear deep in / with your mouth”, or “listen in / with the mouth”,746 thus a 
combination of hearing and perhaps entrance, belonging, participation. However, Felstiner 
reveals to us what we should hear ourselves into: “Here a common Yiddish command makes 
itself heard, one used also in Talmudic study — her dikh ayn, ‘pay attention’, ‘listen up’” 
(Poet, Survivor, Jew, p. 274). Now the “glowing / text-void”, through the pun that connects 
Leertext with Lehrtext, associates itself with the Torah and, of course, with its very incipit, 
the void and the light of Genesis 1:2-3. The Lutheran language — Posaune, “trombone”, 
for shofar (a ram’s horn) and also for the trumpets (?????????) blown by the angels in the 
Revelation of Saint John (8:6ff) — conceals the Hebrew and Yiddish expressions to the 
extent that several interpreters have recognized the New Testament passage as the main ref-
erence of this poem, the seven trumpets (trombones in Luther’s Bible, Posaunen) correspond-
ing to the seven lines of the poems. This interpretation seems to leave the text-void rather 
hollow, however. Celan does indeed take the detour of Luther’s German, albeit he “had direct 
access to the Hebrew Bible”, as Felstiner reminds: “His term Posaune accepts yet implicates 
Luther’s usage and points ‘deep’ toward a founding text.” (Poet, Survivor, Jew, p. 273.) Thus 
the encryption is at least double: if you come across the “trumpet passage” of Luther’s New 
Testament, you should also “hear into” the text-void (Leertext) the palimpsest, deep below 
                                                 
744 John Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1995), pp. 271-275. 
745 Zeitgehöft, GW 3:104. “THE SHOFAR PLACE / deep in the glowing / text-void, / at torch height, / in the time-
hole: // hear deep in / with your mouth.” (Trans. Felstiner, Selected Poems and Prose of P.C., p. 361.) 
746 The last version of the two last lines is from Ken Frieden’s translation of Stéphane Mosès’ essay on this 
poem (cf. below): “THE TRUMPET PLACE / deep in the glowing / empty-text, / at torch-height, / in the time-




the more directly accessible detour. But how could he not have taken the detour? The German 
language “Christianized” by Luther is not simply Celan’s choice of language, it is still his 
language, the language that remained “not lost”, or unlost as I would translate the word un-
verloren, in spite of everything.747 The very paradox of the echo of the Yiddish imperative, 
her dikh ayn, is that it still resounds in German, and that these seven lines reverberate — al-
though in a more hollow manner, as it comes to the question of motivation — also the Lu-
theran New Testament passage. So here in “Die Posaunenstelle” we find the traces of Yiddish 
and Hebrew, but only as a shibboleth encrypted within the German.  
 What these two almost “complete decipherings” by Szondi and by Felstiner reveal 
does not exhaust the “message” of these two poems — the message that is not essentially a 
message, a piece of information, a constatation of a fact. A constatation of facts could be ex-
hausted. But what is revealed in these two readings, in their “special knowledge”, is rather 
that there is a secret in the poem, a secret that is not revealed as some specific content, but 
manifested as a secret. And what is inexhaustible in these poems is not due to some indefi-
nitely proliferating potency of content issuing from within them, but their address, their im-
perative: the imperative “hör dich ein / mit dem Mund” is not exhausted as an imperative but 
rather accentuated by the fact that the Yiddish imperative can be heard through, insofar as 
this imperative is pronounced and listened to, if not with already established familiarity, then 
with proper regard to its unfamiliarity, and insofar as this character is not overlooked as mere 
artful coinage, as some modern novelty instead of being perhaps something very old, at once 
also something very old. The rash de-scandalization, the ignorance of the internal shibboleth 
of the poem, is an ethical and not only an aesthetic problem. Yes, we see from the case of 
“Die Posaunenstelle” that sometimes the familiar appearance may work as a “false” shibbo-
leth and protect, as it were, the true secret, preventing its revelation, its divulgence. But per-
haps one may be true to the secret as a secret even without access to it. “The avowal of not 
understanding”, as Gadamer very well says, “is in most cases, in facing Celan’s work, com-
manded by epistemic honesty”.748 Gadamer’s position, with all the problems we may recog-
nize in Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du? and with regard to Szondi’s “Eden”, cannot be objected 
to on grounds of his alleged quest for “phenomenological significations”, especially if “phe-
nomenological” is all too quickly and vaguely identified with “general”, as Jean Bollack does 
(cf. L’Acte critique, p. 269).  
 “Hear yourself in”, “hear deep in”, “hör dich ein”: this sounds like signalling a par-
able (Gleichnissignal), pointing out that there is an allegorical double entente to be listened 
to: “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.” Discussing allegory and its signals, exhortations 
                                                 
747 ”Sie, die Sprache, blieb unverloren, ja, trotz allem.” (Ansprache anlässlich der Entgegennahme des 
Literaturpreises der freien Hansestadt Bremen, January 26th, 1958; GW 3:185 .) Cf. Jean Bollack’s polemic 
against Gadamer and Pöggeler: “Et s’il ne s’y trouvait pas chez lui [la langue, la «communauté linguis-
tique»], ou bien à la fois «chez lui» et pas, parce que c’est sa langue (maternelle) et pas sa langue?” (L’Acte 
critique, p. 285.) 





for those who are able to translate the carnal letter into its spiritual “antitype”, or the “initial 
text” into its “allegorical pretext”, Gerhard Kurz takes his example from the Parable of the 
Sower: “Hearken; Behold, there went out a sower to sow [Höret zu!] [etc.]” (Mark 4:3).749 
But here, in the case of the poem “Posaunenstelle”, “hearing yourself in” happens “with your 
mouth”: it is not a question of a purely spiritual initiation through understanding (entente), an 
“inward circumcision”, but one that solicits the limit between the inward and the outward. 
There is a shibboleth and a palimpsest in the poem, but it is not primarily a question of an-
other signification buried beneath the literal surface, but, before any discovery or deciphering 
of such encrypted content can take place, there must be a certain corporeal experience of 
otherness, a minimal distance retaining itself even when I pronounce the words as if they 
were all mine. That is, even when I have them by heart. If the password — and, at the same 
time, envoi — of the poem signals here some kind of an access, it is not to some wealth of 
parousia and to the “cultivation of intimacy” within a linguistic or discursive community, but 
a “text-void” and a “time-hole”, a space that is indeed “vacant” and “occupiable”, and pre-
cisely because it is a question of writing, “speech of the absent”. 
 While the gathering of all the information and knowledge obtainable concerning the 
poem and its genesis is absolutely indispensable in its own right, a phenomenological ap-
proach to the poem cannot be dispensed with either. In principle, every true reading is and 
should be phenomenological in a certain sense. Only a non-transcendent reading can pay 
heed to the transcendence of the written (namely that which has ‘turned into’ the written text 
in the empirical sense; I think that poetry is “anti-biographic”, for Celan, because biographies 
are also texts, they are ‘graphies’ and not ‘lives’) and pay respect to the irreducible remain-
der, that which, in the poem, remains absolutely unattainable, in the poem and at once “in 
life”, or in death, “like a secret”. A certainty of an impossibility, an acknowledgement of un-
certainty, knowing the limits of the knowable. Jacques Derrida spoke on several occasions of 
this necessity of a non-transcendent reading and of the limit to interpretation, the line not to 
be crossed that runs within the poem, a line within the poem, a line which is the poem, hold-
ing apart and together the intrinsic and the extrinsic evidence, the evidence and the limits of 
all evidence, the limits pertaining to its absolute singularity and the unlimited expansion of 
the sense and reference of the poem (here Derrida speaks of Celan’s poem “Aschenglorie”, 
ending with the famous, often cited envoi, “Niemand / zeugt für den / Zeugen”): 
 
Au-delà ou en deça de tout ce qu’on peut penser, lire ou dire de ce poème [”Aschen-
glorie”], selon le « peut-être », la probabilité et l’acte de foi qu’est une expérience 
poétique, au-delà ou en deçà de toutes les traductions possibles, une marque reste et se 
re-marque ici : c’est une certaine limite de l’interprétation. Finalement, il est en toute 
certitude impossible d’arrêter le sens ou la référence de ce poème,  le sens ou la 
référence dont il témoigne ou répond. Quoi qu’on puisse en dire, et cela peut se dé-
ployer à l’infini, il y a une ligne. Elle n’est pas seulement marquée par le poème. Elle 
                                                 
749 Gerhard Kurz, Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), p. 52; on “initial 




est le poème, le poétique et la poétique du poème – qui se dissimule en exhibant sa 
dissimulation comme telle. Mais c’est ce « comme tel » qui se trouve voué au « peut-
être ». Probable et improbable (possible mais soustrait à la preuve) ce « comme tel » a 
lieu comme poème, comme ce poème, irremplaçablement, en lui, et là où rien ni per-
sonne ne peut répondre à sa place, là où il se tait, là ou il garde son secret, tout en 
disant qu’il y a du secret, révélant le secret qu’il garde comme secret, ne le révélant 
pas, tandis qu’il témoigne encore qu’on ne peut pas témoigner pour le témoin, qui fi-
nalement reste seul et sans témoin. Dans Le pas au-delà, Blanchot parle d’une « pa-
role encore à dire au-delà des vivants et des morts, témoignant pour l’absence 
d’attestation ».750 
 
Blanchot’s sentence opens up, by its very laconic gesture of referring to the famous envoi of 
“Aschenglorie”, something very essential of another poem, “Fadensonnen”:751 
 
FADENSONNEN 
über der grauschwarzen Ödnis. 
Ein baumhoher 
Gedanke 
greift sich den Lichtton: es sind 
noch Lieder zu singen jenseits 
der Menschen.752 
 
Blanchot’s laconic sentence reveals, with one stroke or two, the essential scene of this poem 
that no survey of its vocabulary could set up all by itself (while such commentaries, furnish-
ing us with a sort of “interlinear version” of the poem in question, are altogether indispensa-
ble in their own right): the definite solitude toward which the poem, as a piece of language, is 
inevitably heading. An address to no one, to (the) no one who speaks after the last to speak753 
and bears witness to the absence of attestation. No one addressing itself to no one. But still a 
song to be sung, a singable residue that survives all human attestation, making way towards 
the proximity of the utterly distant, language addressing itself beyond the living and the 
dead. Not only a despairing dialogue but also an act of faith, a leap of faith “i kraft af det Ab-
surde” as Kierkegaard would say. By virtue of the Absurd. After all the gatherable informa-
tion gathered — an inexhaustible task it can show itself to be — the leap to be taken may still 
be missing. 
                                                 
750 Derrida, Poétique et politique du témoignage (Paris: L’Herne, 2005), p. 76-77. Cf. Outi Pasanen’s transla-
tion,  “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing”, in Sovereignties in Question, pp. 65-96. 
751 Le pas au-delà (Paris: Gallimard, cop. 1973), p. 107. The whole ‘fragment’ or section in Le pas au-delà is 
as follows: “Le Neutre, la douce interdiction du mourir, là où, de seuil en seuil, œil sans regard, le silence 
nous porte dans la proximité du lointain. Parole encore à dire au-delà des vivants et des morts, témoignant 
pour l’absence d’attestation.” 
752 TCA/Atemwende, p. 37 (dated “27.11.63”). Trans. Michael Hamburger: “THREAD SUNS / above the grey-
black wilderness. / A tree- / high thought / tunes in to light’s pitch: there are / still songs to be sung on the 
other side / of mankind.” (Poems of Paul Celan [2002], p. 211.) Cf. Felstiner: “Threadsuns / over the gray-
black wasteness. / A tree- / high thought / strikes the light-tone: there are / still songs to sing beyond / hu-
mankind.” (Selected..., p. 241.) 
753 Blanchot’s essay on Celan is entitled “Le dernier à parler” (reprinted in Une voix venue d’ailleurs [Paris: 
Gallimard, 2002], pp. 69-108), borrowing its title from the poem “Sprich auch du” (Von Schwelle zu 
Schwelle, GW 1:135). Le pas au-delà is a book in which Celan is never named explicitly but constantly re-





In this poem, the words Fadensonnen and Lichtton are not exactly neologisms, they 
are not “the very coynage of your braine” as it is said in Hamlet (III.4.139), but they may al-
ways bear reference to very specific contexts, possibly several contexts, and objects. The 
commentaries of this poem have pointed out that there is an instrument called a Fadenson-
nenzeiger, also known as filargnomon or méridienne filaire, introduced in the early 18th cen-
tury, a certain type of sundial used for determining place and time, and Lichtton can be read 
either as a cinematographical term (relating to the recording of sound: Lichttonverfahren)754 
or perhaps even with reference to the musical instrument called a Lichtton-Orgel developed 
in 1936 by Edwin Welte. These possible ‘lexicological’ citations must be considered with 
each apparent neologism or metaphorical coinage. The sheer possibility of such associations 
or references must be considered, even when their function in the poem may remain obscure. 
The use of rare but lexical words in Celan’s poetry, such as specific technical terminology 
drawn from the domains of geology, botany or medicine, etc., especially in his later poetry, is 
well known.  
On the other hand, there are the possible references to other poems, poems by Celan 
himself or by others, such as Rilke or Brecht, on whose poems he commented more than 
once.755 With regard to Astrid Poppenhusen’s very suggestive construal of the term 
Durchkreuzen, which she relates to the figure of syllepsis (or zeugma, a less ordinary word 
for the same figure of speech) and in which two acceptations of a term “cross” each other out, 
namely a figurative and a literal meaning,756 we might want to suggest that the word 
Fadensonnen in the poem has an at least a double reference. As for instance König observes, 
the two-word compound Fadensonnen forms a part of the three-word compound term 
                                                 
754 Cf. esp. Peter König, “Der Fadensonnenzeiger: Zu Paul Celans Gedicht »Fadensonnen«”, in Gerhard Buhr 
and Roland Reuß, eds., Paul Celan: »Atemwende«. Materialien (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
1991), pp. 35-52; on Lichtton, pp. 46ff. 
755 Cf. Ian Fairley, “When and Where? Paul Celan’s Fadensonnen”, in Celan, Fathomsuns and Benighted, 
trans. Ian Fairley (Manchester: Carcanet, 2001), pp. 4ff. One of Brecht’s poems possibly commented on 
here is this chiasmic epigram: “In den finsteren Zeiten / Wird da auch gesungen werden? / Da wird auch 
gesungen werden. / Von den finsteren Zeiten.” (Cit. Fairley, p. 6.) Another one is “An die Nachgeborenen”: 
“Was sind das für Zeiten, wo / Ein Gespräch über Bäume fast ein Verbrechen ist / Weil es ein Schweigen 
über so viele Untaten einschließt!” Celan’s reply to this poem takes place in one of his Schneepart poems: 
“EIN BLATT, baumlos / für Bertolt Brecht: // Was sind das für Zeiten, / wo ein Gespräch / beinah ein 
Verbrechen ist, / weil es soviel Gesagtes / mit einschließt?” (GW 3:385.) 
756 Cf. Poppenhusen, Durchkreuzung der Tropen, pp. 195ff, et passim. Cf. also Zanetti, »zeitoffen«, pp. 174-5. 
And cf. also Christoph Schwerin, “Bitterer Brunnen des Herzens: Erinnerungen an Paul Celan”, in Der 
Monat 279 (April/Juni 1981), pp. 73-81, here p. 74: Schwerin tells how Celan referred to a letter by Dylan 
Thomas containing for instance the following statement on the destructive and constructive — by one word, 
deconstructive — “dialectic” of poetic images: “Each image holds within it the seed of its own destruction, 
and my dialectical method, as I understand it, is a constant building up and breaking down of the images 
that come out of the central seed, which is itself destructive and constructive at the same time.” (A letter to 
Henry Treece, March 23, 1938, in The Collected Letters of Dylan Thomas, ed. Paul Ferris [London: Dent, 
1985], p. 281.) Schwerin also mentions Celan’s statement on “founding each image”, with reference to 
René Char this time: “Wie in den Dichtungen Chars, die er [P.C.] später übersetzte, sei ein jedes Bild zu 
begründen, so erklärte er mir.” (Loc. cit.) This founding of images is not the opposite of their self-
deconstruction described by Thomas: if there is a well-founded image (or ‘metaphor’), does it not cease to 
be ‘just’ an image, or (fully) metaphorical? Doesn’t the well-motivated trope actually become a pseudo-




Fadensonnenzeiger, just as Lichtton forms part of the technical term composed of four dis-
tinct verbal elements, Lichttonverfahren. So there is a sort of elliptical reference to the tech-
niques and instruments denoted by these terms, and as König observes, an insinuation of an 
underlying dialogue with a certain scientist of the 18th century, Christian Gottlieb Kratzen-
stein. But, at the same time, Otto Pöggeler seems to be right in pointing out that the word 
Fadensonnen relates simply to the perception of the sun’s rays piercing through dark 
clouds.757 Taking these two directions into account, both at the same time, we may see that 
the word Fadensonnen is in at least two distinct ways un- or premetaphorical: on the one 
hand, it relates to a certain already existing technico-scientific terminology, and perhaps also 
to the historical fact of this concept formation (by Ch. G. Kratzenstein); on the other, it takes 
advantage of the possibility of forming such terms catachrestically by combining extant sim-
ple words and thus refers also to this ‘archaic’ possibility of ‘concept formation’ itself. It is 
perhaps these two antagonistic but intimately related moments that are brought together in 
this kind of “crossing-through”, Durchkreuzen.  
 In his reading of “Posaunenstelle”, one from which also Felstiner draws some ingredi-
ents of his interpretation, Stéphane Mosès makes a remarkable distinction between the meto-
nymical and metaphorical interpretation with respect to the Jewish mystical tradition: 
 
In the Jewish mystical tradition, the Shofar, as an instrument of Revelation, refers by 
metonymy to the structure of Revelation itself. Its three parts designate the three steps 
of the process of emanation by which divine Wisdom flows into the world.  The 
mouthpiece corresponds to the origin of the divine breath; the body of the instrument 
corresponds to the process by which this breath descends into the lower worlds; and 
the bell corresponds to the transformation of breath into voice, that is, into an articu-
late series of sounds. At the same time, this mystical process refers to the anthropo-
logical or organic transformation of ambient air into human voice (as the physiologi-
cal basis of speech). According to the logic of Jewish mysticism, this relation should 
not be understood as metaphorical, but as properly metonymic. The production of the 
human voice is not an image of Revelation, but rather, on the level of human experi-
ence, it is Revelation itself. Therefore, Celan’s poem does not  merely represent the 
image of the Shofar. Even if such representation is, in some way, inscribed in the lin-
guistic structure of the text, the poem achieves much more: it sets breathing in motion, 
and actualizes the process by which physical breath is transformed into human 
voice.758 
 
In the very transformation “the pure phonic essence of voice”, as Mosès writes, “is heard in 
its originary violence: a rasping of the breath which, beyond speech, nevertheless makes all 
speech possible” (p. 218). The grain of the voice, as Barthes would say. But Mosès is here 
                                                 
757 “Symbol und Allegorie”, in Buhr and Reuß, eds., Paul Celan: »Atemwende«. Materialien (1991), p. 347; 
this is the first version of a text that would become a chapter, “Symbol und Allegorie. Goethes »Divan« und 
Celans »Atemkristall«”, in Pöggeler’s book Der Stein hinterm Aug. Studien zu Celans Gedichten (München: 
Fink, 2000), pp. 89-118, here p. 94. In the same volume with the first version of Pöggeler’s article and 
König’s article (Paul Celans »Atemwende«), cf. also Hendrik Birus, “Celan — wörtlich” (pp. 125-166). 
758 Stéphane Mosès, “Patterns of Negativity in Paul Celan’s ‘The Trumpet Place’”, trans. Ken Frieden, in San-
ford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, eds., Languages of the Unsayable. The Play of Negativity in Literature and 





speaking of the Jewish New Year’s liturgy and the instant when “the recitation of prayer is 
interrupted so that the sounding of the Shofar may be produced”, with regard to Celan’s word 
Zeitloch; now let us hear how he continues: “But this caesura of speech (in the ongoing proc-
ess of the liturgy) is itself the reflection or the repetition of a more general caesura of time, of 
a break through which radical otherness can manifest itself. Here the ‘time-hole’ would indi-
cate the suspension of profane time for the sake of another experience, that of the festival rit-
ual.” (“Patterns of Negativity”, p. 218.) I will not cite more of Mosès’s rich essay on Celan’s 
“Posaunenstelle”; however, another citation from a text by Stéphane Mosès, this time not di-
rectly concerned with Celan, will be related to this one, a few pages later.  
 What we have is the grain of the voice, the corporeal singularity underlying every 
spoken word (and the reference to the body is retained in every written text, too, even in a 
poem written by a computer, which too is still a poem and thus an anti-computer, as Celan 
has reportedly said), but this singular voice is always also a palimpsest of others, forgotten 
voices and remembered voices, bygone voices and voices still to come. 
 
 
“MY / SOUL WINKLED AT YOU” 
 
      
     MEINE 
     dir zugewinkelte Seele 
     hört dich 
     gewittern, 
 
     in deiner Halsgrube lernt 
     mein Stern, wie man wegsackt 
     und wahr wird, 
 
     ich fingre ihn wieder heraus – 
     komm, besprich dich mit ihm, 
     noch heute.759 
 
                                                 
759 Zeitgehöft (posth., 1976); GW 3:90. The poem was written  Sept. 13th, 1969. My translation: 
  
MY 




 in your throat-pit  
my star learns how one packs away 
and becomes true, 
 
 I finger it out again — 
come, bespeak yourself with it, 
yet today. 
 
 I translate the expression dir zugewinkelte by “winkled at you”, anticipating mein Stern and thinking of the 




The word does what it says: zu-ge-win-kel-te. You pronounce the soul (Seele) with the very 
angles of this vocable and not without them: the participle zugewinkelt is here not a predicate 
separable from its subject, from “[die] Seele” or “MEINE [...] Seele”, from the soul that could 
survive without it, without being dir zugewinkelt. This expression has its ownmost angle that 
cannot be anglicized, but I would translate it — or evade translating it — by “winkled at 
you”, bearing in mind mein Stern in the next strophe, and the angular shape of this star that 
perhaps “winkles” and twinkles and winks at you. The subject is not there without the articu-
lation, this articulation that should take place here and now, in the here and now of the poem, 
always again only for once. The words “MEINE / dir zugewinkelte Seele” give a name to what 
is inseparably given in this poematic instant. Inseparably given, since, as part of the instant, 
the vocable demands to be pronounced, instantly articulated (“besprich [...] noch heute”). 
 Gewittern (to thunder), too, has its ‘onomatopoetic’ sensibility. “My soul”, the soul of 
the addresser, Meine Seele, the soul of the hearer rather than the speaker of this poem — or 
rather: not the soul of the hearer but the soul who hears, the soul that silently hears the 
speaker of this poem who you are, who you must become in order to be its addressee. The 
addresser, as well as the addressee, are constituted by the address: the addresser, as if before-
hand, by anticipation (noch heute: yet today, still today, in a today that is comprised of two 
todays of which one anticipates the other and the second commemorates the first), hears the 
addresser speak, hears “you” recite the poem already, “my soul” hears how “you” speak “my 
soul”, it hears how the angular syllables resound in their — in your — throat-pit (in deiner 
Halsgrube), where “my star”, this angular shape of the soul (Atemkristall?) learns how to 
pack away (wegsacken: one might perhaps associate this with the process of a star shrinking 
and becoming a compact star) and become true, become real. Now “your” hand has “my fin-
gers”, and therefore — as “my star”, which I can now touch again with “my” new fingers, 
has learnt how to become real or true by dying and thus living in your throat-pit, throat-grave, 
— you should now come and bespeak yourself, as soon as today you should. This is indeed a 
detour from you to you and a sort of home-coming, of which the “Meridian” speaks.760 A be-
coming true, becoming real. 
                                                                                                                                                        
unters wasser oder den horizont STENZEL seemänn. wb. 460a: zwischendurch knallten sie ein paar 
seeräuber entzwei, dasz sie mit mann und maus wegsackten E. G. SELIGER top (1910) 84. aus dem nd., vgl. 
sacken III th. 8, 1622, ndl. wegzakken.” (Bd. 27, Sp. 3018.) The proximity to the next subentry, wegsagen, 
might be considered significant: “wegsagen, durch sagen abwenden: um ein böses omen abzuwenden, wirft 
man die am leibe herab hangenden arme nach hinten und sagt dazu: 'weg gesagt' SCHLEICHER volksthüml. 
aus Sonneberg. 144. von der brust, dem herzen, der leber wegsagen 'frei heraus sagen' s. sp. 2937.” (Ibid.) 
Cf. the entry sacken, “III.  intransitives und reflexives sacken, sich senken, sinken, sich setzen. diese bedeu-
tung findet sich nur im niederdeutschen und in dem gemeinen hochdeutsch der ursprünglich nieder-
deutschen gegenden; nicht zu sack, sondern zu der sippe von sinken (s. d.) gehörend, aber in beziehung zu 
sack gedacht: das bier musz sacken, die hefen im biere müssen sich setzen; das haus sackt sich, es senkt 
sich; das wasser ist im sacken, im fallen; der schnee sackt sich, wenn er zusammenschmilzt; in besonderer 
anwendung: sacken, bey den Elbschiffern, das schiff mit fleisz mit dem hintertheil den strohm abwerts ge-
hen lassen. FRISCH 2, 140c.” (Bd. 14, Sp. 1622.) I translated wegsackt as “pack away”, thinking also of the 
process of the shrinking of compact stars. 





 The hearer and the speaker of this address are not separable anymore, not separable 
from the event of this apostrophe. As if they perfectly coincided. 
 But, at the same time, we cannot overlook the separation and distance involved in the 
poem, inherent to the poem, its constitutive obscurity as its constitutive distance. We cannot, 
in the double sense of the word ‘cannot’: we must not and we may not. To name only one 
possibility and impossibility in this poem, properly unnameable in fact: we cannot overlook 
the possibility that the poem may be addressed to the Other of all others, to deus absconditas, 
the unnameable in whose name none of us has the  absolute authority to speak. It could well 
be that the five syllables in their angular articulation, zugewinkelte, encrypt a certain unname-
able name represented by a pentagram (or tetragram). But on the other hand, the unspeakable, 
unpronouncable name of this Other of all the others is also the name of all names. This name 
of the Wholly Other names the names of all the others. 
 Halsgrube is, once again, no metaphorical coinage, but an anatomical term, meaning 
the throat pit, the “triangular depression at the front of the neck, between the collar-bones at 
the point where they articulate with the breastbone” (OED). While the Latin name for the 
breastbone is sternum, the “star” in the poem, mein Stern, may well be a pun on this false 
etymology. This pun could be motivated by the strange transformation, through the recitable 
apostrophe of the poem, of your “sternum” into “mein Stern” and vice versa: your fingers 
that have now become mine, once again through this strange transplantation of what stands 
pars pro toto, my fingers, as you are pronouncing my body that has taken on the form of a 
verbal body, these fingers may feel my soul, my star — distant in time and space, yet percep-
tible — as it travels through your throat-pit, in the form of the word, the angular shape of the 
star-word, as you are voicing the poem. You voice the poem, you feel the word that touches 
your very interior without touching, you feel its movement in your throat-pit, feel it with my 
fingers, and bespeak yourself with the word, the star-word, the soul-word, already today. 
Your words, your ownmost innermost words are the words of another, always: bespeak your-
self with the word, the word of no-one’s possession and thus, if anything, a pure gift. Bespeak 





In response to the “glowing void-text” just discussed, I would like to cite another text by Sté-
phane Mosès, a passage also cited by Jacques Derrida as a conclusion to his close reading of 
a letter by Gershom Scholem to Franz Rosenzweig: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
solche Wege? Sind diese Wege nur Um-Wege, Umwege von dir zu dir? Aber es sind ja zugleich auch, unter 
wie vielen anderen Wegen, Wege, auf denen die Sprache stimmhaft wird, es sind Begegnungen, Wege einer 
Stimme zu einem wahrnehmenden Du, kreatürliche Wege, Daseinsentwürfe vielleicht, ein Sichvoraus-





Il semble que dans son texte de 1926 [lettre à Rosenzweig] Scholem veut dire que 
l’usage incontrôlé de la langue hébraïque implique, en quelque sorte, le risque d’une 
« magie pratique » involontaire. En effet, la dimension symbolique de l’hébreu, telle 
qu’elle apparaît dans ses textes sacrés, y disparaît au profit d’un emploi purement 
utilitaire de la langue. Certes, dans notre monde désacralisé il ne s’agit plus de manip-
uler consciemment les virtualités magiques du langage pour en tirer quelque bénéfice 
personnel. Mais lorsqu’une société tout entière détourne la langue qui fut celle de sa 
tradition religieuse à des fins purement matérielles, lorsqu’elle en fait un simple in-
strument au service de ses intérêts immédiats, elle retrouve sans le savoir l’attitude 
des magiciens de jadis. « Imitation grossière » de la langue des textes sacrés, l’hébreu 
moderne a vidé les mots anciens de leur signification symbolique et religieuse pour 
les réduire à de simples indices de la réalité matérielle. Mais, pour Scholem, ces signi-
fications symboliques continuent à vivre au fond du langage, ou, si l’on veut, dans 
l’inconscient de la culture qui prétend de les nier. La question est alors de savoir s’il 
n’y aura pas un jour un « retour du refoulé », où les contenus religieuses reviendront 
sous une forme aujourd’hui imprévisible, mais qui risque d’être — pour employer un 
terme dont Scholem ne se serait pas servi, mais qui traduit pourtant sa pensée — celle 
d’une névrose collective. 
 « Le jour où la langue se retournera contre ceux qui la parlent » : dans cette 
formule où la théorie mystique de la langage s’achève en eschatologie se résume 
l’intention du texte de Scholem dédié à Franz Rosenzweig. Car si les significations 
symboliques qu’abrite la langue sacrée risquent, lorqu’elles réapparaitront au grand 
jour, de se révéler comme funestes et destructrices, c’est, paradoxalement, parce 
qu’elle sont, en elles-mêmes, dépourvues d’un contenu identifiable. Pour la mystique 
juive, en effet, la dimension sémantique du langage n’apparaît qu’avec l’exercise du 
discours par l’homme ; la spécificité des significations est liée à la multiplicité qui 
caractérise le monde matériel dans lequel l’homme, créature finie, est immergé. Le 
langage divin au contraire, tel qu’il se révèle dans le texte de la Tora, et surtout dans 
sa texture linguistique secrète, est d’une telle généralité qu’il se présente plutôt sous la 
forme de structures abstraites (qui correspondent aux noms divins et à leurs diverses 
combinations). Ces structures ne transmettent pas un sens déterminé, et par con-
séquence limité, mais sont porteuses d’une infinité des interprétations possibles. Dire 
que la Tora est un texte texte divin signifie qu’elle est infiniment ouverte à 
l’interprétation [n.: Le Nom et les Symboles de Dieu..., p. 86]. Le jour où « les noms 
et les sigles de jadis », aujourd’hui enfouis dans l’inconscient de la culture séculière, 
émergeront de nouveau à la lumière, nul ne peut dire comment il seront réinterprétés. 
Mais le risque est grand, selon Scholem, de voir leur retour, après une longue période 
de refoulement collectif, prendre la forme d’une explosion anarchique de forces re-
ligieuses incontrôlées.761 
 
Scholem’s sacred horror is indeed strange to the secular-minded reader. But is this original 
void, yet full of implicit “symbolical” power, not the condition of all language, of the secular 
language which is still the only language we have access to, the condition humaine — at the 
same time as it is also the condition inhumaine — of all language? Also condition inhumaine, 
because this power, this pre-semantic virtuality inherent in all language, the essential inde-
terminacy and openness of its constituents to an indefinite iteration, is never fully mastered 
by a speaking subject, an individual or a community. 
                                                 
761 Stéphane Mosès, L’Ange de l’histoire : Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem (Paris: Seuil, 1992), pp. 254-255. 





 As a reader, Celan entertained a more or less intimate relation with the tradition of 
Jewish mysticism and knew for instance the texts by Scholem and Rosenzweig very well. He 
did not have to share young Scholem’s strange and uncanny, prophetic relation to the sacred 
Hebrew, sacred to the very letter (Scholem’s letter to Rosenzweig he could not have known, 
of course, since it has been only lately discovered), in order to have known some of the most 
fundamental features of  the “linguistic theory of the Kabbala”, and to have enciphered these 
features in his poetry. Enciphered, for instance, in the poem referring to the “glühende Leer-
text”, the Yiddish idiom as a palimpsest within the pseudo-German expression “hör dich 
ein”, indeed an instance of “extinguished sense-giving”, an archaic residue glowing darkly 
through the language called modern German and its poetic use.  
 It is there, visible in the palimpsest, the imperative or optative visibly there to be pro-
nounced, to be given voice, to be trusted with the mouth that belongs to it (“glaubst du mir 
meinen / Mund”), to be “learned by heart” and “cited-recited beyond knowledge”,762 intrinsic 
and extrinsic at once, by virtue of the strange dialectic that translates the German idiom of 
auswendig lernen by the French apprendre par cœur and the English “to learn by heart”: 
 
hör dich ein 
mit dem Mund. 
 
This learning by heart, this giving one’s voice, granting one’s mouth and heart to the un-
known who bids it, the unknown voice or piece of writing “begging for the earth-mouths 
[betteln um Erdenmünder]” — always handwriting, even when “incised in a spaceship [ins 
Raumschiff gekerbt]” (GW 2:27) — undecidably and equivocally between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic, this ownmost token irreducibly foreign at the same time: is this not the “living 
nought”, “lebendige Nichts” to be inscribed, incised in the heart? A token of the absent, 
withdrawn, and most literally and corporeally present in one’s interior? Like language. Like 
language, always the language of another: another bygone (“eines / Sinnes mit diesem / Vor-
bei”), and another to come. 
 The text-void glows like a meteor and is to be voiced by another, it glows like dark 
eyes beneath “comet-brows” and like an “un-mouthed lip”: 
 
SINGBARER REST – der Umriß 
dessen, der durch 
die Sichelschrift lautlos hindurchbrach, 
abseits, am Schneeort. 
 
                                                 
762 Cf. Derrida, “‘A Self-Unsealing Poetic Text’: Poetics and Politics of Witnessing”, trans. Rachel Bowlby 
(2000), p. 201 (“our compulsion to cite-recite it without knowing, beyond knowledge”); the slightly revised 
original French text, Poétique et politique du témoignage (Paris:L’Herne, 2005), here p. 65, has been newly 






die Blickmasse, auf 
die der verfinsterte winzige 
Herztrabant zutreibt 
mit dem 
draußen erjagten Funken. 
 
– Entmündigte Lippe, melde, 
daß etwas geschieht, noch immer, 
unweit von dir.763  
 
This “singable residue”, this “disempowered”, “un-author-ized lip” is to be mouthed again, it 
is to be restored its voice which is not the same voice anymore, but another voice as its very 
own, according to the “secret of the encounter”, the paradoxical self-encounter which is at 
once an encounter with the irreducibly other. The sundered lip becomes re-embodied in an-
other mouth which becomes its ownmost Herzmund, re-embodied in its proper singularity, 
once and again, again and again only for once. This transposition, this transplantation is not a 
metaphor. No content, no message is carried over, only the “disempowered lip”, the pledge of 
the absent voice. A sumbolon, a metonymy or quasi-metonymy. Only “quasi-”, though, inso-
far as this tropological term, metonymy, still also tends to bear the traits of inauthenticity, 
sundered from the carnal and earthy, atmospheric reality. Like a spaceship, Sputnik perhaps, 
or a metaphor. But the landing of this trope, its reaching the “heartland perhaps”, means also 
the reductio ad absurdum of metaphor. The image, the trope becomes reality, more real than 
any allegedly pre-existent reality, it searches for and attains reality, wins reality (cf. 
GW 3:167). More proper than the pretended proper meaning ever was, without losing its irre-
ducible otherness however, without ever being ripe for full assimilation, for being fully inte-
riorized or appropriated.764 Unweit von dir — by heart, par cœur, but auswendig. Neither in-
ternal nor external, but both at once. 
 “Entmündigte Lippe”: the un-mouthed lip, the lip without authorization and without 
the performative power, the disembodied lip becomes re-embodied in the moment it an-
nounces that “something happens, always still, / not far from you”. In the moment it finds a 
voice, its own voice as the voice of another. An unforeseeable event, no doubt. 
                                                 
763 “Singbarer Rest”, in TCA/Atemwende, p. 53 (GW 2:36). “Entmündigen” is of course an extant verb, 
meaning “to place under disability” (cf. DWB: “ENTMÜNDIGEN, sui impotentem declarare, auszer 
mündigkeit setzen, unter curatel stellen, z. b. wegen geistesschwäche, verschwendung: / wir aber hatten uns 
entmündigt. / SCHENKENDORF” [Bd. 3, Sp. 574].) But in the expression entmündigte Lippe this verb is also 
punned with regard to the homonymy (or pseudo-homonymy which is rather a metonymical relation) be-
tween the DWB entries “MÜNDIG, adj. einen mund habend, in einmündig, s. d.” and “MÜNDIG, adj. ge-
walt habend; [...]” (Bd. 12 Sp. 2688ff.); both must be thought at once, together: the “unmouthed lip” as the 
“dis-empowered lip”. The disempowered lip articulates the art of literature: it is not licensed to a performa-
tive speech act (the license to perform is an essential condition of the performative), it is essentially power-
less. But on the other hand, the dis-empowered lip also exerts its power to become re-embodied in reality. 
764 In 1968, Celan wrote the following note, signed in Hebrew letters: “celle qui apprend à respecter l’autre 





 As if every poem said: 
 
Abtrünnig erst bin ich treu. 
Ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin.765 
 
This maxim articulates its own condition of impossibility, or rather, of the impossibility of 
following it; it articulates the condition of both the possibility and impossibility of remaining 
true to it. Abtrünnig:766 fidem fallens, apostate or disloyal, rebel or renegade — if apostasy or 
rebellion is how to be true to the maxim itself, the maxim itself remains impossible to follow, 
it rebels against maxims. It withdraws and yet, withstands. Desists, yet, insists. If you want to 
be true, be untrue, be true. 
 To restore to the words their original bloom would be to restore to them their free-
dom: freedom of signification. That is: their freedom to signify, albeit multiply and in an 
originarily, undecidably equivocal manner, and on the other hand, their freedom not to sig-
nify, their freedom from signifying things, their right to say anything and their right to remain 
silent, their freedom to protect silence, as non-sense or non-signification, or rather, silence as 
a form of signification, a form of sense, an audible silence. An absurdity making sense, com-
ing to appear. In May 1968, Celan wrote one of his anarchic aphorisms: 
 




“LIKE IN A RETORT” — OR AN AIR-CROWN 
 
There are metaphors, no doubt. But they are pertinent only within the restricted economy of 
give-and-take, in which poetry’s function is seen to be the enrichment of extant vocabulary. 
But when the poem is a “gift of oneself”,768 and when it speaks the words that traverse time 
(without transcending time), traverse several times, the words that from times immemorial 
struggle for expression, as Celan says in his 1948 essay on Jené (cf. GW 3:156-157), when 
the poem struggles with these words that have also gathered the cinders of centuries, when it 
struggles with these words and struggles for them, it can become a breath-crystal. This is not 
just to say that it can condense and crystallize something otherwise loose and impure into a 
pithy aphoristic form, purified of the accidents that have befallen and may still befall the 
                                                 
765 “Lob der Ferne”, in Mohn und Gedächtnis (1952) (GW 1:33). 
766 Cf. DWB: “ABTRÜNNIG, fidem fallens, ahd. abtrunnig (GRAFF 5, 533) transfuga, apostata, mhd. abetrün-
nec, von dem verlornen stamm trinnan tran trunnun herzuleiten, aus welchem auch trennan f. trannian 
separare, (wie aus rinnan rennan) und mhd. trünne ein gesonderter haufe, trupp flieszt. war trinnan se-
cedere, fugere, so ist abtrunni anttrunni profugus, ein abgetronnener, enttronnener, entronnener [...]” (Bd. 1 
Sp. 145.) 
767 Mikrolithen, p. 56, No. 98; this fragment bears the date “10.5.68”. 
768 Cf. Broda (“À personne adressé”, p. 17, loc. cit.): “Ce qu’il y a dans cette bouteille hermétique comme le 




word. To be a breath-crystal is, perhaps, to be a token of an individual breath, but also a re-
flection of an indefinite multiplicity of breaths, voices, bygone and still to come, to go by. 
 The combinations of a word with others are limited by what is called the language 
system, a system which itself evolves and revolves. A breath-crystal may reflect and refract 
an unlimited multiplicity of relations, also those to come: it reaches for reality, it seeks to be 
true. Poems can be cited and recited, for better and for worse, and all kinds of accidents may 
befall them.769 
 Language deploys itself in time. Time brings opposites together: often it is clearly 
time, “as the formal unity of contradictory predicates”, which constitutes the  “oxymora” in 
Celan’s poems, as Hamacher remarks.770 One of the major poetic principles for Celan was 
the attention paid to time and history in language, stated already in the 1948 essay, in which 
he remarks that the sedimented slag of centuries of lying is not just an addition to the given or 
an attribute of the proper and authentic (“Zusätliches zu Gegebenem, [...] Attribut des Ei-
gentlichen”); this historical dimension of the words, or language or sign-giving in general, 
including bodily gestures, cannot simply be cast away; rather, what has struggled since time 
immemorial to find expression has gathered into itself all the cinders, all the ashes of extin-
guished sense-giving, and not only these:   
 
So mußte ich auch erkennen, daß sich zu dem, was zutiefst in seinem Innern seit 
unvordenklichen Zeiten nach Ausdruck rang, auch noch die Asche ausgebrannter 
Sinngebung gesellt hatte und nicht nur diese! [GW 3:156-157.]  
 
Not only that, but perhaps also a trace of all that was “burnt together with” the names, with 
“all the co-incin- / erated / names”: “alle die mit- / verbrannten / Namen” (GW 1:227)?  
 Ash — Asche — is not always cinder or slag. A figure without figure, without a track, 









wie alles Verlorene nahe 
Schwestergestalt: 
 
                                                 
769 Cf. Mikrolithen, p. 99, No. 163.6: “Es gehört, so glaube ich, zu den Grundzügen der Dichtung, daß sie sich 
dem Mißverständnis ausgesetzt weiß.* / Das Gedicht nimmt selbst seinen Autor nur für die Dauer seines 
Entstehens ganz ins Verständnis – und entläßt sodann auch ihn[.] / * [n.:] Dadurch weiß sie sich auch auf 
dem Wege zu jenen, die noch gewillt sind, sich bedenklich stimmen zu lassen.” 
770 “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett, p. 285 (loc. cit.). We have of course already seen that Celan him-





Alle die Namen, alle die mit- 
verbrannten 
Namen. Soviel 












Du mit der fahlen, 
aufgebissenen Knospe. 
Du in der Weinflut. 
 
(Nicht wahr, auch uns 
entließ diese Uhr? 
Gut, 
gut, wie dein Wort hier vorbeistarb.) 
 
Schweigen, wie Gold gekocht, in 
verkohlten, verkohlten 
Händen. 
Finger, rauchdünn. Wie Kronen, Luftkronen 
um – – 
 





                                                 








 Great, grey, 
like all the lost nigh 
sister-figure: 
 
 All the names, all the co-incin- 
erated  
names. So much 
ash to bless. So much 
land won 
over 





Silence is golden. Silence is golden on this poem, silence is golden in this poem: but the cli-
ché is literalized rather than brought to new life as a resurrected metaphor.772 The crown-like 
shapes formed by coaled hands are like gold, but they are silence; they are air-crowns, like 
gold they are in coaled hands, like gold that is cooked, like an alchemist’s handicraft, that is; 
but literally, silence, and literally, not crowns but air-crowns, air-crowns “around — — ”. An 
air-crown: what else is it but the word ‘crown’? And fingers (Finger could be either singular 
or plural here: the absence of an article and the shape of a crown would suggest plural), 
smoke thin: what else but fingers in the air, word-fingers, the word ‘fingers’? 
 This poem can be read, and has been read, as Celan’s counter-word to those critics 
who saw in his early poetry just “verbal alchemy and esoteric art of combination [Sprachal-
chimie und esoterische Kombinationskunst]”; artificial, malformed metaphors, poetic change-
lings: “keine geglückten Metaphern, es sind poetische Wechselbälge, künstlich, wie in der 
Retorte gezüchtet.”773 
 More and more clearly, the later poems show themselves as words gathered around 
silence, protecting the unseen crown of silence like gold between the airily cupped fingers, 
the smoke-thin fingers of the coaled hands. A secret they manifest, in the air, visible and in-
visible, audible and inaudible, together at once: the vocal things with their mute consonants 
of the singularity they still belong to, the figure of the other-to-come they are devoted to. The 
other-to-come, awaited in silence, with the air-crown between the fingers. The secret thus 
                                                                                                                                                        
rings. 
 
 Great. Grey. Cinder- 
less. 
 
 You, back then. 
You with the pale, 
bitten-open bud. 
You in the wineflood. 
 
 (Is it not true, this watch 
discharged even us? 
Good, 
good, as your word here to death overtook.) 
 
 Silence, like gold, cooked, in 
coaled, coaled 
hands. 
Fingers, smokethin. Like crowns, 
aircrowns 
round – – 
 





772 In German the phrase is: “Reden ist Silber, Schweigen ist Gold.” 





protected is not a jealous “cultivation of intimacy”, esoteric or hermetic; it is open for the 
other to come, but on the other hand, the Thou of the poem is indeed endowed to it, already, 
as much as its I is. The Thou comes by the poem, comes into, or maybe as the occupiable va-
cant form that the poet’s heart is,774 the heart reached toward the other, opaque and open, 
both at once: occupiable in its opacity, in the opacity of anyone’s heart, recognized in the 
handshake. 
 Indeed, the handshake, as any gesture whatsoever, any piece of language in general, 
can harbour bad faith. Bad faith, perjury, or mere mechanism. There is absolutely no way to 
penetrate beyond this risk of inauthenticity, beyond the hazard involved in encountering the 
other, the strangers that are, “dicht beieinander”:775 one of these others can always be  
an uncanny automat, indistinguishable from the other wholly other. This is the risk and 
the chance involved in every encounter. As Jacques Derrida emphasizes, there is no way to 
prove that the other has lied. There is absolutely no way in which I could take the other’s 
place, be in the other’s head. The other is secret: “The secret is the very essence of other-
ness.”776 No one bears witness for the witness.777 And this does not have to be a matter of 
despair, even if it can be also that. Even if nothing illustrates this state of affairs better than 
the possibility of lying and the invisible line between good and bad faith: 
 
Il y a dans chaque texte poétique, mais aussi bien dans chaque parole, dans chaque 
manifestation hors littérature, un secret inaccessible auquel aucune preuve ne sera ja-
mais adéquate. Dans la vie courante par exemple, je sais que j’ai souvent surpris mes 
étudiants quand je leur ai dit: « On ne pourra jamais prouver que quelqu’un a menti ». 
On ne pourra jamais le prouver, ni dans la vie courante ni en justice. Un témoignage 
peut être faux mais on ne pourra jamais prouver qu’il ya un faux témoignage. Pour-
quoi ? Parce que, de l’autre côté, du côté du témoin, comme du côté du poète, il y a 
toujours la ressource de dire : ce que je dis est peut-être faux, je me suis trompé, mais 
je l’ait fait de bonne foi. À ce moment-là, il n’y a pas de parjure, il n’y a pas de faux 
témoignage et il n’y a pas de mensonge. Si je dis quelque chose de faux mais sans 
l’intention de tromper, je ne mens pas. On ne pourra donc jamais prouver de façon ob-
jectivable que quelqu’un a menti. Ce quelqu’un pourra toujours dire : j’étais de bonne 
foi. On ne pourra jamais prouver que quelqu’un est de mauvaise foi, ce qui s’appelle 
prouver. Ceci tient au fait que l’autre est secret. Je ne peux pas être à la place de 
l’autre, dans la tête de l’autre. Je ne pourrai jamais me mesurer au secret de l’altérité. 
L’essence même de l’altérité, c’est le secret.778 
 
                                                 
774 “Besetzbarkeit / Die Form – Leer<Hohl >form – des Gedichts, ist das auf das Gedicht wartende Herz des 
Dichters. –” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 777=504; dated ”ab 19.8.60”.) 
775 “Aber es gibt vielleicht, und in einer und derselben Richtung, zweierlei Fremde – dicht beieinander.” 
TCA/Meridian, Endf. 28. 
776  “L’essence même de l’altérité, c’est le secret.” Cf. below. 
777 “Niemand / zeugt für den / Zeugen.” DGKG, p. 198. 
778 Derrida, “La vérité blessante, ou le corps à corps des langues. Entretien avec Jacques Derrida [réalisé par 
Évelyne Grossman, 12 décembre 2003]”, in Europe : revue littéraire mensuelle, 82ème année, no. 901 (mai 
2004), pp. 8-27, here pp. 22-23. Partial translation by Thomas Dutoit, “The Truth That Wounds. From an 
Interview”, in Derrida, Sovereignties in Question. The Poetics of Paul Celan, ed. Dutoit and Outi Pasanen 







The secret in question is not a jealous cultivation of intimacy. Often these poems take on 
the form of a request rather than statement; they request a word, enquire after a word, but 
not like a riddle would; they thematize a missing word, an unspoken word or a word in 
response, sometimes an anticipated word, sometimes perhaps an unanticipated word, un-
foreseeable. Sometimes a very unlikely word in response, as in a prayer.779 The “lan-
guage mesh [Sprachgitter]” of these poems is not a crossword puzzle. Their truth cannot 
be the truth of a proposition or statement, either, as Aristotle’s statement on the truth of 
statements and those ways of speaking that are neither true nor untrue, such as prayers, 
already suggests. Thus they are not derived from statements or propositions, either, sec-
ond-grade propositions so to speak, such as metaphor would seem to be. 
 The secret these poems manifest can be that of an air-crown. Who says one cannot 
be crowned by air? By fingers, by words? A fool can be ‘crowned’ by mere words, words 
hovering in the air, of course, by mere fancy, by a speech act that is not performative 
since it lacks the power required of a performative. Such a mock throne, a figurative 
throne, can always be mocked by counter-figures, a throne of thorns for instance, and an 
inscription like this one: “Iesvs Nazarenvs Rex Ivdaeorvm”. But again, who says no one 
can be crowned by air? By fingers, by words? A crown, a crowning always already pre-
supposes and involves words, speech and writing (in the colloquial as well as in the gen-
eral sense). A performative speech act, and a performative speech act requires power, in-
stitutional power. It is questionable whether poetry has ever, de jure or de facto, pos-
sessed such an institutional power, a power to institute (namely to establish, found, or-
dain), political power.780 A crown of majesty, her majesty or anyone’s, is ‘always al-
ready’ an air-crown, and a crown of fingers. Such a quasi-metonymical configuration that 
                                                 
779 Cf. e.g. “In memoriam Paul Éluard” and “Argumentum e silentio, in Von Schwelle zu Schwelle 
(GW 1:130; 138); cf. “Engführung”: “Kam ein Wort, kam, / kam durch die Nacht, / wollt leuchten, 
wollt leuchten.” (GW 1:199); cf. “Selbstdritt, selbstviert”, in Die Niemandsrose: “Diese Stunde, deine 
Stunde, / ihr Gespräch mit meinem Munde. // Mit dem Mund, mit seinem Schweigen, / mit den 
Worten, die sich weigern.” (GW 1:216); cf. “Ich kenne dich”, in Atemwende: “Wo flammt ein Wort, 
das für uns beide zeugte?” (GW 2:30); cf. “Todtnauberg”, in Lichtzwang (GW 2:255). 
780 “L’événement ne peut pas être performatif. Le performatif implique la maîtrise dans l’observance 
d’une convention donnée et inflexible. Donc, un événement plus que performatif ou autre que 
performatif, comment peut-on dire qu’il constitue une vérité ? Eh bien, pourtant je le crois. Je crois que 
la vérité, celle qui m’intéresse au-delà du concept traditionnel de vérité, est toujours révolutionnaire, de 
type poétique si vous voulez, ou du type de l’événement, et non du type du théorème, de ce qu’on peut 
voir devant soi ou transmettre. C’est une mutation qu’on peut après coup essayer de réfléchir. On peut 
tenter de la transformer en vérité transmissible, avec tous les risques que cela comporte, mais au 
moment où cela arrive, ce n’est pas pensable, thématisable, objectivable.” Derrida, “La vérité 
blessante”,  p. 20; cf. pp. 19-20. — Insofar as it is not an authorized ceremony and an authorized 
person, smashing a bottle of champagne in the steel prow of an ocean liner and declaring “I baptize 
thee Queen Elizabeth” would hardly make a performative speech act in the sense of an authentic 
baptism. A performance is not always performative.  
Crossing...   
 
349
associates fingers with speech, solitary hands with writing as a form of prayer, air with 
smoke and ash and coaled hands, all this that hangs in the air but remains terrestrial, even 
when forming a great, grey, sisterly figure in the air, such a configuration is always in-
volved in these air-crowns and ashen glories, these time-haloes bringing together the 
mortalities of one as well as the other’s.  
 Even as we might speak of catachreses, these poetic configurations have little or 
nothing to do with dead metaphors or their resurrection in a live metaphor. Even though 
the cliché “silence is golden” is apparently invoked and involved in the poetic configura-
tion of the poem we have just been discussing, counter-figured by an irony of sorts or an 
irony beyond itself: it is, after all, a silence cooked between coaled hands like gold, 
cooked or rather as if it were cooked, as if it were the gold of an alchemist, as if it were a 
crown held by the silent, coaled hands. This poem’s counter-figure objects to an outrage, 
the disgrace of speaking of such poetic commemorations — of that which is absolutely 
beyond memory and testimony in itself — as if they were just rhetorical figures or aes-
theticism. It is a crown, the poem’s hands hold a crown up in the air and extend it toward 
someone to come, but it is an air-crown. It is no one’s crown: no one can appropriate this 
crown as if it were gold, a matter of possession. It is no one’s, because it is equivocally 
someone’s who is no longer there to be crowned, and someone’s who remains to come, 
remains to come beyond all citations and recitations of the poem. 
 Following Derrida, we might say that these air-crowns, in this case a space 
formed by coaled hands cupped into the form of a crown, an invisible form of the invisi-
ble, or visible and invisible both at once, written to be voiced again, this poetic revolution 
dethrones majesty and its speech acts, even its own, even the poetic sovereignty, in fa-
vour of a silence which appears, comes to be seen, as a visible-invisible majesty “in the 
air”, a fancied majesty, fool’s gold: a crown or crowned head half-seen, inter-viewable 
insofar as a poem is conversation (Gespräch) with an invisible that does not quite re-
spond or correspond (cf. TCA/Meridian, Ms. 57). A madness of sorts, to be sure, a kind 
of madness of which another poem, “Ich kenne dich”, speaks (GW 2:30):  
 
(ICH KENNE DICH, du bist die tief Gebeugte, 
ich, der Durchbohrte, bin dir untertan. 
Wo flammt ein Wort, das für uns beide zeugte? 
Du – ganz, ganz wirklich. Ich – ganz Wahn.)781 
 
                                                 
781 Trans. Felstiner: “(I KNOW YOU, you’re the one bent over low, / and I, the one pierced through, am in 




In this case, it is a question of the madness in seeing oneself in the pietà motif, but a rec-
ognized and confessed madness.  
 The great, grey, track-less, majestic figure of which the poem speaks, this cinder-
less figure is a figure in time. The words Schlacken-/lose, Fährte-/lose are divided on two 
lines, which is perhaps not at all insignificant. But this division must not be read so that it 
would somehow diminish the significance of the privative affix -lose; to the contrary, the 
tiny pause in the enjambment introduces something like a temporal shift within this priva-
tion. This figure is “like all the lost nigh” (“wie alles verlorene nahe / Schwestergestalt”). 
We remember the earlier, much earlier poem, with the verse: “Du bist so nah, als weiltest 
du nicht hier.”782 The great, grey sister-figure, grey like ashes or like smoke but also 
gold-like, relates, no doubt, to an unnamed sister and, on the other hand, to all those 
whose names, even the names, were “co-incinerated” in the ovens of the camps; the 
names, whole families with even their names, sisters and brothers, mothers and fathers; 
the shape is obviously also that of the Schechina, the “soul of smoke (Rauchseele)” rising 
above the clouds in the desert, and the crown, golden-like, is also like the crown of a 
rose.783 
 The word that ends the poem, König-/liche, is also divided. The adjective is femi-
nine, while König would be masculine. But another significant motivation for the en-
jambment may be the minimal suspension of the suffix -liche, whose common significa-
tion and  etymology associate it with all the “wie” adverbs in this poem.784 The treacher-
ous ‘like’ inhabits all language, all general names for instance: “everything is like every-
thing, and in endless ways”, as for instance Donald Davidson says (“What Metaphors 
Mean”, p. 39), but each and every thing is also unlike anything else. The like is unlike. 
 
                                                 
782 Mohn und Gedächtnis, GW 1:61. Trans. William D. Jewett in Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion”, p. 
283: “You are as close as if you were not lingering here.” 
783 Cf. Otto Pöggeler, Spur des Worts. Zur Lyrik Paul Celans (Freiburg: Alber, 1986), p. 360. 
784 Cf. DWB: “GLEICH, adj. h e r k u n f t  u n d  f o r m . // das gemeingerm. adj. ahd. galîh, gilîh, gelîh, 
mhd. gelîch, gelîche, glîch, gelich (zu letzterem s. ZWIERZINA in: zs. f. dtsch. altert. 45, 81 ff.), adv. 
gelîche, gelîch, gelich, glîche, mnd. gelîke (neben lîk, like), mnl. gelijc, nl. gelijk; got. galeiks, altnord. 
glîkr (neben lîkr), schwed. lik, dän. lig, as. gilîk, afries. lîc, ags. gelîc, engl. like ist deutlich bahuvrihi-
zusammensetzung aus ga- und l?ka- 'gestalt, körper', bedeutet also ursprünglich 'dieselbe gestalt 
habend', vgl. got. wisan þiudos gaarbjans jah galeikans jah gadailans ????? ?? ???? ???????????? ??? 
??????? ??? ????????? (wörtlich 'dasz die völker seien dasselbe erbe habende und denselben körper 
habende und denselben teil habende') Eph. 3, 6 sowie die entsprechenden bildungen samaleiks 'gleich', 
aljaleiko, adv., 'anders', swaleiks 'so beschaffen', hwileiks 'wie beschaffen' und die zahlreichen 





“Do you know what ‘grille’ could be?”,785 Celan asked Hugo Huppert, speaking of his poem 
“Sprachgitter”. One of the things by which he himself defined “speech-grille” is “distanced 
comprehension”: 
 
Und dieser durchs Gitter »freigegebene Blick«, dieses »entfernte Verstehen« ist schon 
versöhnlich, ist schon Gewinn, Trost, vielleicht Hoffnung. Keiner ist »wie« der 
andere; und darum soll er vielleicht den andern studieren, sei’s auch durchs Gitter 
hindurch. [“Spirituell”, p. 320.]  
 
The word Sprachgitter is not a neologism, it is rather a citation and possibly refers to several 
sources. The term has an individual entry in the Grimm dictionary. Sprachgitter means first 
of all, primarily and originally, the lattice window in a parlatory, namely the reception room 
in a convent, the mesh through which the nuns speak to the worldly. Jean Paul, an important 
source for Celan, has on several occasions used the term in a figurative sense. One of these, a 
passage in Kampaner Thal and quoted by Grimm, a sentence speaking of nightingales sing-
ing louder before a thunderstorm, “behind blossoming speech-grilles”, has been copied by 
Celan in his notebook:  “unter dem tiefer einsinkenden Gewitter schlugen die Nachtigallen 
lauter, gleichsam als lebendige Gewitterstürmer, hinter blühenden Sprachgittern.”786 
 But isn’t this Gitter, mesh or lattice, still a metaphor? In his words on the “treacherous 
like”, doesn’t Celan still use simile and metaphor? If we take the word Gitter here as a meta-
phor for something else, or even as a catachresis, we easily forget that the parlatory window, 
the “speech-grille” would not be what it is without the reference to speech. The certain dis-
tance between speakers belongs to the very constitution of this lattice. The parlatory window 
is already a metonymy of sorts, it already speaks of the distanced comprehension across lan-
guage, through the “speech-grille” or “language mesh”. It is not just an object made of wood 
or iron, but made with regard to its function as, well,  “speech-grille”. It is not just a regular 
window but a parlatory window. So speech primordially and inseparably coincides with the 
grille in the speech-grille also when it is a question of the lattice window as a material object. 
 While there have been dozens of interpretations of the poem “Sprachgitter”, an indis-
pensable encyclopaedic cycle of commentaries, it is Maurice Blanchot who very laconically 
states that the wish to decipher the “outside” through the lattice is due to an illusion: isn’t 
there, outside, already and again, writing to be read: “le dehors ne se lit-il pas encore comme 
une écriture”?787 Let us read the poem and then try to figure out, not so much its content but 
what kind of a glimpse it might perhaps give of this outside itself — as a sort of writing, per-
haps? 
 
                                                 
785 “Wissen Sie, was Gitter sein können?” (Hugo Huppert, “Spirituell”, loc. cit.; my translation.) 
786 Cf. Barbara Wiedemann’s commentary in DGKG, pp. 652-653.  






Augenrund zwischen den Stäben.  
 
Flimmertier Lid  
rudert nach oben,  
gibt einen Blick frei.  
 
Iris, Schwimmerin, traumlos und trüb: 
der Himmel, herzgrau, muß nah sein.  
 
Schräg, in der eisernen Tülle,  
der blakende Span.  
Am Lichtsinn  
errätst du die Seele.  
 
(Wär ich wie du. Wärst du wie ich.  
Standen wir nicht  
unter einem Passat?  
Wir sind Fremde.)  
 
Die Fliesen. Darauf,  
dicht beieinander, die beiden  




The poem could invite us into an endless discussion, with all its possible allusions and asso-
ciations, and with its dozens of previous detailed readings: in the bibliography of Kommentar 
zu Paul Celans »Sprachgitter« (2005, ed. Jürgen Lehmann), there is a list of no less than 103 
items related to the poem, many of which are its individual interpretations.789 
 The whole enigma seems to be condensed into the word Passat. Jerry Glenn hears in 
this word the echo of Passah, the name derived through Greek from the Hebrew and used in 
German for the Jewish Passover feast. For Glenn, the change from Passah to Passat suggests, 
among a few other things, “the remoteness and esoteric nature of Benn’s South Sea Utopia of 
the poetic word”.790 Celan’s distantiation, in his own Büchner Prize speech, from Benn’s po-
                                                 
788 TCA/Sprachgitter, p. 41; GW 1:167. Trans. Felstiner: “SPEECH-GRILLE // Eyes round between the bars. // 
Flittering lid / paddles upward, / breaks a glance free. // Iris, the swimmer, dreamless and drab: // heaven, 
heartgray, must be near. // Aslant, in the iron socket, / a smoldering chip. / By sense of light / you hit on the 
soul. // (Were I like you. Were you like me. / Did we not stand / under one trade wind? / We are strangers.) 
// The flagstones. On them, / close by each other, both / heartgray puddles: / two / mouthfuls of silence.” 
(Selected Poems and Prose of Paul Celan, p. 107.) 
789 Cf. Hendrik Birus, “Sprachgitter”, in  Jürgen Lehmann, ed., Kommentar zu Paul Celans »Sprachgitter« 
(Heidelberg: Winter, 2005), pp. 209-224; the bibliography of the interpretations of this poem is on pp. 513-
519. The few interpretations and commentaries particularly concentrated on this poem that I have taken into 
account, besides the commentary by Birus, are, in a more or less chronological order: Alfred Kelletat, “Ac-
cessus” in Dietlind Meinecke, ed., Über Paul Celan [Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1970], pp. 116 ff. Jerry 
Glenn, Paul Celan [New York: Twaine, 1973], pp. 91-92; 99-105. Jean Bollack, “Paul Celan sur la langue. 
Le poème Sprachgitter et ses interprétations”, in Martine Broda, ed., Contre-jour. Études sur Paul Celan 
(Paris: Cerf, 1986), pp. 86-115, here p. 88.  





etics and in favour of the “poem today” instead of “modern lyricism”, has often been recog-
nized. We might think that Passat is indeed the very same Mediterranean wind that blows 
over the anemones, the narcissi, the olive trees in Benn’s “Probleme der Lyrik” (1951), or in 
the much earlier text of his that he quotes in the speech, “Das lyrische Ich” (1927). It would 
be the trade wind that blows also under the sky of Zanzibar and over the blooming Bougain-
ville. Benn speaks for instance of creatures with cilia (Flimmerhaare) and of the lyrical ‘I’ as 
an “open-work-I”: “Das lyrische Ich ist ein durchbrochenes Ich, ein Gitter-Ich, fluchter-
fahren, trauergeweiht.” And:  
 
Worte, Worte — Substantive! Sie brauchen nur die Schwingen zu öffnen und 
Jahrtausende entfallen ihrem Flug. Nehmen Sie Anemonenwald, also zwischen 
Stämmen feines, kleines Kraut, ja über sie hinaus Narzissenwiesen, aller Kelche 
Rauch und Qualm, im Ölbaum blüht der Wind und über Marmorstufen steigt, 
verschlungen, in eine Weite die Erfüllung — oder nehmen Sie Oliven oder 
Theogonien — Jahtrausende entfallen ihrem Flug. Botanisches und Geographisches, 
Völker und Länder, alle die historisch und systematisch so verlorenen Welten hier 
ihre Blüte, hier ihr Traum — aller Leichtsinn, alle Wehmut, alle Hoffnungslosigkeit 
des Geistes werden fühlbar aus den Schichten eines Querschnitts von Begriff.791  
 
Even as we seem to find some kind of a correspondent for almost all the ingredients of 
Celan’s poem in Benn’s discourse, there remains something unsatisfying about this observa-
tion of similarities and of the ironic distantiation through these very similarities or perhaps 
even through playful orthographic faults of sorts, not only the change between Passah and 
Passat but also between Lichtsinn and Leichtsinn, or the transformation of Traum into 
“traumlos und trüb”. Even this could be read as a sort of reductio ad absurdum of meta-
phors, in the sense that the fantastic, metaphorical attributes of poetry in Benn’s discourse are 
‘misunderstood’, as it were, in a quasi verbatim manner (and thus quasi absurd, too), or dis-
figured so that Lichtsinn (photosensitivity) instead of Leichtsinn (light-heartedness) is attrib-
uted to the organism having cilia (Flimmerhaare). So this is a re-literalization of sorts, except 
that it concerns the eyelid; but what connects the ciliates with eyelids are not only the cilia 
but the sense of light, too, photosensitivity. And if we allow ourselves to step outside the 
poem’s strict textual contours, the “hope [Hoffnung]” mentioned by Celan in his private con-
versation with Huppert might even be seen as in opposition to Benn’s “hopelessness [Hoff-
nungslosigkeit des Geistes]”.  
 But let us see if we could argue for this “consolation and hope” even from within the 
textual contours of the poem. Let us now read it apart from these comparative associations 
and apart from the exclusively dark shades, the “extremely negative connotations” that some 
have found in it (cf. e.g. Glenn, Paul Celan, pp. 99-105). I also find darkly humorous aspects 
in the poem, not only darkness but light too. 
                                                 
791 Benn, “Probleme der Lyrik” (1951), in Gesammelte Werke IV: Reden und Vorträge, ed. Dieter Wellershoff 




 The word Passat has a quasi synonym in German: Tropenwind.792 If we replace 
“trope” by “metaphor” and “wind” by “flurry”, we could associate this word with 
Metapherngestöber. Another tropospheric phenomenon. This is perhaps not as far-fetched as 
it seems, taken that the context calls into question  the “particle”, the tiny word “like” (“das 
Wörtchen »Wie«”). Yet, of course this coincidence cannot furnish us with any other informa-
tion concerning the word Passat but that which we already possess: in spite of the one trade 
wind under which “we” stand, in spite of the suggested “like” that would liken us with each 
other, “we” are strangers. Which does not have to be an altogether “negative” situation, as 
Celan himself points out.793 The situation in which the shared language, common word (Pas-
sat), fails to communicate, which is also to establish a community (a “cultivation of intimacy” 
as a horizon for communication and metaphor), is accompanied by a shared silence.794 
 Passat, Tropenwind — in the draft material for this poem the word Seelenpassat oc-
curs — has been etymologically described as a wind that is favourable for crossing over the 
sea (“für die Überfahrt günstiger Wind”);795 therefore Passat is, etymologically speaking, 
something that facilitates passage or transfer. And when we speak of etymology here, we do 
not have to think (only) of some historical origin of the term, the Dutch seamen’s vocabulary 
for instance, but (also) the conditions favourable for ‘crossing over’, transference in a linguis-
tic sense. Langage à l’état naissant. Thus it could be taken in a meta-metaphoric sense, or 
perhaps rather, or at the same time also, in a sense that evokes the pre-metaphoric, pre-
conceptual formation of terminology. However, the word Passat also marks, as part of the 
singular address of which the strophe in parentheses gives a hint, the limit of construing the 
                                                 
792 Cf. Duden, entry “Passat”: “gleichmäßig wehende Tropenwind” (cit. TCA/Sprachgitter, p. 40n); Wahrig: 
“Passat <m. 1>, Passatwind <m.> beständiger Wind in den Tropen innerhalb der Wendekreise, infolge der 
Erdumdrehung wechselnd aus NO u. SO wehend (Nordost~, Südost~) [über das Nddt. [=Niederdeutsch] 
(seemänn.) < ndrl. passaat-(wind)]”. Once again, cf. Jean Paul for a possible clue, mentioned by Grimm as 
one of the figurative uses of “Passatwind” (“Passatwind der Eitelkeit”): “Beim Himmel! mein 
spitzbübischer Maskopeibruder und Lehnsvetter in Flachsenfingen hatte die Liebesbriefe an gegenwärtige 
Kontrapunktistin adressiert. Aus jeder Zeile blies Liebes-Tauwind, Hof-Stickluft und der Passatwind der 
Eitelkeit: wie die Theologen sonst jedes Glied zum Beweise und Pfeiler einer Gottheit machten — z.B. 
Morus das Auge — Schmid das Ohr — Donatus die Hand — Hamberger das Herz — Sloane den Magen —,
so regt ein junger Fant kein Glied, das ihm nicht den erfreulichen Beweis eines existierenden Gottes oder 
Halbgottes oder Venerabile (er selber ist nämlich der Gott oder das Venerabile) darreichte, und er schauet in 
sein göttliches Wesen.” (Der Jubelsenior, 1797; cited from Projekt Gutenberg,
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/jeanpaul/jubelsen/jubelo43.htm.) 
793 Besides Huppert’s account, cf. Birus, “Sprachgitter” (in Lehmann, ed., Kommentar zu Sprachgitter), pp. 
219-220, and Celan’s poem “Oben, geräuschlos”, connecting “the stranger, uninvited” and “guest”: “Der 
Fremde, ungebeten, woher, / der Gast.” (GW 1:188.) 
794 Cf. Bollack, “Paul Celan sur la langue”, p. 95: “L’union tacite, sans paroles, la mémoration qui fait le 
« cœur » condense si fortement une conformité du langage à la chose que les larmes se rapprochent (« dicht 
beieinander », vers 17), dans une proximité que ne saurait établir aucun dialogue, restant un échange de dif-
férences, même si les mots échangés étaient les mêmes.” 
795 Cf. Birus, “Sprachgitter” (2005), p. 219. The Tübingen edition shows some significant differences between 
the first draft and the final version, and in the first draft, partly consisting rather of a list of words than 





vocabulary in such general terms. And this limit is emphasized by the preceding word, 
printed in italics, “einem”.796 
 When we acknowledge that this Passat forbids rather than allows us to ‘pass over’, or 
rather that it does both at once, is both “strongbox [coffre-fort]” and “newsstand [kiosque]”, 
as Derrida has argued about Celan’s poetry and poetics,797 we may cautiously leave the single 
term without precise determination and concentrate rather on the ‘frame’ than the ‘focus’, 
although we are not dealing with metaphors here, but rather with the withdrawal of all rheto-
ric into a mutism. We might allow the word the whole ‘abstract’ emptiness of possibilities, its 
formal vacancy. This legitimate resignation of specificity is what for instance Guillaume Ar-
tous-Bouvet has done, with respect to the strophe between brackets: 
 
Ici, une rhétorique de la question enracine l’énonciation dans une pure conditionnalité 
(conditionnalité qu’accentue encore l’encadrement parenthétique): or, c’est précisé-
ment l’identité – ou plus précisément, la commensurabilité, la communauté possibles 
– des « deux » qui fait l’objet de ce conditionnel. La tenue des deux êtres sous 
l’identité, sous la mêmeté d’un unique « alizé » (Passat) ne garantit aucunement leur 
réciproque familiarité. Dans l’élément d’un commun souffle, une étrangeté puissante 
continue de régir les rapports de l’un et de l’autre, de l’un à l’autre. Le poème se tient 
précisément sous le vent de cette identification déchirée, divisée, du poète et de son 
lecteur.798 
 
Passat and Sprachgitter, a little like Schibboleth or no pasarán, are not only what keep us 
apart but what also bring us together. After citing the strophe in parentheses, Artous-Bouvet 




Aug in Aug, in der Kühle, 
laß uns auch solches beginnen: 
gemeinsam 
laß uns atmen den Schleier, 
der uns voreinander verbirgt, 
 
                                                 
796 To my knowledge, very little attention has been given to this little word, comparable to the likewise empha-
sized word “ein” in Trakl’s “Abendländisches Lied”, “ein Geschlecht”. The last stanza of 
“Abendländisches Lied” is as follows: “O, die bittere Stunde des Untergangs, / Da wir ein steinernes Antlitz 
in schwarzen Wassern beschaun. / Aber strahlend heben die silbernen Lider die Liebenden: / Ein  
Geschlecht. Weihrauch strömt von rosigen Kissen / Und der süße Gesang der Auferstandenen.” Heidegger 
and, following him with critical attention, Derrida have paid specific attention to this emphasis in Trakl’s 
poem. — In his essay on “Sprachgitter”, Jean Bollack happens to make the following observation (moti-
vated by  “[l’]alternance des ronds et des bâtons”): “Le langage est androgyne dans sa couche la plus in-
time.” (“Paul Celan sur la langue”, p. 88; cf. also the brief remark on p. 94: “« un seul » est emphatique”.) 
Bollack also reads the strophe in parentheses in much the same way as we do here: “établissant en marge 
une correspondance (personnalisée)*, il conduit pourtant l’analyse à une cloture jusqu’à laquelle elle 
n’aurait pas pu se développer dans sa logique propre sans intervention « personnelle ». | *[n20:] Qui n’a rien 
de biographique [...]”. 
797 Cf. “Discussion”, in M. Bollack, ed., L’acte critique, pp. 239ff; En. trans. Hughes, “Discussion” [1983], p. 
156, passim. 
798 Guillaume Artous-Bouvet, “Une lecture de Celan : di-visions de la forme”, in Revue des Littératures de 




wenn der Abend sich anschickt zu messen, 
wie weit es noch ist 
von jeder Gestalt, die er annimmt, 
zu jeder Gestalt, 
die er uns beiden geliehen.799 
 
To breath the veil that is common to us and that covers us both, conceals us both from each 
other, even when our eyes mirror each other, is it not speech, language itself? Is language not 
the word-veil (Schleier) between us, the veil that we breath? And is it not the word “veil 
[Schleier]” that we breath when we pronounce it in the cool, dark air of the evening, which is 
the atmosphere of the poem? The cool dark air, the evening preparing itself for measuring the 
distance between the figures that it takes upon itself and the figures that it gives us, the veil 
that is between us and that we breath together, keeping us apart even in the closest proximity, 
we who are the distant (“Fernen”): all this becomes one as the darkness becomes darker. The 
air, the veil, the figures, all melt into each other, into an invisibility that brings together and 
keeps apart, also us both, also us breathing together. The poem describes, as it were, or rather 
lets appear, light turning into twilight turning into darkness: it both bestows to us the forms 
and effaces the contours, turns the visible into invisible and vice versa. A most erotic poem. 
And it does not describe what happens; it gives form to that which happens. 
 The poem, language taking form, gives the contours to an existence,800 allows the en-
counter to take place, as the visible contours of the distant ones disappear in the night. Figura-
tion and counter-figuration, figuration by counter-figuration. 
 Let us return to the poem “Sprachgitter” for another moment. It gives a glimpse, “re-
leases a glance”.801 Almost the only lines in the poem that seem to address speaking in the 
usual sense of this word, almost the only lines that directly address themselves to a Thou (a 
human interlocutor, as it seems?), are the lines in parentheses, the conditional, interrogatory 
sentences and the sentence affirming that “we are strangers”. The rest of the lines address, 
first, through the “speech-grille” as it seems, “Eyes round between the bars”,802 eyes that are 
at the same time animals or something like animals, organisms having cilia, Flimmertier Lid. 
Organs of sight or organisms from whose reaction to light, in one word, photosensitivity, you 
may divine the soul, a manifestation of life. Also here we have this address to a Thou, but an 
address that concerns “divining” the presence of a soul from the sense of light, and not from 
verbal communication. And in the last strophe, the heart-grey colour that was earlier attrib-
                                                 
799 Von Schwelle zu Schwelle, DGKG, pp. 67-68. 
800 “Gedichte sind Daseinsentwürfe.” (TCA/Meridian, D.O.M., 21 [p. 221]; cf. Endf. 46, loc. cit.; also in 
Mikrolithen, No. 300, p. 206); cf. the Bremen speech: “In dieser Sprache habe ich, in jenen Jahren und in 
den Jahren nachher, Gedichte zu schreiben versucht: um zu sprechen, um mich zu orientieren, um zu 
erkunden, wo ich mich befand und wohin es mit mir wollte, um mir Wirklichkeit zu entwerfen.” (GW 
3:186) 
801 Cf. the translation by Michael Hamburger (Poems of Paul Celan, p. 95). 
802 The bars of the parlatory lattice, perhaps, but they could also be the bars of a cage; a certain affinity with 
Rilke’s famous “Der Panther” has been observed (cf. Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, in DGKG, p. 653; Birus, 




 uted to the sky, whose proximity was divined from the dreamlessness and bleakness of “Iris, 
the swimmer, dreamless and drab”, this heart-grey colour is now attributed to the two puddles 
upon the flagstones.803 Outside, no doubt, since they reflect the colour of the sky. 
 Are the puddles, side by side, a pair of eyes, then? No doubt. But are they not also 
mouths, as it seems? Or at least mouthfuls? Mouthfuls of silence; these could be eyes, indeed. 
But does this not mean that they are not only puddles (Lachen) and eyes and mouths and also 
tears and even associated with blood, or perhaps rather ash instead of blood (heart-grey), not 
only all these but also ‘laughter’, Lachen? Lachen (plural) is ‘laughter’, too.804 To laugh is a 
way of not speaking, to not say a word, and it is easier to say this in German: Lachen ist auch 
ein Schweigen. 
 “... die beiden / herzgrauen Lachen”: these are, of course, two heart-grey puddles, 
having the colour of ashes rather than of blood, reflecting the colour of the sky that is not 
himmelblau, nor himmelgrau, but herzgrau;805 but they can be also, at the same time, laughter. 
Laughing is not speaking, therefore two ‘heart-gray laughters’ can be “two / mouthfuls of si-
lence”. Schweigen is not speaking rather than absence of sound. One may laugh and yet re-
main silent, one may even speak and speak a lot, too, one may babble and yet remain silent, 
remain silent upon something (“über etwas schweigen”, as this would be said in German), 
for instance evade some topic, while speaking continuously about something else. Schweigen 
does not have to be absence of sound or even absence of voice. 
 The “puddles” reflecting the heart-grey sky could be eyes as well. Eyes may speak 
while they are silent, they may be the “mirrors of the soul” and any photo-sensitive organ or 
sense (Lichtsinn) may be an indication of the soul (anima) as the principle of life in any of its 
zoological grades and even in the protozoan or metazoan grade; Flimmertiere, ciliates, may 
be photophilic but they may be scotophilic or even photophobic, too.806  
                                                 
803 On the flagstones (“Die Fliesen.”), cf. “Gespräch im Gebirg”, GW 3:220; cf. Birus, “Sprachgitter”, p. 220. 
804 Cf. the entries of the homonymic word “Lache, f.” in DWB, for instance. Jerry Glenn is one of those who 
have taken this possibility of homonymy seriously: “The primary Biblical allusion in ‘Sprachgitter’ is to 
Psalm 126:1-4: [‘][...] Then was our mouth filled with laughter [Lachen], [...][’]” (Paul Celan [New York: 
Twayne, 1973], p. 101). Cf. also Birus, pp. 220-221. 
805 Cf. DWB: “deine himmelblauen augen. J. PAUL uns. loge 3, 64”; “HIMMELS-, HIMMELGRAU, n. das 
grau des himmels, z. b. bei anbrechendem morgen: die lerche fuhr als ouvertüre des tages hoch ins himmel-
grau hinauf. J. PAUL Hesp. 3, 202.” (DWB, Bd. 10, Sp. 1342ff, 1356.) 
806 For instance: “Stentor coeruleus and the related Blepharisma japonicum possess photoreceptor systems that 
render the cells capable of avoiding light. On account of this unique feature, these ciliates exhibit photodis-
persal as they tend to swim away from a bright illumination and accumulate in shady or dark areas.” (Hanna 
Fabczak, “Protozoa as Model System for Studies of Sensory Light Transduction: Photophobic Response in 
the Ciliate Stentor and Blepharisma [Summary]” (Acta Protozool. [2000] 39: 171; 
http://www nencki.gov.pl/pdf/ap/ap3931.pdf.) — Here is a way to read three strophes from the middle of 
the poem: 
  
Flimmertier Lid  
rudert nach oben,  
gibt einen Blick frei.
 Iris, Schwimmerin, traumlos und trüb: 
Crossing... 357
 So it seems that the poem addresses not only human language or languages and hu-
man silence and mirrors of the soul (one might even imagine that “Sprachgitter” could also 
be a love poem dedicated to the French Roman Catholic Gisèle Lestrange by the Romanian 
German-speaking Jew Paul Antschel; these lovers were certainly strangers [étrangers, 
Fremde], too, and Celan seems to have alluded to this personal, interpersonal situation quite 
often), but perhaps also our relation to animals, to “creatureliness [Kreatürlichkeit]”, and 
manifestations of life without verbal language; and perhaps it addresses both at one and the 
same time: so-called non-verbal communication in general. Both verbal and non-verbal: in 
the prose drafts, Celan links the line speaking of “divining the soul” with rhythm and with 
tropism, with “involution” and involuntary reactions to light, etc. (Lichtzwang is the title of
the later book of poems).807  
 It is indeed the passage in Jean Paul’s Kampaner Thal that Celan refers to, reportedly 
also in a letter to Klaus Demus, the passage which speaks of nightingales as “living signs of a 
storm” singing through the “blossoming language mesh”. The language mesh brings together 
and keeps apart not only humans, speaking a common language to each other or different 
                                                                                                                                                        
der Himmel, herzgrau, muß nah sein.  
 
 Schräg, in der eisernen Tülle,  
der blakende Span.  
Am Lichtsinn  
errätst du die Seele. 
 
 I have italicized the words muß and errätst to indicate a mode of conjecture based on a manifestation, while 
the underlining indicates the allusion to sight and photo-sensitivity, and the line gibt einen Blick frei has 
both of these emphases to indicate both the manifestation upon which to divine something (the grounds for 
guessing that “der Himmel, herzgrau, muß nah sein”) and the association with sight or photo-sensitivity. 
807 “das Gedicht zeigt — nicht eine Neigung zur Sprachlosigkeit, aber zum Verstummen; es behauptet sich [...] 
am Rande seiner selbst. In seiner Selbstaufhebung erblickt es seine Chance; es ruft und holt sich zuweilen, 
um zu bestehen, aus seinem Schon-Nicht-Mehr [statu moriendi] in ein Immer-Noch zurück. — / An dieser 
Bewegung, an diesen keineswegs mit Apparaten meßbaren Vibrationen ist es zu erkennen — Flimmertier-
chen Flimmerbewegungen — [...] Bewegung: an dieser Flimmer Sinn-bewegung, die sie uns nicht mittels 
irgendwelcher Apparate, sondern unmittelbar unserem Denken und Dasein mitzuteilen vermögen, erkennen 
wir das Gedicht: wir sind das Medium, in dem es geschieht...” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 27.) “Rhythmus — 
Sinnbewegung auf ein noch unbekanntes Ziel zu. ? eine Art Tropismus »am Lichtsinn errätst du«” 
(TCA/Meridian, Ms. 212.) “Rhythmus im Gedicht: das sind unwiederholbare, schicksalhafte 
Sinnbewegungen auf ein Unbekanntes zu, das sich zuweilen als Du denken läßt: »am Lichtsinn errätst du 
die Seele«. — Sie sind, auch da, wo sie am stimmlosesten sind, sprachbedingt.” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 344.) 
“die Sprache des Gedichts: involutiv ? am Lichtsinn errätst <du> die Seele: das Kreatürliche als Horizont 
des Gedichts —” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 379.) “Das Kunstfeindliche — also nicht der Entfaltung [Elargissez 
l’Art!], sondern der Involution Verschworene — bei Büchner: es gehört zweifellos zu dem uns 
Ansprechenden. / Kunst, das ist das Künstliche, Erkünstelte, Synthetische, Hergestellte: es ist das 
menschen- und kreaturferne Knarren der Automaten: es ist, schon hier, Kybernetik, [...] eingestellte 
Marionette, es ist der Mensch diesseits und jenseits seiner selbst: der aus dem Schoß der Technik geborene 
Weltraumschiffer, dem Sprache einen Rückfall in eine Vor-Existenz bedeutet. —” (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 
376/530.) The inclusion of this last fragment may hint at the sense of the word “involution” used in many 
of the notes: for modernity or for ultra-modernity, ‘natural’ language means already a step back, regression; 
thus a  poem seems to be closer to ‘animality’, to simple organisms, than to the “automat”; however, let us 
not forget that even a poem written by a computer would be an anti-computer (cf. above). On “tropism”, cf. 
OED: “The turning of an organism, or a part of one, in a particular direction (either in the way of growth, 
bending, or locomotion) in response to some special external stimulus, as that of light (phototropism, helio-





languages, but also humans and animals. We surmise the soul of the other, through our eyes 
and ears and touch (and who knows, perhaps even otherwise: there are of course theories of 
unconscious olfactory stimuli, for instance), by the feature that is common to all living beings 
and yet distinguishes us from each other too, namely manifestation in general, whether in re-
sponse or in reaction only, whether conscious or not.808 Celan’s thematization of sign-giving 
has been noted by Levinas,809 and Hendrik Birus suggests that the frequent image of the eye-
lids (or rather Lid, in the singular) might be inspired by a text by Buber, speaking of “a most 
silent speech [ein allerstillstes Sprechen]” that wants to communicate nothing, nothing but an 
existence (“das nur Dasein mitteilen, nicht beschreiben will”); instead of any description, it 
just says that something is: “wie ein Heben der Lider im Schweigen. Es übet keine Untreue, 
denn es sagt nur aus, dass etwas ist.”810 In terms of the philosophical, post-Aristotelian dis-
tinction, it is a question of existentia and not of essentia,811 nor of any other categorial attrib-
ute of existence pure and simple, which can only be conjectured through the “distanced com-
prehension” across the Sprachgitter. This defiance of the propositional form, resembling the 
apophatic discourse of ‘negative theology’, this strange kind of ‘naming’ that gives us only a 
glimpse, means also a defiance of metaphoricity, inasmuch as metaphor is an instance of “de-
viant predication” (Ricœur).812 
 There is the darkness indoors, the flickering light and the iris, surrounding the photo-
sensitive pupil, and the eye reflecting the heart-grey colour of the sky, or of heaven, that must 
be near;813 but outside there is the sky, judging by its reflection in the two puddles close to 
each other. Two mouthfuls of silence, two laughs, two heart-grey laughs which are perhaps, 
at the same time, not only puddles and not only mouths but also a pair of eyes reflecting the 
sky. Two creatures, two organs or organisms. 
 Perhaps something like two pigeons, outside on the flagstones. By metonymy, techni-
cally speaking: “die beiden / herzgrauen Lachen”, laughter for laugher, cooing for cooer. Or, 
                                                 
808 I am here of course alluding to one of the insistent themes in Derrida’s later work, not “the animal” or 
“animality” or “animals”, but animot as he himself puts it; cf. “L’animal que donc je suis (à suivre)”, in 
Marie-Louise Mallet, ed., L’animal autobiographique : autour de Jacques Derrida (Paris: Galilée, 1999), 
pp. 251-301, and “La bête et le souverain”, in Mallet, ed., La démocratie à venir : autour de Jacques Der-
rida (Paris: Galilée, 2004), pp. 433-476. 
809 Cf. Levinas, “Paul Celan: From Being to the Other”, in Proper names, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: 
Stanford U.P., 1996), p. 40. 
810 Martin Buber, Ekstase und Bekenntnis; cit. Birus, “Sprachgitter”, pp. 214, 223. 
811 Cf. Heidegger, “Die Metaphysik als Geschichte des Seins”, in Nietzsche II (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), p. 406 
(also GA 6.2.). 
812 On metaphor as a “deviant predication”, cf. Ricœur, La métaphore vive (Paris: Seuil, cop. 1975). On the 
apophatic discourse as one that defies propositional form as well as the concept of metaphor or the opposi-
tion between literal and figural, concept and metaphor, cf. Derrida, Sauf le nom (Paris: Galilée, 1993), pp. 
42, 43-45, 53-54, 61-63, 75ff; Khôra (Paris: Galilée, 1993), pp. 20-22; “Comment ne pas parler : Dénéga-
tions”, in Psyché — inventions de l’autre (Paris: Galilée, 1987), pp. 567-8. 
813 Cf. Bernhard Böschenstein, “Gespräche und Gänge mit Paul Celan”; cit. Birus, “Sprachgitter”, p. 215: “An 
einem Vormittag [Ende Februar 1968] zeigte mir Celan anhand seines Gedichts ‘Sprachgitter’, wie er sich 
deutendes Lesen vorstellte. [Zitat V. 5f.] Über den Himmel gibt es hier keine Gewißheit. Aber aus dem 
Auge läßt er sich erschließen, freilich nur vorsichtig. Die erschließende, ahnende Befragung wird durch die 




if we change the place of the capital letter, perhaps even this: die beiden / Herzgrauen lachen. 
Their cooing is not speaking, it resembles laughter, and therefore a species of pigeons has 
been named after this resemblance. This species is called, in English, wood pigeon or ring 
dove, but as its Latin and German names suggest, it is a laughing dove: Columba risoria, La-
chtaube.814 In English, the “laugher” is a “variety of the domestic pigeon”.815  
 This chain of associations is of course nothing but wordplay. However, in the quasi-
metonymical still-life constellation of this poem, ideas or images slide one upon the other in a 
way that we do not know whether we are dealing with puddles, eyes or mouths, or yet some-
thing else, and perhaps all these at once. For the word Sprachgitter alone, we have several 
allusions or connotations besides the parlatory window, several possibilities offered by the 
Grimm dictionary, and many of these come from Jean Paul: Sprachgitter is not only associ-
ated with birds, namely with nightingales, but also with the “jib-door” (Tapetenthür) of a 
blindfold over the eyes, and with an old man who “speaks with the dead behind the speech-
grille of sleep”.816 We do not need wild conjectures in order to observe the strange “overlap-
ping of relations”, linking human speech and silence with the manifestations of life even in 
                                                 
814 The OED states that the name “ring-dove” applies usually to “The wood-pigeon, cushat, or queest 
(Columba palumbus); also called ring-pigeon”, or Palumbus Torquato, but according to one of the citations, 
“The term Ring Dove is also applied to the Collared Turtle, Columba risoria” which is, in German, La-
chtaube (DWB). — Pigeons may be white, may be dove-coloured like snow, like yesterday’s snowflakes, or 
like a flag cloth (Fahnentuch), as in the poem “Heimkehr” (“Schneefall, dichter und dichter, / taubenfarben, 
wie gestern”), or they may be grey (taubengrau, or taubenblau, a greyish blue), of a cinereous shade of col-
our. Grey as the sky, grey as the puddles, grey as the heart. Like cinders, pigeons can be of various shades, 
their particular shade of colour may be difficult to fix. The ring-dove, Lachtaube, may have a rosey hue in 
its feathers, for instance. — Cf. “Heimkehr” (1956; GW 1:156; TCA/Sprachgitter, pp. 20-21), whose last 
stanza reads: “Dort: ein Gefühl, / vom Eiswind herübergeweht, / das sein tauben-, sein schnee- / arbenes 
Fahnentuch festmacht.” An earlier sketch reads: “[...] ein Pflock, / an den ein erborgtes Gefühl / sein graues 
Fahnentuch / nagelt.” Cf. also  “Schneebett”, combining the formation of a bed of snow and the verb form 
gegittert: “Augen weltblind, / Augen im Sterbegeklüft, / Augen Augen: // Das Schneebett unter uns beiden, 
das Schneebett. / Kristall um Kristall, / zeittief gegittert, wir fallen, [...]” (TCA/Sprachgitter, p. 43.) There is 
a strange constellation — columbarium — of doves, candles, snow, ice, eyes and ears (taub is ‘deaf’, as in 
the poem “Stilleben”; this is almost a pseudo-homonymy), cinders and cinereous colour, a configuration 
that seems to relate several poems together. Indeed: Kristall um Kristall, / zeittief gegittert. Cf. e.g. “Vor 
einer Kerze” (“da, wo es turmhoch ins Meer tritt, / da, wo die graue, die Taube / aufpickt die Namen / 
diesseits und jenseits des Sterbens”, Von Schwelle zu Schwelle, in DGKG, p. 73); and even “Stilleben” 
(DGKG, p. 75; here are lines speaking of a “mouth disappeared in the Deaf”: “Und dies noch, verschollen 
im Tauben: / der Mund”). — On the colour of pigeons and doves, see DWB: “TAUBENHALS, m.: / so 
dasz ihr (der rose) roht und weisz, als wie das blau und grün / an einem taubenhals, sich oft zu ändern 
schien. / BROCKES 1, 82” (Bd. 21, Sp. 172). 
815 “laugher / [...] 1. One who laughs; one addicted to laughing; also, a scoffer. [...] / 2. A variety of the domes-
tic pigeon, so called from its peculiar note.” (OED, 50130440. 4 Dec., 2006.) — It does not have to be any-
thing more than a mere coincidence that even some strange affinities might be suggested with Hölderlin’s 
uncanny verse from 1808, “In lieblicher Bläue”: “Ein heiteres / Leben seh’ich in den Gestalten mich um-
blühen der Schöpfung, / weil ich es nicht unbillig vergleiche den einsamen Tauben auf / dem Kirchhof. Das 
Lachen aber scheint mich zu grämen der / Menschen, nemlich ich hab’ ein Herz.” (Sämtliche Werke, Briefe 
und Dokumente, ed. D.E. Sattler [Bremer Ausgabe] [München: Luchterhand, 2004], vol. 12, p. 23.) 
816 DWB: “J PAUL: da ihres auges tapetenthür und sprachgitter schwarz verhangen war. Hesp. 3, 34;  [...] der 
alte mann (den Albano im garten eingeschlummert fand) sprach hinter dem sprachgitter des schlafs mit tod-





the most simple organisms, such as the ciliates of which Gottfried Benn also speaks (but in a 
different manner). 
 When you are done with collecting information and dealing with the poem as if 
Sprachgitter were some sort of a crossword puzzle, you may let this expanding horizon re-
cede and take a look outside, so to speak. Even when the association of the two heart-grey 
puddles or laughs with two pigeons cooing may be far-fetched and cannot really be con-
firmed as valid information about the poem, it is clear that the poem invites us to see a certain 
playfulness in juxtaposing or overlapping the images of the eyelid and the ciliate, the organ 
and the organism, poetic creation and creatureliness; it invites us also to discover laughter 
behind the bars, or rather beyond the bars of the language mesh, ‘outside’. A mad laughter, if 
you will, but perhaps still not exclusively negative. A glimpse of freedom? A song to be sung 
beyond humanity? 
 If we are ready to abandon the binary logic of either-positive-or-negative, not neces-
sarily either-black-or-white but the clichés concerning the colour grey, we might discover 
something: “es gibt das Gedicht als einmalige, atemgetragene, herz- und himmelgraue 
Sprache in der Zeit.”817 
 
 
“ABSTRACT” AND “SPIRITUAL” 
 
Concerning Sprachgitter, the word that gives the title to the poem as well as to the book of 
poems, Celan had a very remarkable conversation with Martin Heidegger, mediated by their 
mutual friend, Otto Pöggeler (here paraphrased by James K. Lyon): 
 
Soon after the volume Speech-Grille appeared in March 1959, Heidegger asked Pög-
geler what Celan meant by the title. Pöggeler relayed the question directly to Celan 
and, drawing on his discussion with the thinker, wanted to know specifically if the 
second word in the title, which also can be translated as “lattice,” referred to the bars 
in a prison, which are known as “Gitter”; the grille, or lattice, on the door of a cloister, 
which both enables and limits communication; or the latticelike structures of crystals 
found in snow and in minerals, which in German are also called “Gitter.” [...] In other 
contexts [Celan] suggested that he drew the word from the grille or lattice on a clois-
ter door [sic: rather: ‘parlatory window’ in a cloister], but for Heidegger he stated em-
phatically that it referred to none of the above specifically but to lattices generally.818 
 
This general ‘abstraction’ with regard to any specific determination opens the possibility for a 
multitude of aspects; the lattice in the parlatory window of a monastery is an ‘instantiation’ of 
this generality, but the word used in the poem, referring also to this object among others, is 
                                                 
817 TCA/Meridian, Ms. 55; cf. Dsl./Ts. (Ms.) 17; Ms. 282-285, 305. Cf. GW 3:167; Birus, “Sprachgitter”, p. 
216. 
818 James K. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger: An Unresolved Conversation, 1951-1970 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins U.P., 2006), p. 96; Lyon’s source is Pöggeler, “Erinnerungen an große Lehrer”, in 
Christoph Jamme, ed., Kunst und Geschichte im Zeitalter Hegels (Hamburg: Meiner, 1996), pp. 258-274, 




not a metaphorical signpost pointing toward an abstract concept through this specific ‘con-
crete’ instantiation, but rather this abstract concept itself. If this overlapping is allowed, we 
might translate a word from Celan’s own poetry and call such an abstraction a breath-crystal, 
refracting the ‘rays’ from several directions and dimensions, with its multiple facets that are 
not visible all at once, except as this very invisibility pertaining to the word as word. So this 
is the correlation between the terms “abstract” (irreducible to the determined content that is 
necessary for metaphor) and “spiritual” (breath and invisibility) with crystal-like multifacet-
edness; and we can also have a glimpse into the mediation involved in the “distanced com-
prehension”. 
 No doubt, Heidegger was the interlocutor who would be able to understand this kind 
of generality or abstraction, not as a sterilized neutrality (say, a worn-out metaphor, in which 
both the concrete sensibility and its metaphorization have been erased in the meta-physical 
grind of concept formation) but as an originary equivocality (Mehrdeutigkeit) or disseminal-
ity of Worte, wie Blumen.819 
 And no doubt, Celan found support for his own draft for an anti-metaphoric phe-
nomenology of poetry in Heidegger’s vehement objections to the concept of metaphor in Der 
Satz vom Grund and in Unterwegs zur Sprache,820 as well as the many other views on lan-
guage and poetry in the works of the thinker that he read in the fifties and sixties, views that 
obviously made a profound impression on the poet. There is a passage in the essay on Rilke, 
“... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ...” (1951), concerning image, Bild, marked by Celan in 
his personal copy of Holzwege in 1959 (“30.8.59”) by underlinings and vertical strokes and 
the word Bild written twice in the margin, where Heidegger seems, for once, to come quite 
close to the traditional characterizations of metaphor, as a portrayal of the unfamiliar in terms 
of the familiar:  
 
Das Wesen des Bildes ist: etwas sehen zu lassen. [...] Weil das Dichten jenes 
geheimnisvolle Maß nimmt, nämlich am Angesicht des Himmels, deshalb spricht es 
in »Bildern«. Darum sind die dichterischen Bilder Ein-Bildungen in einem 
ausgezeichneten Sinne: nicht bloße Phantasien und Illusionen, sondern Ein-Bildungen 
                                                 
819 Cf., besides “Das Wesen der Sprache”, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, also “Zur Seinsfrage”, in Wegmarken 
(both have been already cited above). The image of “erasing the exergue” is of course borrowed from Der-
rida’s “White Mythology”, but it must be noted that Derrida actually borrows the image and the title from 
Anatole France, as an exergue and in order to erase it — i.e. only with great reservations. 
820 La bibliothèque philosophique indicates that Celan has made no annotations whatsoever to his personal 
copy of Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), which was sent to him by Heidegger in Novem-
ber 1959, fresh from print, dedicated “with heartfelt greetings and gratitude” (“mit herzlichem Gruß und 
Dank”), and that only the last seventeen pages (pp. 194-211) of Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 
1957) contain fourteen instances of “reading traces”. However, as we already observed, James K. Lyon con-
tradicts this information by claiming that Celan read Der Satz vom Grund as a whole: “although there are 
markings on only thirty-one of 211 pages, they begin early and extend to the end, revealing that Celan read 
the entire work with customary thoroughness” (p. 68; cf. above). Lyon also claims that Celan must have 
been reading Unterwegs zur Sprache “during late 1959 or the first part of 1960” (p. 121; cf. pp. 122ff, pas-
sim); it is in any case surprising that there are neither dates nor any other annotations in the margins of that 





als erblickbare Einschlüße des Fremden in den Anblick des Vertrauten.821 
 
The first phrase of this quoted passage was underlined by Celan, as well as the adjective ge-
heimnisvoll in the second. But is this not precisely what a metaphor does? Is it not so that 
metaphor brings the strange, the unfamiliar, the enigmatic, or whatever defies immediate 
comprehension, closer to us by portraying it in the image of that which is already familiar to 
us? Does Heidegger not concede here, in spite of his vehement objections to the concept of 
metaphor elsewhere, that poetry is metaphorical after all? Let us not rush into any conclu-
sions yet. 
 These emphasized sentences in Celan’s personal copy of the book were actually pre-
ceded by a passage that bears a double vertical line in the margin: 
 
Der Dichter ruft in den vertrauten Erscheinungen das Fremde als jenes, worein das 
Unsichtbare sich schicket, um das zu bleiben, was es ist: unbekannt.822 
 
The unfamiliar, the invisible (we recall Celan’s designation of poetry as a conversation with 
the invisible), the unknown is called to appear in the phenomenal image, not in order to be-
come more familiar, visible or comprehensible, but in order to appear as what it is, as un-
known in its very phenomenality, invisible in its very visibility, in order to be and to remain 
what it is: unknown. 
 This passage is preceded, in Heidegger’s text, by a quote from Hölderlin’s poem draft: 
 
Was ist Gott? unbekannt, dennoch 
Voll Eigenschaften ist das Angesicht 
Des Himmels von ihm. Die Blize nemlich 
Der Zorn sind eines Gottes. Jemehr ist eins 
Unsichtbar, schiket es sich in Fremdes. [...]
 
It is the last sentence of this excerpt, in Celan’s personal copy of the book, which bears the 
trace of his pencil in the margin, a vertical double stroke: “Jemehr ist eins / Unsichtbar, 
schiket es sich in Fremdes.” 823 
Another fragment from May 1807, probably written as a sequel to the previous one, 
begins: “Was ist der Menschen Leben? ein Bild der Gottheit.”824 What is a god? Unknown. 
                                                 
821 Cit. La bi. phi., p. 390, nos. 782, 783-784; the source is Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Ne-
ske, 1954), pp. 200-201. Cf. Lyon, Paul Celan and Martin Heidegger, p. 102. 
822 Cit. La bi. phi., p. 390, No. 781; Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 200. 
823 Cit. La bi. phi., p. 390, No. 780; Vorträge und Aufsätze, p. 200; there is a facsimile of the pages 200-201 in 
Hadrien France-Lanord, Paul Celan et Martin Heidegger : le sens d’un dialogue (Paris: Fayard, 2004), p. 
304. Hölderlin’s poem, from 1807, is here cited as in Heidegger’s text; cf. also Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke 
(Bremer Ausgabe), 12 vols., ed. D.E. Sattler (München: Luchterhand, 2004), vol. 12 [In lieblicher Bläue, 
Hyperion III, Turmgedichte], p. 19; the fragment continues: “Aber der Donner / Der Ruhm ist Gottes. Die 
Liebe zur Unsterblichkeit / Das Eigentum auch, wie das Unsere, / Ist eines Gottes.”  




What is man? An image of divinity... An image of the unknown. In the Meridian, Celan 
writes:  
 
Vielleicht, so muß ich mir jetzt sagen, – vielleicht ist sogar ein Zusammentreffen 
dieses »ganz Anderen« – ich gebrauche hier ein bekanntes Hilfswort – mit einem 
nicht allzu fernen, einem ganz nahen »anderen« denkbar – immer und wieder 
denkbar. [TCA/Meridian, Endf. 31d.] 
 
And in another passage already cited: “Jedes Ding, jeder Mensch ist dem Gedicht, das auf 
das Andere zuhält, eine Gestalt dieses Anderen.” (35b.) Gestalt — form, figure, image of the 








M E T A P H O R A  A D  A B S U R D U M  
 
Before concluding, before the end (the last words, quoted from Celan, will concern the end or 
“border [Grenze]” to which metaphor, also metaphor, even metaphor is taken), let us view 
this trope, or metaphor and antimetaphor, from a slightly different angle. This other perspec-
tive is offered in a very remarkable article by Beda Allemann, from which we have already 
cited one of the epigraphs for one of the prolegomena above. 
 Actually I do not quite know what to call Allemann’s remarkable article; by what title, 
that is. Actually it is a question of two articles, or an article and its translation, namely a 
translation which appeared as a first version of the text whose German version appeared only 
a couple of years later. What puzzles me in this otherwise not so extraordinary incident, what 
I found most  puzzling upon first sight of these two texts taken together, is the evident dispar-
ity between its two titles, namely the English title and its apparently slightly later German 
counterpart. The title of the English version, translated by Günther Rebing, is “Metaphor and 
Antimetaphor” (1967).825 This English version was indeed the first I could lay my hands on, 
before I even knew whether any German original was available. The second version, which 
was in Beda Allemann’s native language, and was published only a year later, in 1968, bears 
the title “Die Metapher und das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache”.826 A strange substitu-
tion: “antimetaphor” is replaced by “the metaphorical essence of language”! How did this 
happen? 
 The English version was presented in the interdisciplinary Third Consultation on 
Hermeneutics at Drew University in Madison, New Jersey, in April 1966, and the overall title 
of the event was “Metaphor, Symbol, Image, and Meaning”. The German version, with the 
less provocative title (?!), was published in the collective volume by Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Weltgespräch and consists of essays by Allemann and two other renowned scholars, Karl Otto 
Apel and Thomas Bonhoeffer. The most notable difference between the versions — of which 
the earlier has only been published in the English translation, to my knowledge — is between 
the titles, and the fact that the revised version in German lacks the endnotes that still featured 
in the English translation; otherwise they are almost as identical as an original and its transla-
tion can ever be, with few rather insignificant exceptions to this quasi-identity, mostly just 
stylistic refinements. 
 I will try to paraphrase the very well-composed and interesting argument of Alle-
mann’s article, or articles, adding a few direct quotes and my own comments. Allemann first 
risks apparent redundancy by discussing at some length the traditional definitions of meta-
                                                 
825 Beda Allemann, “Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, in Stanley Romaine Hopper and David L. Miller, eds., In-
terpretation: The Poetry of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World), 1967, pp. 103-123. 
826 Beda Allemann, “Metapher und das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache”, in Karl Otto Apel et al., Welt-




phor, those by Aristotle and Quintilian which have never been superseded and are still usable, 
and then concludes this introduction as follows: “The presence of an analogy that can be 
traced by logical thinking is essential for understanding a given metaphor as well as the phe-
nomenon of metaphor as such.” (“Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, p. 104.) The notion of meta-
phor “as being based on a logical comparison”, or as an abbreviated simile, reducible to the 
rational relations of analogy, this whole mathematico-logical model of metaphor is one of the 
main contraindications that have lead so many modern poets to distrust or reject metaphor; 
this is actually how Allemann also understands Paul Celan’s “characteriz[ation of] modern 
poetry with these words”: 
 
“In the poem all tropes and metaphors tend to be reduced ad absurdum” (“Und das 
Gedicht wäre somit der Ort, wo alle Tropen und Metaphern ad absurdum geführt 
werden wollen.”) This is more than just another of the battle cries against metaphor 
we have heard from the poets for the last fifty years. Celan does not proclaim the 
death of metaphor; he rather postulates  that metaphor should no longer be regarded as 
being based on a logical comparison. [“Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, pp. 115-116.] 
 
When Aristotle reduces the metaphors of his opponents ad absurdum, he shows their logical 
deficiency, the lack or insufficiency of the similarity or of the analogy they pretend to rely 
upon. The will of the tropes and metaphors in “the poem today” — as a well-known gesture 
of differentiation with regard to Gottfried Benn, Celan explicitly denies that he is speaking of 
the “modern lyricism” — is also the reduction of similarity and analogy, but with an alto-
gether different aim: not to show the lack of validity, or the lack of general acceptability of an 
argument that turns out to be a pseudo-argument by virtue of its metaphorical nature, but the 
irreducibility of the uniqueness, singularity, the “once”, “only once” (I’m afraid Einmaligkeit 
does not have a good equivalent in English) to which the poem lays its claim — even as an 
always-again-only-for-once — we shall eventually return to this claim (Anspruch), after our 
discussion of Beda Allemann’s important article. 
 The battle cries mentioned by Allemann are for instance those of the Expressionist 
dramatists Carl Sternheim and Ferdinand Bruckner (alias Theodor Tagger; in 1917 he pub-
lished a Programmschrift gegen die Metapher which is actually mentioned in Kafka’s dia-
ries),827 Marinetti’s manifest of Futurism (1912), and the chapter “Nature, Humanisme, 
Tragédie” in Alain Robbe-Grillet’s Pour un Nouveau Roman (1963); Allemann also mentions 
Benn’s disqualification of the “like” of simile which happens in favour of more potent “trans-
formations” pertaining to the “word” as a Phallos des Geistes (cf. “Probl. d. Lyrik”, p. 1074). 
On the other hand, Allemann also discusses the tradition which sees metaphor in connection 
with the very origin of language, Vico and Herder as the most well-known proponents of this 
                                                 
827 See the remarks of Sept. 25th, 1917, on Tagger’s Das neue Geschlecht, in which the Programschrift was 
contained; Kafka characterizes the book as “elend, großmäulig, beweglich, erfahren, stellenweise gut 
geschrieben, mit leisen Schauern von Dilettantismus. [Etc.]” (Gesammelte Werke. Taschenbuchausgabe in 





view are mentioned, as is the “crisis” generated by Nietzsche, who “discovers the 
metaphorical translatio taking place even before language itself comes into being”, and 
for whom poetry is “deliberate deception” and thus, paradoxically, more true to the 
deceptive nature of language itself. Allemann dismisses this “radical skepticism” of the 
young Nietzsche as “outdated” as well as by recourse to the “phenomenological school” 
which has “convinced us that such skepticism is in its way no less naïve than that naïve 
realism against which Nietzsche fought”, while on the other hand, Nietzsche’s influence 
on the modern poets is of course undeniable. But the modern anti-metaphorists of the 
different schools, which seem to have otherwise little in common (Expressionism and 
nouveau roman, for instance), seem to challenge Nietzsche and all the theorists of the 
originary metaphor by supposing that “within the medium of language there is a 
possibility of a more immediate access to reality than by way of metaphor”, while 
“metaphor is a downright lie”. But Nietzsche himself affirmed metaphor as an illusion 
and a “lie in an extra-moral sense”, as Allemann reminds. And the attempt to free poetry 
from metaphor by way of “all manifestos and proclamations against metaphor” seems to 
be doomed to fail, if we are forced to admit (and this is what Allemann himself seems to 
affirm, after all) that “language is originally metaphorical, that even scientific terms can 
only be the product of a metaphorical act [we have seen that some theorists would rather 
call this ‘metaphoric’ than ‘metaphorical’, as if this would be enough to ward off 
confusion!], of a translatio”, and that “then it must be impossible to avoid metaphor in 
poetry” (cf. “Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, pp. 105-110). This leads Allemann to ask: 
[How can] modern poets [...] come to grips with the metaphorical nature of 
language in spite of their openly declared dislike of metaphor and in spite of their 
being aware of the fact that metaphors and images in the manner of Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra are impossible today? [“Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, p. 110.] 
How could a poet decline the gift of metaphor? Allemann could not make a better choice 
in addressing this complex question: Franz Kafka. And the obvious place to begin is the 
relatively famous sentence in Kafka’s diary: “Metaphor is one thing among many that 
make me despair of writing.”828 The second citation could be his so-called parable on 
parables, the counter-parable “Von den Gleichnissen”, but Allemann chooses otherwise.  
828 “6. Dezember [1921]. Aus einem Brief: »Ich wärme mich daran in diesem traurigen Winter.« Die 
Metaphern sind eines in dem vielen, was mich am Schreiben verzweifeln läßt. Die Unselbständigkeit 
des Schreibens, die Abhängigkeit von dem Dienstmädchen, das einheizt, von der Katze, die sich am 
Ofen wärmt, selbst vom armen alten Menschen, der sich wärmt. Alles dies sind selbständige, 
eigengesetzliche Verrichtungen, nur das Schreiben ist hilflos, wohnt nicht in sich selbst, ist Spaß und 
Verzweiflung.” (Ed. Brod, p. 403.) This has been cited also, for instance, in Derrida’s De la 
grammatologie (Paris: Minuit, cop. 1967), p. 383. 
367
Counter-figures 368
 We shall not dig deeper here into the instances of Kafka’s struggle with metaphor 
and Allemann’s acute analysis concerning it (“this insight that metaphors cannot be 
avoided causes despair”; “[a] critical attitude towards his own manner of expression and 
the habit of first using a simile and then partially retracting it are both highly 
characteristic traits of Kafka’s style”, etc.), nor cite Alleman’s well-chosen examples, but 
let us move on to a general conclusion, which is illustrated by the example of a short 
prose piece entitled “Prometheus” (1918), concerning a reduction to a state where there is 
eventually “no comparison whatever possible” (cf. pp. 110-113): 
The basic structure in all of  Kafka’s stories seems to be precisely this: the 
circumstances and possible explanations of what happens are reduced step by step 
to a core that can no longer be explained. In view of what I have said before, a 
way of writing like this might very well be called antimetaphorical. [“Metaphor 
and Antimetaphor”, p. 113.] 
But very soon after this characterization of the antimetaphorical reduction and a couple of 
remarks on the common practice of calling Kafka’s short tales “parables”, while these are 
nevertheless no “exemplary stories” (keine Exempla) to be deciphered, or moralizing 
fables, Allemann introduces the next moment of his argument, a paradoxical move which 
leads us from the “antimetaphor” suddenly toward the term “absolute metaphor”: 
Kafka’s prose texts avoid metaphor and thus become a kind of metaphor 
themselves; this new metaphor, however, is without a definite level of meaning 
outside of it, a level on which its “real”, nonfigurative, eigentliche meaning may 
be found. [Es zeigt sich, daß diese Prosastücke, indem sie sich der Metapher 
entledigen, ihrerseits zu einer Art Metapher werden, die aber keinen festen 
Bezugspunkt mehr hat, auf den sie als auf ihre eigentliche Bedeutung 
zurückbezogen werden könnte.] [“Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, pp. 113-114; 
“Metapher und das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache”, p. 37.] 
The translator’s (?) choice of using the verb “avoid” here is not the best equivalent for the 
verb sich entledigen which features at least in the later, German version, while Kafka’s 
procedure of reduction is a ‘liberation’ from metaphor rather than avoidance of what 
Allemann himself considers unavoidable. 
 Allemann concedes that the paradox may seem “confusing at first glance”. 
Namely the paradox that the text, in which the reduction of metaphor takes place and 
“everything that is said is severed step by step from any conventional associations”, the text
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becomes itself a metaphor, and indeed a “metaphor of itself”. But another surprise is to fol-
low. Surprisingly enough, Allemann seems to be right in saying that “if you look more 
closely you will see [the] inner logic” of this paradox. But meanwhile, until this insight can 
be gained by reading the article carefully enough and all the way through, perhaps in spite of 
our first fit of indignation at its half-way turning point, we shall have to cope with its “some-
what precarious terminology” (p. 114). The term of absolute metaphor, first and foremost, 
introduced here as a designation of Kafka’s parables: 
 
A text like Kafka’s prose parables, however, which has torn down the bridges of 
metaphor, necessarily becomes a metaphor whose only frame of reference is itself. By 
avoiding metaphors [Der Verzicht auf die Metaphern, says the German version; the 
renunciation of metaphors, which is again not quite the same thing as avoiding] that 
may be isolated as single stylistic figures here and there in the text [this isolation of 
metaphors in a text is indeed a problematic trait of the traditional notion of metaphor 
upon which the present treatise has been insisting], the parable as a whole is a kind of 
absolute metaphor. 
 I hasten to admit that I am using here a  somewhat precarious terminology. In 
the first place, I call the whole of a text metaphor [just a moment ago it was the tradi-
tional trait of isolation of single metaphors here and there in the text that might have 
forbidden this extension], which means that the term “metaphor” loses its technical, 
rhetorical meaning with reference to a clearly defined single element of style. But we 
have no other choice when a text obviously does away with the single metaphors con-
tained in it, as Kafka’s texts do. [This ‘having no other choice’ is not immediately 
clear at all. The German text chooses a different way of speaking: Wenn ein Text 
selbst aber – wie es bei Kafka der Fall ist – die in ihm vorhandenen Einzelmetaphern 
auflöst und abbaut, so bleibt uns am Schluß nichts anderes übrig. I must say I am still 
not convinced of the necessity of using the term ‘metaphor’. Why not the ‘antimeta-
phor’ that features in the title of the English version? (Let us remark that the verb ab-
bauen used here is almost a translation for ‘to deconstruct’.) But let us not yet pass 
judgment on Allemann’s terminology.] Secondly, and this is more important [und das 
wiegt schwerer], it is a downright contradictio in adjecto to talk of an “absolute 
metaphor.” A metaphor always has its origin in a simile, and therefore it can never be 
absolute. Nevertheless modern literature abounds with absolute metaphors, and there 
are even plenty of single stylistic elements which very well might be called absolute 
metaphors. This is particularly true for poetry. [“Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, p. 
114; “Metapher und ...”, p. 37.] 
 
Obviously enough, Allemann recognizes that he is having some trouble convincing his audi-
ence or readers, who expected him to deal with “metaphor and antimetaphor” rather than “ab-
solute metaphor”. This latter term is not his invention; to my knowledge, the terminological 
monster die absolute Metapher was introduced by Hugo Friedrich in 1956 and famously 
adopted (and adapted) by Hans Blumenberg, and after him by many German theorists,829 for 
                                                 
829 Hugo Friedrich, Die Struktur der modernen Lyrik. Von der Mitte des neunzehnten bis zur Mitte des zwan-
zigsten Jahrhunderts, erweitete Neuausgabe (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1974), p. 209; cit. Astrid Poppenhusen, 
chapter “III. »Absolute Metaphorik«?”, in Durchkreuzung der Tropen (2001), pp. 165-193. Poppenhusen’s 
chapter and the pages following it (pp. 195ff) contain an acute critique of Blumenberg’s, Allemann’s and 
Gerhard Neumann’s use of the notion. For Friedrich, an “absolute metaphor” is one in which the “basic 
meaning [Basisbedeutung]” is not given; his example is Apollinaire’s “Soleil cou coupé”, a case where the 




instance Gerhard Neumann, who in 1970 published an article with the title of “Die ‘absolute’ 
Metapher: Ein Abgrenzungsversuch am Beispiel Stéphane Mallarmés und Paul Celans” (Po-
etica 3 [1970], pp. 188-225). Celan was reportedly very annoyed at this well-meaning “at-
tempt at delimitation” which considered his poetry side by side with Mallarmé’s and in terms 
of an “absolute metaphor”, and we can imagine some of the reasons for his indignation: in the 
Meridian he had distanced himself from both Mallarmé and metaphor and had also denied the 
possibility of an “absolute poem”.830  
 Blumenberg’s notion of absolute metaphor is actually an adaptation of Kant’s sym-
bolical hypotyposis, and he actually more or less defines the term by citing Kant: 
 
Unsere ›absolute Metapher‹ findet sich hier [in Kant, KdU, § 59] als Übertragung der 
Reflexion über einen Gegenstand der Anschauung auf einen ganz andern Begriff, dem 
vielleicht nie eine Anschauung direkt korrespondieren kann.831 
                                                                                                                                                        
ivre”, in which it is spoken “only of the ship, never of the symbolized I [die dichterische Technik [...], die 
den Text durchweg als absolute Metapher anlegt, nur vom Schiff, nie vom symbolisierten Ich redet]” (pp. 
73-74). Cf. also a few lines later (p. 74): “[...] die Metapher hier nicht mehr bloß eine Vergleichsfigur ist, 
sondern eine Identität schafft. Die absolute Metapher wird ein beherrschendes Stilmittel der späteren Lyrik 
bleiben. Bei Rimbaud selbst entspricht sie einem Grundzug seines Dichtens, der nachher unter dem Stich-
wort ›sinnliche Irrealität‹ zu berühren sein wird.” Celan would hardly be satisfied with the application of the 
notion of absolute metaphor characterized as “sensible unreality” into his poetry. — The “carrying ad ab-
surdum” (of tropes and metaphors) is not very strictly defined by Celan, and therefore this terminology can 
be used in many ways. As an example of Poppenhusen’s use we may cite her remarkable discussion of the 
first four lines of “Psalm” (GW 1:225: “Niemand knetet uns wieder aus Erde und Lehm, / niemand bespricht 
unsern Staub. / Niemand. // Gelobt seist du, Niemand.”), in which the word niemand / Niemand can be seen 
as a syllepsis of sorts (a single word used in the same context in both a ‘proper’ and a ‘figurative sense’; cf. 
e.g. Fontanier, pp. 105-108; Poppenhusen, pp. 195ff) and, as Poppenhusen sees it, line four “seems to carry 
ad absurdum, in a retrograde fashion, the interpretation [of the word niemand] in the first three lines [Vers 
vier scheint rückwirkend die Interpretation der ersten drei Verse ad absurdum zu führen]”. But as Poppen-
husen herself points out, there are actually no tropes to be found in these lines: “Tropen sind hier in keinem 
Fall zu finden.” (Durchkreuzung der Tropen, p. 207.) As she also points out, the word niemand or Niemand 
allows for many different, contrasting and even contradictory interpretations in the poem (blasphemy, for 
instance, but also, and perhaps at the same time, mysticism, the prohibition of names and the Cabbalistic 
tradition), but that does not mean that it is a question of tropes, namely shifts with respect to some original 
signification of a word, such as the word niemand, no one (cf. ibid.). However, someone might argue that 
the certain ‘allegorization’ in the second strophe, the nominalization and prosopopoeia or apostrophe, estab-
lishes a tropological shift of sorts with respect to the pronoun niemand in its ordinary usage. In any case, for 
Poppenhusen, it is the shift from the first strophe to the second in which the “carrying ad absurdum” takes 
place, although, according to her, there are no tropes in either one of the strophes. 
830 Cf. TCA/Meridian, Endf. 38c-d (i.e. the section that directly precedes the one that begins with the question: 
“Und was wären dann die Bilder?”): “Das absolute Gedicht – nein, das gibt es gewiß nicht, das kann es 
nicht geben! / Aber es gibt wohl, mit jedem wirklichen Gedicht, es gibt, mit dem anspruchslosesten 
Gedicht, diese unabweisbare Frage, diesen unerhörten Anspruch.” Interestingly enough, Peter Szondi writes 
in his famous essay of 1962, “Zur Erkenntnisproblematik in der Literaturwissenschaft” (whose later version 
is known as “Über philologische Erkenntnis”) sentences that echo these two sections of the Meridian (Endf. 
38-39) in a reversed order and with a slightly different emphasis: “Kein Kunstwerk behauptet, daß es 
unvergleichbar ist (das behauptet allenfalls der Künstler oder der kritiker), wohl aber verlangt es, daß es 
nicht verglichen werde. Dieses Verlangen gehört als Absolutheitsanspruch zum Charakter jedes 
Kunstwerks, das ein Ganzes, ein Mikrokosmos sein will, [...]” (Die Neue Rundschau, vol. 73, p. 156). 
Celan’s word is Gegenkosmos, of course (TCA/Meridian, Ms. 286). 
831 Blumenberg, “Einleitung”, in Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998 
[1st ed. 1960]), p. 12; the text emphasized by Blumenberg is a citation from Kant. Cf. p. 11: “Der mit Kant 
vertraute Leser wird sich in diesem Zusammenhang an § 59 der »Kritik der Urteilskraft« erinnert finden, wo 






Here the italicized sentence is a direct quote from Kant. Blumenberg also defines “absolute 
metaphors” (“solche Übertragungen [...] die man »absolute Metaphern« nennen müßte”) as 
a “base stock of philosophical language [G r u n d b e s t ä n d e  philosophischen Sprache]”, a 
a sort of untranslatable stock of verba translata (›Übertragungen‹), one that cannot be 
translated back into the realm of “proper” terminology or “logicality” (“die sich nicht ins
Eigentliche, in die Logizität zurückholen lassen”) (Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, p. 
10). The absolute metaphors are irreducible metaphors, but are they still metaphors?
 The notion of symbolical hypotyposis has often been assimilated with metaphor, but 
as Blumenberg observes, Kant himself does not actually use the term ‘metaphor’ when he 
defines hypotyposis in Kritik der Urteilskraft (§ 59). There are two types of hypotyposis, ac-
cording to Kant, schematic and symbolical; besides these two types, Kant also speaks of ex-
amples (Beispiele) by which empirical concepts can be portrayed. Concepts of understanding 
(Verstandesbegriffe) are portrayed by schemata, by schematical hypotyposes. The symbolical 
type or hypotyposis consists of portraying purely rational concepts (Vernunftbegriffe), 
namely ideas for which there are no adequate equivalents or instantiations among sensible 
things, through sensible analogues — or perhaps we should rather say quasi-sensible ana-
logues, since we are of course dealing here with representations, imagined sensible objects, 
and not with objects of sense perception. In any case, it is not sensible or quasi-sensible intui-
tion (Anschauung) but the rule of the procedure (der Regel dieses Verfahrens), not the con-
                                                                                                                                                        
unter dem Titel des »Symbols« beschrieben wird. Kant geht hier von seiner grundlegenden Einsicht aus, 
daß die Realität der Begriffe nur durch Anschauungen ausgewiesen werden kann.” Cf. Kant, KdU, § 59, 
B255ff: “Alle Hypotypose (Darstellung, subiectio sub adspectum) als Versinnlichung ist zwiefach: 
entweder schematisch, da einem Begriffe, den der Verstand faßt, die korrespondierende Anschauung a 
priori gegeben wird; oder symbolisch, da einem Begriffe, den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem keine 
sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann, eine solche untergelegt wird, mit welcher das Verfahren der 
Urteilskraft demjenigen, was sie im Schematisieren beobachtet, bloß analogisch ist, d. i. mit ihm bloß der 
Regel dieses Verfahrens, nicht der Anschauung selbst, mithin bloß der Form der Reflexion, nicht dem 
Inhalte nach übereinkommt. [...] Alle Anschauungen, die man Begriffen a priori unterlegt, sind also 
entweder Schemate  oder Symbole , wovon die erstern direkte, die zweiten indirekte Darstellungen des 
Begriffs enthalten. Die ersteren tun dieses demonstrativ, die zweiten vermittelst einer Analogie (zu welcher 
man sich auch empirischer Anschauungen bedient), in welcher die Urteilskraft ein doppeltes Geschäft ver-
richtet, erstlich den Begriff auf den Gegenstand einer sinnlichen Anschauung, und dann zweitens die bloße 
Regel der Reflexion über jene Anschauung auf einen ganz anderen Gegenstand, von dem der erstere nur das 
Symbol ist, anzuwenden. So wird ein monarchischer Staat durch einen beseelten Körper, wenn er nach in-
neren Volksgesetzen, durch eine bloße Maschine aber (wie etwa eine Handmühle), wenn er durch einen 
einzelnen absoluten Willen beherrscht wird, in beiden Fällen aber nur symbolisch vorgestellt. Denn, 
zwischen einem despotischen Staate und einer Handmühle ist zwar keine Ähnlichkeit, wohl aber zwischen 
den Regeln, über beide und ihre Kausalität zu reflektieren. [...] Unsere Sprache ist voll von dergleichen indi-
rekten Darstellungen, nach einer Analogie, wodurch der Ausdruck nicht das eigentliche Schema für den 
Begriff, sondern bloß ein Symbol für die Reflexion enthält. So sind die Wörter Grund (Stütze, Basis), ab-
hängen (von oben gehalten werden), woraus f l ießen (statt folgen), Substanz (wie Locke sich ausdrückt: 
der Träger der Akzidenzen), und unzählige andere nicht schematische, sondern symbolische Hypotyposen, 
und Ausdrücke für Begriffe nicht vermittelst einer direkten Anschauung, sondern nur nach einer Analogie 
mit derselben, d. i. der Übertragung der Reflexion über einen Gegenstand der Anschauung auf einen ganz 




tent but the form of reflexion that is transferred from one ‘object’ onto another in this basic 
form of analogy. In the case of symbolical hypotyposis, it is a question of neither a direct in-
tuition nor “stereoscopic vision”. Therefore I would doubt whether it would be altogether jus-
tified to associate symbolical hypotyposis with the traditionally rhetorical concept of meta-
phor. Why keep using the term ‘metaphor’ where it no longer seems to apply? Even when 
Kant discusses “beauty as a symbol of morality”, he does not discuss beauty as a metaphor of 
morality. The so-called sensible representation (Darstellung) of suprasensible concepts is not 
always, strictly speaking, metaphorical, and this becomes especially clear when we quote 
Kant’s examples, such as “ground”, “depend” and “substance”, which have nothing to do 
with the so-called live metaphor and the tension or stereoscopy involved therein. Kant’s ex-
ample of “hand-mill” as a symbolical image of a despotic state seems of course closer to a 
“live metaphor”. But Kant actually revises one of the most determinant traditional features of 
metaphor, actually the most determinant feature, when he maintains that there is no resem-
blance between a hand-mill and a despotic state, but their similarity resides in the rules of 
reflexion that we apply to these things with respect to the relations of causality that character-
ize each of them: “Denn, zwischen einem despotischen Staate und einer Handmühle ist zwar 
keine Ähnlichkeit, wohl aber zwischen den Regeln, über beide und ihre Kausalität zu reflek-
tieren.”832 The resemblance resides not in the content but in the form. 
 We remember how Celan said that he sees no difference of principle between a poem 
and a handshake; we remember how he affirmed that writing can indeed be seen as a form of 
prayer,  albeit this form cannot be practiced with folded hands; and that to call the mills of 
death a metaphor would mean an attempt to make them harmless, an euphemism of sorts. The 
connexion between those death-mills that “grind the white meal of the Promise” for the con-
secrated wafer and those that fabricated corpses in “Auschwitz, Treblinka, etc.”833 is some-
thing other than a metaphorical connexion: it is a connection of incommensurability, incom-
parability, and perhaps also contiguity. Contiguity, inasmuch as it is the metonymical 
connexion between “the Promise” (Luther’s Verheiszung baked into the wafer) and the white 
meal (another ingredient of the wafer) that  motivates the quasi-metaphorical “Mühlen des 
Todes”, and, inasmuch as this connexion is linked with the other death-mills through the im-
possibility of understanding the Holocaust in terms of sacrifice — words like ‘grotesque’ are 
not enough with regard to the ‘absurdity’ of comparing the human flesh, skin and bones and 
hair and blood, of millions turned into ashes, with the wafer, the white meal of the Promise, 
“set before our brothers and sisters [ihr setzt es vor unsern Brüdern und Schwestern]” — 
                                                 
832 Kant, KdU, loc.cit. Blumenberg designates “absolute metaphor” also as follows: “Absolute Metaphern 
beantworten jene vermeintlich naiven, prinzipiell unbeantwortbaren Fragen, deren Relevanz einfach darin 
liegt, dass sie nicht eliminierbar sind, weil wir sie nicht stellen, sondern als im Daseinsgrund gestellt vorfin-
den.” (Paradigmen…, p. 19.) 
833 Cf. above; these lines in the poem “Spät und Tief” are in question here: “Ihr mahlt in den Mühlen des Todes 






while, as we already observed, the verb vorsetzen means ‘setting before’ not only in the ob-  
vious sense of placing the bread before someone to eat, but also in the sense of ‘preferring’. 
 Perhaps the Christian discourse, the mill of death that not only mixes the white meal 
with the Promise but also “wed[s] dust to dust” (“den Staub zu vermählen dem Staube”), also 
weds, paradoxically, Partikelgestöber with Metapherngestöber? The carnal reality (or the 
reality of “the letter”) would be secondary with respect to the spiritual (as in Augustine); and 
the Democritean materialism, according to which the world results from a flurry of atoms 
(Partikelgestöber) while “all else is only opinion [doxa]” (Metapherngestöber, indeed), 
shows itself only as the reverse side of the “vulgar Platonism” (the Nietzschean view of 
Christianism),834 both belonging to the same metaphysical binary configuration. 
 Let us return to Allemann’s text. The restraints of space and time seem to press him to 
move on with the delicate dialectic between “the basic antimetaphorical tendency in modern 
literature” and the absolute metaphor: “A detailed analysis of an absolute metaphor in this 
comprehensive sense [the contraction of a whole text into an absolute metaphor] could only 
be done at great length and would take too much space here.” Therefore the examples must 
be chosen from among the “smaller units” that can be found in lyric poetry. The example 
comes from Nelly Sachs: 
 
Klagemauer Nacht! 
Eingegraben in dir sind die Psalmen des Schweigens.835 
 
Allemann conscientiously points out all the difficulties that an interpretation relying on the 
traditional definition of metaphor would face in trying to analyse lines like these, while the 
limits of rhetorical flexibility could also always be stretched out in order to produce an inter-
pretation in traditional terms. But it would indeed require some effort and “quite a few 
words” to discover the logical basis of such “metaphors”, to explain the carrying over of 
something abstract (“night”) to a sensuous and concrete perception (“wailing wall”), or the 
tertium comparationis, the point of resemblance involved, i.e. all these traditional prerequi-
                                                 
834 Cf. e.g. Szondi’s “Reading ‘Engführung’”, p. 53, concerning this strophe: 
  
Orkane. 
Orkane, von je, 
Partikelgestöber, das andre, 
du 
weißts ja, wir 
lasens im Buche, war 
Meinung. 
 
 Democritus’ doctrine of atoms vs. doxa has been preserved though a fragment in Diogenes Laertius (IX, 
44). 
835 Nelly Sachs, “Chor der unsichtbaren Dinge, in In den Wohnungen des Todes (Fahrt ins Staublose [1961], p. 
62); cit. Allemann, “Metapher und das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache”, p. 38; the English translation. 
(p. 115) seems to be by the translator of Allemann’s article, G. Rebing: “Wailing wall night! / Carved in 




sites of metaphor. On the other hand, when such modern verse, whose “particularly intense 
poetic effect” is doubtless (even before we understand anything of the logic that brings these 
terms together, as I would add), cannot be comfortably interpreted in terms of these tradi-
tional presuppositions and reduced to the most simple model of rational analogy, it does not 
quite fit into the forms of, for instance, the Mannerist metaphor, the paralogical metaphor, or 
the oppositional metaphor either (these are the types mentioned and designated by Alle-
mann), while these all still retain the characteristics of the traditional Aristotelian metaphor, 
namely the reducibility to a “firm basis of a rational and conventional analogy pattern”; and 
thus these have “nothing in common with an absolute metaphor that cannot be reduced to 
anything” (cf. pp. 115-118). Let us proceed, with Allemann, on the way toward the genui-
nely positive discoveries concerning such modern poetry that is exemplified by the two lines
from Nelly Sachs’s poem, across the aporias of his “precarious terminology”:
 
I believe that the examples I have quoted from Nelly Sachs may indicate what such 
metaphorical language free from metaphors is like. [Ich denke, daß die Beispiele, die 
ich aus Nelly Sachs angeführt habe, bereits eine Vorstellung von einer solchen 
metaphernfreien, aber metaphorischen Sprache geben können.] [P. 119 (41).] 
 
Metaphorical language free from metaphors: Allemann is by no means the only one who 
seems to believe in such miracles. Many other modern theorists stubbornly cling to the term 
‘metaphor’ even when metaphor, in terms of the “traditional theory”, is conspicuously absent 
from the object they are addressing, such as a poem. 
 The plural in “the examples [...] quoted from Nelly Sachs” — while the pair of sen-
tences, pair of lines from the beginning of a poem, could have been called, in the singular, ‘an 
example’ — indicates  the fact that Allemann actually considers the two lines with regard to 
certain of their elements, two pairs of words or nouns, Klagemauer Nacht — die Psalmen des 
Schweigens. Is this not already to consider them as isolated figures, on the one hand (a pair of 
words is the minimal unit of signification that can also compose a metaphor, outside of a con-
text; but the quest for isolated figures here and there in a text was just one of the traits of the 
quest for metaphor that Allemann objected to, as we remember), and on the other, to consider 
this piece of poetry with regard to relations and tensions between a word and another, within 
a pair of words? This concern with the minimal units of signification, pairs of words in their 
syntagmatic juxtapositions, however disparate they are, does it not suspiciously look like an 
attempt to justify the terminological conventionalism in the guise of overturning the concept 
of metaphor by adding the odd attribute, “absolute”? But this retention of some aspects of the 
traditional metaphor is deliberate: the terminological tension and precariousness which is not 
relieved just by recognizing it, and this focus on “smaller units” rather than whole texts, are 
moves motivated by a goal which makes it worthwhile to keep reading to the end of the con-
cise and extremely interesting essay, in all its interior tensions, retentions and protentions. So 






We have seen that expressions like “wailing wall night” or “psalms of silence” cannot 
be explained fully as metaphors in the strict sense of the traditional system of rhetoric. 
Nor would we get any further by interpreting a combination like “wailing wall night” 
as an identification instead of a simile. A purely linguistic analysis shows that “wail-
ing wall” and “night” do not coincide at all, but are two disparate words standing in 
juxtaposition. [...] But simply by noting the juxtaposition of the two words, their rela-
tion to each other is described only in the most superficial way. The essential question 
is one that aims at the tension that is always inherent in the juxtaposition of two words 
in a poem, provided that it is a real poem and not an empty play with words. [...] / A 
logic of language in the sense I indicated [...] would have to concentrate first on what 
stands between the lines and between the words, or, to be more precise, what is not 
patently there, but what appears between them as a kind of magnetic field, as tensions 
created by the interplay of relations. I think it is justified to speak of a translatio or 
metafora/ taking place in this “magnetic field” between words. (P. 119.) 
 
I cut the citation short here and skip some material, not because it is less important, but be-
cause this ellipsis is already suggestive enough; we shall move on to the concluding para-
graph of Beda Allemann’s essay and cite this last paragraph in extenso: 
 
Perhaps I should add that I certainly do not believe that the basic metaphorical quality 
of language is manifest  in modern poetry only and did not exist in earlier periods. 
One might go as far as to say that for a long time the theory of metaphor contained in 
the traditional systems of rhetoric has prevented us from perceiving that quality. The 
traditional theory separated meaning and sound and saw the process of translatio un-
der the aspect of a logical and mathematical analogy between meanings. On this basis, 
metaphor could be regarded as a mere ornament that has only a loose relation to the 
real (eigentlich) meaning of what is said. But by rejecting metaphor or, to be more 
precise, by reducing metaphor ad absurdum, modern literature has made impossible 
the conventional explanation of the metaphorical nature of language.836 
 
The goal which I anticipated, the final motivation for retaining the term ‘metaphor’ all the way 
to the end, was in my eyes at least, that this whole tension retained so patiently by Allemann, 
through all the paradoxical sentences speaking of “absolute metaphor” and of a “metaphorical 
language free from metaphors”, and so on, was to indicate a possibility to re-interpret the 
whole history of the poetic metaphor as well as the “metaphorical nature of language” anew 
— an effacement, a project delineated for a Destruktion of the concept of metaphor in order 
to reveal what it actually always meant, beyond and before the obstacles erected by the tradi-
                                                 
836 “Metaphor and Antimetaphor”, pp.120-121. The German version differs here slightly (pp. 42-43): 
“Vielleicht muß ich noch hinzufügen, daß ich natürlich nicht der Ansicht bin, diese metaphorische 
Grundqualität der Sprache sei erst in der modernen Dichtung zum Vorschein gekommen. Höchstens könnte 
man sagen, daß der Blick auf sie lange Zeit durch das rhetorische Metapherntheorie verstellt war. Durch 
eine Theorie also, welche die Bedeutung vom Wortkörper trennte und den Vorgang der Übertragung aus 
dem Horizont einer logisch-mathematischen Analogie zwischen den Bedeutungen verstand. Auf dieser 
Grundlage konnte die Metapher als ein Ornatus begriffen werden, der die eigentliche Bedeutung des Gesag-
ten lediglich umspielte. Es ist ein Ergebnis der modernen Literatur, daß uns durch ihren Kampf gegen die 
Metapher oder, genauer gesprochen: dadurch, daß sie die Metapher ad absurdum geführt hat, der Weg zu 
dieser konventionellen Erklärung des metaphorischen Wesens der Sprache verlegt worden ist, und wir auf 
diese Weise gezwungen sind, das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache, und der Dichtung im besonderen, von 




tion of rhetoric and metaphysics that hindered our view. A project for discovering what 
metafora/ must have meant, or could have meant, already before Aristotle; what it almost 
came to mean already for him, before he took to defining it and forgot what preceded this act 
of definition. 
 But still: Why cling on to the word ‘metaphor’, as if we could, by an act of re-
definition, clear the obstacles once and for all, all these hindrances? And why “absolute 
metaphor”? Why not try to decline the temptation of defining a term instead of retaining the 
tension with what is juxtaposed with it? Why give up the anti- of the first title’s antimetaphor 
in favour of the “essence”, “das metaphorische Wesen der Sprache”? Why not keep speaking 
of metaphora ad absurdum instead of just “metaphor”? How long could we keep up the ten-
sion, anyway? 
 Actually I think that Kafka’s despair over metaphor should be juxtaposed with some-
thing — perhaps — happier (and by saying happier, perhaps happier, I would like to evoke 
Celan’s adverbial heitererweise near the end of the Meridian speech [TCA, Endf. 50]). Kafka 
was also a great humorist, after all, albeit in a non-obvious sense (and who could tolerate a 
person whose sense of humour is constantly obvious?) — and so was Celan, perhaps in an 
even less obvious sense. The erasure of the figures of speech may sometimes leave nothing 
but silence — but who’s afraid of silence? “Wieviele sind es wohl, die mit dem Wort zu 
schweigen wissen”, Celan asks. For me, Kafka’s counter-parabolic “parable on parables”, 
“Von den Gleichnissen”, whose oblique sense of humour resembles the warmth of many 
Hassidic tales, is a text to which it is very hard to respond in the manner of commentary or 
interpretation; like all genuine humour, it requires no paraphrase, but rather excludes it. Like 
grief, like “calamity”, and perhaps never far from grief and despair, such joy may leave us 
speechless — and, as Gilles Deleuze has remarked, humour is never metaphorical, which 
amounts to saying that we are not to expect a ‘hidden meaning’ apart from the very letter (“le 
comique est toujours littéral”)837 — 
 
»Warum wehrt ihr euch? Würdet ihr den Gleichnissen folgen, dann wäret ihr selbst 
Gleichnisse geworden und damit schon der täglichen Mühe frei.«  
Ein anderer sagte: »Ich wette, daß auch das ein Gleichnis ist.« 
Der erste sagte: »Du hast gewonnen.«  
Der zweite sagte: »Aber leider nur im Gleichnis.«  
Der erste sagte: »Nein, in Wirklichkeit; im Gleichnis hast du verloren.«838 
 
                                                 
837 Gilles Deleuze, “Bartleby, ou la formule”, in Critique et Clinique (Paris: Minuit, cop. 1993), p. 89. 
838 “Why such reluctance? If you only followed the parables you yourselves would become parables and with 
that rid of all your daily cares. / Another said: I bet that is also a parable. / The first said: you have won. / 
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable. / The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.” 
(Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes [bilingual, various translators] [Schocken: New York, 1971]; cit. J. 
Hillis Miller, Tropes, Parables, Performatives: Essays on Twentieth Century Literature [New York: Har-





At its best, perhaps, the experience of reading can be an experience of “losing in parables”: 
coming across something incomparable, encountering that which defies all translation or 
paraphrase but also demands transformation, my own transformation, not into a parable but in 
reality. It is not different, in principle, from a handshake: and this “hand-clasping” also 
means grasping with hands and even something like “grasping a concept” and “being grasped 
and understood”; it is both an encounter “with the otherness of the you, which is at the same 
time its alteration”,839 and a self-encounter as a homecoming and an alteration, both at once. 
It is an experience that cannot be literalized, put in other words, and this is why it also defies 
metaphor (including Paul de Man’s notion of “criticism [as] a metaphor for the act of reading, 
and this act is itself inexhaustible”); perhaps an experience of instantaneous complicity with 
the poem (we shall return to this reader’s chance in a moment). But also this complicity is 
one that must be abandoned — otherwise this wink of an eye could not be called instantane-
ous (augenblicklich). Abandon, exposure, self-deconstruction are prerequisites of the poe-
matic encounter. 
 All the detailed analyses of poetry, all the indispensable commentaries and “interlin-
ear versions” can only offer guidance toward such moments, and the greatest effort at “study-
ing the other” cannot guarantee that such an encounter really takes place. The encyclopaedic 
detours offer only a horizon which must, as if by definition, recede into the background and, 
most knowingly, open itself onto an abyss of non-knowledge. 
 
 
THE OPEN END OF “METAPHOR — ALSO THAT” 
 
A poem is, as Celan writes in one of the Meridian fragments, written down as a figure of all 
language. The note cites Paul Valéry: 
 
Das Gedicht ist als Figur der Ganzen Sprache eingeschrieben; aber die Sprache bleibt 
unsichtbar; das sich Aktualisierende — die Sprache — tritt, kaum ist das geschehen, 
in den Bereich des Möglichen zurück. “Le poème”, schreibt Valéry, [“]est du langage 
à l’état naissant[”]; Sprache in statu nascendi also, freiwerdende Sprache. [Meridian, 
TCA, Ms. 239.] 
 
The following passage in the occasional text “De l’enseignement de la poétique au Collège de 
France” (1937) seems to be the source of the quote: 
 
                                                 
839 Cf. Werner Hamacher, “The Second of Inversion”, trans. Jewett, pp. 299, 302. Hamacher writes (on p. 299): 
“Speaking is grasping with the hands. In his letter to Hans Bender, Celan wrote of poetry as a hand-
clasping, thereby awakening to new life the dead metaphor of grasping a concept, of making oneself capa-
ble of being grasped and understood.” (Cf. Premises, p. 371; Fenves’s translation is not substantially differ-
ent.) Obviously enough, I would object to the suggestion that it is a question of reviving a dead metaphor in 
a live one: as we have seen, Celan emphasizes that “only true hands write true poetry”, and that “even a 





La formation de figures est indivisible de celle du langage lui-même, dont tous les 
mots « abstraits » sont obtenus par quelque abus ou quelque transport de signification, 
suivi d’un oubli du sens primitif. Le poète qui multiplie les figures ne fait donc que 
retrouver en lui-même le langage à l’état naissant.840 
 
A very traditional scheme indeed, as it seems: there is an original signification,841 which is 
then abused or transported, and then there is the oblivion, the double erasure of both the pri-
mordial signification and this metaphorical usure by which the abstract concept has been 
produced. This usury-by-wear-and-tear would be not only the movement of the metaphysical 
grind but the very process of ordinary language. Abuse and oblivion.  
 But let us relate these words by Valéry to how Celan cites them, among several other 
places, in the letter of November 18th, 1954 to Hans Bender: 
 
Dichtung, sagt Paul Valéry irgendwo, sei Sprache in statu nascendi, freiwerdende 
Sprache… Gewiß, an diesem Freiwerden wirkt auch unser Bewußtsein mit, ist auch 
unsere Erinnerung und Erfahrung beteiligt – aber in welchem Maße? Könnte eine 
schärfere, methodisch vorgenommene Introspektion hier mehr Klarheit schaffen? Ich 
fürchte, es gehört zum Wesen des Gedichts, daß es die Mitwisserschaft dessen, der es 
»hervorbringt«, nur so lange duldet, als es braucht, um zu entstehen… Denn gelänge 
es dem Dichter, das freiwerdende Wort zu belauschen, es gleichsam auf frischer Tat 
zu ertappen, so wäre es damit wahrscheinlich um sein weiteres Dichtertum geschehn: 
ein solches Erlebnis duldet keinerlei Wiederholung und Nachbarschaft. So ephemer 
das einzelne Gedicht auch sein mag – und Gedichte sind, trotz allem, vergänglich: das 
»freigewordene« Wort kehrt zuletzt wieder in die »alte« Sprache zurück, wird 
Sprichwort, Wendung, Klischee –, es erhebt dennoch Anspruch auf Einmaligkeit, lebt 
und speist sich mitunter auch aus diesem Anspruch, ja aus dieser Arroganz, glaubt 
immer, die ganze Sprache zu repräsentieren, der ganzen Wirklichkeit Schach zu 
bieten… Welch ein Spiel! So ephemer, so königlich auch.842 
 
A certain paradox, among other things to be sure, merits specific attention here. I will try to 
translate this strange move that in a very specific sense circumscribes the sentence between 
dashes, isolates the sentence that speaks of the becoming of the cliché: “As ephemeral as the 
individual poem might be [...] it still lays its claim to uniqueness [one-timeliness, the ‘only 
once’, Einmaligkeit]”. The ephemeral is no synonym for the unique “only-once” here. To the 
contrary, these seem rather to be opposed to each other first in this syntax; but the claim or 
demand (Anspruch),  the sheer arrogance of this claim laid to the only-one-time, this move of 
                                                 
840 Œuvres I, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), pp. 1440f (Celan possessed this edition); cf. 
Wiedemann, “Kommentar”, in Mikrolithen, p. 510. In addition to this passage, another from 
“L’invention esthétique” (1938) could be cited: “La poésie est d’ailleurs essentiellement « in actu ». Un 
poème n’existe qu’au moment de sa diction, et sa vraie valeur est inséparable de cette condition 
d’exécution. [...] / [L]a création poétique est une catégorie très particulière d’entre les créations artistiques ; 
à cause de la nature du langage. / Cette nature complexe fait que l’état naissant des poèmes peut être très di-
vers : tantôt un certain sujet, tantôt un groupe de mots, tantôt un simple rythme, tantôt (même) un schéma de 
forme prosodique, peuvent servir de germes et se développer en pièce organisée.” (Ibid., pp. 1412-1415.) 
841 But we should read Derrida’s remarks, in his essay on Valéry, on the necessary link between source and 
origin, the abstraction without which the proper meaning of “the source” would be unthinkable, and the dif-
ference between the proper and the primordial meaning, sens propre et sens primitif (cf. “Qual Quelle : Les 
sources de Valéry”, in Marges, pp. 333ff). 





giving check to the whole of reality, makes the ephemeral also at once majestic. Perhaps this 
happens “by virtue of the absurd” as Kierkegaard would say. The Majesty of which the Me-
ridian speaks and to which Lucile pays her tribute, the Majesty of the Absurd, is not far. 
And this arrogant move checks the sentence between the dashes, the sentence claiming that 
“the ‘liberated’ word eventually returns to the ‘old’ language and becomes a proverb, a turn 
of phrase, a cliché”. The arrogance of the poetic word ventures to place in check this inevita-
ble fate, to counter-circumscribe the wear-and-tear of every gratuitous coinage. Is this arro-
gant move, then, anything but the demand of the tropes and metaphors to be carried ad ab-
surdum, always again only for once? 
 Celan repeated the citation from Valéry several times, as we have already seen; once 
more in another letter, six years later (March 26th, 1960), this time to Werner Weber: 
 
Aber wieviele sind es denn heute, die solche Aspekte des Dichterischen überhaupt 
wahrnehmen? Die das Gedicht wahrnehmen als menschliche – und mithin von 
einmalige und vom Geheimnis der Einmaligkeit begleitete – Präsenz? Wieviele sind 
es wohl, die mit dem Wort zu schweigen wissen, bei ihm bleiben, wenn es im 
Intervall steht, in seinen »Höfen«, in seiner – schlüsselfernen – Offenheit, das 
Stimmhafte aus dem Stimmlosen fällend, in der Systole die Diastole verdeutlichend, 
welt- und unendlichkeitssüchtig zugleich – Sprache, wie Valéry einmal sagt, in statu 
nascendi, freiwerdende Sprache, Sprache der Seelenmonade Mensch – und, wenn  ich 
auch noch das hinzufügen darf, Sprache in statu moriendi, Sprache dessen, der Welt 
zu gewinnen sucht, weil er – ich glaube, das ist ein uralter Traum der Poesie – weltfrei 
zu werden hofft, frei von Kontingenz.843 
 
Laying claim to freedom, the old claim of freedom from the world and from contingency  — 
“diese Unendlichsprechung von lauter Sterblichkeit und Umsonst!”844 — this placing the 
whole of reality in check, however, is not a pretension to otherworldliness; it is not a pretension 
to transcend time but to traverse it. In statu nascendi, in statu moriendi: this is not the cycle 
of metaphor, the living and the dead, but the words of someone who speaks as a mortal, as a 
finite ‘creature’, from the perspective of his being-there (Dasein), from the perspective of his 
being-a-creature (Kreatürlichkeit).845 
 “There is a line”, as Derrida writes, marked by the poem as a poem.846 A borderline 
between the intrinsic and extrinsic, but one that traverses the interiority of the poem itself, the 
poem as a poem. It is a limit of interpretation, the limit between hermeneutical interpretation 
                                                 
843 Letter to Werner Weber, March 26th, 1960, cit. in Axel Gellhaus, ed., »Fremde Nähe«. Celan als Überset-
zer (=Marbacher Kataloge 50) (Marbach: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1997), p. 398. 
844  TCA/Meridian Endf. 44: “Die Dichtung, meine Damen und Herren –: diese Unendlichsprechung von lauter 
Sterblichkeit und Umsonst!” 
845 “Dieses  Immer-noch des Gedichts kann ja wohl nur in dem Gedicht dessen zu finden sein, der nicht ver-
gißt, daß er unter dem Neigungswinkel seines Daseins, dem Neigungswinkel seiner Kreatürlichkeit spricht.” 
(“Der Meridian”,  TCA/Meridian Endf. 33c.) Cf.  TCA/Meridian Ms. 27: “das Gedicht zeigt — nicht eine 
Neigung zur Sprachlosigkeit, aber zum Verstummen; es behauptet sich [...] am Rande seiner selbst. In 
seiner Selbstaufhebung erblickt es seine Chance; es ruft und holt sich zuweilen, um zu bestehen, aus seinem 
Schon-Nicht-Mehr {statu moriendi} in ein Immer-Noch zurück.” 




and a disseminal reading, as Derrida has also written in his memorial speech for Gadamer, 
one that traverses the hermeneutical process itself from within and from without the text, one 
that launches the interpretative process in the first place, invites one to the “study of the 
other”.847 This study of the other is double: not only the hermeneutical effort but also the 
other phenomenology or post-phenomenology of otherness as otherness, attention to the me-
teoric phenomenon as an ephemeral exposure to reiteration, across an irreducible “time-
crevasse [Zeitenschrunde]”. This limit crosses through and defies the opposition of ‘intrinsic’ 
and ‘extrinsic’. Each time I expose myself to the words of the other, each time I read or lis-
ten, but also each time I speak or write, I am dealing with radical alterity and with an expo-
sure to time, my time as finitude and the other’s. And the precarious borderline runs also, no 
doubt, between “metaphor and antimetaphor”, trope and counter-trope, image and other-than-
image. Like the Meridian — immaterial but terrestrial — it connects and keeps apart. 
 Once, once again, in a note whose date is uncertain but which is probably, according 
to the editors of the posthumous fragments among which this one belongs, written several 
years after the Meridian, the question of complicity (Mitwisserschaft), the author’s complic-
ity with the poem but also the reader’s, is linked to those of punctuality and iterability — a 
possibility of repetition which gives the reader his chance, the chance of the wink of an eye 
and his punctual complicity with the poem — and to the question of metaphor, the always 
again only for once as the borderline where also metaphor is carried, the border region where 
the “distanced comprehension [entferntes Verstehen]” may take place; now, instead of con-
cluding the already too long discourse “against metaphor”, let us leave the last word to the 
poet — and the chance to whom it belongs: 
 
Die Dichtung macht den Leser zu ihrem augenblicklichen Mitwisser. 
Diese Mitwisserschaft ist punktuell, aber, das ist die Chance für alle Beteiligten, also 
Autor und Leser, wiederholbar: das gerade ist die Grenze, an welche die Metapher – 
auch sie – geführt wird.848 
                                                 
847 Cf. Béliers (2003), pp. 35ff, e.g. on p. 36: “une bordure vient interrompre, qui cette fois ne traverse plus le 
dedans du texte. Elle l’entoure. Une frontière externe dessine une interruption suspensive”; pp. 47ff: “Je ne 
déplierai pas ici, je n’en aurai pas le temps et j’ai tenté de le faire ailleurs, des protocoles d’allure théorique 
ou méthodologique. Je ne dirai rien, directement, de la frontière infranchissable mais toujours abusivement 
franchie entre, d’une part, d’indispensables approches formelles mais aussi bien thématiques, 
polythématiques, attentives, comme doit l’être toute herméneutique, aux plis explicites et implicites du sens, 
aux équivoques, aux surdéterminations, à la rhétorique, au vouloir-dire intentionnel de l’auteur, à toutes les 
ressources idiomatiques du poète et de la langue, etc., et, d’autre part, une lecture-écriture disséminale qui, 
s’efforçant de prendre tout cela en compte, et d’en rendre compte, d’en respecter la nécessité, se porte aussi 
vers un reste ou un excédent irréductible. L’excès de ce reste se soustrait à tout rassemblement dans une 
herméneutique. Cette herméneutique, il la rend nécessaire, il la rend aussi possible, comme il rend ici 
possible, entre autres choses, la trace de l’œuvre poétique, son abandon ou sa survie, au-delà de tel 
signataire et de tout lecteur déterminé. Sans ce reste, il n’y aurait même pas l’Anspruch, l’injonction, 
l’appel, ni la provocation qui chante ou fait chanter dans tout poème, dans ce qu’on pourrait surnommer, 
avec Celan, selon le titre ou l’incipit d’un autre poème de Atemwende, Singbarer Rest.” — On “studying the 
other”, cf. Celan’s words reported by Huppert, “Spirituell” (1988), cited above. 
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